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In 2010, the German invasion starting five years of occupation in Den-
mark and Norway is being commemorated in a special way. 70 years af-
ter the events, only a few of the eye witnesses are still alive and the 
traumatic past is about to be transformed from “communicative” to “cul-
tural” memory (Assmann 2004). 65 years after the end of World War II, 
a fourth generation is learning about the events in school, through media 
and, less and less, through the stories told in families. The different gen-
erations communicating about the war have experienced different ways 
of telling – or silencing – stories about the war, as they have witnessed 
different commemorative cultures and political uses of this past. But 
even 65 years after the breakdown of German National Socialism and 
the liberation of the former occupied countries, this war is by no means 
fading away from public debate and media. “The war” is still capable of 
engaging people and mobilizing strong feelings. 
The ambition of this volume is to diagnose and position the history 
and commemoration cultures of the Scandinavian countries within 
broader tendencies and recent developments of the history culture of 
WWII in an international perspective. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
devote particular attention to the Holocaust-related commemoration and 
history culture. The articles in this volume dealing with the different na-
tional cases will show that the most significant changes in the national 
representations and interpretations of WWII during the last decades are 
in one way or another linked to the integration of the Holocaust into new 
national narratives and to new patterns of interpretation. 
In this field, a confusing variety of concepts has emerged, which 
partly seem to have synonymous, partly overlapping meanings, and 
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which are not always used in coherent ways. Therefore, we would first 
of all like to clarify our use of some core concepts in this introduction – 
which does not, however, in every instance necessarily correspond with 
the ones chosen by the authors in this volume. The variety in uses of 
concepts mirrors, in effect, different backgrounds with regard to aca-
demic disciplines and “schools”. 
To start with, the perhaps most confusing distinction in the field is 
the one between “collective memory”, “memory culture” and “history 
culture”. Some scholars doubt that such a thing as collective memory ex-
ists, arguing that memory is a phenomenon linked to the individual ways 
of turning experiences into mental and emotional representations. Others 
interpret memory as a social and communicative process of attaching 
meaning to the past, mediated by cultural activities. Here the terms so-
cial memory and cultural memory indicate the activity of creating or 
constructing memories, whereas the term collective memory points to the 
fact that memories serve to construct group identities and cultural tradi-
tions (see Erll/Nünning 2008). 
Memory culture is often used to describe the complete field of cul-
tural representations and practices dealing with a specific past. Still, it 
seems more appropriate to reserve this term to all phenomena which are 
related to commemoration and coming to terms with the past, whereas 
history culture signifies the whole spectrum of ways the past is ad-
dressed and used in a society. 
In this volume, the diagnosis of history culture is addressed within 
the perspective of history didactics. This means inquiring how these de-
velopments with regard to the interpretations and uses of the history of 
WWII and the Holocaust raise new challenges and possibilities for histo-
ry teaching. The main focus here lies on the question whether the open-
ing up of monolithic national master narratives to incorporate grey 
zones, ambivalences and a more reflective attitude corresponds to new 
approaches to historical learning and teaching. These might include re-
placing authoritative fact canons with the reflection about the ways the 
past has been interpreted and used at different times and in different con-
texts, including one’s own contemporary situation. This perspective of 
history didactics, understood as a meta-perspective on learning and 
teaching history, is addressed throughout this volume, but especially in 
the second and third chapter. 
In order to specify the kind of questions to be raised and discussed 
within a mainly Scandinavian comparative framework throughout this 
volume, we shall start this introduction by providing a small glimpse of 
the history culture in Denmark and Norway respectively, represented by 
two recent films. We will then go on to summarize the primary ques-
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tions of the volume and outline some of the general tendencies within 
the history culture of WWII and the Holocaust reflected within individu-
al contributions. Finally, we will give a brief presentation linking each 
contribution to the shared perspectives.  
In 2008 and 2009, it seemed that the Scandinavian resistance hero 
had made his comeback. Two films, a Danish and a Norwegian produc-
tion, were released, both of them dealing with the resistance against the 
German occupation of the respective country. But, even if both films 
played on well-known topics from national history cultures, they dealt 
with them in quite different ways and, consequently, provoked very dif-
ferent reactions in the Danish and Norwegian public. One could say that 
each film represents an antipodal landmark in the memory landscapes 
that have emerged during the more than six decades since the end of 
WWII. 
On the one hand, there is the Danish film Flammen og Citronen 
(Flame & Citron), released in 2008 and featuring two members of the 
Danish resistance movement who are shown as being responsible for the 
“liquidation” of people considered to be collaborators and to represent a 
danger for the activities of the resistance movement. Still, the narrative 
of the movie is not as clear-cut as the last sentence might indicate. The 
two heroes are portrayed as being under heavy nervous and physical 
strain, not only due to their brutal task, but also because they are drawn 
into intrigues within the resistance movement. They even suspect that 
they are being manipulated into killing innocents, thereby entering the 
grey area of virtually committing murder. The film leaves the question 
open whether personal animosities and power struggles within the re-
sistance movement might have been the motives behind some of these 
“liquidations”. The heroes have turned into anti-heroes; their depressed 
and at times desperate state of mind undermines the narrative of a re-
sistance movement fighting a just war against a foreign occupier – in the 
name of the people. 
On the other hand, the Norwegian film Max Manus, released in 
2009, carries the name and tells the story of a resistance hero – even one 
of the best known, belonging to a legendary group: the “Oslo gang”. 
While Flame & Citron undermines patterns of black and white, con-
fronting the narratives of heroes and villains with shades of grey (at 
times very dark grey ...), the actions and motives of the heroes of Max 
Manus are still beyond any doubt and suspicion. The members of the 
“Oslo gang” are depicted as those who take action in a situation when 
being occupied by an overwhelming military power caused lethargy 
among most Norwegians. In addition, the heroes of Max Manus gain 
their legitimacy through the exiled leaders of the country. In one scene, 
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Max Manus meets the Norwegian king Haakon VII (being himself a 
mythical figure representing “the-nation-in-resistance”) in his British ex-
ile. When the king encourages him, Max Manus and his actions are 
symbolically ennobled. When Max Manus is worn out and depressed at 
the end of the film, it is not because he has lost faith or because he is 
confronted with moral doubts. Max Manus’ depression is easily ex-
plained because he is the only survivor of the Oslo gang – it is the price 
he paid for his heroic fight. It is his personal sacrifice. This makes him, 
of course, even more a hero. 
The success of both films and the reactions they provoked leave no 
doubt as to which of the two narratives is the more appealing. Flame and 
Citron won much critical acclaim as a nuanced representation of war 
history and drew a large audience in Denmark (about 700 000) as well 
as abroad. But it came nowhere close to the success of Max Manus – 
first of all in Norway. More than a million Norwegians saw the film in 
the cinemas and it was proclaimed the most successful Norwegian film 
of all times (taking over from Nine lives, a resistance drama from 1957).  
Moreover, both films caused quite different reactions among critics 
and historians. Flame & Citron provoked a dispute among historians 
over alleged lapses in the presentation of historical facts and, according-
ly, the degree of fictionalization. No debate of this kind arose after the 
release of Max Manus. It was praised for its “realism” and “authentic-
ity”. The voices of critics accusing the film to present an outdated black-
and-white image of war and resistance drowned in the choir of euphoria, 
including resistance veterans, politicians and even the present Norweg-
ian king Harald VII.  
In Norwegian cinemas, one could observe how the film became a 
matrix for intergenerational transmission of historical knowledge and 
memories, when grandparents took their grandchildren to a film that 
supposedly showed the “real past” and linked to their own war experi-
ences. Appealing to the younger generation’s sense for dynamic and ac-
tion and at the same time authorizing grandparents as contemporary wit-
nesses, the film obviously succeeded in building bridges between gener-
ations. Still, it did not include recent developments in Norwegian history 
culture, namely the inclusion of grey zones and less flattering topics than 
that of a purely heroic resistance. In other words, the movie Max Manus 
could be regarded as being anachronistic both in relation to contempo-
rary history culture (since it omits several of the perspectives that have 
been publicly debated in the last years), and when it comes to the “state 
of the art” of historical research, which also embraces a broader spec-
trum of perspectives than displayed in the movie. How, then, can the 
major success of such a representation of the war be explained? Within 
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the broader picture of history culture, Max Manus seems to represent a 
kind of permission to stick to the positive aspects of occupation history, 
those aspects easy to identify and to cope with. In stark contrast to 
Flame & Citron, it doesn’t challenge the notions of the right and the 
wrong side and the unambiguous good cause. Still, there are traces of re-
cent developments in history culture visible in Max Manus: some years 
ago, it would have been impossible to see the hero in despair and de-
pression, while his country is celebrating liberation. A diachronic com-
parison of different movies displaying war heroes since 1945 would 
yield interesting results in this respect. And here, again, the perspective 
of history didactics is touched upon: How can an understanding of the 
dynamics of the success of Max Manus contribute to an understanding 
of the mechanisms of individual and collective uses of the past in gen-
eral?  
The two films and the reactions they provoked are specifically con-
nected to the Norwegian and Danish situation, which means to the spe-
cific war history and the commemorative and history cultures that 
evolved after 1945. Two other Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland, 
went through very different war experiences – which we will come back 
to later in this introduction – and both countries went through their own 
processes of coming to terms with this past – including commemoration, 
historization and other cultural forms of representing and using the past. 
A common topic dealt with in the contributions of this book is the diffi-
culty of coping with problematic aspects of this past, which means: fully 
integrating them into the narratives and images circulating in history cul-
tures.  
Still, what applies to all national cases dealt with in this book is the 
double function of cultural representations of war history: the duplicity 
of mirroring and affecting public history cultures related to WWII. This 
means, in Michel Foucault’s terms, that the elements of history culture 
are inscribed into cultural systems of meaning which regulate the possi-
ble uses of the past (“what can be said and thought” about a certain peri-
od of the past) and at the same time constitutes these systems, related to 
the possibility of change. In this way, the example of Flame & Citron 
and Max Manus touch upon a variety of topics which this book is going 
to highlight: 
• The transformation of experiences of WWII into commemorative 
practices, individual and collective memories and public history cul-
tures. 
• The role of the representations of war as a source for individual and 
group identities. 
• The conflict over “true” and “legitimate” representations of the past.  
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• The tension between national and universal narratives as well as be-
tween identity-focused and reflexive frameworks informing the rep-
resentations and uses of the past. 
• The “pedagogical” impacts of the normative and formative functions 
of all kinds of representations and uses of the past – and the chal-
lenges for didactics of history related to this.  
 
This book represents the attempt to connect the developments on a soci-
etal and scientific level and to present them within a Scandinavian com-
parative framework:  
• Which challenges and possibilities of the didactics of history are 
prompted by the changed European and Scandinavian historical cul-
ture and the changed use of history, with a view to the mediation of 
WWII and the Holocaust? 
• How can the concept of historical consciousness be elaborated theo-
retically and empirically with regard to a mediation of history aim-
ing to develop a self-consciousness of history and a use of history 
which supports the democratic political culture? 
• How can theoretical insights about the consciousness of history, the 
use of history and the culture of history be transformed into concrete 
methods of teaching? 
• How can an improvement of the level of historical reflection about 
WWII and the Holocaust be adequately described and evaluated? 
 
The intention of this book is to combine scholarly work and empirical 
examples in the fields of historical consciousness, history culture and 
didactics in order to show in which ways they inform and inspire each 
other. The concept of historical consciousness represents the theoretical 
linkage between the studies of history cultures and didactics of history. 
Since history teaching in the Scandinavian countries is focused on the 
strengthening of critical thinking and the consolidation of democratic 
values, the concept of historical consciousness has traditionally occupied 
a strong position. Still, there has been little reflection on the conse-
quences of the changing history culture with regard to the history of 
WWII for learning and teaching history. This anthology is a contribution 
to a debate about how the insights into the narrative formation of histori-
cal consciousness and the uses of the past which have materialized in the 
study of history cultures, can be integrated into didactics of history and 
thereby become sources of (self-)reflective historical learning processes. 
Much of the work done at memorial sites and in other institutionalized 
spaces of historical learning in the Scandinavian countries can be re-
garded as “good practice”, enhancing competences in historical thinking 
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and in participating in the negotiations of the past in society. Thus, the 
aim of the anthology is to facilitate an interdisciplinary dialogue be-
tween different fields of research, to integrate a Scandinavian perspec-
tive into ongoing European debates, and finally to bridge the gap be-
tween scientific debates and teaching practices in the field of history cul-
tures with reference to WWII and the Holocaust. 
History culture is conceptualized as a field of cultural practices 
which serve individuals and social groups/communities to make sense of 
the past, and which has a crucial function for the establishment and 
regulation of a social order (including power relations). Due to these fea-
tures, history culture can serve as a brilliant starting point for historical 
thinking and for didactics of history. Thus, in this volume a variety of 
examples of “history culture in action” from different national contexts 
in Scandinavia are presented, and confronted with the “meta-discourse” 
established by the theoretical and didactical contributions. The idea be-
hind the choice of contents and its structure is to introduce the concept 
of the “reflexive turn” with regard to the history of WWII and the Holo-
caust. The concept of a reflexive turn points to the increasing attention 
on the question of how this period was remembered and turned into a 
“usable past” after 1945. This process is related to a tendency of demy-
thologization, deheroization and a decreasing influence of the patriotic 
master narratives which formerly dominated the postwar era. Today, lo-
cal, national and global narratives and interpretative patterns alike con-
tribute to what Levy and Sznaider call the “de- and renationalization” of 
history cultures with regard to the Holocaust (2005). This means, that 
not only a “supra-national” knowledge about history, but also “supra-
national” patterns of interpretation have emerged. This development has 
the paradoxical effect of re-enforcing national historical narratives, by 
modernizing and adapting them to contemporary needs for identity 
building and the search for political legitimacy. An example of this is 
the tendency of nation states to confess their guilt regarding the persecu-
tion of the Jewish population during WWII. This recognition of national 
guilt has become a condition for political legitimacy in the context of 
foreign policy, as described by Cecilie Stockholm Banke in this volume. 
Considerable research has been done on these phenomena in many Eu-
ropean countries, but so far a comparative perspective on the Scandina-
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Shifts in  the history culture in Scandinavia   
 
In recent years a conceptual shift has occurred both in the Nordic coun-
tries and in other European countries regarding the approach to the his-
tory of WWII. This shift applies both to research, to the public culture of 
memory, and to the common historical consciousness about WWII. In 
the early postwar years, the national “master narratives” about war and 
occupation had an elementary meaning for material and moral recon-
struction of the war-affected countries and for the establishment of a 
postwar political order. In the later postwar years, these master narra-
tives have been confronted with perspectives focusing on opposing, am-
bivalent and painful aspects of the history of war. In Norway and Den-
mark, Eriksen (1995) and Bryld/Warring (1998) published critical anal-
yses of the mythologizing tendencies in the national “consensus narra-
tives” (Fure 1997) about collective opposition during the war. These 
studies prompted a new tendency towards “demythologizing” the history 
of war, focusing on earlier forgotten or suppressed aspects.  
Ten years later it can safely be said that a paradigm shift is taking 
place, both within historical research as well as within public accounts 
and presentations of the history of WWII. As far as the reasons for a “re-
flexive shift” in the treatment of WWII are concerned, one has to con-
sider not only demographic but also political factors. The war generation 
is no longer the generation shaping the agenda – neither economically 
and politically nor in the cultural and academic debate. This means that 
the vision of a society molded by war experience has been replaced by 
visions linked to postwar experiences. During the 1980s and 1990s the 
so-called “generation of 1968” became an important player in cultural 
and political life, enabling representatives of this generation to exert a 
considerable influence on interpretations of history. At the same time, 
new “agents of political memory” came to the fore. In Norway, the soci-
ety of “War children” was founded in 1985 and constitutes an example 
of a social group belonging to the “generation of children”; this group 
made its voice heard in the struggle for memory and its political conse-
quences when its members had reached middle age.  
In Sweden, the national narrative of a neutral Sweden during WWII 
was challenged when Boëthius (1991) subjected Sweden’s relationship 
to Nazi Germany to critical investigation. This prompted the debate 
about “Jewish gold”, the rejection of Jewish refugees, etc. As a result, 
the Council of Science granted 20 million Swedish kroner in order to 
conduct research on the topic “Sweden’s Relations with Nazism, Nazi 
Germany and the Holocaust: A Research Programme” and the Forum for 
Living History was founded, becoming an important player within the 
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formation of history culture in Sweden and abroad, as will be shown in 
some the contributions by Gullberg, Gerner and Banke. 
As the celebration of the liberation in 1995 has shown, the “national 
consensus syndrome” (Grimnes 1990) was still predominant both in 
Denmark and Sweden at that time. And yet the historical culture of the 
Scandinavian countries presented in this volume underwent significant 
changes during the 1990s, due to shifts within the national political cul-
ture of the postwar years as well as under the influence of an increased 
globalization. Globalization occurs not just on an economic, but also on 
a cultural level, not least due to new patterns of migration. With a view 
to the cultures of history and memory, this means that the focus on na-
tional unity loses some of its identifying and legitimizing significance.  
One decisive factor in this new interpretation process came from 
outside: the realization that the persecution of the Jews and the Holo-
caust is a historical theme which concerns all European nations – regard-
less of whether they were confronted with the policy of extermination as 
an occupied or (apparently) neutral nation. The cases involving damages 
which took place during the 1990s in Switzerland, Sweden and Norway 
were enormously important politically, scientifically and culturally in 
terms of a new interpretation and a paradigm shift in the national presen-
tation and interpretation of history. It is no exaggeration to claim that the 
paradigms of history writing were shaken in this period. The categories 
“us” (patriots) and “them” (inner or outer enemies) could no longer be 
sustained, or acquired a bad off-taste. Where, for example, were the 
Jews to be situated on this mental map: as a minority or as refugees? Al-
so in this regard, the Finnish War history seems to be the most complex 
of the Nordic countries. Fighting at times together with Nazi Germany 
against the Soviet Union, the self image of Finland was for a long time 
formed by the idea of having been first and foremost a victim of WWII 
and of not being involved in the Holocaust. These notions have quite re-
cently been challenged by a younger generation of historians asking 
questions of responsibility and guilt which have been avoided for dec-
ades. It is symptomatic for this trend that Michael Burleigh’s last book 
on WWII is called Moral Combat, and addresses the moral choices 
made by key protagonists (Burleigh 2010). 
In all these countries, the lasting concern with the Holocaust has also 
left its mark on historical research and on the culture of memory. Today 
it is no longer possible to present the history of the war without address-
ing the issue of the Holocaust. The formative aspects of history teaching 
are no longer related to, and solely informed by, patriotic identification 
with the resistance heroes, but rather linked to values more closely asso-
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ciated with global problems of today and related to the promotion of 
human rights, democracy, and peace. 
Such a perspective can be seen as a new area of commitment in the 
presentation and teaching of history; the effects or interpretation of his-
tory (linked to the German concepts “Wirkungsgeschichte”, “Deutungs-
geschichte”) are regarded as important within the formation of historical 
consciousness, and as such issues to be addressed within history didac-
tics. 
The different chapters of the anthology will address these new 
tendencies within memory and history culture and didactics of history. 
 
 
I  Cases of  nat ional  h istory cultures 
 
In the first chapter, Cases of national history cultures, the contributions 
present actual investigations of how national cultures of memory of 
WWII within Scandinavia seem to move within new directions. The 
tendencies shown throughout the national cases seem both to be opening 
up to more pluralist views upon national history, and keeping a strong-
hold within national identity building.  
This part opens with the contribution Representations of Victims and 
Guilty in Public History. The Case of the Finnish Civil War in 1918 by 
Sirkka Ahonen. Ahonen stresses how it is vital to understand WWII in 
the light of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Finnish Civil War 
which divided the Finnish society into Whites and Reds. This division 
has cast shadows into the culture of memory of Finland until today, and 
Ahonen uses the perspectives of victimization and guilt in a discussion 
of how a society can reconcile itself with different interpretations of the 
past. 
In The Holocaust as History Culture in Finland, Tom Gullberg ex-
plores the national debates of Finnish historians concerning the history 
of the Finnish WWII and the Finnish Cold War. This national debate is 
related to a larger European discourse about the role of the Holocaust in 
creating a common European standard for morality and, subsumed under 
this, the place of Holocaust education in relation to the national history 
culture. Under the theme of Holocaust education the connection to the 
Swedish governmental institution Living History is explored, an institu-
tion also examined closely in the contributions by Gerner and Banke. 
The European concentration camp system creates the setting for Jon 
Reitan’s article The Nazi Camps in the Norwegian Historical Culture. 
Reitan explores a change in Norwegian memory culture where the Nazi 
camps have moved from the margins of the national historical culture in-
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to occupying a central position in the public consciousness. Reitan ar-
gues that this should be seen as an attempt to stabilize and systematize 
memories and messages from WWII. This analysis corresponds with 
Karlsson’s exploration of different forms in which history is used. Reit-
an’s analysis shows a dialectics between rendering the past fixed in a lo-
cation with a paradigm of fascination for the concrete and the creation of 
strong transnational and placeless narratives and meta-narratives inter-
preting the Holocaust. This tendency of a “glocalization” of the Holo-
caust is also addressed by Banke and Bjerg in this book.  
The changes in interpretations and uses of historical places in Nor-
wegian history culture are also the theme in Tor-Einar Fagerland and 
Trond Risto Nilsen’s chapter The Norwegian Fascist Monument at Sti-
klestad 1944-45. By focusing upon Stiklestad, often regarded as the 
founding place of Norway as a Christian nation, the authors investigate 
how different layers of (national) history have constructed a symbolic 
place that most Norwegians take pride in even today. Still, the use of 
Stiklestad as a rallying point for the Norwegian Nazi Party and Vidkun 
Quisling is a bone of contention within the contemporary uses of the 
site. As such, the authors suggest a redesigning of Stiklestad as a site of 
commemoration aimed at exposing the different archeological layers of 
the uses of the past connected to the site.  
Kristian Gerner also analyzes contemporary debates on interpreta-
tions of the past in The Holocaust and Memory Culture: The Case of 
Sweden. Gerner focuses on the Swedish governmental body, “Living 
History”, which studies and disseminates knowledge about genocides 
and violations of human rights. The article investigates the different re-
ceptions of the Holocaust within Sweden, connected to the position of 
neutrality, the position of Sweden as the savior related to the White Bus-
es, but also recent modifications of the Swedish self-understanding in re-
lation to new perspectives on the Swedish involvement in the Holocaust. 
Gerner also addresses the recent initiatives to broaden the original scope 
of the “Living History” from focussing on the Holocaust to studying and 
addressing Swedish attitudes towards other genocides or mass killings, 
as in Cambodia or in the Stalinist Soviet Union and how these have 
spurred vehement reactions and protests of the Swedish political left re-
garding both the validity and the possibility of comparing Nazi and 
Communist crimes.  
In her article Small and Moral Nations. Europe and the Emerging 
Politics of Memory Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke establishes a link to 
the topic of universalization of the Holocaust as found in Reitan’s con-
tribution. Banke analyzes how the re-actualization of the Holocaust 
through the Stockholm International Forums created both national poli-
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cies and the wider field of genocide studies. As touched upon earlier in 
this introduction, the national narratives of WWII in the Scandinavian 
countries have turned towards embracing a new universal morality. 
Hereby a new policy regime has been framed where human rights could 
find their way into international politics. Banke relates these tendencies 
to the development of a denationalized European memory culture in 
which Holocaust is related to through remembrance. This establishes a 
break in the former national memory cultures focusing on confrontation, 
interpretation, and justice. Banke discusses how putting morality on the 
agenda of international politics may open up new possibilities for small-
er states to become bigger moral players.  
Looking at the different national case studies, one can easily see 
common traits in the dynamics of public history culture and politics of 
history. There seem to be similar mechanisms at work with regard to the 
formation and negotiations of narratives and interpretative patterns as 
well as with regard to the negotiations and disputes about legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of the past. Apparently, the need and capability to han-
dle and cope with unflattering and burdening aspects of the past was not 
there before the 1980s in any of these countries, and the process of really 
integrating the “darker sides” of the past into national history and related 
self-images seems to be an ongoing one. As is the dispute about the con-
sequences of these changing images of the past for contemporary values, 
political decisions and power relations. The contributions in chapter II 
within this volume provide theoretical frameworks for understanding 
these mechanisms of history culture and politics of history. The contri-
butions in chapter III will introduce perspectives on how to teach and 
learn about history cultures and some theoretical arguments for the im-
pact this kind of understanding has for active citizenship.  
 
 
I I  H istor ical  consciousness in history didact ics  
 
The contributions within this chapter take historical consciousness as 
their starting point for theoretical elaborations of how to conceptualize 
uses of history and historical thinking. The debates raised in this chapter 
serve to give a theoretical framework for the study of national cultures 
of memory and history as presented in Chapter I as well as for the didac-
tical reflections and concepts to be presented in Chapter III. 
The first two contributions, Processing Time – On the Manifesta-
tions and Activations of Historical Consciousness by Klas-Göran Karls-
son and German History Didactics: From Historical Consciousness to 
Historical Competencies – and Beyond? by Andreas Körber, give an 
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outline of different theoretical developments building on the ground-
work of the concept of historical consciousness – the focus on history 
culture, on one hand, and that on didactics of history, on the other. To-
gether, both articles provide a conceptual tool kit for the description, re-
construction and analysis of the ways in which individuals and social 
groups make sense of the past, the ways in which the past is linked to 
contemporary issues and future prospects, as well as the narratives, arti-
facts and practices that are bearers of historical meaning.  
Karlsson’s contribution starts with reflections on the conditions for 
the past to manifest itself in the present and how this manifestation is 
mediated. His key argument for transcending the limits of the concept of 
historical consciousness is related to this topic of mediation: there is no 
way to understand the processes of making sense of the past and the uses 
of the past without looking at culture, more accurately: history culture. 
When it comes to the ways of using the past displayed in history culture, 
Karlsson differentiates between: 
• The scholarly-scientific use of history 
• The existential use of history 
• The moral use of history 
• The ideological use of history 
• The politico-pedagogical use of history 
 
In his contribution Körber argues for using the concept of historical con-
sciousness as a pathfinder with regard to history culture and the process-
es of attaching meaning to the past – which presupposes that everyone 
has the capacity to “process time” in different ways and for differing 
purposes. He develops a concept of historical thinking, consisting of a 
number of operations, which enables an individual to perform what is 
described by Karlsson as “processing time”. Körber draws on the devel-
opment of the concept carried out within the German network FUER 
Geschichtsbewusstsein (Schreiber et al. 2008) and suggests a shift of fo-
cus from historical knowledge to historical competence. Using the con-
cept of “(self-)reflective historical consciousness”, Körber describes two 
basic narrative operations of historical thought: reconstruction of histor-
ical events and courses of action and deconstruction of existing narra-
tives and interpretations. This new thinking has not yet been integrated 
into the Scandinavian debate about the didactics of history, but is re-
flected in some of the contributions with a didactical perspective in 
Chapter III. 
The article by Bodo von Borries, Coping with Burdening History, 
takes its starting point in the question of “coping with history”. He ap-
plies the assumptions developed by Körber when describing different 
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forms of overcoming hate and animosities between nations produced by 
difficult and traumatic histories. After describing forms of collective at-
titudes towards a traumatic past which maintain and prolong hatred he 
outlines various initiatives of constructing historical narratives that aim 
at bridging former dividing lines.  
 
 
I I I  The mediat ion of  history in pract ice 
 
This chapter moves the theoretical debates of the development of histor-
ical consciousness into analyses of empirical examples of the mediation 
of history within a didactical perspective. The chapter offers examples 
of how WWII and the Holocaust are presented within different types of 
media, and of how history culture is both reflected and addressed within 
specific cases of history education. The articles in this chapter reflect the 
broader changes in the history culture of WWII and the Holocaust out-
lined in chapter I, briefly summed up as universalization, victimization, 
moralization, de- and renationalization. In that sense, this chapter elabo-
rates on how these tendencies are crystallized within very different set-
tings. Furthermore, the different contributions are to some extent in-
formed by the theoretical development of the concept of historical con-
sciousness outlined in various ways in chapter II. As such, the overall 
theme of chapter III is the question of how to develop a (self-)reflective 
historical consciousness. This question is dealt with more or less explic-
itly in the analyses and evaluations of the various examples of mediation 
of history in practice. 
The first contribution by Ola Svein Stugu: Exhibiting the War. Ap-
proaches to World War II in Museums and Exhibitions provides a gen-
eral framework of “reading” war exhibitions with regard to national and 
supra-national narratives and interpretations. As such, the article pre-
sents a framework for the perception of how the tendencies in the history 
culture of WWII and the Holocaust present themselves within the muse-
um exhibition as a specific form of representation, as well as in very di-
verse national contexts. 
In World War II at 24 Frames a Second – Scandinavian Examples, 
Ulf Zander carries out analyses of films relating to WWII and the Holo-
caust in Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and his analysis shows the 
close linkage between media representations as moving images and his-
tory culture. The analysis focuses on the understanding of these movies 
within different national history cultures in Scandinavia, and shows how 
the movies can be seen as products and producers of history culture in 
the sense that they reflect the interpretations of a given period in the 
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light of the time of production. In a didactical perspective the elabora-
tion by Zander on the relation between history culture and films paves 
the way for the development of didactical approaches using films in con-
textualizing, historicizing and deconstructing war narratives.  
With the article by Erik Thorstensen: Historical Propaganda and 
New Popular Cultural Medial Expressions we move into the framework 
of history teaching and historical learning within the context of a specif-
ic exhibition. The article presents and evaluates a teaching concept de-
veloped and used in relation to an exhibition on Leni Riefenstahl, pre-
sented in 2008 at the Holocaust-centre in Oslo. The teaching concept 
presented is developed on the basis of the concept of reflective historical 
consciousness, and Thorstensen points to the difficulties encountered 
when attempting to develop several of the historical competences intro-
duced by Körber. Especially clear is the danger of producing mor-
al(izing) statements lacking historization and critical judgments by only 
taking the past as a “stepping stone” for declamations about the present.  
The article by Helle Bjerg: The Culture of Memory in the “Grand-
children Generation” in Denmark follows up on the outline of recent 
developments within history and memory culture in an empirical analy-
sis of how these tendencies are reflected and developed within the his-
torical consciousness of the “third” generation in Denmark. Further-
more, the analysis points to the didactical perspectives and challenges 
posed by a generation where the manifestation of the ongoing relevance 
of WWII and the Holocaust within the memory culture goes hand in 
hand with a strong tendency of de-historization and universalization 
threatening to empty the use of history of the complexities of a specific 
historical context. Here the article is in line with the contribution by Jon 
Reitan pointing to the impact of “globalized memory” detached from 
place and time and the contribution by Thorstensen pointing to a de-
historicized use of history where a universal moral message becomes the 
– only – content of history. This opens up a question of how to didacti-
cally confront the paradox of what might be termed as “forgetful re-
membering”. 
This question is followed up in the contribution by Claudia Lenz: 
Strengthening Narrative Competence by Diversification of (Hi)stories, 
Lenz presents a case of teaching history teachers within the context of 
Norway’s Resistance Museum (Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum) where a 
specific learning tool was implemented aiming at developing narrative 
competence by challenging the participants to re- and de-construct his-
torical narratives of WWII. As such, the case serves as an empirical ex-
ample of how to operationalize the didactical focus on the development 
of (self-)reflective historical thinking as theoretically elaborated by 
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Körber in this volume. Lenz links up with the various contributions 
within this volume (in particular with those of Reitan, Stugu and Bjerg), 
pointing to how different layers of history culture intermingle when his-
torical consciousness is put to work within the task of reconstructing and 
deconstructing existing historical narratives. Finally the case also exem-
plifies how the historical learning processes are closely related to the ca-
pacity of actively participating in the ways the past is used in society, 
not least related to matter of “burdening history” as discussed by Bor-
ries.  
Several of the articles in this chapter explicitly deal with didactical 
approaches and learning methods where the materializations of history 
culture are put into didactical practice in order to activate a full-fledged 
historical thinking. The idea of (self-)reflective historical thinking build-
ing on the model of a whole range of historical competences raises seri-
ous challenges in regard to the evaluation of learning processes and the 
assessment of individual learning progress. The final contribution by 
Bodo von Borries: How to Examine the (Self-)Reflective Effects of His-
tory Teaching takes up this challenge by suggesting various forms of 
testing which genuinely aim at grasping and diagnosing learning pro-
cesses leading to (self-)reflective historical thinking. Against the back-
drop of a critique of the widespread tendency of testing factual historical 
knowledge, Borries presents some promising examples designed to test 
the competence of historical method by carrying out historical reflection 
rather than just answering factually oriented questions.  
The common aim of all contributions in this volume is to build 
bridges between the empirical finding that history and memory cultures 
related to WWII have become “reflexive” in the sense of a critical eval-
uation of narratives of national heroism and suffering on the one hand, 
and approaches in history didactics taking this reflexivity as a starting 
point for fostering historical competences and critical judgment, on the 
other. Theories of historical thinking and historical consciousness – un-
derstood as “processing time” – serve as transmitters between the case 
studies of national history cultures and the didactical case studies. The 
reflection of the processes transforming the past into history and linking 
it to the present and future informing the teaching approaches presented 
here, takes its cue from the insight that human beings’ understanding 
and interpretation of the past are crucially important for individuals’ and 
social groups’ conception of reality, construction of identity, and for-
mation of human values. As the German sociologist Peter Reichelt 
(1995) provocatively puts it, history culture is always accompanied by a 
“ruler-legitimizing” dimension. If linked to a perspective which is more 
concerned with an egalitarian and participatory culture, this point may 
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be rephrased as follows: an understanding of the uses of history and a 
competence in participating in the debates and struggles about memories 
(i.e. the significance of history and the consequences this entails for our 
own time) should be considered a condition for active co-citizenship. 
These problems present themselves in new forms today, since the deci-
sive value-based frame of reference for identity formation and sound 
judgment is no longer limited to one national dimension. Our sense and 
understanding of history are today formed in a reality increasingly 
molded by international connections, transnational structures (the EU) 
and processes of migration. Seen in this light, the apparent phenomenon 
that local and other group specific (e.g. religious) identities experience a 
renaissance can be seen as an expression of a distrust of ambiguity and a 
need for orientation. Rather than rejecting such tendencies, the theoreti-
cal and practical-didactic work should be oriented towards a way of his-
tory-mediation which enables individuals and social groups to partici-
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Representations of Victims and  
Guilty in Public History.  




History as an ethical  project  
 
During the last two decades history has commonly appeared as an ethi-
cal project in the public field. Historical guilt and victimization have 
been manifested through official apologies by heads of states and, more-
over, through claims of financial reparations to those who became 
wronged in the past. Controversial issues of guilt have been dealt with 
by the international community in war crime tribunals, as in the case of 
former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Rwanda, and by Truth and Reconcil-
iation commissions, as in South Africa and Argentina.  
The participation of historians in legitimizing apologies and repara-
tions through their membership in truth commissions has puzzled some 
other historians, who regard history as an impartial science (Ash 1998). 
Whereas earlier, since the 19th century, recognition of history as a sci-
ence, academic and public histories were seen as different fields, histori-
ans today widely regard themselves theoretically justified to ask broader 
questions than in the objectivist tradition of historiography. A. R. Mar-
rus explains the revival of the interest in the Holocaust not only in public 
history but also in academic research with a change that allows moral 
perspectives, including questions of guilt, in research (Kalela 2000: 85–
6; Marrus 1987).  
Unlike the academic science of history, the social use of history has 
always been characterized by ethical overtones. The interest in the past 
among ordinary people is to a great extent founded on the questions of 
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guilt (Barkan 2000: XV-XXI). Historical communities identify them-
selves as victims or as guilty. Representation of victimization and guilt 
appear in public history, also called the culture of history, which in-
cludes collective memories, ritual commemorations, monuments, cultur-
al products and schoolbook texts. The representations may be positively 
assuring for the members of a community but provocative to others. 
They may even ignite history wars, as, for example, the heated debates 
about the schoolbook representations of the Second World War between 
China and Japan as well as Russia and Poland. In this article, representa-
tions of victims and guilt are first studied in theory and then illustrated 
through an example from Finnish 20th century. The analysis reveals a 
Finnish way of relating to the past, which may explain Finnish responses 
to internationally sensitive issues, among them the Holocaust.  
“Guilt” and “victimization” as the key terms of this article are de-
rived from the metaphor “history as a courtroom”. In a judicial court-
room, the guilty party and the victims are default adversary parties. In 
the courtroom of history, guilt and victimization are not suggested by a 
prosecutor, but by fellow members of a community – thus we can speak 
of an ethics of recognition in relation to the subjects’ sense of history – 
or to their historical consciousness. “Guilt” and “victimization” then are 
here used as cultural representations and studied in regard to their social 
meaning and use.1  
 
 
Vict imizat ion and gui l t  as   
tenets  of  h istorical  ident ity 
 
Collective memory is the foundation of the historical identity of a com-
munity. Especially in cases of authoritarian and totalitarian rule, a dou-
ble-faced situation emerges with people using official rhetoric in public 
and home-fostered history in private. The former communist countries 
provide examples of such double-talk. In Estonia the Soviet period was 
called “invitation to the happy family of the Soviet peoples” at school 
and “occupation” at home (Ahonen 1992: 52, 121).  
Collective memory appears as spontaneous vernacular history talk. 
However, it is inevitably manipulated through hegemonic representa-
tions authorized and mediated by those in power. The power-related 
 
1  See also Karlsson in this volume and the understanding of the existential 
use of history: “The existential use of history is triggered off by the expe-
rienced need, felt by all individuals to remember, alternatively to forget, in 
order to uphold or intensify feelings of orientation, anchorage and identity 
in a society in a state of insecurity, pressure or sudden change.” 
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public history consists of official rhetoric, monuments, rites, artifacts 
and schoolbooks, and its ethos is most often founded on pride in the 
common past. Most politicians are well aware of the effect of the repre-
sentations of historical guilt or victimization on the identity of a people. 
Therefore they often urge educators to emphasize memories that evoke 
pride rather than guilt among the people. In the 1980s, Helmut Kohl was 
concerned that the German youth was too frequently exposed to the 
German guilt for the Second World War; Margaret Thatcher wanted the 
glorious moments and great men of the British nation to be introduced in 
the class-rooms; and Ronald Reagan did not like to see his people in-
dulging in national self-bashing instead of bolstering their pride in the 
past. 
Political concern for collective identity tends to trigger history poli-
tics by governments and parliaments. In 2005, the French parliament 
passed a law which ordered teachers to tell their students about the posi-
tive achievements of the French colonial rule. Historians reacted by in-
sisting on the freedom of research and education, but also by demanding 
recognition of historical guilt: “ […] in calling to mind only the positive 
role of colonization, [the law] enforces an official falsehood about past 
crimes, about massacres and even genocides, about slavery and about 
racism”.2 In 2009 the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev appointed a 
special commission charged with investigating falsifications of history. 
Lurking in the background of this decision was the denial of the Soviet 
victory in the Second World War by some liberal publicists, expressed 
in the context of the celebrations of May 9, “the Victory Day”. The 
commission was asked to defend the history of the Great Patriotic War, 
as it was taught in schoolbooks.3 
Vernacular history talk is morally and emotionally loaded. Memories 
are rather about victimization than guilt. In The Guilt of Nations, Elizar 
Barkan points out the significance of victimization for the construction 
of a morally positive identity. Unlike guilt, victimization ennobles peo-
ple in their own self-understanding. It empowers a community that is in 
the course of asserting itself as an equal partner of other communities. 
Minorities within a nation may cherish stories of victimization as means 
of obtaining recognition (Barkan 2001: 317). 
Victimization in collective memory tends to appear as mythical ar-
chetypes that are common across different communities. The contents 
vary but the mode follows archetypes. George Schöpflin has categorized 
 
2  Le Monde, 25 March 2005, quoted in Cajani 2009: 46-7. 
3  Helsingin Sanomat, 13 June 2009. 
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internationally existing myths of victimization into archetypes of biblical 
origin. The most powerful types are as follows: 
• Myths of redemption and suffering: A community is led to make sac-
rifices in order to fulfill a God-given destiny and will eventually be 
redeemed. Various ante-mural myths of fighting for religion belong 
to this category. 
• Myths of unjust treatment. They help a community claim recognition 
of a special moral worth. The Holocaust tradition is an example of 
an outstanding success in gaining universal recognition. 
• Myths of military valor. Military valor is used to denounce political 
compromises and justify expansionist politics (Schöpflin 1997: 28–
34).  
 
Myths mediate both victimization and heroism. The mythical form is 
convincing, as it implies an ethical solution: good is rewarded and evil 
punished. Both guilt and victimization acquire meaning as they lead to a 
righteous result. Myths are about doing the right thing. For a communi-
ty, popular myths work as collective lessons.  
In a political transition, a popular quest for recognition of past 
wrongs and glories tends to arise and a redesigning of history takes 
place. To what degree such a quest turns into an ethical or judicial pro-
cess, depends on the different contexts. According to Timothy Garton 
Ash, the popular quest is normally restricted to the recognition of the 
past wrongs, but in many cases straightforward claims of judicial sanc-
tions or even economic reparations are raised. Removals of monuments 
and revision of schoolbooks are “soft” examples of redesigning history, 
while truth commissions and special criminal courts are stronger modes 
of recognition policies (Ash 1998; Evans 2003; Thompson 2002: 26–7, 
47, 50–6). 
In the course of acknowledging moral claims regarding the past, 
guilt and praise are attributed to persons and groups. Some are labeled 
rogues, others heroes. Such attributes redefine the relationships not only 
between groups within a society but also between a country and the in-
ternational community. In such a process of reconsidering the past, his-
tory wars arise. Recent examples of such wars are the Bronze Warrior 
war between Estonia and Russia. The Warrior, represented in the mon-
ument, was seen as a hero of liberation by Russians and as an evil occu-
pant by Estonians (Torsti 2008: 19–36). China and Japan engaged in a 
cultural war over schoolbooks, with the Chinese calling for a representa-
tion of Japanese as war criminals, while the Japanese chose to leave is-
sues like the Nanking massacre as blank spots in their collective 
memory. 
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Guilt and victimization can be incorporated in collective identities in 
different modes. Only rarely does a community adhere unanimously to a 
self-image as guilty. A community rather regards itself victimized, in 
some cases as a perpetual victim of history. Victimization is felt to en-
noble a community, besides often being politically purposeful. Some na-
tions are more inclined than others to regard themselves as perpetual 
victims. In the following, examples of representations of guilty and vic-
tim by a few different communities are suggested. 
In “Heavenly Serbia” (1999), Branimir Anzulovic maintains that the 
Serbs throughout their past have regarded and presented themselves as 
victims. Serbian folklore is dominated by melancholic themes of victim-
ization. Loss, suffering and martyrdom prevail in stories and songs. Slo-
venian psychoanalyst V. D. Volkan has studied the subtle ways in which 
the very private identity of Serbs was manipulated by Slobodan Milose-
vic at the end of the 1980s. Volkan analyzed the effect of the prince 
Lazar cult, revived by Milosevic, on Serbian males. According to folk 
tradition, the prince fell as a martyr of the Orthodox faith in a battle 
against the Muslims. A martyr is a victim and a hero at the same time. 
Milosevic let an inscription to be hammered in the pedestal of Lazar’s 
statue, which urged the Serbs to fight the Muslims, adding the curse that 
those who refused would never be able to conceive male heirs (Volkan 
1995).  
Another small nation with a dominant victim identity are the Estoni-
ans. Ever since they started recording their history in the medieval peri-
od, they have portrayed themselves as perpetual victims. In the course of 
history, German knights, Danes, Swedes and Russians invaded Estonian 
territory and brought hardships and suffering upon the Estonian people. 
In their public history, the Estonians lament the victimization. In com-
parison, the Finns who were likewise invaded and annexed by Swedes 
and Russians, have found historical pride in their participation in the 
Swedish 17th century wars and later in their resistance to Russia (Aho-
nen 2006). The difference in historical identification might depend on 
reality – Estonia’s geopolitical position is awkward – but it also reveals 
something about the ethos of collective memory. Especially since the 
1980s Estonian public history has been characterized by victimization 
(Ahonen 1992: 101–126). 
Among the guilt-stricken nations, Germans are a rare example of a 
community that has adopted an identity of guilt. For several decades af-
ter the Second World War Germans fostered an identity of guilty in their 
public history. They worked on their Holocaust-guilt actively through 
drama, film, literature, museums and school education. However, politi-
cal transitions may alter identities of victim or guilty. In Germany, in the 
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atmosphere of the reunification around and since 1990, a revision of his-
tory has taken place. In fiction, like in Günter Grass’s Krebsgang, the 
Germans were portrayed as victims. The reconstruction and solemn reo-
pening of the Frauenkirche in Dresden was a sign of Germany’s re-
sumption of pride in their history. In 1992, the Germans felt self-
confident enough to criticize the raising of the statue of “Bomber” Har-
ris in London. For Londoners the statue meant recognition of heroism in 
beating Germany, while for the Germans “Bomber” Harris personified 
the historical guilt of the British. Since the unification, Germans have 
emphatically represented themselves not only as guilty but also as vic-
tims of the Second World War  
The modes of adoption of an identity of guilt or victimhood in the 
examples above included heroic victimization, resignation in perpetual 
victimization and the combination of guilt and victimization. As identi-
ties are constructions, the modes may vary in the course of time. Varia-
tion depends rather on historical context than on national disposition. 
In the following, representations of victimization and guilt are ana-
lyzed in the case of the Finnish Civil War of 1918. After four genera-
tions, the war is still being used in the identity struggles among the 
Finns. Victimization and guilt are contested over the borderline between 
the political left and right, even if in the present politics the borderline is 
becoming more and more blurred.  
 
 
The Civi l  War  as the most  
t ragic  chapter  of  F innish history 
 
In order to suggest how far the Finns, in their public history, represent 
themselves as victims or guilty, I will first identify the most sensitive 
topics of the 20th century and then focus on the most difficult of them. I 
define a topic as sensitive, if it divides people into adverse communities 
of historical interpretation. If a topic is sensitive, there are at least two 
stories of it, one of victimization and one of guilt. If one story was si-
lenced in public for a period it is most likely to indicate guilt.  
According to the testimony of Finnish public history, the most sensi-
tive topics are constituted by the Civil War of 1918 and its aftermath, the 
Second World War alliance with Nazi Germany and the Finnish contri-
bution to the Holocaust, and, finally, by the Finlandization of the 1970s, 
meaning an opportunistic appeasement of Moscow by the Finns. The 
guilt and victimization due to the civil war is the most complex of these 
topics. I will focus on the civil war, while the Finnish Holocaust is treat-
ed in the chapter written by Tom Gullberg in this book. For many dec-
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ades, the Finns indulged in the identity of a community that defied the 
Germans and protected the Jews, but as late as 2000 they had to admit 
that the Finnish war cabinet took part in the Holocaust, even if indirectly 
and in small numbers. Finlandization is a very recent painful element of 
Finnish historical identity. Apart from feeling shame for having kept si-
lent about the dark side of the Soviet system, Finns admit to the guilt of 
having adopted a bystander attitude in regard to the plight of Soviet dis-
sidents.  
Compared to the sensitive topics of the Second World War and Fin-
landization, the Civil War of 1918 is a deeply divisive episode in the 
Finnish social memory. Even in the first decade of the 21st century, old 
people in some parts of the country still feel hatred towards their neigh-
bors on account of having been on different sides in 1918.  
Finland had declared itself independent in December 1917, but not 
on a unanimous basis, as a part of the people preferred a socialist revolu-
tion. The Civil War between socialist Red Guards and bourgeois White 
Guards started in January 1918, lasted three and a half months and re-
sulted in the victory of the Whites. The death toll was around 30 000, in-
cluding deaths due to civil terror and postwar concentration camp atroci-
ties. Acts of terror were committed by both sides. At an early stage of 
the war, the country was divided into White and Red territories, and both 
the White Army and the Red Army wanted to secure their territories 
against enemy infiltration. The hostile elements in the local population 
were controlled, detained and cleansed. As the military strategic purpose 
on its own does not suffice to explain the extreme cruelty and the exces-
sive killings of civilians, the social attribution of victimization and guilt 
deserves a critical study. 
The contradictions in the Red and White history are evident in the 
disagreement over how the war of 1918 should be called. The disagree-
ment has prevailed until today. In the working class tradition, the war is 
called a civil war, a class war or a war between brethren, while among 
the bourgeoisie it is referred to as a fight for freedom, which indicates a 
war in the defense of independence. 
 
 
Attr ibut ion of  vict imization  
by the part ies of  the Civi l  War 
 
The Red victimization was emphasized by the far larger numbers of cas-
ualties sustained by the Reds in the conflict in comparison to those of 
the Whites. The Reds suffered massively, especially due to the revenge 
after the war, known as the White terror. The victims of the White terror 
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amount to 10 000, compared to the 1600 victims of Red terror. No won-
der then that the social memory of the working class became character-
ized by victimization.  
Due to the mass killings of civilians and prisoners of war, Reds 
called the White guards “slaughterers”. Rhetorically, many terms used 
by Reds were derived from the Communist Manifesto and Marxist theo-
ry. The theory was translated into powerful vernacular expressions, 
many of which were familiar to people from the archaic biblical lan-
guage. The workers represented themselves as victims of “exploiters”, 
“bloodsuckers”, “robbers” and “oppressors”. The morally charged terms 
indicated an antagonism between capitalist owners and socialist workers 
(Hyvönen 1977: 96–106; Manninen 1982: 169; Tikka 2008:71). 
Apart from being victims of the owners’ class, the Finnish working 
class regarded itself as victims of a political betrayal by the bourgeoisie. 
The parliament with a socialist majority was dissolved in July 1917 
through a joint decision by the Russian Provisional government and the 
Finnish bourgeois parties. The socialist voters, empowered by the suc-
cessful Bolshevik revolution in Russia, considered themselves betrayed 
and justified to refuse loyalty to the new, bourgeois-dominated Parlia-
ment (Hyvönen 1977: 30–34).  
Another betrayal, according to the socialists, took place when the 
bourgeois government promoted the White paramilitaries, the Civil 
Guards, to the status of the official Finnish army. The socialist leader-
ship interpreted this as an attack against the working class and pro-
claimed a Red revolution (Hyvönen 1977: 97). In the consequently di-
vided country the workers became victims of the White Army’s military 
cleansing policy. When the White Army progressed to the Red areas, the 
Reds were hunted down, punished and executed by the White Guards. 
Every workers’ union member and supporter became a suspect and an 
enemy to be eliminated. 
After the war ended in May, the cleansing policy was intensified. Al-
together 80 000 Reds were locked up in concentration camps, which 
were portrayed as death camps by the inmates. The deaths were mostly 
due to the inhuman conditions in the camps. Reds died of hunger and 
epidemic diseases.  
For long after the war, members of the working class were suspected 
of rebellious intentions. The witch hunt against Reds continued for 
years. Acts of terror continued and were reinforced by the rightwing ex-
tremism of the 1930s. In social memory, the Finnish working class re-
gards itself a victim of extended White terror.  
The White victimization was based on the Red terror, reinforced by 
an ideological Red scare. White Finns regarded themselves as victims of 
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a primitive Red rage. The rhetoric of the “monstrous” lower class spread 
universally in Europe as a by-product of a political fear of socialism. 
The rhetoric was articulated by Gustave Le Bon in his popular La psy-
chologie des foules, which was translated into Finnish and widely dis-
seminated among the bourgeoisie in the 1910s. In the emerging White 
rhetoric, workers were portrayed as rogues who had no sense of law and 
order and a tendency for cruel violence. The actual Red terror included 
breaking into manor houses, killing the owners in front of their family, 
sit-ins in factories and distributing leaflets containing death threats 
against bureaucrats and big capitalists. The 19th century paternalist pic-
ture of rural poor as dependents who had to be both protected and disci-
plined, gave way to a picture of workers as alien and hostile masses 
against whom the civilized people had to defend themselves. 
The White victimization appeared as grim austere torture stories. 
Especially if the victim was a clergyman, the Red perpetrator was de-
monized. The number of stories about tortured priests increased after the 
war and indicated a great fear and deep disgust of Reds among the bour-
geoisie. The presence of women among the Red Guards was regarded by 
the bourgeoisie as particularly offensive to their sense of decency (Man-
ninen 1982:121, 160).  
The Whites considered themselves victims of a betrayal by fellow 
countrymen. Finland had finally gained independence. For Whites, the 
Red attack against the young nation-state was an incomprehensible blow 
against the civil code, according to which people should be able to trust 
their compatriots. The socialists had betrayed the nation by resorting to 
revolution and accepting support from Russian Bolsheviks. According to 
the White propaganda, the Reds were fighting their fellow countrymen 
with Russian bayonets (Manninen 1982). According to the White view, 
the countless death sentences pronounced by White military tribunals at 
the end of the war were an act of self-defense by the victims of anarchy 
(Tikka 2006: 154). 
 
 
Attr ibut ion of  gui l t  to  
the part ies  in  the Civi l  War 
 
Guilt was attributed to the Reds by the adversary party, the Whites. In 
the aftermath of a war the defeated tend to be treated as guilty and the 
victors as innocent. In the case of the Finnish Civil War, the White mili-
tary and special tribunals charged, tried, and sentenced Reds, while in-
vestigations into the White terror were few and mainly nominal. In ver-
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nacular discussion the issue of guilt was handled more symmetrically. 
Both parties memorized and mythologized each other’s evil deeds.  
Attribution of guilt as a way of making sense of past events evades 
structural explanations. Instead of accounts of institutional evil, guilt is 
attributed to persons or groups. In the case of the guilt of Finnish Reds 
in the Civil War of 1918, the guilt was attributed to barbaric masses, 
bloodthirsty leaders and ruthless local Red Guards. 
The accusation of low-class masses being barbaric was elaborated by 
a popular contemporary author Eino Leino as follows: 
 
 “[The rebellion] released all passions, lifted guns against legal government 
and parliament, felled all courts of justice and civil institutions, spread blood 
and death, deadly horror and red destruction (hävitys) into the most far-away 
forest settlements. It was like letting the devil free.” (Kunnas 1976: 102)  
 
Accusations of barbaric bloodthirstiness and bestiality were presented in 
the media, in military tribunals, in public registers and in the official 
declarations by the Commander-in-chief C. G. E. Mannerheim. Accord-
ing to the communion register held by the church in the parish of Akaa, 
an unemployed worker, Juho Viktor Vuori, was executed “as one of the 
biggest monsters of the Red terror” (Tikka 2006: 148). In his address to 
the Finnish people at the triumph parade on 16 May 1918, Mannerheim 
praised the White Guards for having defended what was most dear to the 
Finnish people and had been threatened by the Reds, namely their reli-
gion, their fatherland and the home inherited from their ancestors (Man-
ninen 1982: 117). 
The adversary party, the defeated Reds, attributed guilt to the 
Whites. The issue of White guilt was raised immediately after the war; 
the accusations were triggered by the massive numbers of executions or-
dered by the White military tribunals, but the outcry was soon stifled 
and the accusations against the Whites silenced or left to underground 
socialist publishing and vernacular history. 
In the socialist rhetoric, the owners’ class, supported by the state bu-
reaucracy, bore the guilt for the exploitation and oppression of the work-
ing class in general. In the Civil War, the White guilt was, according to 
socialist publications, shared by the oppressive White senate, “slaugh-
terer-general” Mannerheim, terrorizing White Guards and unjust mili-
tary tribunals (Hyvönen 1977: 83–128). After a month’s fighting, with 
the White army having advanced into Red Finland, the White headquar-
ters issued the order to shoot dangerous suspects “at sight”. The killing 
was executed by military tribunals and specially appointed war police 
contingents consisting of White Guards. Moreover, individual White 
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Guards shot unarmed Reds after taking them prisoner (Tikka 2006: 36, 
121-2). “White terror” and “slaughterers” became the core of Red accu-
sations.  
The concentration camps finally became the most illustrative part of 
the White guilt. Already after the first victories of the White army the at-
titude of the Senate towards the Reds hardened. As no detainees were set 
free, the camps swelled. The biggest camps were Suomenlinna (13 300 
prisoners), Hämeenlinna (11 5000), Lahti (10 900), Viipuri (10 350), 
Tammisaari (8700) and Tampere (8 700). The camp barracks had not 
been designed for the growing numbers of prisoners, which led to pris-
oners being accommodated in animal shelters, floorless cellars and earth 
holes. The administration of the camps was left to the White Army, 
namely to the Department of the Protection of the Conquered Territo-
ries. The White Guards functioned as commanders and subjected the 
inmates to harsh military discipline. The camp wards, judges, and bu-
reaucrats in general were regarded by socialists as bearers of class ha-
tred. The judges were guilty of executing bourgeois justice and the bu-
reaucrats of harassing the poor (Tikka 2006). 
The concentration camps were criticized by foreign Western gov-
ernments as an insult to the rule of law. The Finnish government re-
sponded by maintaining that the camps were a Finnish internal affair 
(Pietiäinen 1992: 353).  
The memory of the concentration camps became a divisive element 
in the Finnish historical identity. Tens of thousands of Red families 
adopted the identity of victims, while the Whites took a pride in the 
righteous victory and repelled accusations of guilt. 
As a whole, Red and White representations of history support 
Schöpflin’s view of the use of mythical archetypes for the claims of guilt 
and victimization. The “myth of redemption” is present in the argument 
invoked by the Whites, according to which their victory saved Finland 
from chaos and barbarity. The “myth of unjust treatment” was used by 
the Reds when referring to the bourgeois exploitation in the past and to 
their snatching away political power from them by dissolving Parliament 
in 1917. The “myth of military valor” was utilized by the Whites in 
stressing the purity of their struggle for freedom and in justifying their 




The aftermath of  the Civi l  War 
 
In the politically divided Finnish society of the 1920s and 1930s the at-
tribution of guilt and victimization was diagonally adversative. The vic-
torious bourgeois state idolized the White victims. During 1920s more 
than 300 monuments were raised in their honor. A monumental memori-
al publication from 1927 was financed by the Parliament and presented 
the life stories of the 5000 fallen White Guards (Boström 1927). In 
schoolbooks the war was portrayed as a freedom fight, implying that the 
aim of the Reds was to make Finland a part of the Soviet Union. 
Memory of the war was used to fuel the Red Scare of the time (Rouhi-
ainen 1974). The public history was dominated by manifestations of the 
White victory. Monuments for the white “freedom fighters” were raised 
in the local cemeteries, while red victims were left buried unnamed in 
mass graves. In the mainstream culture, doubts about the White truth 
were expressed only by a few authors like Frans Emil Sillanpää, Joel 
Lehtonen and Jarl Hemmer. 
Even though a few reconciliatory political gestures were attempted 
by the centrist governments just after the war, the plight of the Reds was 
perpetuated by the discriminatory social atmosphere of the 1920s and 
1930s. Only 11 monuments for the Red victims were raised during that 
time. In most cases they were dumped in the outskirts of towns and vil-
lages (Peltonen 2003: 222–3). When in 1923 a local workers’ union in 
Hämeenlinna raised a monument to the Red victims in a churchyard, the 
ones responsible were charged with subversive activities. The church 
denied the right to commemoration, and the monument was destroyed 
by the police.4 However, in socialist publications and vernacular work-
ing class tradition, the memories of the Red sacrifices in the Civil War 
were cherished, often as half-mythical stories of Red heroism and White 
evilness. 
After the Second World War, under the auspices of a short leftist 
wave in politics, public commemoration of the Red victims gathered 
momentum. Parliament urged the government to care for the neglected 
graves of the Reds. However, a true public recognition of the plight of 
the Reds only came as late as the 1960s. In big public burials, with cler-
gymen speaking of guilt and reconciliation, the exhumed remains of the 
Reds were reburied in churchyards. Monuments were raised for those 
who had “died for their ideological conviction” (Peltonen 2003: 226–8). 
Moreover, in the 1960s the public was ready to accept schoolbooks, 
where a balance was pursued, with authors accounting for the Red upris-
 
4  Helsingin Sanomat 14.5.2006.  
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ing in terms of social distress, and editors making sure that equal num-
bers of Reds and Whites appeared in illustrations.  
In the mainstream culture a change took place thanks to the novelist 
Väinö Linna. His monumental novel Täällä Pohjantähden alla (Under 
the North Star) opened the issue of guilt. The Reds were portrayed as 
victims, not as guilty, and the Whites as perpetrators. Following Väinö 
Linna, theatres and film studios adopted the Red perspective. The pro-
ductions were attended by massive audiences and greatly affected Finn-
ish collective memory. 
Apart from an attempt to deal with a collective guilt, the Finns of the 
1960s and 1970s used history to fuel political antagonisms. In many 
municipalities, the raising of a monument for the Red triggered an 
equivalent quest among the political Right. As a result, equal numbers of 
monuments were built for the White and Red Guards in the period. As 
the political contest between socialists and non-socialists was fierce, his-
torical guilt was used to bolster political identities.  
At the turn of the new millennium, the Civil War is nearly five gen-
erations back in time, but facing up to the disaster is still a regular need 
at the war’s anniversary. The ethos of the commemoration is today less 
political than in the 1960s. People seem to think more in terms of trans-
generational ethics. The generation of 1918 deserves to be done justice 
to. A comprehensive survey was conducted by the state at the turn of the 
new millennium in order to establish the true numbers of the victims on 
both sides. The numbers were not radically different from those already 
confirmed by research in the 1960s, but they helped many Finns to es-
cape inertia about the collective historical identity and forced the estab-
lishment to acknowledge a historical wrong. Since the turn of the new 
millennium, the leadership of the church has officially expressed re-
morse for taking the White side in 1918. Already in five dioceses the 
bishops have organized solemn burials for the Red victims exhumed 
from hidden mass graves in the forests. As late as in 2006, in the mid-
dle-sized city of Hämeenlinna, in the center of the region worst stricken 
by the war, a burial of 3500 exhumed Reds took place under the auspi-
ces of a public recognition of guilt by the church, personified by a bish-
op who held the service and gave a sermon on reconciliation. A sugges-
tion was made – even if not yet materialized – that an annual day of rec-
onciliation should be included in the calendar of commemorations. 
In 1997 I conducted a research into the historical identity of young 
Finns. When asked about the Civil War, they did not express any feeling 
of transgenerational guilt. According to them, it was necessary to re-
member and recognize the tragedy but not to attempt reparation (Ahonen 
1998: 67–73). However, the testimony of public history is different. Vic-
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timization and guilt continue to be reified in fiction, monuments and rit-





In this article I have explored the use of history as an ethical project in 
the sense of addressing the question of moral recognition.5 The concepts 
of guilt and victimization can be seen as constitutive of such a process of 
recognition, not least in the sense of construction of a sustainable collec-
tive identity.  
Finns do not belong to the communities that would strongly identify 
with historical victimization. They rather tell their history as a story of 
tough survival. Nevertheless, Finns are burdened by some difficult epi-
sodes of history, above all by the tragedy of a civil war, which, together 
with its aftermath, kept people divided for decades. Public history, in-
cluding monuments, commemoration rituals, literature and art as well as 
school books seem to keep the history alive for new generations. 
There was no attempt at reconciliation after the Civil War. Therefore 
the horrors were left as an open wound in the collective memory. Even 
though the Finns have felt ready to face up to the difficult past since the 
1960s, the interpretations have fluctuated from pro-Red to Pro-White, 
sustaining mutually exclusive group identities, and an open dialogue of 
healing between the two memory-communities has only slowly been es-
tablished. In a deliberative dialogue, mutual accusations would be ac-
commodated and victimization acknowledged. Collective identity would 
become inclusive instead of consisting of mutually exclusive sub-
identities. 
What does a redesigning of collective identity depend on? Having 
looked at the representations of guilt and victimization in the context of 
the Civil War, I suggest two factors: popular political will and a trickle-
down of academic research. 
Collective recognition of the guilt of the atrocities of the Civil War 
was triggered by the leftist turn in politics in the late 1960s. Apologetic 
rhetoric and demonstrative burials of Red victims spread after the social-
ist parties won the majority in the parliamentary election in 1966. Since 
a rightist turn in the 1980s, some rehabilitation of White perpetrators has 
taken place. However, the political will to bring the descendants of Reds 
and Whites together at a common round table is still missing.  
 
5  Ethical should here be understood in the Hegelian sense where “one be-
comes an individual subject only in virtue of recognizing, and being rec-
ognized by, another subject” (Fraser 2003: 10). 
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Academic research was long divided along the lines of the war, but 
during the last two generations a genuine contribution has been made by 
historians to help Finns confront the events of 1918. The works of Jaak-
ko Paavolainen in the 1960s sorted out the numbers of victims on both 
sides and put an end to the game of inflated numbers concerning the 
amount of victims and suffering. The numbers were counted again in the 
course of state-supported extensive research in the 1990s. The hard facts 
are there for a mutual acknowledgement of victimization and guilt, as 
soon as the Finnish community wants to redesign its identity in terms of 
inclusiveness.  
The case of the Civil War shows how the “awkward” or conflictive 
past was dealt with by means of a long silence, based on pragmatism. 
And when the history of the Civil War was addressed, it happened with-
in the fixed terms of heroism and of victims and guilty. This way of 
dealing with the past may be compared to the way in which the legacy of 
the Holocaust was dealt with within the national history culture of Fin-
land. Up until the 1980s, a self-righteous – or heroic – image of Finland 
as protector of the Jews during the Second World War dominated public 
perception. Only when the question of guilt in relation to the Holocaust 
reappeared in an international context, did a Finnish discussion arise on 
the role played by the Finnish state. As an outcome of this discussion, 
the Finnish national identity as a victim of great power aggression was 
modified by the acknowledgement of how the Finnish state carried out 
decisions and actions which, at the very least, failed to avert further per-
secutions of Jews, both before and after the outbreak of war (see the 
contribution by Tom Gullberg for an elaboration on this issue). In that 
sense the themes of victims and guilty were played out once again with-
in national history culture, but this time with a shift within the position 
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The Holocaust as History Culture in Finland  
TOM GULLBERG  
 
 
The Holocaust has in the post-Cold War era provided different societies 
with the possibility to discuss and debate their historical development in 
the 20th century. The Holocaust means different things in different 
states. For states like Germany and Israel that have been directly in-
volved and affected, a historical debate about the Holocaust constitutes 
at the same time a reflection on their own national identity. In these cas-
es the Holocaust has activated a political and identity-based historical 
and actual interest (Karlsson/Zander 2006). 
For states like Sweden, that was not directly involved, the debate has 
been more ideological, and focused on themes such as values and human 
rights, but also on the basic subject competence of history. During the 
latter part of the 1990s this perspective was connected with the debate of 
Neo-Nazism and skepticism and Holocaust-denial. Here, the post-Cold 
War debate has had a strong focus on moral and values, and has in-
volved also other genocides than the Holocaust.1  
Several studies have been published about the reasons for making 
the Holocaust the most important object in the debate of historical iden-
tity and historical consciousness in the post-Cold War Europe. In this ar-
ticle I restrict myself to Finland and the Finnish historical discussion – 
or non-existing discussion – about the Holocaust. Nevertheless, also the 
Finnish case must be related to the general context, not only of the post-
Cold War debate, but also to the general context of post-Second World 
War debate in Europe in the era after 1989.  
 
1  For example Rosenbaum 2001 and Gerner/Karlsson 2005. 
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The leading argument in this article is that the Finnish silence in re-
lation to the Holocaust must be understood in the context of some more 
tragic, sensitive and complex aspects of Finland’s own history, or at 
least how some of these historical phenomena have been interpreted in 
the historical debate during the last decades.  
The general (Western) European discussion during the 1990s about 
Holocaust-deniers and Neo-Nazism was also introduced in Finland, but 
the question never grew into such a big political issue as in Sweden. 
While Sweden became a world leader in the new international debate on 
the Holocaust, Finland handled the newly arisen interest in a more for-
malistic way as a technical issue for the National Board of Education. 
Especially Swedish-speaking schools in Finland were also at quite an 
early stage inspired by some didactical models from Sweden (and Nor-
way), as for example the White Buses-projects and the Swedish school 
book “Om detta må ni berätta” (also in English with the title “Tell ye 
your children”). The book was later translated into Finnish with a shorter 
supplement, on the initiative of the National Board of Education.2 The 
supplement is related to the debate in Finland in 2000-2001 about the 
expulsion of eight Jewish refugees to Germany, and further on to 
Auschwitz-Birkenau (Bruchfeld/Levine 1998; Bruchfeld/Levine 2001). I 
will return to that debate later in this article, but it is interesting to note 
that a national authority was eager to explain, and in some extent even to 
contend the official version of what really happened in Finland during 
the War. I will argue that this is quite illustrative for the Finnish histori-
cal debate of Finland’s role in World War II during the period 1941-
1944 in general, and for the relation to Nazi Germany in particular (Sana 
2003).  
Like all the other members of The Council of Europe, Finland has 
celebrated the 27th of January as the Day of Remembrance of the Holo-
caust and the Prevention of Crimes against Humanity since 2001. Still, 
the reason for flying the flag that day seems to be quite unknown to the 
 
2  Since the first constitution in 1919 of the newborn Finnish sovereign na-
tion-state, the state has had two official national languages, Finnish and 
Swedish. Swedish is spoken as mother tongue by approximately 6 percent 
of the population (about 300,000 people). Both language groups have their 
own distinct and independent school systems, at least when it comes to 
school cultures, although the curricula and school laws are shared by both 
language groups. It is compulsory for every student to study the other na-
tional language in school, which should guarantee some kind of functional 
bilingualism. Fluency in both languages is required for work in state ser-
vice, and also in officially bilingual municipalities (official bilingualism is 
reached when the minority language is spoken by 8% of the population, or 
has reached a number of 3000 persons). For a contemporary overview, see 
Sjöholm 2004 and Hansén 2004. 
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majority of the citizens of Finland. No official declaration about the rea-
sons behind flying the flag has been made on that day, apart from the 
situation in many other European states. But, as has been mentioned 
many times in the academic discussion about the Holocaust in modern 
historical culture, the Holocaust is today an entry ticket to European val-
ues and identity, which was something that Finland actively strove for 
(Karlsson 2008; Levy/Sznaider 2006). 
In comparison with Sweden, and also partly in comparison to the 
other Nordic countries, there seems to be a more remarkable political si-
lence in Finland, especially in relation to the debate of the co-operation 
with Germany during World War II. The reason for the unwillingness to 
discuss the Holocaust theme has to do with the degree of involvement in 
the war. Sweden was indirectly involved through the active “non-
military” co-operation with Germany, but Sweden was not occupied, as 
was the case with Norway and Denmark, and did not fight side by side 
with Germans at the front, which was the case with Finland during the 
period 1941-1944.The co-operation with Germany seems to be more po-
litically sensitive than could be expected over a half decade after the 
war. An example of this sensitivity is the reaction that was provoked 
when the Swedish journalist and writer Henrik Arnstad during the au-
tumn of 2006 tried to discuss Finland’s close co-operation with Germa-
ny from a moral point of view. The core of Arnstad’s argumentation was 
that Finland’s choice of side was immoral and that Finland in reality 
fought for the same goals as the Third Reich. These reflections were 
very eagerly attacked by nationally oriented Finnish war historians 
(Forss 2006). It seems that it is more comfortable to play down the co-
operation with Germany than to reflect upon what the co-operation looks 
like from a post-Cold War perspective. 
The history of Finland involves all the crucial keywords that make 
an open discussion about the Holocaust sensitive. Finland has its own 
history of concentration camps, massacres and expropriations, and may 
therefore not have the same access to moralize about the inhuman ac-
tions during the World War II. 
 
 
The Finnish Civi l  War 
 
One of the crucial historical events that have had consequences for the 
attitudes today towards the discussion of the Holocaust is undoubtedly 
the Finnish Civil War during the spring of 1918. The Civil War is still a 
very sensitive event to handle in the Finnish political and historical de-
bate, and also in history education in school (The article by Sirkka Aho-
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nen elaborates the question on the relationship between the legacies of 
the Finnish Civil War and the Holocaust). One of the more delicate 
questions is connected to the naming of the event: “Civil war” is said to 
be the most neutral name, although it indicates that it was a war between 
two different political and ideological parties of Finnish citizens. For 
some right-wing “White” groups it is still important to talk about the 
“Freedom War”, to mark that it was first and foremost a war against 
Russian bolshevism and a war for freedom from Russia. For some more 
left-wing “Red” groups it is, on the other hand, still important to de-
scribe the war in terms of a class struggle.  
Irrespective of the name of the war, the Civil War is still a trauma in 
Finnish debate, not least from a human rights perspective. Terrorism, in 
the form of executions and both mental and physical torture, was com-
mon on both sides during the war, although the victorious White party’s 
vengeance after the war is more known and debated. The documentation 
of different mass executions and massacres has been intensified since 
the 1990s, after being denied and silenced during many decades. The 
World War II and the more complicated relations to the Soviet Union 
did not make the discussion about these actions easier. 
Besides massacres and executions, a prominent feature of the period 
immediately after the war were the concentration camps holding Red 
prisoners. About 50 000 Red soldiers or sympathizers were taken pris-
oner in May 1918, and the only available places to keep such a huge 
amount of people were at the evacuated Russian garrisons. The most in-
famous of the Red concentration camps – because of the high mortality 
– were those in the fortress of Sveaborg outside Helsinki and the garri-
son Dragsvik in Ekenäs, today functioning as the Swedish-speaking bri-
gade of the Finnish army. The official reports for Dragsvik states that 
the camp had a total of 9 313 prisoners, of which over 3 000 died. The 
biggest mass grave in Finland is situated just outside Dragsvik. Most of 
the prisoners died of hunger, although hundreds were also executed 
(Lindholm 2005). Even though the grave was well-known by the older 
local inhabitants, the first official memorial at the place was not dedicat-
ed until 1988. 
In the history culture of Finland a debate about historical inhuman 
actions, such as the Holocaust, easily turns into a discussion about in-
human actions within Finland. Mass graves, concentration camps and 
executions during the Civil War were not a part of the national success 
story. The Holocaust comes too close to the national trauma – and the 
non-usage of history has been the most-used method for avoiding pain-
ful discussions, not least on an international level.   
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Expuls ion of  Jews 
 
One of the most sensitive questions in the Finnish World War II debate 
is, not surprisingly, the Jewish question. For several hundred years Fin-
land had a small Jewish minority, which was well integrated into Finn-
ish society, and with full religious rights. The Jewish minority was im-
mediately entitled to vote when the universal suffrage (for men) was in-
troduced in 1906. Like other minority groups, the Finnish Jews also 
served in the army during the war, both in the Winter War of 1939-1940, 
and in the Continuation War – in collaboration with Germany – in 1941-
1944. This meant that Jewish soldiers in the Finnish army were under 
the risk of being confronted with German Nazi officers, a situation that 
actually occurred several times. 
The Finnish government and army officers’ defense of the Jewish 
minority is well documented, and it has been politically unproblematic 
to discuss the position of the native Jewish minority during the war. A 
crucial detail of the debate is connected to the group of Jewish refugees 
that arrived from Germany to Finland. As early as 1970 the journalist 
Elina Sana (Suominen) described how eight Jewish refugees were sent 
back to Germany in 1942. She could track the refugees, of whom two 
were children, to the concentration camp in Auschwitz. Her book 
“Kuolemanlaiva S/S Hohenhörn – juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo” (The 
Ship of Death S/S Hohenhörn – the Fate of the Jewish Refugees) was 
considered a very impressive academic work – it was even awarded the 
information prize of the state – but the issue was very sensitive, not least 
from a political perspective (Suominen 1979). Despite the encouraging 
critic of Sana’s book, it did not result in a more visible debate about Fin-
land’s policy in relation to the Jewish refugees.3 The expulsion of Jews 
was politically sensitive in a double sense. It was painful for both Finn-
 
3  This has been a general trend in the discussion of sensitive historical is-
sues during the Cold War era in Finland: It has been possible to research 
in even very politically sensitive topics in narrower academic circles, the 
results have been made public, but a debate in a broader sense has been 
toned down. There has never existed any form of formal censorship, but 
editors and politicians have – in the politically very sensitive environment 
of the Cold War - not been very eager to debate sensitive aspects of na-
tional history in the public sphere: it was more important to take the sensi-
tive relation with the Soviet Union into consideration. Therefore results of 
research from the 1970s could again be considered as “sensations” 40 
years later. The Finnish use of concentration camps during the Continua-
tion War is a good example of this phenomenon. Antti Laine wrote about 
the camps in his dissertation as early as 1982, but Henrik Arnstad (2009) 
could nevertheless write about the camps in his new book as if he was 
coming out with hitherto unknown facts.  
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ish historians and politicians to publicly discuss an act that in the 1970s 
was deemed as both politically and morally wrong. But the question of 
the expulsions also had a connection to the politics of 1979. When the 
first Austrian refugees of Jewish origin arrived at Helsinki on the ship 
Ariadne in the summer of 1938, the government and its minister of civil 
affairs, Urho Kekkonen, were implementing a very restrictive policy to-
wards refugees. The refugees from Ariadne were allowed to stay in Fin-
land, but the reason why remains unclear. One theory is that the Finnish 
consulate in Vienna had stamped a visa in the passports of the refugees 
without consulting the government. Still, the next ship that arrived with 
53 refugees four days later was immediately sent back to Stettin. It is 
said that this happened on the direct order of the minister of civil affairs. 
These refugees, of whom some of them are said to have committed sui-
cide, were later called “Kekkonen’s Jews” by different historians. One 
outspoken motive for the government’s policy at that moment during the 
war was to avoid “a Jewish question” in Finland. 
In 1979, Kekkonen was already a legendary figure and president of 
the Republic of Finland, so the political climate did not lend itself to 
speaking openly about the Finnish actions towards Jewish refugees dur-
ing World War II. At the end of the 1970s, President Kekkonen was 
considered to be the only political leader capable of handling the sensi-
tive relations with the Soviet Union, which made it politically expedient 
to leave his reputation untarnished. This might be the main reason for 
toning down the academic discussion about the Jewish refugee-question 
during the War.4  
 
 
The col laborat ion with the GESTAPO 
 
Sana’s book about Jewish refugees (1979) was quite eagerly criticized 
both by politicians and nationally oriented historians, and her audience 
was almost even more critical in 2003, when she followed up with the 
book “Luovutetut – Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle” (The Extra-
dited – Finland’s extraditions to the Gestapo), in which she describes the 
relation between Communism, Jewish ethnical background and extradi-
tions (Sana 2003). Her theories about direct contacts between the Finn-
 
4  This so called “Finlandization aspect” was discussed in relation to histori-
cal research as early as 1991 by Timo Vihavainen. The concept “Finlandi-
zation” is generally understood to mean the Finnish adaptive policy in re-
lation to the Soviet Union, characterized by informal ways of self-
censorship and a tendency not to criticize the policy of Moscow.  
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ish Secret Police (VALPO) and its German counterpart the GESTAPO 
were too sensitive even in 2003. 
On an academic level, the dissertation of Oula Silvennoinen (2008) 
on wartime relations between the secret police in Finland and in Nazi 
Germany seems to have started a more open and critical debate, alt-
hough the theme is still regarded as politically and morally sensitive. 
Silvennoinen has been able to describe the growing co-operation be-
tween the two secret police organizations in a very convincing way. He 
quite laconically notes that the VALPO had to strengthen the co-
operation with the GESTAPO in 1941 due to political reasons, with the 
aim to be perceived as a good ally. On the other hand, he also notes that 
several high-ranking figures in the VALPO had right-wing leanings, in-
dicating how it might not have been so difficult for them to take such a 
radical step. The co-operation seems to have been very pragmatic during 
the war – sources confirm that the Finnish army systematically sent over 
Soviet war prisoners to the Germans, in several cases with the direct aim 
to execute the representatives of a common enemy (Silvennoinen 2008).  
During the Cold War, Finland was handed over from the influence 
of one dictatorship to another, from Berlin to Moscow. From this point 
of view it is quite obvious that it was, not least on a political level, not 
very easy to debate the wartime relationship between Berlin and Helsin-
ki in the new Cold War atmosphere. The handing-over of Soviet prison-
ers to the Germans was considered to be a war crime, and was not the 
most convenient issue to discuss with the Soviet leadership in the con-
text of the problematic Finnish-Soviet relationship after the war.  
In connection with the debate on the infrastructure of the Holocaust, 
it must also be mentioned that the Finnish authorities undoubtedly sent 
about forty Jewish refugees to build fortifications in Salla and the rail-
way line to Kemijärvi. This is also mentioned in the supplement of “Tell 
ye your children”, but in the text from the National Board of Education 
it says that “it is, in retrospect, difficult to understand why these Jewish 
refugees were sent up to the north as a labor force” for the German 
troops. Sana had a straight answer to that question already in her book 
from 1979. She mentioned that in July 1942 the minister of civil affairs, 
Toivo Horelli, had admitted that the reasons behind the measures were 
purely political. 
In the supplement of “Tell ye your children” the co-operation be-
tween Finnish and German secret service authorities is not discussed at 
all. A general tendency in the Finnish historical debate is to tone down 
the active relationship between the Finnish secret police (VALPO) and 
its German counterpart, the GESTAPO. Elina Sana is almost the only 
one who has attempted to discuss those connections since the 1970s, and 
TOM GULLBERG 
52 




Concentrat ion camps in Eastern Karel ia   
 
As already mentioned earlier, the co-operation with Nazi Germany is 
still a very sensitive issue in Finland. The establishment and use of con-
centration camps by the Finnish army during the Continuation War 
1941-1944 has made the connections to German war history and the 
Holocaust even more painful, and an open discussion about the Holo-
caust even more difficult. 
During the autumn of 1941, the Finnish troops launched a powerful 
offensive into Soviet Union’s Eastern Karelia, subsequently occupying 
Soviet territory. The military commander Mannerheim had beforehand 
given instructions on how the local Russian population was to be dealt 
with. It was clearly pointed out that the Russians should be detained and 
placed into concentration camps, and these were also established. The 
Finnish military authorities used the concept of concentration camps, 
which complicates the discussion of the possible links to the Holocaust 
even more. Every ten years, there is a surge of sensational articles about 
the Eastern Karelian concentration camps – “never exposed before” – 
and after a brief rush of media excitement the topic is once more buried 
in silence by, as it seems, a process of collective self-denial. The latest 
example is from spring 2008, when the historian Osmo Hyytiä published 
his new book “Helmi Suomen maakuntien joukossa – Suomalainen Itä-
Karjala 1941-1944” (The Pearl of Finnish Provinces – Finnish Eastern 
Karelia 1941-1944). Hyytiä very systematically describes the Finnish 
administration of Eastern Karelia during the occupation period, includ-
ing the concentration camps.  
The book “Suur-Suomen kahdet kasvot” (The Double Faces of the 
Greater Finland), which was published by the historian Antti Laine in 
1982, was the first study that initiated a debate about the Karelian 
camps. He was himself very careful to point out that there are no paral-
lels or similarities between the German concentration camps during the 
war and the Finnish methods to isolate the Russians in Eastern Karelia. 
A big concentration and labor camp was opened in Äänislinna (Petroza-
vodsk; today Petroskoi) in October 1941. The highest number of inhab-
itants in the camps was reached during spring 1942, when up to 24 000 
persons lived in different camps around Petrozavodsk. Laine estimated 
that the number of inmates made up 27 per cent of the total population in 
the occupied territories (Laine 2002; Lindholm 2005). 
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Following the public debate, it seems to be easy to associate the term 
“concentration camp” with the Nazi annihilation camps, although the 
Finnish concentration camps in Eastern Karelia had totally other func-
tions. For political or military reasons a part of the Russian population 
was regarded a security risk for the occupying power. The Finnish mili-
tary authorities in Eastern Karelia needed to transfer a lot of people to 
other parts of the territory for different reasons: Some of them were a 
security risk, others just needed protection, and some were marked out 
for expulsion but needed a place to stay during the waiting time. 
Because of diseases and famine the mortality was quite high in the 
camps as well as outside the camps, but in general the camps were not 
places of executions and systematic torture. Still, the selection for the 
camps was based on nationality and ideological criteria, so from the se-
lection perspective the Karelian camps could be compared with the 
German concentration camps. Irrespective of similarities or differences 
with the Nazi-German camps, the existence of Finnish concentration 
camps in Eastern Karelia has always been politically sensitive. 
In public debate the existence of the concentration camps in Eastern 
Karelia has often been related to the cooperation between Finland and 
Nazi Germany. The animosity against a deeper discussion about the 
Holocaust is not only caused by the debate about the camps. When 
Hyytiä, in his book, pointed out that the military commander-in-chief, 
Marshal Mannerheim, established the camps on a direct order, the de-
bate focused even more on how the legendary national hero was treated 
in relation to the concentration camps. Critical comments – not always 
based on facts – maintaining that Mannerheim’s co-operation with Hitler 
and his employment of “Nazi methods” was more of an ideological than 
of a pragmatic nature, met with a strong reaction from the nationalist 
camp in defense of the Marshal.5 
This nationally quite sensitive issue, indicating that there was a 
strong relation between the Finnish concentration camps and Nazi ideol-
ogy, definitely reduced the chances for an open debate about the Holo-
caust in Finland. There was an obvious risk that some could draw the 
conclusion that Finland was involved in the structures of the Holocaust – 
which seems to have generated silence as well as a focus on the more 
heroic aspects of the war.  
 
5  The debate on the website of the popular scientific journal Tiede, 





History is in daily use all the time, and for different purposes. Some as-
pects of history are used very actively – for example for political or ide-
ological purposes. Some other aspects of history are used more seldom 
or are actually denied – also for political or ideological reasons. 
The lack of discussion concerning various chapters in the Finnish 
World War II history is best understood when interpreted in light of po-
litical or ideological reasons. Particularly important reasons are, as ar-
gued in this article, the co-operation with Nazi Germany, the extradition 
of Jews, the establishment of concentration camps under the territorial 
expansion during the Continuation War 1941-1944, and not the least, the 
massacres and mass graves from the Civil War 1918. These are all as-
pects of a past where the Finns have been victims, perpetrators, collabo-
rators and heroes. The uses of national history in relation to a past that 
has been closely tied up to international events might create an existen-
tial void in the Finnish memory culture. As Karlsson makes clear in this 
volume, individuals have a need to arrange their histories “in order to 
uphold or intensify feelings of orientation, anchorage and identity in a 
society”. Especially traumatic events need to be integrated into larger, 
common narratives. Such a void could create uneasiness both in the po-
litical institutions and estrangement amongst Finns from their estab-
lished past. 
The unwillingness to debate Finland’s role in relation to the Holo-
caust, has also had consequences for the didactics of history, especially 
when it comes to education in schools and the content of the curricula. 
As already mentioned, the Swedish-speaking schools readily imported 
didactical and practical working methods from Sweden and Norway, 
while there has been more genuine passivity in the Finnish-speaking 
schools, although with some exceptions. The national history of patriot-
ism and courage has overlooked – and continues to overlook – the more 
painful aspects of history of Finland. To all this should be added the 
complex political situation of Finland during the postwar period until the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Bearing the position in the shadow of 
the Bolshevik Kremlin in mind, it is quite obvious why the discussion of 
the Holocaust and the relation to Nazi Germany was not at the top of the 
political agenda. The fate of Finland was to change from having close 
relations to Nazi Germany to being part of the sphere of interest of the 
Soviet Union, and with the strong influence of Moscow it was not ap-
propriate to raise the question of concentration camps and executions. 
This might be quite understandable when discussing such a young na-
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tion state as Finland; especially taking into consideration how young the 
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“When you look at these hammocks in three 
layers [...] when it has become a museum here 
[...] it really does not say much. Because the 
inmates are not here, the stench is not here [...]. 
In the night prisoners went out of the barrack and 
touched the electric fence, they could not take 
anymore. And in the morning dead prisoners 
were hanging on these fences [...]. These are 
things we experienced and which cannot be 
visualized by looking at these hammocks.”1 
Holocaust survivor, Robert Savosnick, 
Auschwitz, November 1992. 
 
 
A Holocaust  survivor revisit ing Auschwitz 
 
In the fall of 1992, 50 years after the deportation from Norway, the 77 
year old pediatrician returned to Auschwitz for the first time since the 
end of World War II. His second meeting with the former concentration 
camp was taped by a journalist. The tape is today located in the archives 
of the Jewish Museum in Trondheim.  
Robert Savosnick returned to a camp landscape which at the time 
was in the limelight of intense international attention (Van Pelt/Dwork 
1996). A few months later, parallel to Steven Spielberg’s world wide 
 
1  The Jewish Community of Trondheim 1992. 
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box office success “Schindler’s list”, a group of experts gathered to dis-
cuss the future of Auschwitz as a cultural memory, museum and site of 
learning (Marrus 1999). In spite of varying professional views on best 
practices for the preservation of the world’s largest cemetery and memo-
rial site, there was, and still exists, a broad consensus that the material 
presence of such disturbing remains benefits international society 
(Schofield/Johnson/Beck 2000). 
A significant manifestation of this consensus is the fact that Ausch-
witz, as the only remnant of the Nazi camp system, is placed on the 
UNESCO World Heritage List. In its “Statement of significance”, the 
communicative power of these material remains is highlighted as fol-
lows: 
 
“At the centre of a huge landscape of human exploitation and suffering, the 
remains of the two camps of Auschwitz I and Auschwitz II-Birkenau, as well 
as its Protective Zone were placed on the World Heritage List as evidence of 
this inhumane, cruel and methodical effort to deny human dignity to groups 
considered inferior, leading to their systematic murder. The camps are a vivid 
testimony to the murderous nature of the anti-Semitic and racist Nazi policy 
that brought about the annihilation of more than 1.2 million people in the 
crematoria, 90 % of whom were Jews.” (Unesco 2009) 
 
Remains of camp barracks and buildings, crematoria, watch-towers and 
barbed wire fences tend to function as material evidence of the Nazi pol-
icies of mass murder. However, concrete localizations of the past also 
bear several inherent dilemmas and challenges. Perhaps it was the risk of 
intellectual simplifications Savosnick had in mind, when he exclaimed 
outside one of the barracks in Auschwitz I: “When it has become a mu-
seum here, it really does not say much.” His statement can be interpret-
ed as a reflection over the possibilities and limitations both of the physi-
cal site, of architecture and language. As such, Savosnick positioned 
himself in the centre of a discourse which artists, authors, film directors, 
academics and others have been grappling with ever since Theodor 
Adorno’s famous dictum on writing poetry after Auschwitz (Adorno 
1969; Friedländer 1992; Levi/Rothberg 2003).  
The taped revisit to Auschwitz almost 20 years ago illuminates sev-
eral historio-cultural aspects of the Holocaust. On the one hand, we can 
understand his, the witness’, thoughts as a message of concern: What 
have we really learnt, or what is there possibly to learn, from the Holo-
caust? Perhaps he also alluded to the problems of inscribing Auschwitz 
into our present understanding of reality? Regardless of what kinds of, 
and how many, cultural and didactical representations we make about 
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the Holocaust, the past itself is irrevocably gone – “the prisoners are 
missing, the stench is missing”. In my opinion, the dialogue between 
Robert Savosnick and a fellow traveler in the ruins of Auschwitz consti-
tutes a small image of a complex interplay between private and collec-
tive memories, between consumption and production of history, between 
past realities and representations of the same. It is this interplay which 
the following text will discuss, empirically based on some of the former 
Nazi camp complexes established on Norwegian soil during WWII.2  
 
 
The afterl i fe  of  the prison camps in  Norway 
 
The postwar European memorial sites which rose from the ruins of the 
Nazi camp system have been formative for the present iconographic sta-
tus of the Holocaust in the Western World (Levy/Schneider 2002: 87). 
Particularly in the last few years, parallel to the inevitable passing away 
of the survivors, these landscapes have become increasingly important 
as evidence of truth of the Nazi mass crimes (Engelhardt 2002: 18). In 
Germany alone there are over 100 so-called Gedenkstätten in remaining 
physical environments from the concentration camps – with Sachsen-
hausen, Dachau, Neuengamme, Buchenwald and Bergen Belsen among 
the most well-known. Equivalent sites constitute significant cultural 
symbols in other countries as well, such as Terezin in the Czech Repub-
lic, Froeslevlejren in Denmark, Westerbork in the Netherlands or Mau-
thausen in Austria (Lutz 2009).3 And in the indisputable centre of this 
characteristic European landscape we find Auschwitz, which attracts 
more than one million visitors a year. The museum and the memorial 
site symbolize not only a place name and the main scene of the imple-
mentation of the Holocaust. Auschwitz has also become a concept for 
absolute evil, close to incomparable with other genocides and crimes 
 
2  Nazi Germany established close to 500 prison camps in Norway between 
1940-45. A total number of 150 000 people were incarcerated in these fa-
cilities during the war. Among these, there were around 44 000 Norwegian 
political prisoners, of whom 8 500 were deported to concentration camps 
on the continent. Furthermore, 100 000 Soviet Prisoners of War (POWs), 
4 200 Yugoslavian POWs and 1 600 Polish POWs were deported to Nor-
way from 1941 onwards. About 15 000 East European POWs died in so-
called Stalags, numerous satellite camps and work battalions in Norway – 
either by execution or as a consequence of systematic maltreatment, ex-
haustion, starvation and disease. These numbers exceeded the total Nor-
wegian military and civilian loss of lives during WWII. See Soleim 2005.  
3  Analyses of such landscapes can be found in Bodemann 1998; Marcuse 
2001; Young 1993. 
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against humanity – a phenomenon which sociologist Ronit Lentin has 
labeled the Auschwitz code (Karlsson 2005; Lentin 1992).  
The majority of the Jews who were deported to Auschwitz from all 
corners of Europe had already prior to the transports experienced suffer-
ing and death in camps and ghettos in their home countries. Most of the 
deported Norwegian Jews in the fall of 1942 and winter of 1943 were 
incarcerated either in Berg prison camp outside of Tönsberg, Sydspissen 
prison camp near Tromsö, Bredtvedt prison and Grini prison camp in 
Oslo, or the SS camp Falstad outside of Trondheim.4  
It was on the remnants of the latter camp complex where the Norwe-
gian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jonas Gahr Støre, inaugurated the 
Falstad Centre in October 2006. This institution is today a state-
sponsored study centre for the history of imprisonment during WWII 
and modern human rights issues. The Centre, located in the former main 
building of the SS Lager Falstad, offers its visitors exhibitions, educa-
tional programs, research facilities, a library, seminar rooms and full ac-
commodation.5 During the official opening of the centre, the foreign 
minister reflected on the dynamic functions of cultural buildings, and 
that it remains in our power to change their meaning and content:  
 
“Buildings, monuments and symbols are established through choice and ac-
tion. It is also in our power to change or expand the meanings and contents of 
these symbols: to become monuments, memorials, sites of experience, narra-
tives, communication and education. This is what is now happening to Falstad. 
We are doing something with the site, which is now to become a national 
study centre for the history of WWII imprisonment and human rights. Many 
years of hard work have come – not to an end – but to a new beginning.” 
(Støre 2006) 
 
I understand this statement as a call to avoid memorial sites being de-
picted as static expressions of a definite, collective memory. These re-
flections are also shared by the linguist James Young. In his book The 
Texture of Memory he calls for memorial sites where material, political 
and esthetical factors merge and contribute to dialogue and active social 
commitment (Young 1993: x). It is within this image we must position 
the landscape and the institution Falstad, which lately has been subject 
 
4  772 Norwegian Jews were deported during WW II. Only 34 survived. Al-
together 230 families were annihilated. See Justis- og politidepartementet 
1998. 
5  On behalf of the Norwegian Government, the restoration works were un-
dertaken by the owner of the building, The Directorate of Public Construc-
tion and Property, in the years 2004-06. More here: www.falstadsenteret. 
no. 
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to several public and even heated debates. The controversies around Fal-
stad have had both historical, conceptual overtones – for instance with 
regard to what epochs of the site’s history to include in the research and 
educational activities of the centre – but also material, like the shaping 
of the memorial in the Falstad Forest and the renovation of existing 
building structures at Falstad.6 
In a broader postwar perspective, however, these remains of the Nazi 
camp system established in Norway have existed only in the margins of 
the national historical culture.7 This phenomenon has a complex back-




The histor io-cultura l  ex it  of  the camps  
 
In 1985 the author and famous Holocaust survivor Primo Levi wrote 
about the relationship between the presence of the camp facilities and 
the spirit of the times: 
 
“If we had been asked as we were liberated: ‘What do you want to do with 
these infected huts, these nightmare barbed wire fences, these multiple cess-
pits, these ovens, these gallows?’ I think most of us would have said, ‘Away 
with it all. Flatten it, raze it to the ground, together with Nazism and every-
thing that is German.’” (Levi 2005: 82) 
 
To a certain extent, this appeared to be a real scenario in parts of Nor-
way during the peace summer of 1945. Particularly hit by this mental 
condition were the camps for East European prisoners-of-war in North-
ern Norway, where the density of camps was superior to other regions of 
the country. Tearing down watch-towers, barbed wire fences and burn-
ing camp barracks might be interpreted as collective acts of symbolism, 
 
6  Falstad has since the 1920s functioned as a special school for delinquent 
boys, as an SS Camp during the War Years 1941-45, as an internment 
camp for Norwegian Nazis and war criminals, from 1950 onwards yet 
again as a special school for so-called mentally disabled pupils, and finally 
as a museum and memorial site. One of the Falstad debates was the empir-
ical focus of the PhD dissertation by Sem 2009. 
7  This fact does by no means indicate an overall weak Norwegian tradition 
of WWII remembrance. On the contrary, no other period in our history has 
given rise to a corresponding amount of memorials and monuments. These 
can be found everywhere in the public sphere, and they have been inaugu-
rated with great momentum in postwar Norway. See Eriksen 1995. 
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maybe also as a continuation of the war – this time against the raw mate-
riality of the Nazi past.  
These concrete, physical actions to remove camp remnants from the 
North-Norwegian cultural landscape were soon followed by the harsh 
realities of the Cold War. With the repatriation of 80 000 Soviet POWs 
from Norway, and an increasing suspiciousness of Russian espionage, 
this narrative of suffering and mass death was rapidly positioned in the 
shadowlands of the Norwegian historical culture. One of the major man-
ifestations of the Cold War politics was the so called Operation Asfalt, a 
state-directed operation where the remains of dead Soviet POWs in the 
northern counties Nordland, Troms and Finnmark were dug up, collect-
ed in large sacks of asphalt and transported to the war cemetery Tjøtta 
on the Helgeland Coast (Soleim 2005). This action was described by the 
Soviet government as an “insult to the memory of Soviet soldiers”, and 
it caused significant diplomatic turbulence between Norway and the So-
viet Union. Only after the dissolution of the Soviet state did the climate 
of memory politics improve. 
Instrumental to the public disinterest in this catastrophe, is probably 
furthermore the fact that 360 Norwegians, among them many returned 
Waffen-SS soldiers from the Eastern Front, served as guards in German 
POW camps. Some of these camps had extreme death rates among the 
prisoner population. A former Yugoslavian POW recalls in his memoirs:  
 
“These Hird guards [the political soldiers of the Norwegian Nazi Party, Nas-
jonal Samling, authors note] were more dangerous than the SS guards. They 
beat and tormented us; they shot us like sparrows, in the work commandos and 
on the way there.” (Reitan 2007)  
 
The public marginalization of this catastrophic experience represents 
one, among several, instances of a lack of elasticity in the Norwegian 
historical culture. However, there is reason to believe that new research 
and other historical products about the Norwegian Waffen-SS volunteers 
will contribute to new ways of interpreting, representing and using 
WWII.8  
With regard to another camp category in Norway, the so called 
Polizeihäftlingslager, where mainly political prisoners were incarcer-
ated, it is to some extent surprising that these landscapes have occupied 
a modest position in the Norwegian historical culture. The sites in many 
ways reflected the catastrophic and painful consequences of resistance 
 
8  The Holocaust Centre in Oslo is also conducting a research project on the 
Norwegian SS Volunteers, which will be finalised in 2010. Other recent 
publications on this issue are Christie 2008 and Veum 2009. 
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and fierce fight against the Nazi system of terror – in other words, the 
nucleus of the Norwegian Gründungsmythos. The Polizeihäftlingslager 
perfectly projected an unambiguous moral, dichotomical system of 
“good” (prisoners from the Norwegian Resistance Movement) and 
“evil” (the brutal German SS camp regimes). From this angle, there is a 
strange disparity between, for instance, the history of Grini on the one 
hand, the largest prison camp in Norway with a population of close to 
20 000 prisoners, a war experience which has produced many memoir 
books, and on the other hand the afterlife of the camp landscape Grini.9 
The material memory of the prison camp is today mediated through two 
monuments, the last one inaugurated by the HM Crown Prince Harald in 
1990, and a low-budget, and non-professional museum exhibition, locat-
ed in the former Abteilung Vermittlung of the camp. The Grini Museum 
was opened on May 8th 1997.10 
One possible explanation for this can relate to the 93 000 Norwe-
gians investigated under suspicion of treason. To meet the extensive 
demands for space during the up-coming war trials, 200 prison camps 
were established – many of them on the remains of abandoned Nazi in-
stallations (Nilssen 2008). Several of the largest camp complexes during 
the war were transformed into permanent internment camps for Norwe-
gian Nazis and sympathizers – such as Grini, Falstad, Espeland near 
Bergen, Krøkebærsletta in Tromsdalen and Berg near Tønsberg. 
In the summer of 1945, pragmatic spatial arguments and solutions 
seemed to merge into symbolic ones. Newspapers were on the one hand 
filled with articles on the lack of space within the Norwegian prison ad-
ministration. In the local newspaper Vestfold Arbeiderblad we can read 
about camp Berg on May 24th 1945: “The police are still arresting the 
traitors. But there is a need for space for the arrested. The police are 
therefore now working on expanding the prisons. At Berg there are now 
400 men, but they intend to incarcerate 100 more in there” (Bugge 2001: 
197). On the other hand, there was an obvious symbolism in placing Na-
zis behind the same barbed wire fences where “good” Norwegians had 
suffered during the war. And the most central camp complexes were re-
named, to signal new meanings and avoid any possible linkage and 
comparison between the political prisoners, the “men of honor” impris-
oned in these sites 1940-45, and the “quislings” populating the same 
 
9  Among the most famous books about Grini are those by Lange/Schreiner 
1946-7 and Nansen 1946. 
10  The museum does not have a web page. Information of the museum and 
opening hours, Sundays 12-15, can be found on the web pages of the local 
authorities, Bærum Kommune, www.baerum.kommune.no. 
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physical environments after the war. As such, Grini, Falstad and Berg 
were renamed into Ilebu, Innherad and Sem prison camps respectively. 
In relation to the symbolic and real processes of transformations dur-
ing the summer of 1945, I have found no references to the tragic impris-
onment of the Jews prior to the deportations to Auschwitz. A number of 
emotional articles about the new names and functions of the camp facili-
ties alluded to “the strong, national resistance movement”, not to the 
Nazi mass murder of Jews and East European POWs. And it is former 
political prisoners and resistance fighters who express themselves, in 
particular through the interest groups “Griniklubben”, “Falstad-
komiteen” or “Norsk Samband av Politiske Fanger” – later to be re-
named “Foreningen av politiske fanger”. It was also the latter which first 
initiated the establishment of the Grini Museum. Many war veteran or-
ganizations closed down their activities during the Anniversary of Lib-
eration in 2005. Until now, there is regrettably no substantial research on 
the vast archives which the veterans left behind, and on the positions and 
functions of these actors in the Norwegian historical culture. 
Within this specific context it seems easy to draw parallels from the 
early afterlife of the camps to other categories of historical products 
from the same period of time. Significant features in the formatting of 
the public uses of the war past can, for instance, be found in the three 
volume work “Norges krig”, published in the years 1947-1950. In an 
analysis of this book, historian Synne Corell writes that it is loaded with 
linguistic and harmonic references to a Norwegian fellowship communi-
ty (Corell 2007). According to Corell, several groups of people are 
placed outside of a “we-category”. Norwegian Jews are practically ex-
cluded from the overall narrative, while members of the Norwegian Nazi 
Party are labeled as social or moral dregs of society. Furthermore, the 
East European tragedy unfolding on Norwegian soil from 1941 onwards 
is hardly mentioned by the authors.11 
In a national, consolidating process of reconstruction, there was no 
room for the two prisoner categories in Norway that fell victims to the 
Nazi genocidal policy. None of them could be integrated into a morally 
edifying image of resistance fighters and heroes, a feature which histori-
an Ole Kristian Grimnes in 1990 called the “national syndrome of con-
sensus” (Grimnes 1990). According to Grimnes, the Norwegian wartime 
experience served as a marker of a positive, national formation of identi-
ty throughout the postwar years. This essential feature seems to merge 
with the findings of historian Pieter Lagrou in The Legacy of Nazi Oc-
 
11  Corresponding patterns of inclusion – exclusion can be found in school 
textbooks. See for instance Skarsem 2007. 
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cupation, where he demonstrates surprisingly many points of resem-
blance regarding how western countries constructed a national epos after 
WWII. Within the establishment of so-called patriotic cultures of re-
membrance there simply was no place for the Jewish catastrophe, be-
cause this narrative was not usable in producing edifying meaning 
(Lagrou 2000: 2).  
In addition to this, there is a perspective of cultural memories, or 
perhaps – rather a lack of it. Archive research has so far proven that rel-
evant Norwegian authorities after the war remained indifferent to these 
camp landscapes as cultural memories or future environments of learn-
ing.12 In an extensive archive of the Ministry of Justice and the Police, 
which managed the former camp facilities in the early postwar period, a 
letter from the director of Ilebu prison camp to the Ministry, dated Sep-
tember 3rd 1948, might serve to illustrate the status of the camp land-
scapes after the war: 
 
“The watch-towers surrounding the inner camp area at Ilebu, built by the 
Germans, are – except from the towers in each corner – not in use. The towers 
that are placed between these corner towers obstruct the view, which makes it 
difficult to monitor. For this reason we suggest to tear down the towers, and 
possibly reuse the materials here at Ilebu.”13 
 
This letter also illustrates a postwar climate where the country was hit by 
a general lack of commodities. At times, this deficit was so precarious 
that barrack buildings in partly good shape were dismantled and used for 
other purposes. This happened repeatedly both at Falstad and Grini. For 
instance, a letter from a shoe factory in Halden to the postwar camp ad-
ministration at Ilebu says: “We know from the daily press that disman-
tled barracks from Ilebu are put up for sale. We need barracks for work-
ing houses; there is a glaring shortage of rooms for workers in our com-
pany.”14 
Around 1950, the majority of the internment camps for Norwegian 
Nazis were closed down, only to be given new functions – as public 
school institutions (Falstad), regular prisons (Grini) or community 
homes (Berg, today, in 2010, a so-called open prison). As such, the ma-
 
12  This subject will be elaborated more in my ongoing PhD dissertation, 
Norske bilder av tilintetgjørelsen. Holocaust og historiekultur, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, Trondheim. The project will be 
published in 2011. 
13  Riksarkivet. Fengselsstyrets landssvikavdeling, D II, Da – Sakarkiv, sak 
21, eske Da 0065 “Ilebu”. Letter dated 03.09.1948. 
14  Riksarkivet. Fengselsstyrets landssvikavdeling, D II, Da – Sakarkiv, sak 
21, eske Da 0065 “Ilebu”. Letter dated 15.12.1948. 
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jor camp sites progressively were taken out of their historical, World 
War context. These many-faceted layers of different and changing 
meanings deposited in the camps’ history of effects arguably corrupted 
the potentials of these sites as stable, moral, didactical and political 
points of identification. In particular, it seems that there were, for several 
years, difficult growing conditions for memorial arenas in landscapes 
overcrowded with the losers and traitors of the war. It is probably in the 
combination of these factors where we can find the answers to why the 
prison camps soon were consigned to the dark shadows of the national 
historical culture – in contrast to other history products from the same 
time, like books and memoirs, TV series, films and unambiguous mon-
uments commemorating the heroes of the war, as elaborated by Zander 
in this volume. 
 
 
The return of  the camp landscapes 
 
Elsewhere in Europe there are examples of preservation of camp instal-
lations from the late 1940s. Most often education and democratization 
formed an ideological and moral back curtain to cultural memory pro-
jects of this kind. However, several have born fruit only since the 1970s 
(Marcuse 2001). In Norway, these historio-cultural movements took 
place at a much later stage. How can we explain that the former Nazi in-
stallations have again engaged the Norwegian public interest? And in 
what kind of narratives are these sites molded today, over 60 years after 
their disappearance from the public eye? 
The decade between 1990 and 2000 represented in general a para-
digm with regard to the level of public consciousness around former Na-
zi institutions in the country. Several new centers, like the Centre for 
Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities in Oslo, the 
Nordsjøfartmuseet in Telavåg, Falstadsenteret, Nord-Norsk Fredssenter 
in Narvik and Stiftelsen Arkivet in Kristiansand were founded with 
some form of state support in this period. Research, remembrance and 
education constitute core institutional practices.15 In spite of variations 
regarding historical background and institutional profiling, all of them 
communicate the following main educational target: The wartime expe-
rience is to be used as a tool for stimulating the fight against racism and 
intolerance, and for human rights, democratization and humanitarian 
commitment. In other words, nurturing and safeguarding the memory of 
 
15  The North Norwegian Peace Center in Narvik 1990, The Espeland Prison 
Camp Foundation in Bergen 2000, Falstad Memorial and Human Rights 
Centre 2000, The Archive Foundation in Kristiansand 2001. 
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WWII is quite simply not enough to legitimize their public function, ex-
istence and state sponsoring. For instance, the Archive Foundation in 
Kristiansand, located in the former Gestapo headquarters in the city, is 
promoting itself as a centre for “history communication and peace-
building”, Falstad is a “memorial site and human rights center”, while 
the North Norwegian Peace Centre in Narvik, localized in close prox-
imity to the former death camp Beisfjord, profiles a bilateral focus on 
“peace” and “war memorialization”.16  This mindset, imprinted in all 
new memorial site concepts in Norway, seems to attract increasing at-
tention from the state educational sector. As such, they might to some 
extent appear like competing elements to the older institution Founda-
tion White Buses to Auschwitz, which in the past two decades has sent 
around 130 000 school pupils to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Accompanied by 
former concentration camp inmates, the articulated target of these travels 
is for the students to learn, existentially and morally, from the experi-
ences of the Holocaust.17  
There are numerous other examples to illuminate this phenomenon 
of practical-political uses of history in Norway today. When the foreign 
minister spoke at the opening of the Falstad Centre in October 2006, his 
speech contained several temporal shifts and references from the ex-
treme realities of the Nazi camps and the SS camp at Falstad, to contem-
porary issues of treatment of prisoners, international binding conven-
tions and the human rights profile of the Norwegian Government: 
 
“Everyone imprisoned at Falstad, and everyone today incarcerated at Guan-
tanamo Bay in Cuba, in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, or other places, and in 
all places not carrying recognisable names: They have the right to humanitari-
an treatment, and to be protected against injustice, torture, and against degrad-
ing and inhumane actions and punishment.” (Støre 2006) 
 
In the National State Budget for 2009, the respective memorial institu-
tions were organized in a separate Chapter, Chap. 255 “Grants to Peace- 
and Human Rights Centres”. A corresponding use of history is clearly 
mirrored also here, when the so called KUF committee in the National 
Parliament (Church, Education and Research) noted that preservation 
and access to the past is an important task to “avoid a repetition of histo-
ry”: 
 
“The committee notes that in order to understand phenomena in our own time, 
such as denouncing, actualized for instance in Burma lately, it would be useful 
 
16  More here: www.fred.no and here: www.stiftelsen-arkivet.no.  
17  www.hvitebusser.no  
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if topics like ‘denouncement’ were included in the presentation of World War 
II. Furthermore, the committee notes that this could be arranged for instance at 
the Falstad Memorial and Human Rights Centre.” (KUF 2008)  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of this chapter outlines in particular the re-
lationship between the material evidence of the past and the fact that in a 
short time there will be no survivors left:  
 
“The KUF committee requested in the Budget Proposition S nr. 12 (2007-08) a 
case depicting the different perspectives of the varying memorial sites, and 
discussing the challenges of a time when we no longer have the witnesses 
among us. The Ministry has asked Vox [an agency of the Norwegian Ministry 
of Education and Research, my remark] to discuss with the Peace and Human 
Rights centers how to meet the National Parliament’s call in relation to the 
time witnesses.” (The Ministry of Education and Research 2008)  
 
Evidently, the new memorial sites seem – at least to some extent – to in-
herit a role as “new witnesses” in an ongoing generational paradigm 
shift. This development is arguably an expression of collective wishes, 
and not least needs, to stabilize the memory of the Holocaust and the Se-
cond World War in otherwise changeable times. This “Era of the Wit-
ness”, as this epoch is labeled by historian Annette Wieviorka (2006), 
has left several imprints in Norway.18 When the editor of the national 
newspaper Aftenposten in 2007 wrote that “we [...] are in the middle of 
a paradigm shift – without quite realizing the consequences of it”, he 
was referring to the witnesses from WWII and the fact that they soon 
will be gone.19 A kind of powerlessness and anxiety reflected on the sur-
face of the text: What awaits the collective “us” when there are no wit-
nesses left?  
In the fall of 2008, the Falstad Memorial and Human Rights Centre 
conducted geophysical investigations in the original camp area, targeting 
to uncover barrack foundations and other “things” originating from the 
SS camp. On September 29th 2008, director of the centre, Tone Jörstad, 
was interviewed in the biggest newspaper in Norway, Verdens Gang. 
Under the headline “Researchers intend to document Nazi traces”, she 
was quoted as saying: “The traces and remnants of evil must be secured, 
the existence of the camps must be documented and we need to establish 
 
18  For instance, the bestselling book, Tidsvitner – fortellinger fra Auschwitz 
og Sachsenhausen, was selected as “the most important book of the year” 
by the readers of the newspaper Morgenbladet in 2006: Jakob Lothe and 
Anette Storeide, ed., Tidsvitner – fortellinger fra Auschwitz og Sachsen-
hausen, Oslo: Gyldendal, 2006. 
19  Aftenposten, 20.10.2007. 
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a plan of preservation which must be integrated into the National Cul-
tural Heritage Act.” (Verdens Gang 2008) The examinations at Falstad 
continued in August 2009, including works to uncover unidentified mass 
graves in the former execution site – the Falstad Forest. Furthermore, 
2010 marks the beginning of a plan to establish a new site of learning 
and contemplation in the old camp area surrounding the main building at 
Falstad. It remains to be seen how this project is conceptualized. Any-
how, in light of already ongoing processes it seems as if contemporary 
archaeology will constitute a major element in the forthcoming Falstad 
memorial landscape. 
A smaller, but still similar, cultural heritage project is under devel-
opment at the Grini Museum in Oslo. In the 1950s, one of the original 
barracks from the camp was replaced as a storage building in the munic-
ipality of Bærum. Today, local politicians have committed themselves to 
returning the barrack to its original surroundings in the Grini landscape. 
The aim of the project is to exhibit objects made by former Grini in-
mates in the barrack, in order to integrate the building into the existing 
exhibition concept. A local politician gave the following statement on 
the matter: 
 
“It is important to speed up the process, so that we can finally return the Grini 
barrack to its original surroundings close to the museum. The war veterans are 
passing away, and therefore it is even more important to preserve history when 
those who carry it with them are gone. The Grini Museum constantly receives 
donations from families of Grini ex-prisoners. It would be a shame if we were 
to lose the opportunity to preserve the historical memorial site Grini and the 
personal memories from the former inmates.” (Senterpartiet 2007) 
 
In the contemporary Berg landscape, from where 227 Norwegian Jews 
were deported to Auschwitz during the war, only the former kitchen bar-
rack, a few prison cells and barrack foundations are all that remain from 
the authentic camp landscape. In cooperation with Berg prison, the 
Vestfold Fylkesmuseum in Tönsberg wishes to develop an exhibition 
concept on the history of the camp in situ, mainly based on original 
“things” and objects found in and around the remnants of the camp. Ac-
cording to the project leader this exhibition will open in 2010.20 The 
main target of the project is to “put Berg on the map”, thus making man-
ifest the ambition to convey lessons about the Nazi past and to push the 
history of the site and the Norwegian Holocaust towards the centre of 
our collective memory (Tønsberg Blad 2008).  
 
20  Conversation with Curator Rune Sørlie, Vestfold Fylkesmuseum, Töns-
berg, April 2009. 
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A consensus-like highlighting of the cultural, moral and educational 
qualities of the material presence of the past seems to be a central indi-
cator of our historio-cultural climate today. The historian Ewa Do-
manska speaks about a renewed, human “enchantment with things” and 
a “longing for reality”. Things, or objects, appear as crucial in the mak-
ing and legitimating of human identities, and as such function as active 
agents of social life: “The renewed interest in things signals a rejection 
of constructivism and textualism and the longing for what is ‘real’, 
where ‘regaining’ the object is conceived as a means for re-establishing 
contact with reality.” (Domanska 2006: 337-348) There is an obvious 
correlation between the advanced, general position of existential matters 
of life and death, good and evil in our cultural sphere, and the establish-
ing of memorial sites related to catastrophic experiences, such as natural 
disasters, wars, terror and genocide. Identifying the modern age with ex-
treme tragedies and occurrences is described by sociologist Kai Erickson 
as “one of the social and psychological signatures of our time” (Erickson 
1994: 240). 
There is, however, some sort of paradox, or antagonism, in the close 
to obsessive attitudes towards the value of specific, authentic “things” 
on the one hand, like archaeological findings of barrack foundations, and 
the general historio-cultural pattern of universalizing and globalizing the 
wartime history on the other. In describing the genocide of European 
Jewry as a representation of an emerging “transnational political morali-
ty” and a “meta-narrative for suffering”, historian Helmut Dubiel argues 
that the Holocaust has constituted a new practice of “a culture of apolo-
gy” by leading Western politicians (Dubiel 2003). In this particular con-
text it is interesting to register that the genocide has been incorporated 
into the narratives of the new Norwegian memorial sites, even in cases 
where historical lines of connection to the Holocaust are rather remote. 
This condition is manifested not least through rituals of commemora-
tion, where the international Holocaust Day of Remembrance, on each 
January 27th, nowadays attracts far more medial attention than the tradi-
tional dates of April 9th and Day of Liberation, May 8th.  
The gradual incorporation of the Holocaust in the profiling of the 
new Norwegian memorial institutions can obviously be seen in light of 
international historio-cultural movements. Many argue that there has 
been a so-called reversal of remembrance in the last decades, where the 
Holocaust has taken over the functions of conventionalized victim roles 
and narratives of resistance (Alexander 2002). The historian Christoph 
Cornelissen writes that the Holocaust in the 21st Century “einen Dreh- 
und Angelpunkt für die Formierung öffentlicher Erinnerungskulturen in 
Europa und Nordamerika abgegeben hat” (Cornelissen 2003). Daniel 
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Levy and Natan Sznaider describes the genocide as a container for a 
cosmopolitan or universal practice of commemoration (Levy/Sznaider 
2001), while historian Dan Diner seven years ago anticipated an estab-
lishment of a common European canon of remembrance in the image of 
the Holocaust: “The tendencies presently dominant indicates, that this 
will happen against the backdrop of the memory of the Holocaust as the 
constituting, in effect the inaugural event of a commonly shared Europe-
an memory.” (Diner 2003: 42) 
Regarding national, historio-cultural energies, the restitutions at the 
end of the 1990s were undoubtedly among the most momentous. It all 
started with the article “Det norske jøderanet” [“The hold-up against the 
Norwegian Jews”], published in the newspaper Dagens Næringsliv by 
journalist Bjørn Westlie, on May 27th 1995. The article, dealing with the 
economic liquidations of Jewish property by the Quisling regime, was 
printed in a context which usually tends to preserve national master nar-
ratives. The unconventional perspective of Westlie therefore reached the 
media limelight, both on a national and international scale. Combined 
with pressure from abroad, the article activated a movement with a con-
siderable effect on the position of the Holocaust in the Norwegian his-
torical culture. 
On June 26th 1998, three years after the article was published, the 
National Parliament Proposition nr. 82 was accepted in a Cabinet Meet-
ing after recommendations by the Ministry of Justice and Police. The 
contents of the Proposition, named “Et historisk og moralsk oppgjør 
med behandlingen i Norge av den økonomiske likvidasjon av den jødiske 
minoritet under den 2. verdenskrig”, referred to a preceding work pub-
lished as a White Paper called “Inndragning av jødisk eiendom i Norge 
under den 2. verdenskrig”.21 The historical and moral restitution had 
both an individual and a collective part. The first constituted a sum of 
money paid out to former victims of anti-Jewish actions as a token of 
acknowledgment, the latter, collective part, was divided into three sepa-
rate sections: a one-time allocation with the main target of preserving 
Jewish culture in future Norway, another amount going to Jewish cultur-
al actions abroad, and finally the financing of a national research center, 
today known as the Centre for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious 




21  Justis- og politidepartementet 1998, and Norges Offentlige Utredninger 
1997. The background chapter in the Proposition refers explicitly to the 





In the book Echoes of the Holocaust, historian Klas-Göran Karlsson 
writes that the Swedish Government Project “The Living History Fo-
rum” was a success with impact on several international levels. The es-
tablishment and the actions of this institution put Sweden on the world 
map, and deserve to be called a paradigm shift in the Swedish historical 
culture (Karlsson/Zander 2003: 15ff). The Norwegian restitution, and its 
history of effects, obtained a corresponding effect in Norway. In a time 
where several international movements of compensation (Karlsson 
2008: 58) were under way, Norway was the first country to conclude a 
process with such an economic and moral scope. This fact was dramati-
cally underscored when the country in 2003 became a full member of 
the institution Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust 
Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF). In 2009 Norway occu-
pied the Chairmanship of the ITF.  
In 2007, in Prague, all member states of the ITF adopted a so-called 
“Historic site Resolution”, highlighting the importance of identifying, 
marking and preserving sites of destruction – be they camp landscapes, 
ghettos or execution sites during the Holocaust – for posterity. The ex-
amples from Grini, Berg, Falstad and finally the ITF, illustrate clearly 
the reinforced national and international history-cultural positions of 
memorial sites. Our present “enchantment with things”, the globalization 
and universalization of the Holocaust together form solid political, social 
and cultural foundations to the once forgotten camp landscapes and en-
vironments. Still, it seems rather striking that along this main current of 
positive attitudes towards these disturbing remains of the past, there has 
hardly existed any counter flow, at least not in public Norway. For in-
stance, there is little Norwegian research analyzing effects of school pu-
pils visiting memorial sites from WWII. Do teaching and excursions to 
Falstad, Grini or Berg strengthen the democratic, tolerant and humani-
tarian stock of 15 year old pupils? Will travelling with the Foundation 
White Buses to Auschwitz immunize youth against xenophobia? By 
mirroring the experiences of the Holocaust in modern narratives on top-
ics such as informing or contemporary policies towards refugees, is 
there an inherent risk to assess the past ahistorically, and furthermore 
perhaps contribute to the establishing of black and white images of the 
world of yesterday and today? Can such juxtapositions of the past and 
present inflict upon us a blindness of perspectives in any way? A com-
prehensive research project “The Role of commemoration sites, original 
sites and historical museums in Holocaust Education and Human Rights 
Education in the EU”, conducted by the Living History Forum with vast 
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international expertise on board, was published in January 2010.22 Hope-
fully this project, illuminating questions and subjects as presented 
above, can stimulate future Norwegian research within this field of ex-
pertise.  
According to historian Tony Kushner, it is precisely the abstracted, 
universal aspect of the Holocaust which in the past few decades has 
made the Holocaust so usable in the liberal world of imagination – cen-
tered on values like pluralism, tolerance and diversity (Kushner 1994: 
272ff). In regard to future perceptions, negotiations and uses of past Na-
zi relics, I think the former camp landscapes will occupy even more 
prominent positions and functions than is the case today. It is probably 
the combination of these factors which stimulated Foreign Minister Jo-
nas Gahr Støre when he addressed former camp inmates, their children 
and grandchildren at the opening of the Falstad Memorial in 2006: 
“Buildings, monuments and symbols are established through choice and 
action. It is also in our power to change or expand the meanings and 
contents of these symbols [...]. Many years of hard work have come – 
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The Norwegian Fascist Monument at 
Stiklestad 1944-45 
TOR EINAR FAGERLAND AND TROND RISTO NILSSEN  
 
 
In 1944, the Norwegian national socialist party, Nasjonal Samling (NS), 
erected a large monument at the historically and symbolically important 
place of Stiklestad in central Norway. A few days after the May 1945 
liberation, the monument was demolished and removed by the Norwe-
gian resistance movement, with the exception of a nine meter tall obe-
lisk, which was too big to be removed. The obelisk was instead torn 
down and buried at the site.  
Raised by Norwegian ultra-nationalists, and not by the German oc-
cupants, the monument represents a difficult and ambiguous part of 
Norwegian war history that does not agree well with clear-cut distinc-
tions between the German aggressor on the one side, and a united Nor-
wegian opposition on the other. Since 2006, attempts have been under-
way to uncover remains of the monument.1 The idea is to make a partial 
excavation of the buried obelisk, and to produce a study exhibition at the 
site, focusing on uses and abuses of the past, problematic features of na-
tionalism and the handling of difficult aspects of the past in contempo-
rary Norway. After giving an introduction to the historical site of Sti-
klestad, this paper first discusses the NS-monument in the light of inter-
national literature on historical places, monuments and counter-
monuments. It then turns to the didactic challenges and potential of the 
buried monument, discussing how a painful and ambiguous past might 
become a tool for reflection and dialogue.  
 
1  The authors of this paper are both members of a task group established by 
the board at Stiklestad National Culture Centre in 2006. See Raaen 2007. 
TOR EINAR FAGERLAND AND TROND RISTO NILSSEN 
78 
Stiklestad: A place of history – a place of memory 
 
For almost one thousand years, Stiklestad has remained Norway’s most 
important historical place. Stiklestad is important for both political and 
religious reasons and plays an important part in the Norwegian collec-
tive memory on a local, regional and national level.2 Its fame dates back 
to 1030, when Stiklestad was the scene of a great battle where the Chris-
tian king Olav II Haraldsson (1015-1030) was killed by his opponents. 
Shortly after the battle, rumours of the dead king’s healing power started 
to circulate. Defeat was turned into victory as the dead king was sancti-
fied.3 After the battle, Olav was moved to Nidaros, and miracle stories 
connected to St. Olav soon turned Nidaros into an important destination 
for pilgrims.4 The legacy of St. Olav also made Nidaros and central 
Norway a natural choice for the new archbishop’s seat in Norway in 
1153. In addition, “ruling on behalf of St. Olav – the eternal king of 
Norway” became an important part of the political legitimacy of all later 
medieval kings in Norway (Krag 2003: 117). The battle of Stiklestad in 
1030 thereby marks the breakthrough of both Christianity and a unified 
national kingdom in Norway.  
In the nationalist era of the late 19th and early 20th century, Stiklestad 
became a popular venue for national gatherings. In 1930, 40 000 people 
attended the 900-year anniversary of the battle in 1030. The NS, whose 
establishment in 1933 was inspired by the NSDAP’s ascent to power in 
Germany, chose to gather at Stiklestad already in 1934. At St. Olav’s 
Day on 29 July 1944, the party celebrated the 10th anniversary of its 
presence at the site.  
Today, an annually recurring expression of the place’s symbolic val-
ue is found in the play “The Saint Olav drama”, staged at Scandinavia’s 
largest open air theatre. The play, which was first performed in 1954, at-
tracts an annual number of 20 000 spectators and is the result of exten-
 
2  The use of the term “collective memory” has been criticized for its vague-
ness. The critics have, however, not yet been able to introduce a more sat-
isfactory analytical tool for understanding the social dimension of 
memory. And as the British historian Bill Niven points out: “Its very 
vagueness, perhaps, is the source not just to our dissatisfaction with it, but 
also of its appeal” (Niven 2008: 427-436). 
3  The cult connected to the dead king spread out throughout Scandinavia 
and Northern Europe. In England he soon became the most popular saint, 
and the worship of St. Olav has left traces all over the British Isles, the 
oldest one dating back to the 1160s. See Krag 2003:116 
4  Nidaros is the historical name of today’s city of Trondheim. Norway’s 
third largest city, Trondheim is located ninety kilometres south of Stikles-
tad. 
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sive cooperation between professionals from across the country and lo-
cal amateurs and volunteers (Kvistad 2003).  
 
Picture 1: Stiklestad 1930. At the 900-years anniversary of the battle of 






Photo credit: Alf Dahling, Stiklestad Nasjonale Kultursenter, Norway. 
 
 
NS and St iklestad 
 
The NS came to power in 1940, with the help of the German occupants. 
The party was based partly on a national socialist ideology, partly on a 
radical version of traditional national values (Sørensen 1989: 27-70). 
While in power, it worked energetically to promote its own interpreta-
tion of traditional Norwegian values and symbols. In order to legitimize 
its collaboration with the German occupants and the attempt to convert 
Norway into a national socialist society, NS made extensive use of old-
Norse history (Sørensen 1998: 27-46).  
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Picture 2: Vidkun Quisling unveils the monument in 1944. 
Photo credit: Unknown, Stiklestad Nasjonale Kultursenter, Norway. 
 
By means of the monument at Stiklestad the party aimed to establish a 
spiritual and ideological link between the medieval king and patron 
saint, King Olav Haraldsson, and the party leader, Vidkun Quisling 
(Mehle 1944: 211). The monument was created by the famous sculptor 
and NS-member Wilhelm Rasmussen, and in contrast to previous and 
later installations at Stiklestad, the NS-monument was huge and domi-
nating. It consisted of a large flight of steps, a relief displaying the battle 
at Stiklestad in 1030 and the death of King Olav, and a nine meter tall 
obelisk displaying the sun wheel – the NS’ symbol, often worn by the 
storm troopers and party members as armlets and pins. Engraved in the 
obelisk were some lines from the poem “Tord Foleson” by the Norwe-
gian writer Per Sivle.5  

5  Tord Foleson was King Olav’s standard-bearer at the battle of Stiklestad. 
According to the myth, Foleson lost his life in the battle, but only after 
having managed to plant the king’s banner in the ground, where it would 
remain throughout the battle. The Poem was written in 1885, in a period 
when Norway was in union with Sweden, but when Norwegian national-
ism was dawning. Its most famous line reads as follows: “The symbol 
stands, even when man falls”.  
 The poem is also quoted in a Memorial Wall at the former concentration 
camp Bergen-Belsen commemorating the Norwegian prisoners there, thus 
showing how traditional nationalist symbols could be used for promoting 
very different ideas and messages.  
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In Norwegian tradition, World War II is portrayed as a period domi-
nated by national unity (Eriksen 1995: 42-94). Approximately 55 000 
Norwegians were, however, members of the NS during the war. Norwe-
gians thus had different opinions on the German occupation, and they 
responded to it in different ways. Since the large majority of the popula-
tion disliked collaboration with the occupants, it was important for the 
leadership and the members of NS to show that their motives were just 
as morally untainted and nationally orientated as the ones of the non-
collaborators. The use of traditional Norwegian symbols was an im-
portant part of the party’s political communication. The building of the 
NS-monument at Stiklestad was meant to be interpreted as a way of pre-
senting the party’s core values, internally towards its own members, and 
externally towards the rest of the Norwegian population.6  
The planning and building of the NS-monument at Stiklestad was 
not done by the Germans or in cooperation with the occupants. It was an 
entirely Norwegian project, demonstrating the will and ability of the NS 
to act independently on motives it regarded as pure and national.7 The 
timing of the project further underlines this independency, as the monu-
ment was raised at a point in time where German defeat was inevitable. 
The monument represents, in many ways, a blurring of the well-
established boundaries between nationally orientated heroes on the one 
side, and traitors and footmen for the Germans on the other. This has 
made it a difficult part of the past to include in traditional ways of re-
membrance. The buried monument has thus remained a part of our un-
spoken past, both at a local and a national level.  
 
 
Stik lestad in  the aftermath of  the war 
 
A conference held at Stiklestad in 2005 sparked a debate about the fu-
ture of the buried NS-obelisk in the media, among academics and in the 
local community. Representatives of the older generation, including both 
resistance veterans and former Norwegian SS-volunteers, oppose any 
kind of intervention at the site. Others, especially younger people, argue 
that the silence has lasted long enough, and that it is time to bring this 
 
6  On the fascist way of political communication, see Griffin 1996. 
7  Archival studies undertaken by the authors show that the regional NS-
leader, Torbjørn Eggen, was instrumental in the planning and implementa-
tion of the project. The project had the support of Vidkun Quisling and the 
party leadership in Oslo, but not of the German authorities who actually 
tried to stop the building. The party’s own ideological arguments for the 
monument are presented in Mehle 1944. See also Fagerland 2010. 
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part of Stiklestad’s history to light. Some feel that an excavation of the 
monument would be tantamount to an acceptance or even glorification 
of the NS-regime. Others fear that the monument will be a popular gath-
ering place for neo-Nazi groups. Finally, some also point to the monu-
ment’s pedagogical potential. The question of what to do with the obe-
lisk fuels emotional debates between different generations and different 
interest groups. The complex picture represents a huge challenge for the 
Stiklestad National Culture Centre (SNK), whose primary task is the 
dissemination of the St. Olav heritage.  
 
 
Places,  monuments and counter-monuments  
 
The geographer Tim Creswell outlines “location”, “locale” and “sense of 
place” as three fundamental aspects of the concept of place. “Location” 
refers to the fixed objective co-ordinates on the earth’s surface. “Locale” 
refers to the material setting for social relations – the actual shape of 
place within which people conduct their lives. Finally, “sense of place” 
refers to the emotional attachment people have to place (Creswell 2004: 
7). The concept of place therefore represents both fairly unchangeable 
structures made by nature (location), an interplay between human beings 
and nature marked by both continuity and change (locale), and an ongo-
ing production of social meaning (sense of place). The two last elements 
in Creswell’s definition clearly indicate that the concept “place” means 
more than just a neutral container, or physical framework, for human in-
teraction. Our perceptions of identity and belonging are closely connect-
ed with places and the sense of meanings we read into them, and some 
places are therefore infused with more meaning and prestige than others 
(Creswell 2004: 50).  
The meaning of a place is sometimes closely connected with im-
portant historical events. At historical places the place in itself repre-
sents both the relative continuity of the physical landscape and the con-
tinuous changes made by people and societies. At such places the 
changeability of time is counterbalanced by the constancy of the place 
and a sense of closeness to historical events can be experienced more 
distinctively (Eriksen 1999: 92). Historical places are therefore well 
suited and commonly used as theatres and meeting spots for presenta-
tion, interpretation and re-interpretation of the past for groups and com-
munities (Rodell 2008: 15-30).  
At historical places of special importance, the significance of the 
place is often emphasized by monuments (Eriksen 1999: 94-97). These 
monuments are reminders of historical events, but also of the current 
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significance and relevance of these events (Stugu 2008: 91-96). Histori-
cal monuments have traditionally been unambiguous, and their main 
purpose has been to provide authoritative interpretations, to simplify, to 
clarify and to create unifying identities based on shared memories 
(Michalski 1998). Some of the essence of a group, a community or a na-
tion is that the individuals that constitute these entities share a great 
many things, and that there are others that they have forgotten. One of 
the main functions of traditional commemorative artefacts is therefore 
that they permit only certain things to be remembered, and that they by 
exclusion cause others to be forgotten (Forty/Küchler 1999: 7-9).  
Groups with different interpretations of the past will in general not 
erect competing monuments on the same historical site. Instead, each 
group will seek to remove the opponent’s monument and replace it with 
its own. This happened during the German occupation when NS held the 
power at Stiklestad and in 1944 physically removed the Olav column 
from 1807 in favor of its own monument. It happened again in 1945, 
when the NS-monument was destroyed by the Norwegian resistance 
movement. It was important for the NS to erect their own monument at 
Stiklestad before St. Olav’s Day in 1944, and it was equally important 
for the victors of the war to erase all traces of the NS-monument prior to 
St. Olav’s Day in 1945. The NS-monument represented an ideology 
considered incompatible with the values of the Norwegian post-war so-
ciety and shortly after the war the Olav column from 1807 was re-
erected. In this way Stiklestad was re-conquered as a site for national 
unity and identity.  
An alternative to the traditional ways of remembrance presented 
above is the counter-monument (Gegen-Denkmal) philosophy. This phi-
losophy was developed in Germany as an attempt to cope with the coun-
try’s traumatic heritage from WWII (Michalski 1998: 172-189; Young 
1993: 27-48). A central principle is the readiness to face painful and 
ambiguous memories. Self-criticism is also very important. This means 
courage and a will to face unpleasant topics, but also a willingness to 
question values which are highly regarded by individuals and society in 
the past and the present. According to James Young, the counter-
monument philosophy with its painful self-reflection is the most power-
ful expression of a new German generation which is conscious of its eth-
ical duty to remember, but at the same time deeply sceptical towards 
traditional ways of remembrance.  
In contrast to traditional history and monuments, the counter-
monument philosophy’s goal is not to provide simplifying and unifying 
interpretations. Instead, the main goal is to spur debate and reflection 
about the past in itself, as well as about how today’s society interprets 
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and makes use of the past. A counter-monument is therefore interroga-
tive rather than authoritative, critical instead of self-exalted, challenging 




Stik lestad:  A place with many layers of  history 
 
Use of painful and problematic heritage in Western Europe is commonly 
related to different aspects regarding moral, ethical and political training 
(democratization). There are several ways of dealing with an inglorious 
past, and one of the most striking is how the former Nazi concentration 
camps are taking part in the democratization processes by transforming 
the traces of genocide and repression to sites of knowledge, learning and 
reflection. Wolfgang Benz points out that the former memorial sites 
must avoid being “cult-like places of emotions”. Instead they should be 
starting points for moral and political reflections. Commemoration can 
be a key to engagement and reflections on essential features regarding 
specific painful events in the past, and must “calmly and assuredly” be 
permanent components in the political culture. That is why, according to 
Benz, the memorial sites should be an integral part in commemoration 
practices and political discourse, not solely in the public interest through 
anniversaries (Benz 2005:33). 
For good or for worse, the different layers of history at Stiklestad 
represent case studies of how regimes and political movements try to de-
fine, adapt and grasp the political legitimacy of St. Olav for contempo-
rary purposes. One of the questions that arose in dealing with the Nazi-
monument was whether the obelisk should be excavated at the place it 
was buried, exhibited inside the museum building or moved to a war-
related museum. Didactic uses of the past can take different directions, 
but in our context we strongly believe in taking advantage of the authen-
ticity of the place. In order to link educational programs directly to the 
place and the physical remains still existing, we therefore wish to show 
the excavated remains of the monument in situ and to produce an indoor 
study exhibition, also at Stiklestad.  
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Picture 3: The Fascist Monument at Stiklestad torn down, May 1945. 
Photo credit: Sigurd Hegdahl, Foreningen Gamle Steinkjer 
 
The theoretical foundation of both the excavation and the study exhibi-
tion is, at least partly, linked to the counter-monument perspectives pre-
sented earlier in this paper. In our attempt to make use of the authentici-
ty of the place and our strong belief in including several different layers 
TOR EINAR FAGERLAND AND TROND RISTO NILSSEN 
86 
of history into the project, the SS-Dienststelle Neuengamme study exhi-
bition and the outdoor exhibition at KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme have 
been important sources of inspiration. The main task of KZ-Neuen-
gamme is to present the history of the place as a part of the concentra-
tion camp system in the Nazi-period. However, the memorial is also an 
example of how West Germany dealt with historic places of the Nazi pe-
riod in the post-war years. After a long-lasting conflict over its realiza-
tion, the memorial, in its current shape, contains multiple layers of utili-
zation before and after 1945. The memorial’s topography thereby re-
flects the claims of different actors on local, national and international 
level. Neuengamme is presently in a process of restructuring on the basis 
of recent historical, pedagogical and creative insights. Remains from the 
concentration camp period, for instance the prison inside the concentra-
tions camp, the former roll-call area and the prison latrine, have been 
excavated and are now parts of a landscape consisting of markers, sym-
bolic reconstructions and wartime and postwar buildings.8  
Both the counter-monument philosophy and the “new archaeology” 
approach used in Neuengamme, focus on the dialogical dynamic be-
tween the landscape, the visitors and new and old installations in use. 
The project at Stiklestad aims to release, and not to seal, the discussion. 
The planned combination of excavations, installations and exhibition 
aims to confront the society and stimulate the exchange of ideas and re-
flection between generations and in the general public at large. Hopeful-
ly, the inclusion of new layers of history will regenerate the significance 
of the place and increase its potential to communicate with a continuous-
ly changing society.  
 
 
A meet ing place for  d ia logue and learning 
 
After the war, membership in Nasjonal Samling was defined as treason 
by Norwegian law, and all members were criminalized and sentenced 
(Dahl/Sørensen 2004). Disclosures about the concentration camps and 
other forms of Nazi cruelty added to the tension and the moral condem-
nation from the rest of the population (Lauridsen 2002; Westlie 2009).9 
Elements of the “ice-front” between the two sides still exist, and “former 
NS-member” and “child of a NS-father or mother” remain stigmatized 
 
8  (KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme: http://www.kz-gedenkstaetteneuengam-
me.de/). 
9  The atrocities committed by the infamous informer Henry Rinnan and his 
group probably made reconciliation in central Norway (Trøndelag) more 
difficult than in many other parts of the country.  
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social categories. For 60 years there has been little dialogue between 
those who judged and those who were judged. As a result, many former 
NS-members and also many of their descendants have remained in small 
sub-cultures dominated by little self-reflection and even less self-
criticism.10 During the war, Stiklestad was used to legitimize a regime 
based on racism, dictatorship and indoctrination. After the war, the place 
has occasionally been used by extreme right wing organizations as well. 
One reason for the existence of such organizations might be that the 
well-established black and white interpretations of WWII have provided 
little room for dialogue and few meeting places for learning and reflec-
tion.  
According to modern museum philosophy (often labeled as “new 
museology”), promoting dialogue about ethical dilemmas should be 
among the main tasks of museums today (Corsane 2005: 38-70). Still, as 
Young points out, there is an inverse proportion between the huge 
amount of memorialization of the past taking place, and the striking lack 
of contemplation and study invested into the same past (Young 1993: 
273). The Vietnam Memorial Wall in Washington made by the young 
Chinese-American Maya Lin in 1982 is, however, an example of the po-
tential for dialogue and contemplation that lies in including also the 
darker and more ambiguous parts of the past. Situated among the huge 
traditional monuments at Washington Mall, all celebrating former 
American presidents and generals, the wall is in many ways an inversion 
of its surroundings. According to May Lin, the aim of her design was to 
bring about the realization of loss and a cathartic healing process in the 
American people, and the monument has turned out to be a highly treas-
ured place for the expression of grief. The monument is also in its es-
sence interrogative, implying terrible questions about futility, dying in 
vain, and about when and for what Americans should die in war (For-
ty/Küchner 1999:137-142; Sturken 1997:44-84).  
It is a widely held belief that the preservation of monuments, arte-
facts and other traces from the past enable us to remember the past, and 
that the decay or destruction of such traces implies forgetting. Some 
 
10  Skepticism towards established knowledge about WWII and the Holocaust 
is still widespread among former NS-members. Such suppressions are also 
found among their descendants. On this topic, see for instance Olden 1988 
and Westlie 2002. The work of the Danish historian John T. Lauridsen 
shows many parallels between the collective remembrance in Denmark 
and Norway. Also in Denmark, those who chose the wrong side during the 
war remained in their roles as villains. Lauridsen’s work also shows that 
neither convictions nor the years after wars have contributed to an in-
creased understanding of democracy among former Nazi-members and 
their descendants (Lauridsen 2002). 
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traces from the past are therefore put on special protection lists, while 
others are left to decay or, like the NS-monument, are deliberately de-
stroyed. The destruction of the NS-monument in 1945 is therefore a 
classical example of iconoclasm: the destruction of physical artefacts in 
hope of achieving oblivion. All destructions of monuments leave how-
ever, a void, and sometimes these voids can be just as noticeable as the 
monuments themselves (Forty/Küchner 1999:10). The strong emotions 
and sentiments revealed in the present debate imply that the physical 
removal of the monument did not lead to permanent oblivion of the dark 
past at Stiklestad. 
The presence of the NS-monument and the national socialists’ use of 
the St. Olav heritage represent a sidetrack to the positive heroic national 
narrative of Stiklestad. The buried obelisk and its invisible place in the 
Norwegian collective memory of WWII provides, however, important 
insight into the values and motives of NS-members as well as insight in-
to post-war thinking about the NS and its members. The passage of time 
has only made the didactic potential of the buried obelisk more evident. 
And, as illustrated by the example of the Vietnam Memorial Wall at the 
Washington Mall, even at places already heavily infused with monu-
ments and meaning is it possible to approach the past in new and more 
dialogical ways.  
A pedagogical programme focusing on the dark history of Stiklestad 
could therefore highlight questions regarding both the past and the pre-
sent. Who were the members? What were their motives? Could we have 
done the same under similar conditions? Why was Stiklestad important 
for the National Socialists? And finally, why has the “ice-front” between 
those on the right, and those on the wrong side, after 60 years, not been 
replaced by dialogue and learning? The “obelisk project” at Stiklestad 
thus has a potential to stimulate reflections, not only about the NS-
monument itself, but also about nationalism, democracy and our own 
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The Holocaust and Memory Culture: 




The Holocaust was not conceptualized as such in Sweden until the early 
1980s. Until then, the main focus in both scholarly and public discussion 
of the Second World War was on the consequences for Sweden. The re-
search project Sweden during the period of the Second World War, in 
Swedish “Sverige under andra världskriget”, SUAV for short, dealt with 
the war primarily from political, diplomatic and military perspectives. In 
this project, which produced twenty PhD dissertations in history and two 
anthologies between 1971 and 1986, the Holocaust was not regarded as 
related to Swedish history (Ekman 1979; Ekman 1986). Also, when the 
project was placed in an international context in a conference in the 
House of Parliament in Stockholm in 1995, the issue of the Holocaust 
and Sweden was not approached (Ekman/Edling 1997). Only one of the 
dissertations in the SUAV project touched upon the issue: Hans Lind-
berg analyzed Swedish refugee policy in the period immediately before 
the Holocaust (Lindberg 1973).  
Because known facts about Swedish complicity in Nazi German pol-
icies during the first war years were usually avoided in the historical 
studies, it is possible to argue that the Swedish example bears some re-
semblance to the historiography on the war in the first post-war decades 
in one of the belligerent states, France (Bosworth 1994). It seems that a 
vague sense of shame made historians play down the subjects of the 
Jewish policy of the Vichy regime and Sweden’s refugee policy vis-à-
vis Jewish people (Ekman 2003; Heuman 2006). 
 




In Sweden, the specific interest in the history of the Holocaust 
emerged from the memory turn in historical research, on the one hand, 
and from the impact of mass culture on historical science, on the other. 
The best known example of mass culture influencing the historical 
knowledge of the Holocaust was the American television series The 
Holocaust. It was broadcast in Sweden in 1979 under the title Förintel-
sen, which literally means “the annihilation.” The term “Förintelsen” 
became the ubiquitous word for the Holocaust in Swedish. It came to be 
spelled with a capital “F”. This is not according to the ordinary spelling 
rules in Swedish. In Swedish, the concept of “the Holocaust” acquired 
an extremely unique quality (Andersson 2002; Andersson 2003; Gerner 
& Karlsson 2003). 
The combination of the memory dimension in historical science and 
historical fiction in mass culture helped shape a context of morality is-
sues concerning research subjects related to the Holocaust. This tilt to-
wards moral issues becomes evident when one compares the previous 
Swedish historiography on Sweden during the Second World War with 
the following Swedish historiography on Sweden and its relation to the 
Holocaust. Although it is possible to discern both a moralist and a realist 
paradigm in public debate during the war and immediately after it, “the 
Holocaust as a matter that concerns Sweden” was briefly approached on-
ly once before the 1990s, namely in 1963 in the supplement volume of 




The national  memory of  the Holocaust 
 
The non-conceptualization of the Holocaust did not mean that the ex-
termination of the Jewish people was a totally neglected issue in Swe-
dish historiography. However, the focus was not on the fate of the Jews 
but rather on two Swedish personalities who became mythologized as 
rescuers of Jews, Raoul Wallenberg and Folke Bernadotte. Their actions 
concerned Jews in Budapest in 1944, and prisoners – some of whom 
happened to be Jews – in concentration camps in northern Germany in 
early 1945, respectively. In the summer of 1944, the Swedish govern-
ment allowed the US War Refugee Board to channel money through the 
Swedish businessman Raoul Wallenberg to enable the rescue of Jews in 
Budapest. The latter was given the status as a diplomat at the Swedish 
legation in Budapest and was able to rescue Jews by distributing Swe-
dish passports to prospective victims and organizing their legal escape 
(Lajos 2004). In early 1945, the chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, 
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Count Folke Bernadotte, made an agreement with the Nazi regime al-
lowing him to bring Scandinavian prisoners and some others from Nazi 
concentration camps to Sweden in special buses, “the White Buses” 
(Persson 2002). 
During the first decades after the war, Swedish society took pride in 
the reputation of having rescued Jewish people from the Nazis. In addi-
tion to Wallenberg’s and Bernadotte’s missions, the most famous action 
was the admission of more than 7000 Danish Jews who, aided by Danish 
fishermen and thanks to an early warning about imminent deportation to 
German concentration camps, managed to escape across the straits of 
Öresund in October 1943 (Kreth/Morgensen 1995). However, this action 
was not analyzed in Swedish historical science until it was discussed, in 
a comparative perspective, in a monograph by an American historian in 
1987 and in a PhD dissertation from Stockholm University in 2006 (By-
ström 2006; Koblik 1988).  
Both Wallenberg and Bernadotte became national heroes. Their tra-
gic fates made these figures overshadow those whom they had saved. 
Wallenberg disappeared after having been arrested by Soviet troops in 
Debrecen in Hungary on 17 January 1945. Jewish terrorists assassinated 
Bernadotte in Jerusalem in September 1948 when he was there on a UN 
mission to solve the conflict between Israel and the Arabs of Palestine. 
A dissertation on the Wallenberg mission, which Attila Lajos from 
Växjö University published in 2004, broke new ground in the sense that 
it focused on the events themselves on location in Budapest rather than 
on Wallenberg (Lajos 2004). Lajos was the first to use Hungarian lan-
guage sources. Swedish colleagues criticized Lajos for unduly de-
heroizing Wallenberg (Liljegren 2004; Lundmark 2004; Wahlbäck 
2004; Zander 2006). However, Lajos’s most important result was that he 
was able to demonstrate that all previous Swedish research on Wallen-
berg had focused on the man and not on the Jewish people who he res-
cued. In this way, the impression of a rather belated Swedish scholarly 
interest in the Holocaust as such was reaffirmed.  
In a similar way as Wallenberg’s mission, Bernadotte’s mission has 
also been re-evaluated. A historian from Gothenburg University, Ingrid 
Lomfors, has broken new ground by highlighting the fact that this mis-
sion was selective: Scandinavians were to be rescued first and others, in-
cluding Jews, only if this was expedient. The facts about the manner in 
which the mission was carried out had been known already when it oc-
curred. However, Lomfors argued that Bernadotte’s mission primarily 
and consciously selected non-Jews (Lomfors 2005a; Lomfors 2005b). 
The political scientist Sune Persson, also from Gothenburg University 
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contested Lomfors’s conclusion. He maintained that Bernadotte did his 
utmost to rescue anyone within reach (Lomfors 2002; Persson 2003). 
It is a fact that Bernadotte’s mission rescued between five and six 
thousand Jewish people among a total of about 21 000 prisoners. Some 
of these, many of whom were Polish women, were brought to southern 
Sweden, where Lund University is situated. In 1945, the University had 
a Polish lecturer, Zygmunt Lakocinski. In 1945, he served as an inter-
preter for the Polish speaking Jewish women who had been rescued 
from the Ravensbrück camp. He realized that the memories of the res-
cued women were worth preserving, not least because they could be 
used as testimonies in the expected trials of Nazi war criminals once the 
war had ended. Lakocinski saw to it that five hundred individuals of the 
rescued were interviewed and that their stories were recorded (Kul-
turhistoriska föreningen för södra Sverige 2004). 
 
 
The oral  history of  survivors 
 
At the time when the prisoners who had been rescued from the Nazi 
concentration camp of Ravensbrück arrived in Sweden, there was at 
Lund University a professor of history named Sture Bolin. He took a 
professional interest in the histories of the former concentration camp 
inmates. In 1944, Bolin had published the book The One-sided Violence, 
an analysis of Nazi propaganda and diplomacy on the eve of the Second 
World War (Bolin 1944). Bolin designed a research program dealing 
with the memories of the rescued concentration camp inmates and ap-
pointed Zygmunt Lakocinski as director of the research. From the pro-
fessional point of view this was a pioneering project, because at the time 
nobody had cared to collect testimonies of Nazi camp survivors using 
systematic, scholarly methods of investigation: it was oral history avant 
le mot. Also in another respect Bolin’s initiative was before its time. In-
terviews had certainly been used as source material for scholars, but 
mainly in ethnological studies. Now a highly skilled professional histo-
rian took an initiative that can be seen, in retrospect, as an early call for 
memory research. Sture Bolin apparently felt that something exceptional 
had occurred and that this called for extraordinary measures in order to 
document it. 
Two Swedish government agencies, Statens Arbetsmarknadskom-
mission (The State Labour Market Committee) and Statens utlänning-
skommission (The State Committee on Foreigners) financed the inter-
view work. It was carried out by an enlightenment agency, The Swedish 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, which was established in 1938 with the aim 
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of educating the Swedish public about international politics and which 
had close connections to the Swedish ministries of defense and of for-
eign affairs. 
As was mentioned above, Lakocinski carried out 500 interviews. 
However, because the Swedish state ceased to sponsor the project, in 
November 1946 this work came to an end without the materials being 
published. In 1974 the archival materials were deposited in the Universi-
ty Library in Lund. In 1995, fifty years after the original documentation 
project, the archive was opened to research (Universitetsbiblioteket 
Lunds Universitet 2005). This became possible thanks to donations from 
a number of private Swedish and foreign foundations.2 Later, the Swe-
dish state agency The Forum of Living History also gave financial sup-
port to the project. 
However, only a year and a half after the end of the Second World 
War, the Swedish authorities lost interest in the memories of the survi-
vors. The remembrances of the war among these new inhabitants in 
Sweden, many of whom later became Swedish citizens, were relegated 
to the dusty shelves of the University Library in Lund. Only thanks to 
the new interest in a new historical period, letters, annotations and arti-
facts made by the inmates of the Ravensbrück concentration camp dur-
ing their imprisonment finally came to form a permanent exhibition at 
the ethnographic museum Kulturen (Culture) in Lund. (Nilsson Nylan-
der 2004; Ravensbrück project 2005). The museum Kulturen had been 
founded in 1892. Its aim was to “save artifacts from the old peasant so-
ciety that was about to disappear.” Its founder, Georg J:son Karlin also 
included in the collections artifacts from all over the world. The idea 
was that in order to understand their own culture, Swedes must be given 
the opportunity to compare it with other cultures (Om Kulturen 2009). It 
is noteworthy that thanks to the comparative vision of its founder, mem-
orabilia from the nadir of human culture, the Holocaust, became an ex-
hibit in a Swedish museum of culture. 
In 2005, the year after the permanent exhibition in Kulturen opened, 
a number of the interviews from 1945 with the survivors from Ravens-
brück finally became available for the Swedish public. In his book 
“Voices that never fall silent”, Artur Szulz presented Lakocinski and his 
work and published witness reports from Ravensbrück together with re-
ports from Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Majdanek, Plaszow, Treblinka, 
Sachsenhausen, and Stutthof (Szulc 2005). 
 
2  The sponsors were Eduard and Sophie Heckscher’s Foundation, The Me-
morial Foundation for Jewish Culture, The Nordenstedt Foundation, The 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, Margit and 
Lennart Carlsson’s Foundation and The Forum for Living History.  
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It is evident that neither Swedish civil society nor the authorities had 
recognized a need to highlight the fate of the surviving victims from the 
Holocaust in spite of the fact that detailed information on their suffering 
was available already in 1945. The delay of fifty and almost sixty years 
until the opening of the archives and the exhibition, respectively, is an 
eloquent example of the Swedish policy and culture of silence concern-
ing the fate of the victims of the Holocaust.  
 
 
Another  memory –  the Swedish self -examination 
 
In 1991, the journalist Maria-Pia Boëthius published a book which was 
highly critical of Swedish concessions to German demands during the 
war (Boëthius 1991). New research that was inspired by the debate 
caused by Boëthius’s book placed these concessions in focus. Also, the 
rather authoritarian Swedish social policy came under scrutiny within 
the wider context of racism. The Swedish eugenics program which was 
initiated before the war and continued into the 1970s became the subject 
of both research and public debate (Tydén 2002; Zaremba 1999). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden changed from being culturally ra-
ther homogenous into becoming a multicultural country. Successive 
waves of immigrants, mainly from other European countries, had been 
assimilated or at least very well integrated into Swedish society from the 
Middle Ages until the 1960s. The last such wave happened to be those 
secularized Polish Jews who left Poland in the wake of the antisemitic 
policies after the 1967 Israel-Arab states war and the student protests 
against Soviet interference in Polish cultural affairs in 1968. However, 
beginning in the 1970s, a large number of people arrived who remained 
less well integrated. They were imported labor and political refugees. 
Many came from Latin America and the Middle East. In the course of 
the 1980s and 1990s, there were manifestations of xenophobia and rac-
ism in Swedish society targeting the new categories of immigrants. This 
development clashed with official policy and it tainted the image of the 
morally good Sweden. Towards the end of the 1990s, the interest in the 
Holocaust became part of Swedish official policy exactly because the 
authorities felt a need to fight xenophobia and racism by way of educat-
ing about the Holocaust. It was presumed that widespread knowledge of 
the Holocaust would cure Swedish society from xenophobia and racism.  
A news report in the Swedish radio became the triggering event for 
the official Swedish interest in the Holocaust. The news was that in June 
1997 a research institute in Stockholm, CEIFO, published a survey 
which said that Swedish youth did not know much about the Holocaust. 
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The Swedish premier Göran Persson was alarmed and took up the issue 
in the Parliament during its last session before the summer recess. The 
effect of Persson’s initiative was a parliamentary resolution on the crea-
tion of an information agency. It was called Living history. Already in 
the autumn, the agency published its first book about the Holocaust, 
aimed at a broad public (Bruchfeldt/Levine 1997). In 2003, The Forum 
for Living History became a state institution (Karlsson 2003: 15-16).3 
The campaigns of Living History created an increased interest also in 
research about Sweden’s relation to different aspects of the Holocaust. 
Ten years after the inception of Living History, two substantial historical 
anthologies presented investigations of Sweden’s relations with Nazi 
Germany and Swedish policy vis-à-vis Jewish refugees in the period 
1920-1950 (Andersson/Kvist Geverts2008; Andersson/Tydén 2007). In 
his dissertation one of the contributors to the first volume, Mikael By-
ström, showed that there were attitudes and views among Swedish bu-
reaucrats concerning Jewish people that implied that if Sweden had been 
under direct Nazi control, Jews in Sweden and especially the non-
citizens among these people might have been treated in the same manner 
as the Vichy regime treated Jewish people (Byström 2006).  
In another dissertation, Karin Kvist Geverts applied the concept of 
“antisemitic background noise” as an explanatory factor. The idea is that 
Swedish bureaucrats who were responsible for implementing refugee 
policies, although they were not consciously antisemitic, anyhow acted 
upon premises that said that Jews were a special people that Swedish so-
ciety should be wary of receiving and therefore restrict immigration of 
(Kvist Geverts 2008b). Kvist Geverts argued that antisemitic 4  back-
ground noise was normal in Sweden in the 1930s. Clerks could dis-
charge open antisemitism at the same time as they gave expression to 
antisemitic ideas (Kvist Geverts 2008a). The implication is that Swedish 
society was imbued with a kind of subtle, seemingly harmless antisemi-
tism, the consequences of which had deadly consequences for the tar-
gets, the Jewish refugees who were not accepted by Sweden. 
 
3  The homepage is at www.levandehistoria.se 
4  Since there is no such thing as “semitism”, the term used in this text for 
hatred of Jews, antisemitism, is not hyphenated. CF Langmuir (1996: 16) 
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The Holocaust and communism in  
Swedish histor ical  culture 
 
Among historians based at Lund University, the belated Swedish interest 
in Holocaust research took an international turn. In 2001, the research 
project “The Holocaust in European Historical Culture” was launched, 
with funding from the Tercentenary Foundation of the Bank of Sweden. 
By 2008, this project had produced three PhD dissertations, three an-
thologies and one monograph (Dietsch 2006; Gerner/ Karlsson 2005; 
Karlsson/Zander 2003; Karlsson/Zander 2006; Karlsson/Zander 2008; 
Sniegon 2008; Tossavainen 2006). The focus was not on historiography 
but on the manifestations of historical consciousness related to the Holo-
caust, in museums, films, novels, places of commemoration and monu-
ments in a number of west European states – the Scandinavian countries, 
Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy – and Israel. The project also 
covered former communist countries – Croatia, Czechoslovakia (and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics), the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Russia and Ukraine. The Holocaust was treated together with investiga-
tions concerning the place in historical culture of the other experience of 
terror in these societies, Stalinism. The focus on historical culture and 
not on history per se produced the result that the two horrors of the Hol-
ocaust and of Stalinist repression were seen not only as complementary 
evils but also as competing for space in the historical culture of the ex-
communist states. 
Members of the research project on the Holocaust in Lund taught 
about crimes against humanity in the Stalinist Soviet Union in education 
programs for school teachers and journalists that were arranged by The 
Forum for Living History. The idea was to invite reflections and discus-
sions on the similarities and dissimilarities between the two totalitarian 
systems with respect to their policy of mass murder. Finally, ten years 
after its inception, The Forum for Living History launched an education 
program on the crimes against humanity committed by communist re-
gimes. The Forum chose to put a special focus on Joseph Stalin’s USSR, 
Mao’s China and Pol Pot’s Cambodia. 
The influence of international historical studies on the place of the 
Holocaust and Communism in the historical culture of former Com-
munist states in Europe, on the one hand, and on the other hand views 
among political groupings in Sweden – mainly but not exclusively con-
nected to the Liberal Party – that Communist regimes had violated hu-
man rights to such a degree, resulted in the thesis that it was relevant to 
teach the Swedish public about these regimes as well. 
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Very few historians and social scientists in Sweden have taken an in-
terest in the study of Communist regimes. Placing Communism seem-
ingly on an equal footing with Nazism was a new and shocking experi-
ence. Those Swedish academics who did not study Communist regimes 
thus experienced the new addition to the program of the Forum for Liv-
ing History in Sweden as an expression of anti-Communism. More than 
five hundred Swedish academic historians and social scientists protested 
against the addition of the communist dimension of genocide by way of 
a public call for condemnation of the new program and, moreover, for 
the abolishment of The Forum for Living History as such (Historieup-
propet 2008). The enlightenment project on Communist crimes thus re-
leased a roll call among Swedish intellectuals that would not accept any 
enlightenment project that included teaching about the crimes against 
humanity perpetrated by Communist regimes. 
It is not a matter of people belonging to the Communist Party of 
Sweden in its nonagenarian guise as The Left Party, but rather of identi-
fication with the utopian gleaming goals of the communist ideology and 
cause. Although individuals had condemned the organization of Living 
History in 1997, no one had bothered to organize a public appeal against 
it. The abolishment appeal in 2008 ostentatiously aimed at the very idea 
of state-sponsored enlightenment projects. It is relevant to note that the 
chosen protest strategy invoked the idea of the night-watch state, an idea 
which is usually linked to liberal rather than socialist political ideology. 
It goes without saying that if this logic became the rule, rather many in-
stitutions in Swedish society would have to be dismantled, including dif-
ferent authorities that enlighten the public.  
In this context, it is relevant to mention that a book on crimes against 
humanity under communist regimes, which was published at the time of 
the new project by The Forum for Living History, met high academic 
quality standards. The book, an overview of academic research in Eng-
lish, German, Russian, Chinese (Mandarin) and Swedish on the regimes 
of Stalinist Russia, Mao’s China and Pol Pot’s Cambodia, actually hap-
pened to throw a certain light on the protest. The appeal appeared to be 
directed not against a simplifying popularization but against an informa-
tive text that reflected the state of the art in communist studies. The au-
thors of the book defined crimes against humanity as “murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecution on 
political, racial or religious grounds” (Karlsson/Schoenhals 2008: 5). 
They applied this standard of judgment to their history of Stalin’s, 
Mao’s and Pol Pot’s regimes.  
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Genocidal  background noise 
 
The Holocaust has always been regarded with abhorrence by an over-
whelming majority of Swedish intellectuals and as has been noted 
above, there was no organized protest movement against the activities of 
The Forum for Living History concerning teaching the history of the 
Holocaust. Whereas, in spite of the label “Living History”, the Holo-
caust had been firmly anchored in the past, Communism really is living 
history. One of the parties in the Swedish parliament, although it calls it-
self simply “The Left Party”, traces its ancestry back to the Swedish 
Communist Party. The Left Party celebrated its 90th anniversary in 2007, 
i.e., on the anniversary of the party that had been founded in 1917 and 
which had been a member of the Communist International and thereafter 
had nurtured intimate contacts with and received financial support from 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Björlin 2001).  
The first relevant point is that the Swedish Left Party is a continua-
tion party of and not a successor party to the Swedish Communist Party. 
The Swedish Left Party thus has inherited the historical legacy of the so-
called “real existing socialism”, including Stalinism. The objection that 
many individual members of the Left Party are decent people is another 
matter. It might well be that members of Fascist parties also are decent 
people. What is relevant here is the historical legacy of communism 
when it comes to the societal role of direct successor parties today, such 
as the Communist party in the contemporary Czech Republic and, what 
is relevant in the present context of Sweden, the Swedish Left Party 
which claims heritage from the Swedish Communist Party (from 1917), 
which was a member of the Comintern. 
The second relevant point is exactly that, in contrast to Nazism, 
Communism is a living ideology in contemporary Sweden. The issue is 
whether it should be treated by Swedish state agencies – the education 
system, museums and the Forum on Living History – as equally menac-
ing to society as Holocaust denial, antisemitism and racism. 
“Crimes against humanity committed by Communist regimes” is a 
complex concept. In the Swedish context, the concept was coined as an 
antidote to the Holocaust rather than to “the crimes of Nazism”. The ar-
gument was that the picture of the genocides of the twentieth century 
would be incomplete if Communist crimes were not treated in historio- 
graphy and enlightenment work alongside the Holocaust. The frame-
work of interpretation for the new project on Communist regimes was 
according to the basic tenet of Living history, i.e. that ideology is a nec-
essary precondition for genocide. In a similar way as the Holocaust was, 
as it were, programmed in Nazi ideology, the Communist mass murders 
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– conceptualized as genocide – were programmed in communist ideolo-
gy under Stalin’s, Mao’s and Pol Pot’s regimes, i.e. the three Com-
munist regimes that the Forum selected as the focal points of the new 
project. This was the idea behind the new project. 
Undoubtedly, the “crimes against humanity committed by Com-
munist regimes” were placed upon the agenda of Living History because 
the Holocaust was there. One notes that the theory of totalitarianism is 
tacitly accepted as a framework. However, whereas there probably is a 
rather broad consensus among non-specialists (concerning Nazism) in 
the historical profession, as well as among the public in general, that 
there is a causal link between Nazi ideology and the Holocaust, people 
with no specialist knowledge about Communism in the USSR, China 
and Cambodia, such as the more than 500 signatories of the appeal 
against the enlightenment project about Communist regimes, deny that 
there is a corresponding link between Stalinist, Maoist and Cambodian 
Communism and the mass murders committed by these regimes. 
It is a reasonable hypothesis that most of the signatories of the ap-
peal referred to above did not regard themselves as defending crimes in 
the name of Communism. Rather, one is confronted with the counterpart 
to what Karin Kvist Geverts has labeled the “antisemitic background 
noise”. The “communist background noise” comes from the idea that 
communism is to be thought of as immanently and essentially “good” 
and that consequently, all real existing historical communist regimes 
must be exempted from moral judgment.  
 
 
Living history in Sweden – beyond the Holocaust 
 
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Swedish historical re-
search on the topic of Sweden and crimes of Communist regimes was in 
the same stage as Swedish Holocaust research had been some thirty 
years earlier. The authors of Living History’s report on the historiog-
raphy on Communist crimes, Klas-Göran Karlsson and Michel Schoen-
hals from Lund University, ended their presentation with the following 
observation: 
 
“How did Swedes, Swedish institutions and Sweden react to the crimes against 
humanity that were committed by communist regimes, both in the time when 
they were executed and after? In spite of remarkable recent research initiatives 




Half a century after the end of the Second World War, the shadow of 
Nazism returned in Swedish historical consciousness, but in a new way. 
The Swedish People’s Home came in for critical scrutiny by both histo-
rians and journalists. Sweden’s complicity in Hitler’s policy was high-
lighted and what could be interpreted as totalitarian traits of the welfare 
state, i.e., compulsory sterilization of citizens, came into focus. In 1997, 
the Prime Minister Göran Persson rang the alarm bell concerning lack of 
historical knowledge about the Holocaust among Swedish youth. As a 
result, the Swedish Parliament decided to launch the educational project 
“Living history”. Information on Nazism and the Holocaust was used as 
an instrument to combat xenophobia among the Swedish youth.  
Ten years after the original initiative, in 2007, the Swedish govern-
ment decided to let The Forum of Living history launch a second educa-
tional project. This time it was about crimes against humanity under 
Communist regimes. The appeal by more than five hundred Swedish 
historians and social scientists against this project can be interpreted as 
having been motivated by the fear that it would make possible “the iden-
tification of thought patterns and rhetorical figures in contemporary de-
bates and politics” and compromise the Communist ideology. It is high-
ly relevant to refer to the concept of “background noise” in this context. 
Kvist-Geverts demonstrated that it was not a matter of Swedish officials 
being antisemitic, but that the cases they handled involving Jews implied 
a discrimination against Jews in general. Similarly, those Swedish his-
torical scholars and social scientists who do not want special enlighten-
ment campaigns on Communist regimes in the contemporary world, es-
pecially those in China, Cuba and North Korea, must be suspected of 
harboring the view that Communist regimes should not be criticized to 
such an extent that Communist ideology as such becomes unattractive. 
The quote in the preceding paragraph is taken from another context: 
the editors of the volume with articles on the Swedish Jewish refugee 
policy in 1920-1950 explicitly argued that their research was instrumen-
tal for making contemporary Swedish refugee policy humanitarian, be-
cause the historical knowledge concerning the earlier – inhuman – 
treatment of refugees made possible “the identification of thought pat-
terns and rhetorical figures in contemporary debates and politics”. An-
dersson and Kvist-Geverts refer to racism, but the observation is also 
valid in respect to other ideologies, for example Communism. Whether 
some people hold that a communist background noise is good and bene-
ficial does not detract from the general relevance of the observation 
(Andersson/Kvist Geverts 2008: 8). As a consequence of the creation of 
The Forum for Living History, Swedish historical science has been en-
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couraged to leave the academic ivory tower and engage in the education 
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Small and Moral Nations. 
Europe and the Emerging Polit ics of Memory 
CECILIE FELICIA STOKHOLM BANKE 
 
 
Since the late 1990s, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have experienced 
an increased interest in the Holocaust as a history that should be ad-
dressed specifically. Best known is the process started in Sweden in 
January 2000 with the first Stockholm International Forum, where 40 
states decided to make it a priority to keep the memory of the Holocaust 
alive. But also in Denmark and Norway, the Holocaust has been ad-
dressed specifically by several politicians, and both countries have offi-
cially apologized for their immoral conduct towards Jews; Denmark for 
denying 21 Jewish refugees entry from Germany in 1941, and Norway 
for participating in the systematic deportation of Norwegian Jews to Na-
zi Germany and to extermination camps. Considering the war record of 
Denmark and Sweden this development is surprising, especially com-
pared to the development in other countries that were more directly af-
fected by the war. Why should Sweden – a presumably neutral country 
during the war – go through such a process? And why should Denmark 
– a country with a reputation for its heroic rescue of the Danish Jews in 
October 1943 – engage in such soul-searching?1  
 
1  This article is based on research in relation to the project “Holocaust 
Memory in Post-War Europe”, conducted partly at the Danish Institute for 
International Studies, and partly during my stay as Visiting Professor and 
Fulbright-Scholar-in-Residence at the Strassler Family Center for Holo-
caust and Genocide Studies, Clark University. Parts of this research have 
been published in Wodak/Auer Borea (eds.), 2009 and Pakier/Stråth 
(eds.), 2010 
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To answer these questions, we need to relate the developments in the 
Scandinavian countries to what Ariel Colonomos has termed the moral-
izing of international relations during the 1990s (Colonomos 2008). 
What we see during this decade is an increased interest in human rights 
and international humanitarian law: Sanctions, humanitarian interven-
tions, and demands for “clean historical records”. And this interest gives 
the Holocaust as a specific crime a new position in the political culture 
developing in Europe after the fall of Communism. With the growing in-
terest in human rights comes a growing interest in how nations conduct-
ed themselves in the past. Addressing crimes of the past and demanding 
historical justice is a way to get access to the international political sce-
ne. The past has become a moral guidepost which aids countries to ac-
cess to the international community – something of particular im-
portance for small nations. (Reiter/Gärtner: 2001) 
 

The Stockholm Process in  Denmark 
 
In Denmark, addressing the Holocaust specifically and investigating the 
country’s share of responsibility happened mainly because of the Stock-
holm International Forums. Of course, Danish historians had shown an 
interest in Holocaust history before. But, the Holocaust was primarily 
seen as a German and a Jewish history where Denmark was generally 
not included. As the most dominant theme in Danish historiography, the 
history of the German occupation has been revised twice, influenced by 
two generational waves, with each new generation writing its own ver-
sion of the national history. The first wave came during the 1970s, when 
a new generation of historians started questioning both the supposed 
heroism of the Resistance and the supposed innocent cooperation with 
the German occupiers.2 The second wave came during the 1990s, when 
journalists and young historians began to examine the Danish industrial 
and agricultural sectors and their cooperation – even collaboration – 
with Nazi Germany.3  
 
2  See among others Hans Kirchhoff, Augustoprøret 1943, 
samarbejdspolitikkens fald, forudsætninger og forløb. Et studie i 
kollaboration og modstand, København: Gyldendal, 1979; Aage 
Trommer, Jernbanesabotagen i Danmark under den anden verdenskrig, 
Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1971 and Henrik S. Nissen, 1940 – 
studier i forhandlingspolitikken og samarbejdspolitikken, København: 
Udgiverselskab for Danmarks nyeste historie, 1973 
3  Joachim Lund, Danmark og den europæiske nyordning, det nazistiske 
regime og Danmarks plads i den tyske Grossraumwirtschaft 1940-42, 
ph.d.-afhandling, Københavns Universitet, 1999 and Hitlers spisekammer, 
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In Denmark, this wave of new research emerging during the 1990s 
became the starting point of a public debate on national history, and 
paved the way for the Stockholm process to have an impact on Denmark. 
Here it is important to note that the new research, which showed other 
sides of the Occupation and the “innocent” cooperation with Nazi Ger-
many, did not relate to the Holocaust. Denmark’s Holocaust history re-
mained basically uncontested until the late 1990s and the Stockholm 
process. We cannot give Sweden all the credit for the revision of Danish 
Second World War history, but it is doubtful that Denmark, with its 
highly prized self-image of resistance and rescue, would have felt 
obliged, without this process, to officially acknowledge its particular 
Holocaust guilt.  
As such, the Stockholm process had a direct and immediate impact 
on Denmark. There had been no national commission in Denmark until, 
in the wake of the Stockholm International Forum in January 2000, the 
Danish Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies was established 
(Østergård 2000). The first major task of the Centre was a large research 
project focusing on the Danish policy towards Jewish refugees before 
and during the war. In early 2000, just after the first Stockholm Interna-
tional Forum, an article in the daily center-right newspaper Berlingske 
Tidende argued that during the Second World War Danish authorities re-
fused 21 Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany entry into the country and 
sent them back to an unknown fate – ultimately death in Auschwitz. The 
story generated considerable controversy and the political response was 
a government-financed investigation into official Danish policy towards 
German-Jewish refugees from 1933 to 1945.4  
After 4 years of research, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
issued an official apology at “Mindelunden”, the national memorial park 
of the resistance fighters in Copenhagen. On the fourth of May 2005 
Fogh Rasmussen stated: 
 
“The remembrance of the dark aspects of the occupation era is unfortunately 
also a part of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of 
   
Danmark og den europæiske nyordning 1940-43, København: Gyldendal, 
2005; Steen Andersen, Danmark i det tyske storrum, dansk økonomisk 
tilpasning til Tysklands nyordning af Europa 1940-41, København: 
Lindhardt & Ringhof, 2003; Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo 
Poulsen & Peter Scharff Smith, Under hagekors og Dannebrog, Danskere 
i Waffen SS 1940-45, København: Aschehoug, 1998; Anette Warring, 
Tyskerpiger, i krig og kœrlighed, ph.d.-afhandling, Roskilde 
Universitetscenter, 1993 
4  Four volumes were published as a result of the Refugee Project, see Banke 
2005; Kirchhoff 2005; Kirchhoff and Rünitz 2007; Rünitz 2005. 
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Denmark. Thus I would very much like – on this very occasion and at this lo-
cation – on behalf of the government and thus the Danish state, to express re-
gret and apologize for these acts. An apology cannot alter history. But it can 
contribute to the recognition of historical mistakes. So that present and future 
generations will hopefully avoid similar mistakes in the future.” (Rasmussen 
2005) 
 
What happened in Denmark because of the Stockholm process shows us 
how important it has become for small nations to admit crimes of the 
past. Some would even claim that Fogh Rasmussen instrumentalized the 
narrative about the Occupation when his liberal-conservative govern-
ment broke the consensus on the course of Danish foreign policy by 
joining the Iraq coalition in 2003 and bringing Denmark into a new role 
in international activism. In a speech held during the commemoration of 
the August rebellion in 1943, when the Danes held a strike for the first 
time and thereby showed their resistance against the Germans, Fogh 
Rasmussen stated that the politics of cooperation was “a moral decline” 
(Rasmussen 2003a). No minister had ever openly questioned the hitherto 
solid consensus among historians and other scholars. What Denmark did 
during the Occupation was, up to that point, officially considered a wise 
policy for a small nation like Denmark. But Fogh Rasmussen challenged 
this consensus, and he did so just before the country entered the Iraqi 
war, introducing a new activist foreign policy for Denmark. 
Looking back at the statement of Fogh Rasmussen, it is doubtful 
whether such a break would have been possible at all without the pro-
cess started by the first Stockholm International Forum and the Stock-
holm Declaration. In that sense the Stockholm Declaration was not only 
a sign of the globalization of Holocaust memory. The Stockholm Decla-
ration could also be seen as an international response to the growing im-
pact of the past in our present political culture where the Holocaust has a 
unique and paradigmatic status.  
 
 
Europe after  1989 
 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the Holocaust has come to play an im-
portant role for Europe as a shared historical experience. We can see this 
not only in the many official apologies that European heads of states 
made during the 1990s, like the apologies offered by the French Presi-
dent, Jacque Chirac, in 1995, the Dutch Queen Beatrix also in 1995 and 
the Polish President in 2001. But also the resolutions adopted by the Eu-
ropean Parliament to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive, and the 
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Stockholm Declaration signed by European governments in January 
2000, are evidence of a general acknowledgement in Europe of the Hol-
ocaust as a historical crime with a crucial place in European memory. As 
it is today, several European countries have adopted January 27 as their 
annual day of remembrance honoring the victims and their families. If 
we want to understand this development, we need to look back at what 
happened in Europe during the 1990s after the breakdown of Com-
munism.  
“This was the third time I had been confronted with the point zero of 
history”, Croatian journalist, Slavenka Drakulic, writes in her book, 
They wouldn’t hurt a Fly (2005).  
 
“First time it had happened with my father’s generation after the Second 
World War, that is, after the communist revolution. All history before then 
was rewritten. The second time was after the collapse of communism, when 
we had to forget about communism and begin again (and start rewriting histo-
ry again) from the year 1990. And the third time is now, the present, following 
the end of the last war.” (Drakulic 2005)  
 
Drakulic is referring to the civil wars in Ex-Yugoslavia that broke out in 
Sarajevo in 1995. What happened in the former Yugoslavia after the 
breakdown of Communism came as a shock to post-1989 Europe; a Eu-
rope full of hope and dreams for a new beginning. And new questions 
arose: What went wrong? How could Europe passively look on while 
their Serbian neighbors slaughtered 8000 Muslims? Had Europe not 
learned from the past? Was Europe about to repeat the same kind of 
madness, killing innocent civilians, as during the Second World War? 
Was ethnic nationalism coming back? Or rather, had ethnic nationalism 
really never disappeared?  
The shock not only lead to a debate about Europe’s unconfronted 
past, but contributed to an increased interest for the history of the de-
struction of European Jewry during the Second World War. And some 
countries established new research centers and public authorities, like in 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, with focus on the Hol-
ocaust and other genocides. In Europe, the emergence of a new academ-
ic field, genocide studies, following the wars in the Balkans was from 
the beginning closely linked to the history of the Holocaust. The Holo-
caust became the paradigmatic genocide for the study of other if not 
similar, then comparable crimes. (Gerner/Karlsson: 2005) Genocides 
were to be studied in a comparative context. And this gave the Holo-
caust a position as the historical crime that all European states should 
learn from. In order to prevent a similar crime, the lessons of the Holo-
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caust were to be taught and remembered. And the Holocaust was to be 
studied anew.  
Although we cannot neglect the national differences in each Europe-
an country, we can understand that what happened in Ex-Yugoslavia 
during the 1990s was nevertheless the beginning of an Europeanization 
of the Holocaust, both as history and as a moral guidepost. Within such 
a process, it is reasonable to ask in what way European societies have 
recognized and dealt with, in the words of Dutch researcher Alfred 
Pijpers their “Holocaust guilt” (Pijpers 2005). What are the mechanisms? 
Who are the agents, bringing justice to the murdered Jews? What is the 
relation between governments, the work of civil society organizations, 
and the changing social and political context in which the postwar trials 
took place?  
Looking at this process more closely, we can observe a more inti-
mate relationship between the national narratives in Western Europe and 
global human rights standards. During the past two decades, these stand-
ards have become increasingly influential in international politics, as de-
scribed by among others Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, Ariel Co-
lonomos and Omer Bartov (Barkan 2000; Bartov et al. 2002; Colonomos 
2008; DUPI 1999a; DUPI 1999b; Levy/Sznaider 2006). The increased 
influence of human rights in international politics and the growing inter-
est for a revision of Second World War history brought European na-
tion-states to confront their own human rights abuses, their own crimes 
of the past, their own dark sides. We have to understand this relation be-
tween an increased impact of human rights-thinking in international pol-
itics, and the revision of the history of the Second World War. Not only 
were national narratives being rewritten by a new generation, posing a 
series of new questions. History was also to be reinterpreted according 
to new moral standards, and these were for the generation of 1989, hu-
man rights.  
Each country had to confront its atrocities from the past, and history 
was to be understood through the parameters of human rights, a change 
that to some historians seemed like a new kind of moralism. After the 
collapse of Communism, the need for some shared values within the EU 
became even more prevalent, especially after the integration of new 
member countries from Eastern Europe. And the shared values became 
tolerance, diversity, and respect for human dignity as stated in the pre-
amble to the draft constitution of Europe, providing the EU an identity 
as a union working for and protecting basic human rights. As such, one 
can say that the growing interest for the Holocaust is conduced by an in-
creased focus on international human rights. A development also pointed 
out by Sznaider and Levy in their book The Holocaust and Global 
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Memory. To a certain extent we can also observe how these global hu-
man rights standards have actually challenged the national narratives, 
and perhaps stimulated a change in the ways national history is being 
understood and interpreted.  
By examining the ways the Holocaust has been dealt with in postwar 
Europe, we can thus distinguish some general dynamics of how societies 
have dealt with their National Socialist past. Secondly, we can also de-
scribe how globalization affects the ways history is being interpreted. 
And, thirdly, we can discuss whether this globalization of history can 
stimulate a change in national identities. Does the Holocaust as a para-
digm stimulate a denationalization, perhaps even an Europeanization, of 
the past, in which individualized religious and cultural identities replace 
the national identities? Or, should we turn the question around and in-
stead ask: Is the crucial role of the Holocaust in European public 
memory in fact a reflection of a process in which European nation states 
becomes increasingly less national? 
 
 
Holocaust  memory 
 
Going deeper into my subject, I want to emphasize that not only has the 
Holocaust been incorporated into European public memory as a specific 
crime. During the past decade, research into Holocaust memory has also 
increased considerably. A recently completed project at Lund Universi-
ty, Sweden, The Holocaust and European historical cultures, describes 
through a series of case studies how the history of the Holocaust has 
been used in several European countries for either educational, political 
or societal purposes. Among other results, this project shows that for 
some countries, such as Sweden, the Holocaust serves as a moral legacy 
to educate younger generations and teach them tolerance and non-
discrimination. A tendency repeated in Denmark, Norway, France, UK 
and the Netherlands. (Banke 2008; Brudholm/Mennecke 2004 Karls-
son/Zander 2003, 2004, 2006). For others, like Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, the demands from the European Union to confront and re-
member the Holocaust is experienced like a dictate coming from above 
(Sniegon 2008), and has now resulted in a request for a similar focus 
within the European Union on the crimes of Communism.5 Thus, this re-
search project has shown us to what extent history can serve a society 
and be used for different purposes. 
 
5  European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience 
and totalitarianism. 
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Another aspect that has unfolded during these years is how the pros-
ecution of crimes committed during the Second World War can affect a 
society, also in a longer perspective, and how it can, in some cases, 
stimulate a debate about what was previously neglected by the public, as 
described by Devin O. Pendas in The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-
1965 (Pendas 2005), and by British historian Tony Judt in Postwar (Judt 
2005). Even though it can be questioned whether trials have a moral im-
pact on a society, they often do influence the public discourses as shown 
by Joan B. Wolf in Harnessing the Holocaust. The Politics of Memory 
in France (Wolf 2004).  
As such, research into the dynamics of postwar trials, how they op-
erate in different societies, and the relations between trials and the pub-
lic, can provide a more profound knowledge of the relation between law 
and history. It can also leave us with a clearer perspective of the agents 
seeking justice on behalf of the victims, such as Simon Wiesenthal and 
Serge Klarsfeld, and what role these advocates have played. Why did 
some societies avoid bringing Nazi war criminals to justice? And why 
did others not? What can we more generally say about the way a society 
uses legal instruments to confront atrocities of the past? To what extent 
do trials stimulate a re-evaluation of history, perhaps even a revision? 
And can public opinion and pressure from interest groups influence pol-
icy making and legislative processes? Is there a general pattern that we 
can apply to all societies? 
How societies remember the past, and also how the history of the 
Second World War is being written and rewritten, is a scholarly field 
that has expanded both in Europe and in the USA during the past one or 
two decades. (Assmann 2007, 2008; Connerton 1989; Herf 1997; Kush-
ner 1994; Rousso 1991; Warring 2002; Welzer 2002). Based on French 
sociologist Maurice Halbwalchs’ concept of collective memory, Peter 
Novick has described how the Holocaust was integrated into American 
collective memory (Novick 1999). Also Jeffrey Klick uses Halbwachs to 
discuss the relation between collective memory and historical responsi-
bility in Germany. The field now includes studies on lieux de mémoire – 
sites of remembrance – and on politics of remembrance (Kroh 2008; Le-
bow 2006; Young 1993). However, few studies consider the influence of 
globalization and how global moral standards help develop what 
Sznaider and Levy term “cosmopolitan memory”.  
Through examining the ways German, Israeli and American socie-
ties have remembered the Holocaust, Sznaider and Levy show, how eth-
nic-group politics, coupled with popular culture, have been powerful 
enough to force to introduce an alternative remembrance of the Holo-
caust. Thus, examining how European societies started to remember the 
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Holocaust and what influence global media and cultural representations 
had on this process, can help us to understand why the Holocaust during 
the past two decades has gained such a prominent position in European 
memory.6 Such an examination can also lead us to a better understand-
ing of the relation between the breakdown of Communism, the increas-
ing role of international human rights standards in politics, and the Hol-
ocaust as a global symbolic reference.  
 
 
The four  phases of  Holocaust  memory 
 
For a general overview, I have found it necessary to divide the ways the 
Holocaust has been dealt with, or not dealt with, into four chronological 
phases. The phases are defined by the development mainly in the United 
States, Israel, Germany and France, and what generally characterizes 
these phases. My phase model was originally inspired by Tony Judt’s 
Postwar, and later the work of German memory scholar, Aleida Ass-
mann. Generally most scholars would agree with this relatively rough 
structure for postwar Holocaust memory, even though my terminology 
can be contested: 
• 1945-1949  Confrontation 
• 1950s    Interpretation 
• 1960s-1990s   Justice 
• 1990s-   Remembrance 
 
The four decades of Soviet influence, however, add additional layers of 
complexity leading to important differences between East and West Eu-
ropean states, but generally we can speak of four phases. Each is defined 
by social, political and cultural developments, beginning in the immedi-
ate postwar days, with the direct Confrontation of the public in the West 
to the crimes of the Nazis. Here, the public in Germany, in the UK, and 
in the liberated countries were confronted with the horrors that had taken 
place in the camps. The confrontation was immediate and short-lived, 
and was followed by silence. Even if the world became aware, it was as 
if the realization of the immense crime did not follow until two decades 
later at a time when the affected countries were better prepared.  
The second phase I have termed Interpretation. Even though silence 
replaced the immediate confrontation, and Europe was busy recovering 
economically from the war, artists and writers started to articulate what 
 
6  See also the contribution by Bjerg in this volume for an empirical example 
of the influence of media on the memory culture of the Holocaust. 
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otherwise seemed too monstrous to describe. What we see during the si-
lent 1950s are some of the first artistic interpretations of the Holocaust 
emerging, mainly by Jewish-American émigré and refugee artists. These 
were artists who themselves had been in the camps or, like the Italian 
Corrado Cagli, were on the spot when the American soldiers entered 
Nordhausen and Buchenwald. And it was the Italian-American painter 
Rico Lebrun who used photographs from Buchenwald in the 1950s to 
speak of the human condition, the pain, the endurance, and the salvation. 
Pictures of emaciated concentration camp inmates, with shaven heads 
and naked, were used to say something general about Western culture: 
attitudes to death, the fragility of the individual, the myth of Christ, vic-
timization, redemption. 
As early as Lebrun’s work in the USA in the 1950s, the Holocaust 
had a symbolic value. For the Russian-born, Boris Lurie, a decade later 
the Holocaust was a key to his iconoclastic NO! art. Lurie was himself a 
survivor of the camps, and after the war he settled in New York where 
he established himself as an artist. In his work, the Holocaust expressed 
a profound disillusion with the free Western world. He made collages of 
photographs from the camps and pornographic images. One of them, 
“Lolita” (1962), has bits of the poster for Stanley Kubrick’s film of the 
same name combined with three dead camp prisoners whose shaven 
heads stick out from behind a wooden barracks. What Lurie wanted to 
show with this particular arrangement was clarified in 1998: “My pic-
tures are less to do with the Holocaust than with discontent with the 
American way of life”.7 
Already then, with these first interpretations, the Holocaust had tak-
en on a symbolic value (Banke 2005a; Liljefors 2002). An artist like Lu-
rie referred to the Holocaust as a symbol for the degenerated Western 
culture and capitalism. Later, in 1996, the Polish artist, Zbigniew Libera, 
would have his installation LEGO Concentration Camp for the Venice 
Biennale accompanied by the following comment: 
 
“I was thinking about such kinds of architecture which could be a factor of 
transformation of individuals: the architecture which influences those whom it 
shelters, which provides control, subordinates individuals to cognition and 
modifies them through discipline. All the aspects can be found in architecture 
of a cloister, a hospital, soldiers barracks, a school, a factory or a prison […] ”8  
Most scholars now agree that the breakthrough for global Holocaust 
awareness came with the transmission of the popular television series, 
Holocaust: The Story of the Family Weiss, in 1978 and 1979 (Judt 2005; 
 
7  Quoted in Liljefors 2002. 
8  Quoted from Lijefors 2002, p. 153 
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Karlsson/Zander 2003; Zander 2003). But Holocaust, and its popular 
success, would not have been possible without the national trials that 
took place in Germany and elsewhere in Europe from the late 1950s 
through the 1960s and 1970s, and the concurrent publication of im-
portant scholarly works, documenting the Holocaust as a crime in and of 
itself. Thus, the third phase is characterised by Documentation and, to 
some extent, the pursuit of justice. It is during this third phase that the 
Holocaust is regarded as a deliberate crime, a genocide, and the dimen-
sions of the anti-Jewish policy of the Nazis are introduced to the public 
by a new generation of scholars who based their works on archival re-
search (Davidowitz 1975; Friedländer 1966; Hilberg 1961).  
It is important to emphasize this interdependent relationship between 
research, the trials in Germany and later in France, and the continuous 
striving for justice on behalf of the Jewish people. The discussion about 
the meaning or effect of trials not only for different societies, but also 
for the understanding of history, was introduced by Hannah Arendt 
when she questioned the Eichmann trial’s legitimacy (Arendt 1994 
[1963]). Arendt’s reflection gave rise to a still ongoing discussion 
among philosophers and lawyers, but also historians, about to what ex-
tent trials can be used for writing history. Every court operates – from a 
historian’s point of view – with a limited vision of the past. The court 
can only judge the past according to the evidence available to it. Thus, 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg is a reflection of the 
prosecuting countries’ interpretation of the Second World War at that 
time (Finkielkraut 1992; Marrus 2002; Paxton 2001). 
The fourth phase is characterized by an increased activity of remem-
brance, starting out in the mid 1990s with a number of resolutions 
adapted at European level and several official acknowledgements of-
fered by heads of states, like the French President in 1995.9 On the 53rd 
anniversary of the round-up of Parisian Jews, France’s newly installed 
president, Jacque Chirac, broke the taboo and acknowledged his coun-
try’s role in the Holocaust (Banke 2010). This phase was clearly de-
pendent on the historical documentation, the trials, and the quest for jus-
tice for the murdered Jews. Combined with the 50th anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War and the ongoing civil wars in Ex-
Yugoslavia, a certain political momentum was created that united Euro-
pean political leaders around the imperative to keep the memory of the 
Holocaust alive. 
 
9  Resolution on European and international protection for Nazi concentra-
tion camps as historical monuments, 1993 and Resolution on a day to 
commemorate the Holocaust, 1995. 
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I am well aware of the risk of oversimplification inherent in creating 
such a chronological model of the phases of how the Holocaust has been 
dealt with in memory culture, and that some of the phases overlap. Nev-
ertheless, this model provides a structure that can help to identify more 
general patterns and dynamics. What the model shows is not only how 
the Holocaust as a specific crime has developed from being basically ig-
nored to being acknowledged and remembered. The model also provides 
an overview of how historical crimes are being addressed, under which 
circumstances and by whom. Through such a chronological phase mo- 
del, actors and agents become visible, and cases are more easily com-
pared at a concrete level.  
However, in order to conduct such a study, we cannot simply ob-
serve and describe. We have to add theories. Within memory studies, 
different concepts and theories have been suggested, like “collective 
memory” originally introduced by Maurice Halbwachs in 1925, “histori-
cal culture” introduced by Paul Connerton (1989), and “historical con-
sciousness” used by, among others, the Danish historian Bernard Eric 
Jensen (1994)10. The concept of “collective memory” can be criticized 
for being an organic metaphor, not suitable for modern societies, as sug-
gested by memory scholar Aleida Assmann (Assmann 2007, 2008; Con-
nerton 1989; Jensen 1994). Instead, we need to look at theories of glob-
alization and social change. The relation between globalization, social 
change, and the development of new kinds of identity with new histori-
cal orientations can be described through theories of nation building, as 
developed originally by Benedict Andersson, Ernest Gellner and Antho-
ny D. Smith, and theories of “de-nationalizations”, as described by 
Georg Delanty and Bryan S. Turner (Andersson 1991; Gellner 2006 
[1983]; Smith 1999, 2000). With globalization, a new kind of citizen-
ship, based less on national identities, has emerged, leaving room for 
other forms of identity making (Delanty 2000; Turner 2001).  
The current phase, Remembrance, is thus deeply dependent on the 
political development during the 1990s, and can to some extent be rela- 
ted to the denationalization of European national identities. In a united 
Europe, the Holocaust has come to represent some shared and European 
values. However strange it may sound, there is a general agreement 
within Europe that the Holocaust represents a unique historical lesson, 
and that the shared European values stem from this lesson.  
And therefore, we may say that the Holocaust as a specific field of 
study stimulates a certain degree of denationalization of national narra-
 
10  See the contributions by Gerner and Körber for elaborations on the con-
cepts of history culture and historical consciousness respectively. 
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tives, maybe even a Europeanization, leaving room for other narratives 
more closely related to individual minority groups based on their reli-
gious and cultural traditions. As such, the increased interest for the Hol-
ocaust in Europe during the past two decades is also a sign of fundamen-
tal changes taking place during these years in many European societies.  
 
 
The legacies of  the Holocaust  in  Scandinavia 
 
Returning to my initial inquiry of the Holocaust as a moral guidepost 
and of how small states like the Scandinavian relate to their national 
pasts, we can see how in the case of Denmark and Norway these states 
have addressed the Holocaust as a specific crime. Until the end of the 
1960s, the rescue of the Danish Jews was not paid any specific attention, 
and when it finally did, it happened as a consequence of a development 
taking place outside Denmark. Since the liberation, the rescue of the 
Danish Jews was seen as an integrated part of the resistance and the his-
tory of the Occupation. But as the international interest for the persecu-
tion of extermination of the Jews during the Second World War grew, 
the more narrow national interpretation of the Danish rescue was chal-
lenged from various sides.  
In 1963, the organization “Thanks to the Danes” (later renamed 
“Thanks to Scandinavia”) was launched by Richard Netter and Victor 
Borge as a means of expressing appreciation to the Scandinavian people 
for their heroism. The Danish prime minister, social democrat Jens Otto 
Krag, attended the opening event, and Netter later told how Krag had a 
hard time understanding the purpose of it all. “Why pay homage to the 
Danes?” Krag asked Netter at the ceremony.11 Also in 1963, the Danish 
Resistance as a collective was among the first to be included in Yad 
Vashem’s Righteous among the Nations because of its perceived pivotal 
role in the rescue. The following year Leni Yahil published The Rescue 
of Danish Jewry. A Test of Democracy. For the first time, the rescue of 
the Danish Jews was interpreted in a wider frame of a European Holo-
caust (Bak 2001: 173). In brief, Yahil argues that the Danish Jewry was 
saved because of strong democratic traditions in Denmark. This interpre-
tation has shown a remarkable persistence.  
The articulation of the Danish rescue as a light in the darkness took 
place abroad, but was brought to Denmark through events and initiatives 
like the one mentioned above. In the end, the international interpretation 
 
11  Richard Netter interview in the Danish newspaper Politiken 11 March 
1993. 
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of the rescue action did not break with the dominant narrative about the 
occupation. On the contrary, Danes rescued the Jews, and again it was 
demonstrated how Danish democracy could not be defeated by Nazism. 
Even though Denmark was occupied and the Danish authorities did co-
operate with the Nazi regime, it was only in order to save the Danish 
democracy and society.  
The example of the starting point for the commemoration of the res-
cue of the Danish Jews, shows how national narratives become influ-
enced, and in some cases also challenged by international moral stand-
ards. The peculiar thing here is that Denmark was at the time not even 
aware of this relation. One reason could be that the growing internation-
al interest for the Danish rescue did not contest the dominating national 
narrative about the occupation. The overall conclusions remained the 
same, and until the late 1990s, the darker sides of Danish occupational 
history remained unaddressed. 
Looking at Norway, we see a similar development following the 
Stockholm process, even though Norway’s war record is very different 
from both Denmark’s and Sweden’s. Norway was occupied like Den-
mark, but Norway not only collaborated with the Nazi authorities. Nor-
way also showed much stronger and more direct violent resistance be-
fore accepting the Occupation, and unlike Denmark, nearly 40 % of the 
Norwegian Jews were deported, to some extent even with the help of lo-
cals. In this sense, with Norway we have a case more similar to other 
European countries.  
Belgian historian Pieter Lagrou (2000) has examined how the 
memory of the Second World War is presented in a national and patriot-
ic narrative in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. He has discovered 
that within this narrative there is little space for the commemoration of 
events or groups whose history and experiences could not be utilized for 
postwar recovery. One of these groups was the national Jews, whose war 
experience was not only radically different from that of most of their 
countrymen, but whose experiences could not be used within a meaning-
ful national narrative. By presenting the deportation of Jews as a solely 
German affair and completely at odds with what was considered to be 
the Norwegian core values, the memory of what had happened to Nor-
wegian Jews could serve a purpose within the national narrative.  
As the Norwegian historian Ingrid Brakstad writes, the symbolic 
embracement of the Jews and their suffering was portrayed as natural to 
all “good Norwegians.” This rhetoric depicted Norwegians as protectors 
of “their” Jews, and as immune to anti-Semitic influences. The fact that 
Norwegians had participated in the deportations of Jewish countrymen 
and that Norwegians were not, in fact, immune to anti-Semitism was 
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hardly ever an issue in this context. This way the memory of the Jewish 
experiences could serve a purpose in the national epos needed in the 
postwar years – as a symbol of German cruelty and Norwegian human-
ism (Brakstad: 2007). 
So, to conclude, the Stockholm process clearly challenged the na-
tional narratives in these countries with demands of adjusting to interna-
tional moral standards. Not least in the Danish case we see a widely re-
spected narrative, namely the one on the Danish rescue of Jews in Octo-
ber 1943, being challenged as a consequence of the Stockholm process. 
The logic behind the Danish “breaking silence” is of course that Den-
mark is such a pure and moral nation, that it can afford to acknowledge 
this particular dark side of the past. And through this acknowledgment 
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Processing Time – On the Manifestations 




The little girl sat by her grandmother’s kitchen table. The old woman 
told her about her childhood, several decades ago. The girl was bored. 
She did not understand why Grandma had not attended school, and why 
she said nothing about television programs and computer games. Trying 
to catch the attention of her granddaughter, the old woman anxiously 
waved her hands. The girl’s eyes fell on her grandmother’s palm, wrin-
kled and rough after many years of manual labor. Then she looked at her 
own soft and smooth hand. Suddenly a historical thought crossed her 
mind: once upon a time Grandma’s palm had been as soft and smooth as 
her own. Immediately, another thought, at least as well-advised as the 
first but rather future-oriented, came to her mind: in time, her own palm 
will also be wrinkled and rough. Thus, in a single line of thought, the lit-
tle girl had depicted herself as a historical individual. She had entered 
into a mental process in which notions of the past and of the future be-
came integrated aspects of her understanding of present life. The effort 
rapidly turned the strangeness and difference of her grandmother’s 
childhood into a notion of identity and familiarity. Consequently, the 
girl had put her historical consciousness to work.  
 
 
Temporal  or ientat ion 
 
Historical consciousness is an essential dimension of our moral, emo-
tional and cognitive thinking and orientation. It is a time compass that 
assigns meaning to past events and directs us towards future projects. It 
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is connected not only nor even primarily to scholarly historical interpre-
tations, but to meanings, memories, metaphors, monuments and myths. 
Thus, historical consciousness is a basic faculty of temporal awareness 
without which there would be no humanity in either of the two meanings 
of the word; that is, no humaneness and no mankind. As human beings, 
we may lack knowledge of many things that have happened in the past, 
being totally unfamiliar with diverging scholarly interpretations of feu-
dalism or the French revolution, but we cannot do without historical 
consciousness.  
Although the phraseology relating to historical consciousness is of-
ten as pretentious as the lines above, historical consciousness is normal-
ly at work in everyday situations, in history classes and in other kinds of 
direct human interaction, as the example with the little girl and her 
grandmother clearly demonstrates. However, it is also present in our in-
direct encounters with history by means of texts or other objectifications 
of history. From this there follows that historical consciousness must be 
analytically connected to history in both its basic dimensions: as res ges-
tae, or what has actually happened in the past, and to historia rerum ges-
tarum, or how we represent and use this past. Consequently, historical 
consciousness can and must be approached historically as well as func-
tionally. Historical consciousness is certainly historical, changing from 
time to time and from one society to another. However, it would be just 
as adequate to use the term “history consciousness”, since it highlights a 
mental activity in which history is functionally processed.  
But how do we actually recognize historical consciousness when we 
see it? Questions of this kind can be multiplied: Is there a straightfor-
ward way to translate historical consciousness into a couple of educa-
tional competences, needed in a modern democracy? This seems to be 
assumed when educational history programs declare it a primary objec-
tive that students should develop or deepen their historical conscious-
ness. Or, to reverse the questions, which makes them even more prob-
lematic: If historical consciousness, as is often argued, is a totality or an 
inclusion that mentally embraces the three temporal perspectives past, 
present and future in a complex pattern of condensation and crystalliza-
tion, what is not part of historical consciousness? If historical con-
sciousness is in everything and everywhere, where does it analytically 
start and end?  
It would probably be safe to say that most of us content ourselves 
with using the concept in a heuristic way. It helps us to raise new ques-
tions about the historical dimension itself and its functions and uses in 
society. In my mind, this is the way it should be. Thus, it reminds us that 
history often functions and is used differently from scholarly history, 
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when related to what the phenomenologically inspired Germans denote 
as Lebenswelt. But while concepts such as historical culture and collec-
tive memory have been successfully made use of as analytical tools to 
better understand how history works in human life and society, historical 
consciousness has not. It seems to me that we still rely heavily on the 
definition given in the first Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik from 
1979, in which Karl-Ernst Jeismann defined historical consciousness as 
den Zusammenhang von Vergangenheitsdeutung, Gegenwartsverständ-
nis und Zukunftsperspektive, “the interrelation between interpretation of 
the past, understanding of the present and perspective on the future” 
(Jeismann 1979: 42).1 This definition is, in my opinion, still valid, but 
should be elaborated, since it gives few indications of how historical 
consciousness works in life and society. The purpose of my contribution 
is in part to reflect theoretically on the concept, and in part to offer a few 
modest proposals on how historical consciousness can be analyzed in a 
more productive way in history-cultural studies.  
 
 
The return of  histor ical  consciousness 
 
Let me start from two notions: first, that right now there is an interest in 
and a need for an expanded concept of historical consciousness. Second-
ly, that the work done so far in terms of providing it with analytical 
qualities has been unsatisfactory. How should we understand the current 
interest in historical consciousness? Undoubtedly, there is an internal 
scholarly answer. This does not only come from the obvious fact that a 
focus on phenomena of “being” has given way to a focus on phenomena 
of “consciousness”. This “cultural turn” has actively demonstrated that 
language and culture serve to promote the kind of time transgression in-
volved in historical consciousness. The argument, mainly but not only 
derived from hermeneutical philosophy, goes: in contemporary language 
and other cultural expressions, past experiences are collected and made 
use of. But future experiences are also anticipated, because in our con-
temporary perceptions and interpretations they are ranged in and influ-
enced by linguistic and cultural structures that had existed before the ex-
periences were collected and made use of. In particular, Hayden White 
has called attention to the “figurative imagination” involved beforehand 
in all approaches to history (White 1985: 101–120).  
 
1  The same definition is repeated in later editions of the handbook from 
1985 and 1997.  
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This perspective illustrates the important question of whether history 
as a phenomenon of consciousness fulfils beneficiary orientative, sense-
giving functions, or whether such “pre-givens” demonstrate the malevo-
lently repressive or narrowly ideological risks inherent in any use of his-
tory. Is historical consciousness, with its focus on constancy and internal 
coherence, primarily connected to canonicity and hegemony, or can it 
further pluralist meanings and openness? There is a general idea, pro-
pounded already by Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, that the ap-
pearance of modern society coincided with a new, more instrumental re-
lationship to time and history. An objectively measured and understood 
sense of time replaced the subjective relationship to time predominant in 
pre-modern and early modern society. In Reinhart Koselleck’s terminol-
ogy, modernization meant that the human horizon of expectations be-
came estranged from the space of experiences of human beings 
(Koselleck 1985).  
It goes without saying that the professionalization of history scholar-
ship was part of the same process. For some present-day commentators, 
this development went a long way in colonizing or usurping the histori-
cal dimension from every-day life. In the bitter words of Nietzsche, his-
torical scholarship interposed itself as a gleaming but hostile star be-
tween history and life (Nietzsche 1983: 77).2 For others, the develop-
ment of history scholarship is on the contrary essential for the growth of 
historical consciousness. They have rather blamed the extreme ideologi-
cal and scholarly modernism of the last century for removing history 
from life and society (Schorske 1998). This debate, which generally can 
be interpreted as a dispute between those who judge historical scholar-
ship as being the prime mover and benefactor of historical conscious-
ness, and those who maintain that historical consciousness is part of a 
much wider socio-cultural process, is in itself no salient part of this 
analysis. Nevertheless, it may say something important about the temp-
tations and prospects inherent in the concept of historical consciousness.  
What unites the opponents is a belief in the need to regain a lost his-
torical consciousness in order to solve various problems and crises of 
modernity, and to provide a “post-modern” individual and society with a 
more “vertical” identity, by promoting integration into processes of 
meaning considered time-transgressing, such as ethnification, European-
ization and victimization. All of these depart from the wide temporal 
realm of historical consciousness, and from a range of questions with 
 
2  Among later proponents of such a critical perspective can be mentioned 
Raphael Samuel (1994: 3–8).  
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temporal extensions: Who are “we”? Who are “the others”? From where 
do we originate? Where did it go wrong? Where are we going? 
Historical consciousness stands out as an indispensible theoretical, 
heuristic concept if we want to investigate present-day identity for-
mations and changes. They all involve wrestling with a historical dimen-
sion that seems hard to bring together with the traditional notion of the 
goal-rational, linear character of modernity. Koselleck’s idea of concep-
tual crises and intellectual reorientations as results of an increasingly 
asynchronous relationship between the different partial processes of 
modernization seems to carry a particular urgency in our time. 
 
 
Genet ic  and genealogical  perspect ives  
 
Now, let us turn to the second question, why we have difficulties arrang-
ing historical consciousness into an analytical framework that might be 
useful for empirical explorations and teaching purposes. One important 
answer is that we are still restrained by our traditional scholarly, genetic-
developmental-chronological understanding of the essence of the histor-
ical dimension. If the past has its own intrinsic value, any involvement 
by posterity is detrimental. History must be explained and understood 
prospectively and according to the contexts pre-given by the past itself.  
However, it seems to me a fruitful procedure to let a reflected histor-
ical consciousness include an enlarged, or rather, a double historical per-
spective. One of them is surely genetic, focusing on the fact that we are 
and have a history. It goes without saying that a well-designed genetic 
perspective, especially if it is allowed to lead up to a temporary “now”, 
is instrumental in demonstrating that the individual and society exist in 
time, having an origin as well as a future. There is an obvious need to re-
late historical consciousness to an individual’s experience of being a part 
of and an agent in history.  
The other perspective is genealogical, maintaining that we make his-
tory by reflecting ourselves and our present situation in the past. A ge-
nealogical perspective is important to prove that the past is recalled and 
present in the perceptions, projects and agencies of individuals and soci-
ety. This means that retrospection is not arbitrary but directed by cultural 
needs and interest, by historical culture. No doubt, the genetic and the 
genealogical perspectives may be hard to reconcile. Stormy debates have 
often been the result when causality contrasts with meaning, prospection 
with retrospection, distance with proximity, abstraction with concretion, 
complexion with simplicity, relative validity with absolute validity, re-
versibility with irreversibility, just to mention a few possible states of 
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opposition. In my mind, however, a reflected historical consciousness 
can balance and join these two fundamental historical perspectives in so 
far that a genealogical perspective can provide genetic history with 
agency and criteria of relevance, while a genetic perspective is needed 
not only to supply us with historical contents, but also to help us under-
stand why history is recalled and represented the way it is. In concert, 
the two perspectives can demonstrate Kierkegaard’s well-known dictum 
that man lives his life forward but understands it backward. 
 
 
Processing t ime 
 
Another answer to the question why operationalization is a complicated 
thing is that historical consciousness is a phenomenon without clear de-
terminants. Should it be defined and contextualized from a disciplinary 
logic, from psychological considerations, or is it worthwhile instead to 
depart from reflections on its functions in society? Such a socio-cultural 
analysis, that I will now turn to, must however be preceded by a qualifi-
cation of the category of historical consciousness. First of all let me say 
that the “real” character of historical consciousness is a complicated 
philosophical and epistemological question which cannot be unraveled 
here. The factors that determine historical consciousness are a combina-
tion of qualities and proficiencies acquired by socialization and cultural 
traditions. Clearly, the degree of historical consciousness, of its strength 
and sophistication, varies greatly between different collectives and with-
in them, and through time and space. In my mind, it is merely possible 
to give some very general ideas of the “essence” and working of histori-
cal consciousness. For the empirically interested scholar, the concept 
must obviously be transformed into more comprehensible analytical cat-
egories, such as historical culture and uses of history. 
It seems reasonable to imagine historical consciousness less as a de-
pository with fixed contents than as an active processor whose function 
is to help the individual and various collectives to make sense of the 
contemporary world, in light of experiences and interpretations of the 
past as well as expectations for and projections of the future. As is indi-
cated by the concept “consciousness”, derived from the Latin words con 
and scentia, approximately “knowing together”, historical consciousness 
is best understood as something that in its fundamental features is shared 
by others who live under similar external and internal conditions. Thus, 
historical consciousness often processes notions of belonging and to-
getherness by helping individuals and collectives go beyond the horizon 
of their own restricted life spans.  
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There is a lot to be said in favor of the idea that historical conscious-
ness does not process cognitive particulars and disconnected facts of the 
past. Rather, it is connected to a more general awareness of how human 
beings come to terms with history. However, singular “facts” probably 
more often than not function to induce us to start thinking historically; 
for many Hungarians, the mere mention of the word “Trianon” – a castle 
outside Paris in which on June 4, 1920 a peace treaty was signed that re-
duced Hungarian territory by three quarters and the Hungarian popula-
tion by three fifths – is enough to trigger painful notions of a time-
transcending character, in the same way that the date “April 24” – the 
day in 1915 when the Young Turks started slaughtering Armenians in 
Constantinople – does for Armenians all over the world (Gerner 2007: 
79–109, Karlsson 2007: 13–45). This painful, often traumatic aspect is 
important. Historical consciousness is actively used for the elaboration 
and qualification of fundamental questions about human life and society. 
These questions often give rise to reflections on continuity and change, 
essence and appearance and necessity and contingency which transcend 
established temporal boundaries. Among them are identity issues of who 
“we” and who “they” are, existential issues related to life and death, 
moral problems of what is right and what is wrong, good and evil, and 
politico-ideological questions related to phenomena such as justice and 
injustice or power and powerlessness.  
To be sure, such “fundamentals” that may serve as crystallizations of 
historical consciousness can also be found among multi-layered phe-
nomena such as theories, concepts, proverbs, rituals, symbols, compari-
sons, analogies and metaphors (Heller 1982: 51–71). Jörn Rüsen’s well-
known basic position is that the sense-bearing and meaningful character 
of historical consciousness is best taken care of by means of a logic of 
historical narration, in which even apparently shocking and contradicto-
ry historical phenomena can be induced to make sense in a narrative, 
constructed from a fabric of temporal experiences and memories with 
not only cognitive, but also aesthetic and rhetorical building blocks 
(Rüsen 2005). Consequently, problems not only of identity, but also of 
fate, crisis and trauma, can probably be expected to evoke a mental ac-
tivity related to historical consciousness. In fact, in a discussion on how 
tenacious turning points or “borderline events” such as the Second 
World War and the Holocaust influence historical thinking, Rüsen has 
argued that “crisis constitutes historical consciousness, so one can say 
that there is no historical thinking without crisis” (Rüsen 2001: 253). As 
briefly indicated above, radical changes, turning-points, contrasts, an-
tagonisms and revaluations in general, and those charged with a high 
degree of positive or negative values in particular, can probably have the 
KLAS-GÖRAN KARLSSON 
136 
same function of stimulating excursions into the temporal realm. All of 
them obviously have a historical character, because if we have no 
memory or knowledge of a previous state of things, we cannot character-
ize a following situation as a break or a change, and simultaneously 




Manifestat ions and act ivat ions 
 
It has already been made clear that historical consciousness in itself 
leaves no traces that lend themselves to scholarly investigation. There-
fore, there is a need for an intermediate level of analytical operation be-
tween historical consciousness itself and its effects on the individuals’ 
cognitive maps, attitudes and readiness to take action. The reflections, 
manifestations and articulations of historical consciousness are best ana-
lyzed in historical culture. This may be described as the communicative 
context in which historical consciousness works and the past is given 
sense. By means of history-cultural products and activities, individuals 
and collectives orient themselves on the time axis. Historical culture 
provides concrete answers to questions concerning what various indi-
viduals and collectives find worth preserving, teaching, learning, cele-
brating and forgetting about the past.  
To be sure, the collectives in question are still often national ones. 
Scholarship has convincingly demonstrated that even history-cultural 
processes related to non-national dimensions such as world wars or 
crimes against humanity have normally been handled nationally. Schol-
arly works are obviously part of historical culture. Nevertheless, the tra-
ditional approach of dealing with scholarly products, the history of his-
toriography, is not adequate if we want to stress their relationship to his-
torical consciousness. Some differences are salient. One is that history-
cultural products must be analyzed not only as effects of prevailing phil-
osophical ideas and scholarly theories, but also as causes to knowledge, 
conceptions and values of individuals and collectives. In other words, 
not only the production but also the mediation and the consumption of 
history must be taken into account within a history-cultural framework. 
In particular, aspects of the reception of history are seldom addressed by 
scholars. Existential, moral and politico-ideological motives are often 
more salient in history-cultural work, and their connection to power rela-
tions more explicit. Another methodological difference is that doctoral 
dissertations and other scholarly products do not normally reflect histor-
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ical consciousness as adequately as broadly mediated history-cultural ar-
tifacts such as textbooks, films, and historical fiction.  
One way of reflecting historical consciousness is to study its activa-
tions or the history-cultural uses of history in society. An analysis of his-
tory uses must correspond to those fundamental values of life that previ-
ously have been characterized as animating historical consciousness: ex-
istence and identity, moral, power politics and ideology. What follows is 
a typology of different ways of using history, produced in order to reach 
a more general, comparative understanding of the role of history in soci-
ety. It is based on theoretical links between different needs of history, 
different uses, different groups and categories of users, and different 
functions in society. In addition, these uses are thought to possess differ-
ent degrees of strength and urgency in different societies and historical 
periods. Since we will seldom find the types in a “pure” state of realiza-
tion, the ideal-typical, analytical character of the scheme must be em-
phasized.3 
 
The scholarly-scientific use of history 
 
The scholarly-scientific use of history is based on strict professional, 
discipline-specific rules and standards. Criteria of historical relevance 
are more often than not determined from an internal, scholarly value 
judgment, which means that the history selected for research or teaching 
is chosen on the grounds of its ability to illuminate an analytical or a 
theoretical position considered fruitful to develop, or to give further em-
pirical evidence to a historical phenomenon or setting that already has 
been the subject of scholarly analysis. To be able to carry out a scholar-
ly-scientific intellectual operation of this kind, professional training is 
normally considered necessary. Part of this ideal self-perception has 
been the opinion that it is a scholarly virtue to dissociate oneself from 
the history interests, needs and requests of the surrounding society. An-
other part has been a belief in the possibility and the wish to distinctly 
separate the present from the past. Mediation of history is unproblemat-
ic, built on the assumption that the unique, scholarly produced history 
should be transferred as unmodified as possible from the historians’ 
community to the school and the larger society. Scholarly debates do not 
normally include references to historical consciousness. If topics such as 
the Second World War are selected as a relevant issue in history scholar-
ship, the reason is often that “blind spots” of the war should be filled 
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with new knowledge, or that interpretations should include other catego-
ries than the traditional military ones.  
 
The existential use of history 
 
The existential use of history is triggered by the experienced need, felt 
by all individuals to remember or, alternatively to forget, in order to up-
hold or intensify feelings of orientation, anchorage and identity in a so-
ciety in a state of insecurity, pressure or sudden change. Memory is a 
retrospective, present-minded mental process in which we confront or 
integrate reconstructions or representations of the past, normally images 
of concrete figures, times and places, with situations in our present lives. 
Thus, memory can provide the individual with a comforting notion of a 
connection to or continuity with history, a kind of “presence of the past”, 
which in turn may bring about an understanding that she is part of some-
thing larger that her own isolated human life. Consequently, memory, as 
well as a more fundamental historical consciousness, fosters identity. 
The existential use of history is often of a very private nature, not trans-
cending the borderline to “large” institutional and publicly mediated his-
tory, and not always leaving its imprint in empirical documentation. It 
should, however, be emphasized that an engagement in what Roy 
Rosenzweig and David Thelen call the “intimate past”, as expressed, for 
example, in genealogical trees, diaries and photo albums, often leads to a 
desire to relate to and participate in “larger” pasts situated outside the 
narrow family worlds (Rosenzweig/Thelen 1998: 115–146). This be-
comes particularly evident when memories of “traumatic” or “cata-
strophic” individual experiences such as wars or genocides need to be 
psychologically digested and culturally made sense of by being integrat-
ed into larger narratives (Rüsen 2004: 46ff.). 
 
The moral use of history 
 
The moral use of history is based on both indignation at the scant atten-
tion given to certain aspects of history in a society, and an endeavor to 
restore or rehabilitate that same history. Generally, the moral use has 
proved to be prominent in situations where a culturally insensitive gov-
ernment, at the head of a totalitarian or a functionally warped state, is for 
some reason, such as political-cultural liberalization and newly gained 
openness, suddenly exposed to criticism because essential aspects of the 
past have been concealed from the population. Thus, the point of depar-
ture of the moral use of history is often a specific event, such as the in-
troduction of a politico-cultural liberalization or change, which often 
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manifests itself in the publication of an article, book, or other kind of 
historical artifact with historical “exposures” or “revelations” that meets 
with a broad social response and, accordingly, gets a paradigmatic sig-
nificance. All over Europe, not excluding “bystander” states such as 
Sweden, several decades of disregard or outright secrecy towards crucial 
aspects of the Second World War and the Holocaust have aroused strong 
expressions of “historical” indignation that have had dramatic political 
consequences everywhere.  
 
An ideological use of history 
 
An ideological use of history is related to attempts made, mainly by 
groups of intellectuals and politicians, to gain control of public represen-
tations, to arrange historical elements into a dominant context of mean-
ing. This arrangement is not, as in the scholarly-scientific case, defined 
by its correspondence to empirical evidence and scholarly discourse in 
general, but by its correspondence to external tasks, or rather by its ca-
pacity to convince, influence, rationalize, mobilize and authorize with 
the aid of historical perspectives. Consequently, the focus on the ideo-
logical use of history is not on separate historical elements, as in the case 
of the moral use, but on the entirety of the historical construct, on its 
consistency, its pretensions and pedagogical clarity. The ideological use 
is intimately connected with the success of those systems of ideas that 
employ history in order to build up legitimacy and rationalize mistakes 
and errors in the past by referring to objective necessities or historical 
laws. In general, the objective of legitimation is often reached by means 
of absolute chronological boundaries and clear-cut periodizations, black-
and-white descriptions, strong continuity lines, and perspectives of un-
problematic progress. History has proved especially useful for national-
ists, whose main interest is to ascertain a special, symbiotic relation be-
tween their own nation and a specific territory, on which historical 
claims are put forward.  
Non-use of history, which should be analyzed as a special case of an 
ideological use, is not a question of simply remembering or forgetting a 
historical date, or of subconsiously omitting it from a historical context. 
Rather, the non-use of history is rooted in the deliberate and ideological 
adoption by some intellectual and political groups of an attitude accord-
ing to which history, or some part of it, should be ignored. Here, too, 
reasons connected with the legitimacy of the non-using society or state, 
or a conscious effort to rationalize historical misdeeds, is involved. Gen-
erally speaking, non-use of history is a successful strategy in societies 
and states where it is strongly felt that legitimacy should not be built on 
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history or a cultural heritage, but on the contention that the society in 
question constitutes a particularly praiseworthy contemporary phenome-
non, or on expectations of a rewarding future. A more tangible example 
of a non-use of history that at present attracts much attention is the deni-
al of the Holocaust or any other genocidal event.  
 
The politico-pedagogical use of history 
 
The last use of history that I will suggest, a politico-pedagogical one, 
may be characterized as a deliberate comparative, metaphorical, or sym-
bolic use in which the transfer effect between “then” and “now” is ren-
dered simple and unproblematic, while the scholarly-scientific insistence 
that history be anchored in the structures of the relevant period is toned 
down, all in consequence of the main purpose, which amounts to sum-
moning history as an aid in attacking what are felt to be severe and con-
crete political problems in a later era. A political use of history is partic-
ularly hard to reconcile with a traditional scholarly use. And indeed, it is 
more or less commonplace among historians discussing the use and 
abuse of history to launch a diatribe against the fact that “historians, or 
would-be historians, all too often become politicians and generals, shap-
ing and reshaping the historical record to score points, clinch arguments, 
and advance their own solutions and nostrums” (Dallin 1988: 181). To 
be sure, the political use of history is a traditional and often-used in-
strument especially in foreign policy. References to Chamberlain’s ap-
peasement of Hitler in Munich in 1938 have attested to the opinion that 
a “Munich syndrome” has guided foreign-policy decisions long after the 
advent of the Second World War (Rystad 1982). There are, however, in-
dications that history has been politically used on a broader scale and 
more frequently in the last full decade, in which the historical dimension 
has been widely disseminated. In general, the political use of history is 
related to the contention that the historical dimension is relevant, as of-
fering guidance for political decisions or help in securing political ad-
vantages. An effective political use that guarantees the user great mass-
medial attention relates a political issue at hand to a historical event of 
strong emotional loading. If a group of anti-abortionists choose to com-
pare abortion with the Holocaust, their intellectual honesty can, for very 




Coda:  Is  there an abuse of  history? 
 
This discussion finally brings to the fore the problem of where to draw 
the line between the use and abuse of history. A simplistic solution is to 
side with a widespread scholarly opinion that the only legitimate use of 
history is scholarly-scientific, which is guided by rules and standards 
gradually agreed upon in the course of a protracted professionalization 
process. In my opinion, it is a highly unsatisfactory position, not least 
because professional historians no doubt abuse history at least as often 
as others, by, for example, writing dissertations that no-one outside a 
limited circle of co-professionals can read and that are devoid of any 
kind of discussion of criteria of relevance. Do not misunderstand me; 
professional historical values should not be dismissed. They should, on 
the contrary, be insisted upon, especially in situations where history is 
widely used for various purposes in society other than scholarship. 
However, a scholarly use of history is not the use par préférence, but 
one of several legitimate ways of furnishing the past with meaning.  
But if traditional scholarly considerations are not appropriate for a 
reasonable distinction between use and abuse, what alternative criteria 
can be proposed, so that revisionists and deniers with regards to the 
Holocaust or Soviet Communist terror, or nationalistic history warriors 
in theatres of war around the world, can be blamed? My only answer, 
admittedly vague, proceeds from an external, non-scholarly considera-
tion: that uses of history that in themselves or in their consequences vio-
late established principles of human rights, by humiliating, wounding or 
in other ways inflicting suffering on individuals or collectives, are abus-
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German History Didactics: From Historical 





Competency-orientated history teaching 
 
In Germany, the results of the PISA-program as well as of a number of 
other studies before and afterwards (TIMSS, IGLU etc.) have triggered a 
growing interest in the (measurable) “outcomes” of school teaching. 
“Educational standards” emerged as the keyword and magic term of the 
new education debate. Even though there has been no official political 
program (on the federation-level) to formulate any such standards for 
history (in contrast to subjects such as mathematics and German) the 
concept and its underlying principles have influenced the discussion on 
historical teaching and learning, too. As in some other subjects (e.g. ge-
ography, religious education of both Christian confessions), sporadic 
initiatives either of school administrations of federal states, teachers or 
academic didacts have worked on “educational standards” for history.1 
Standards in history should – if developed and agreed upon – take 
the form of “performance standards”, not “content standards” (Körber 
2007). This demand conforms to the initial concept of general educa-
tional standards (depending on the official political process on the feder-
ation level) as outlined in the quite renowned “Klieme-Expertise”, 
named after Eckard Klieme, who presided a committee devising general 
principles of how to formulate “educational standards”. Following their 
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line of argumentation, educational standards need to be “domain-
specific”, i.e. the concept of general “competencies” to be applied to dif-
ferent subject matters has been rejected in favor of a concept of special-
ized sets of abilities which are used in different fields of knowledge and 
cognitive activity (“domains”) (Klieme et al. 2003).2 “History” and his-
torical thinking then is one such “domain”, besides e.g. geography (ori-
entation in space), languages, sciences etc. and deserves a differentiation 
of the competencies needed to achieve orientation. 
All in all, the concept of “performance standards” based on “compe-
tencies” is a useful innovation for history didactics, because it allows 
for, or rather requires more structural definitions of what earlier had 
been coined “historical consciousness”. By employing the definition of 
“competencies” by Franz Emanuel Weinert, which is mainly used in the 
standards debate (including the Klieme-Expertise), it seems possible to 
differentiate procedural vs. static aspects of historical consciousness as 
well as cognitive vs. more affective ones. 
Weinert defines “competencies” as complexes of (cap)abilities, 
skills (proficiencies) and dispositions which enable a person to solve 
(new) problems in a specified domain.3 
Two of the central characteristics of competencies, following this 
definition, are that 
• they contain knowledge, but that knowledge is not sufficient to 
speak of a “competence”, and 
• whatever form of knowledge is part of a “competence” cannot refer 
to some specific past event, structure etc., because a competence is 
the mental capability to solve new and different “problems” (of ori-
entation). 
 
Let me give a rough example for the latter: following this concept, it is 
perfectly possible to attest a high level of historical competence to 
someone lacking even the most basic information, say, on the medieval 
German “Old Empire”, as long as she/he shows the capability to master 
a process of coming to terms with this complex through historical think-
ing. Thus, a professor of history from, say, Japan, in applying himself to 
 
2  The term “knowledge” falls somewhat short here. “Domains of orienta-
tion” would be better. 
3  Originally, the definition reads: “die bei Individuen verfügbaren oder 
durch sie erlernbaren kognitiven Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten, um be-
stimmte Probleme zu lösen, sowie die damit verbundenen motivationalen, 
volitionalen und sozialen Bereitschaften und Fähigkeiten, um die Pro-
blemlösungen in variablen Situationen erfolgreich und verantwortungsvoll 
nutzen zu können“. (Weinert 2001, cited in Klieme et al. 2003: 21). 
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the subject matter of medieval Germany, will show a high level in these 
competencies, even though he will (initially) lack case knowledge. 
The form of knowledge contained in historical competencies there-
fore is structural knowledge, i.e. knowledge on categories and concepts, 
procedures etc., which needs to be applicable to different historical sub-
jects. Examples of this are systems of periodization, e.g. the well-known 
differentiation of Antiquity, Middle Ages, Early Modern Times and 
Modernity vs. the chronology Anno Domini, the differentiation of style-
based epochs of history of art, Jewish chronology, but also other differ-
entiations used in smaller groups, e.g. the reference to “the war” in old 
people’s talk, to the “interwar period”, “the postwar era”, up to refer-
ences like “back in the old house” in a family’s narrative.  
Similarly, second order concepts such as “change” and “evidence” 
etc. are part of the historical knowledge integrated in the “Sachkompe-
tenz” (“subject matter competence”) dimension. This specific compe-
tence indicates not only whether a person understands that historical ac-
counts and stories can be “true” or “wrong”, but of the concepts used to 
a) differentiate between these two states and b) to differentiate them-
selves, too. By which concepts, for instance, does a person express or 
negate the reliability of a story heard or justify a story to be told?  
By drawing on the concept of historical thinking as an individual 
process of orientation in time, triggered by needs for orientation encoun-
tered in “everyday life”, I am very skeptical as to the possibility of de-
riving “educational standards” for the competencies relevant to our do-
main, i.e. standards as could be operationalized by means of closed 
items following probabilistic IRT-models. The core argument against 
standards operationalized like this is that most IRT-models and especial-
ly the unidimensional Rasch-model used in almost all large-scale-
assessment-programs (TIMSS, PISA etc.) requires items (tasks) which 
can be coded as either “solved” or “not solved”, or at least (with partial 
credit-technique) as “partly solved”, (Rost 2004: 662-678), but that there 
is no room in this model for differing solutions, which are necessary if 
historical thinking is to be taken seriously as problem solving from a 
certain (one’s own) perspective (Körber 2008). Therefore, at the mo-
ment, work on competencies does not aim at formulating educational 
standards, but has to appreciate the (underlying) concept of “competence 
models” as an analytical tool to better define and achieve the goals of 
historical learning appropriate for post-traditional, pluralistic societies. 
At school, learners (pupils and students) must acquire general abili-
ties as well as precise skills and (structural) knowledge, which enable 
them to take part in the historical and memorial culture of their (plural-
ist) society. More precisely, they must learn to 
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• (correctly) apply concepts and categories, procedures (methods and 




• have at their command/control these concepts, categories, proce-
dures and methods, i.e. to gain the intellectual and affective distance 
necessary and the cognitive power to reflect on their benefits and 
limits, the assumptions inherent in them, their adequacy for a specif-
ic problem etc. 
 
 
A structural  competence model  
 
If historical teaching and learning is neither about teaching “the past” 
nor about passing on a conventional picture of the past to young mem-
bers of society (aiming at their integration or assimilation), but about en-
abling them to individually and critically take part in a society’s han-
dling of history, then some more concrete concepts are needed of what 
this capability can be said to consist of. A model of competence is need-
ed, in order to define 
• different fields of historical competence, i.e. dimensions in which the 
abilities of historical thinking can differ between people, or in which 
these abilities can differ between different stages of a learning-
process, 
• different levels of these competencies, by which any of these differ-
ences (between people or between stages of learning) can be “meas-
ured”. 
 
In Germany, different competence models have been suggested in the 
last 5 years,4 but the model suggested by the FUER group is the only 
one 
• to be based on a specific theory of historical thinking (see below), 
and 
• to introduce both a differentiation of dimensions of historical compe-




4  For a discussion of several models cf. Körber 2007 and Körber 2008. 
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Dimensions of historical competence 
 
The competence-model of FUER5 is based on the notion of historical 
thinking as a process of orientation in time. It distinguishes four basic 
dimensions of competence, three of which are procedural and one is 
basic (and rather declarative/static). The three procedural competence-
dimensions are derived from the circular process of historical thinking, 
developed on the basis of Rüsen’s theory by Hasberg and Körber (2003). 
From this, the following dimensions of competences can be derived: 
• Anyone in need of historical orientation needs the capability to 
transform her or his perceived uncertainty into some processable 
form of historical question in order either to reconstruct a historic 
narrative or to analyze given historical narratives of other people for 
their historical questions, and to understand them. This first dimen-
sion of historical competence (“inquiring competence”) spans from 
the perception of any uncertainty referring to time via the activation 
of earlier insights, concepts and categories up to the start of a me-
thodically controlled process of re- and de-construction. In fact, it al-
so includes the ability to decide whether (or rather, when) to turn to 
narrative accounts or to original sources. 
• The second dimension of competence (“methodical competence”) 
combines all knowledge and proficiency pertaining to finding and 
analyzing historical material and to re- and deconstruct historical ac-
counts on their basis. This includes heuristic skills as well as the 
ability to place pieces of information along a timeline, to draw com-
parisons between events and structures within an epoch and between 
historical times and to integrate all this information into a narrative 
structure, but also to identify the “particles of the past” and the nar-
rative structures in given narratives. 
 
5  A short version (Schreiber et al. 2006); a longer publication includes ex-
tensive discussions (Körber et al. 2007). 
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Illustration 1: The process model of historical thinking by  
Hasberg/Körber 2003: 187 
 
• The third procedural dimension of competence combines all those 
often neglected competencies needed for actually using the historical 
information (previously gathered in processes of re- and de-
construction) for personal or collective orientation in the present and 
the future. Core competencies in this dimension are 
o the ability to revise one’s concept of history and the concepts and 
categories used in historical thinking and one’s “historical con-
sciousness”, 
o the ability (and disposition) to (re-)shape and revise one’s own 
concrete notion(s) of the past and the present world, i.e. one’s 
pictures of other people and/or other times; 
o the ability to (re-)shape the concept of one’s self in relation to the 
outside world and the past, i.e. to revise one’s historical identity, 
e.g. by coming to (new) terms with one’s own personal relation-
ship to the deeds (merits and sins) of one’s ancestors, etc. 
o the ability to (re-)shape the own conceptions of what can be done, 
achieved, hoped for in the present and the future – in the light of 
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the insights and the knowledge derived from analyzing material 
about the past. 
 
These “procedural competencies” are all linked to a fourth basic (stat-
ic/declarative) dimension of competence, which is not only needed when 
executing the process of historical orientation, but also – on the meta-
level – in all instances of theoretical reflection and of communication 
about historical thinking, its assumptions, principles or its results. This 
fourth dimension of competence has been named “Sachkompetenz” 
(“subject matter competence”) in German, a term otherwise often (but 
erroneously in our view) used for relating to case knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge about individual “facts”, “dates”, “names”, but also specific 
insights etc. 
As argued above, such case-knowledge cannot be part of a compe-
tence model, because competencies need to be applicable to different 
situations and contexts. In the FUER model, the term “Sachkompetenz” 
is used nonetheless, on the grounds that the “subject matter” of historical 
teaching and learning is not the past, but rather “thinking about the 
past”. Therefore, in our model, this “subject matter competence” stands 
for the command over/ability to use and apply rather abstract first and 
second order concepts, categories, knowledge of procedures ad methods 
etc. 
In graph 2 these dimensions of competence are shown as based on 
the above given theoretical process model of historical thinking. 
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Graph 2: The dimensions of competence in the competence model 
“Historical Thinking”of the FUER-group 
Translated from Schreiber/Körber et al 2003: 56. Translated by the 
author. 
 
Levels of historical competencies 
 
As for the differentiation of levels,6 our model remotely draws on the 
widely known concept of Lawrence Kohlberg, referring to the conven-
tional character of moral standards, and distinguishing levels by the rela-
tion of moral thinking to these conventions – but with an important dif-
ference: we do not (yet) define stages within a process, but levels to 
begin with. This means that it is not part of our model to postulate some 
unidirectional development from one level to the next higher one, but 
that it can also be used to track down and register leaps, “regressions” 
etc. Thus, in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate-system, our levels 
would constitute the axis of ordinates (y-axis) only with (yet) no claim 
whatsoever as to a progression with increasing age (or other factors). 
 
6  Within the FUER model, the term “level” is used in order to distinguish 
from connotations of gradually advancing “stages” or “steps”. 
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Even though in reality there will be an infinite number of small dif-
ferentiations of levels, the FUER model only differentiates three, respec-
tively five main levels. The core concept for the differentiation of these 
levels is the mode and degree of command a person has over conven-
tional forms of applying the operations subsumed under a given dimen-
sion of competence: 
• On the basic level, a person applies and performs all operations nec-
essary for elementary historical thinking, but without any command 
over conventional forms, terms, concepts and procedures whatsoev-
er. The person’s historical thinking therefore will take on a highly 
individual and situational form and therefore will not or only hardly 
be readily understandable to other people, just as the person cannot 
(or only hardly) use other people’s help for her/his own thinking. A 
(non-historical) example of such a level would be children playing 
with LEGO-bricks but giving both the building blocks and the as-
sembled constructions new names, so that without some translation 
or learning they would not be able to order missing bricks in a 
LEGO-store or to tell anyone what their constructions are meant to 
represent. An example from the domain of history would be people 
not familiar with the common concepts of historical periodization, 
and therefore always referring to “back then” instead of some gener-
ally recognized historical time. This basic level, in the FUER-
terminology, was labeled “a-conventional”. Historical consciousness 
on this level of competence is solitary in nature. 
• The intermediate level, accordingly, is labeled “conventional” be-
cause it describes the (above mentioned) ability to apply standard 
terms and concepts, procedures etc. in order to perform one's own 
historical thinking. This allows for access to all the material and in-
formation categorized using these concepts in libraries and archives, 
enables the person to consult experts and witnesses, but also to 
communicate the findings and results etc. It is important to note that 
this intermediate “conventional” level does not require the person to 
hold conventional beliefs, interpretations and values. It also (or even 
more so) applies to persons doing their own historical thinking and 
even disagreeing with their society’s consensus, as long as they are 
capable of using the society’s (or other relevant group’s) concepts 
and terminology. Historical consciousness on this level of compe-
tence is connective in nature. 
• The third level of historical competence then is defined by the ability 
not only to apply the conventional and standard concepts, terminolo-
gy, procedures etc., but to reflect upon them, to evaluate them, criti-
cize their shortcomings and (if necessary) to deviate from them, sug-
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gesting new concepts, new terms etc. This level represents an “ideal 
type” in that it cannot be characterized conclusively: people will 
never stop learning. As with the “Richter-scale” of seismology, it is 
open-ended, too. The ideal level has been termed “elaborate” and 
“trans-conventional” because it requires command over conventions 
but also the ability to transgress them. Persons on this level could, 
for instance, be students who have learned that there were times 
generally referred to as “The Middle Ages” in past reality, but that 
this concept has been coined retrospectively and has some ad-
vantages, but also poses some dangers,7 and who are then able to de-
cide autonomously on where and whether to use this concept, and 
when to resort to/suggest other/better ones. Historical consciousness 
on this level of competence is reflective in nature. 
 
Let us again refer to the examples used above for the dimension of 
“Sachkompetenz”: A basic level of command over concepts of periodi-
zation would be shown if common references to time were not under-
stood. She or he would then have to spontaneously invent new terms, 
which the others don’t know about, and which in most cases would not 
hold up for other instances. To know these conventional differentiations 
and to be able to use them when referring to a certain time, also to be 
able to translate between them in a limited way, would mark an interme-
diate level. Of course, the ability to translate and recalculate would be 
higher than mere knowledge, but as long as these differentiations can 
only be used, but not queried, examined as to their assets and limits, the 
level would still only be intermediate. Elaborated level then is indicated 
by insight into the logic by which these periodizations are constructed, 
by their dependence from cultural viewpoints, and by the ability to re-
flect upon their appropriateness for a specific task of historical thinking. 
As for the second example of concepts to differentiate the reliability 
of stories, a basic level would e.g. be indicated if a person could just in-
dicate that a story was “doubtful” or “wrong”, but would have no idea 
how to express and justify this judgment using terms others understand. 
To have in one’s arsenal of “Sachkompetenz” concepts like “lying” vs. 
“telling the ‘truth’”, “error” and “misconception”, would indicate a 
(somewhat lower) intermediate level. To be able to refer to concepts of 
“(multi-)perspectivity”, of (different) “interest” and their influence on 
historical accounts (both in secondary and in primary material), would 
mark a fully developed intermediate level. An elaborated level could be 
diagnosed if the person could discuss what “(multi-)perspectivity” 
 
7  See Moos 1999 and Borries 2008. 
GERMAN HISTORY DIDACTICS 
155 
means, what the epistemological grounds and implications are, if she or 
he was able to differentiate between “testimony” and “evidence” and to 
reflect on further differentiation and new concepts. 
In conclusion, Historical Competencies (as formulated in the FUER-
model) offer a more structured version of important aspects of what pre-
viously was discussed under the heading of Historical Consciousness. 
Our model does not abolish or re-invent the entire complex of con-
sciousness concepts, but yields some new opportunities to formulate ed-
ucational goals (and, less possibly, also standards). It offers the chance 
to operationalize competencies of historical thinking for empirical re-
search and evaluation, even though only a small part of these competen-
cies will be assessable via quantitative analyses and large-scale analyses 




A new concept  of  h istor ical  l i teracy 
 
Even though competence-based historical learning and teaching is in no 
way “knitting without wool” and therefore always will require dealing 
with concrete aspects of the past, promoting propositional “knowledge 
about the past” as well as abilities of interpretation and orientation, it is 
true that the concept reinforces a formal concept of learning. The con-
cern expressed by some teachers and didacts that, as a consequence, the 
subject matter and historical topics might disappear, must, however, be 
taken seriously. Still, the solution cannot lie in a model in which the 
teaching of competencies is accompanied (or even compensated for) by 
another approach to history-teaching, in which statements about the past 
are presented as unquestionable truths, as has been suggested by the 
German History Teachers’ Association under the heading of “education-
al standards”. In this Association’s own competence model, acquiring 
competencies of a designated “first dimension of competencies” comes 
down to memorizing statements of propositional knowledge and judg-
ments the students are only required to “name” and “explain”, but not to 
“consider”, “check” or “assess”, and the standards listed in the other two 
dimensions (“competency to interpret and reflect” and “media/method 
competency”), though focusing on real abilities, are limited to school 
use (Verband der Geschichtslehrer Deutschlands 2006).8 Categorically 
speaking, such a solution represents a fundamentally conservative strat-
 
8  See also the discussion between Karl-Heinrich Pohl and Martin Stupperich 
(the spiritus rector of these standards) in Pohl 2008 and Stupperich 2008. 
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egy to the challenges of education, namely the attempt to introduce the 
young generation to an “existing world of solutions”, binding them to 
their scope (Girmes 1997), instead of enabling them to perform new at-
tempts to find other solutions, better ones, ones more adequate for their 
times, or even new solutions to new problems.  
Renate Girmes, professor in general didactics in Magdeburg, has de-
veloped a new concept of literacy (“Bildung”), which, in overcoming the 
traditional orientation inherent in the classical notion of the term, is 
more likely to be adequate for post-traditional societies and which is 
based on Hannah Arendt’s anthropological elaboration of the activities 
(from which Girmes derives “tasks”) of human beings existing under 
certain (given and self-made) conditions. Besides the activities of labour 
and work, it is a central characteristic of the third main activity, action, 
that it needs to reflect (and take into account) the plurality of mankind. 
This state of plurality is not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative 
characteristic: humans perceive and judge both their historically given 
conditions and the resulting (individual as well as common) tasks differ-
ently, which leads to a multitude of different interests and actions. One 
of the necessities resulting from this condition is, that people must 
communicate about their perceptions, beliefs, judgments and actions – 
especially if the society they form is a heterogeneous and post-
traditional one – to be democratic. The capacity to tolerate and accept 
uncertainty and to (actively!) handle it, then, is one of the main tasks of 
social communication. 
However, this kind of uncertainty (resulting from plurality) needs to 
be distinguished from the concept of contingency in Rüsen’s theory of 
historical thinking. Thus, on the whole, history can be said to be affected 
by contingency of at least three types (Girmes 1997: 42):9 
1. The first is contingency that results from temporal experiences of 
humans when earlier expectations and plans are compared to the 
eventual, actual (historical) development. “Contingency” here means 
the mental construct which enables us to conceive the real develop-
ment not as totally accidental (which would make any effort to con-
struct sense and to orientate oneself futile in the first place) but not 
as totally determined either (which would deprive us of any possibil-
ity to decide about the consequences to be derived from historical in-
sight and therefore of any possibility to act). This form of temporal 
contingency is the movens of processes of historical thinking / con-
 
9  For an in-depth analysis of philosophical elaborations and differentiations 
of chance and contingency and their role in (social) historiography as well 
as in theory of history see Hoffmann 2005. 
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structing meaning. Also, contingency here is part of the explanan-
dum. 
2. Another role of contingency in historical thinking is its use as ex-
planans, i.e. the possibility to refer to “chance” in order to construct 
(reasonable) historical meaning. Strictly speaking, if this were the 
only strategy, it would prevent the emergence of historical sense in 
the first place – for referring to chance in historical explanations 
means not to explain at all. However, it may occasionally be neces-
sary to integrate limited amounts of “chance” into a historical ac-
count in order be able to construct an orientating, meaningful narra-
tive. In such cases, “contingency” means to accept “blind spots” in 
history which are resistant to explanatory efforts and to which to re-
sort to does not (or only rarely) constitute a surrender. Often, contin-
gency is used in this way not so much to refer to coincidence in his-
tory, but as a means of either masking a thread of inquiry not further 
pursued by the narrative’s author or marking a change of perspec-
tive. This is e.g. the case when references are made to events which 
“by chance” foil a strand of action, events, which could neither have 
been influenced nor foreseen by the actors in the resulting history, 
but could be clarified by further inquiry on another scale.10 
3. The third version of contingency, which is central here, is to be 
found on the side of the results of historical thinking: due to their 
multi-dimensional plurality, humans exhibit different needs for tem-
poral orientation. Because of the different times, societies, social 
groups, cultures etc. they live in, they will quite naturally be using 
different concepts, operations, patterns of explanation and of narrat-
ing which in turn will result in different narratives. These narratives / 
constructions of meaning will not be incomparable, but also not 
simply translatable into one another. In that sense, it is historical ori-
entation itself which is contingent – contingent not only in its tem-
poral, but in cultural, spatial and social dimensions. And as for peo-
ple living and acting within the plurality of today’s societies, it be-




10  An example would e.g. be a narrative portraying the success story of a 
company suddenly destroyed by a terrorist attack which “by chance” took 
place at the very moment of the signing of an important contract. Alt-
hough both actions, the signing of the contract and the terrorist attack, are 
by no means accidental in themselves, their actors and motives are totally 
unconnected unless a connection is discerned or established by focusing 
another level (e.g. the terrorists’ view of the economic system and the 
company’s role within this system). 
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What is more, each of the latter contingent orientations (3) is not only a 
narrative, but constitutes a world, a perception of (temporal) reality 
guiding the actions of its bearers. Thus, alternative narratives among in-
dividuals and cultural groups ultimately represent different “solutions” 
to the task of temporal orientation. 
In this sense, in the plural societies of a globalized world, it becomes 
increasingly important not only to participate in the construction of his-
torical sense and of political rooms in which to communicate, but to gain 
insight into the perceptions of (the task as well as) the results of other 
people’s thinking. 
It is here that we find the basis of a new concept of historical litera-
cy. From this point of view, literacy is neither to be defined as some 
high-class knowledge about important events and actions in the past nor 
as a set of general insights into the historicity of mankind, even though 
this latter aspect can still be part of the concept, as the Swiss philosopher 
Peter Bieri recently pointed out in a lecture entitled “What would it be to 
be literate?”. As to the religious dimension, he formulates: “Only he 
who knows about and acknowledges the historical contingency of his 
cultural and moral identity really has grown up.” (Bieri 2005: 4) 11 In 
this quotation, the classical notion and concept of German literacy lin-
gers on in a familiar way. But the sentence is framed by statements 
which add another relevant aspect, more reminiscent of what has been 
said about the importance of contingency so far: 
 
“The knowledge of alternatives only seemingly deprives it [here: religion] of 
its value: the value can even be experienced as higher, because we now no 
longer deal with an intangible fate, but with free choice. […] One has not 
completely taken over the responsibility for one’s own life, as long as one ac-
cepts an external authority prescribing how to think about love and death, mo-
rality and happiness.” (Bieri 2005: 4)  
 
Similarly, Girmes proposes as a quality for being able to deal with un-
certainty in post-traditional societies, not to look for certainty, but to 
(learn to) think in concrete constellations. Education aiming at literacy 
therefore should neither aim at providing the learners with fixed solu-
tions (here: fixed narratives) nor with tasks and tools to find such solu-
tions only, but also with the variety and plurality of different real and 
possible solutions as a prerequisite for thinking and living in a new and 
self-determined way (Girmes 1997: 44). 
The multitude of different narrative orientations therefore is not only 
be to be used as an exchangeable substrate for developing formal com-
 
11  All translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated.  
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petencies (especially that of de-constructing other people’s orientations 
and narratives), but gains a value in itself: these narratives (which still 
need to be de-constructed and analyzed as well as critically reflected as 
to their plausibility) are both the repository of concepts, patterns of in-
terpretation and explanation, values etc. for later use, and they also re-
present the variety and plurality of life-guiding orientation of a person’s 
fellow citizens. “Historical literacy” therefore is rooted in knowing 
about this multitude and variety, in being familiar with great parts of 
these orientations, in accepting and assessing their orientational function 
and strength and in recognizing the necessity and the value of this multi-
tude of orientations in itself. 
 
 
Consequences for  d idactics of  h istory 
 
It is not easy to derive clear-cut consequences from principles and mod-
els which are still under debate. The following therefore is more or less 
to be understood as suggestions and impulses for the current discussion. 
For history didactics as a discipline, the orientation towards competen-
cies calls for a more consequent definition of its own theoretical basis 
and its self-concept. Neither the work of academic historical research 
nor mere political and/or pedagogical aims can be at the heart of its re-
flections, but original theoretical reflections on what history is and what 
it is for. History didactics in this sense is a meta-discipline which em-
braces the work of academic research as one, if particularly important, 
instance of the many forms and institutions of historical thinking, but its 
aim is not to steer this academic work or to externally set standards for 
it, but rather to reflect its position and relevance for society. 
As for future research, first of all, the empirical validity of the 
FUER-competence model needs to be tested (Are the distinguished di-
mensions discernible in data? Can different levels, as postulated, be 
found as a matter of fact?), and, as a second step, research needs to be 
conducted as to the identification of developmental processes. It might 
be that learning historical thinking comes down to a mere (steady) in-
crease in the levels in all dimensions and competencies, but it is also 
possible, that differences in pace of development, phases and ties be-
tween levels among/within different competencies or even regressions 
can occur. 
Furthermore, the theoretical premise that historical thinking occurs 
on all levels and that the intermediate level is marked by command over 
conventional concepts, whereas the elaborate level is marked by the 
ability to reflect, criticize and change conventional categories, calls for 
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empirical analyses into specific conventional concepts, procedures etc. 
of specific groups of society and for comparisons of their standards of 
historical orientation. For a type of history teaching which does not aim 
at transmitting specific interpretations into the students’ heads, but at 
enabling students to handle different perspectives, questions and con-
cepts, this would prove essential. 
Last but not least, models, strategies and instruments are needed for 
determining levels of historical competence(s) underlying actual forms 
of historical performance. These are needed for large-scale assessment 
and evaluation purposes, but even more for individual diagnostics and 
subsequent educational measures in school. A lot of work remains to be 
done in this respect, especially since the instruments used e.g. in PISA 




Consequences for  h istory teaching 
 
Consequences for history teaching in general 
 
The first and most obvious consequence of the sketched understanding 
of historical learning is that history teaching at school must be about 
promoting students’ historical competencies. In the broad sense of the 
term “competence”, this, at first, does not seem to amount to something 
fundamentally new. Teaching only specific knowledge and authoritative 
interpretations of the past seems to be a bygone concept anyway. But a 
closer look at current suggestions for curricula (some actually in force 
by now) shows that even under the heading of “orientation towards 
competencies”, in some federal states and by some actors in the debate, 
exactly this is promoted, when, for instance, in the German History 
Teachers Association’s concept, students’ abilities are narrowed down to 
“naming” specific aspects, to “explaining” events, structures, actions in 
specific pre-determined ways and students are even required to come to 
specific conclusions, such as presenting the crusades as a “conflict, but 
also as a chance for (cultural) encounters between the Christian and the 
Muslim world.”12 Other crucial abilities (more likely to deserve the term 
“competencies”) are also included but are only illustrated by examples 
of minor controversies and, revealingly, never by examples questioning 
the Eurocentric grand narrative presented (as factual) in the first place. 
 
12  The example is taken from the German History Teachers’ Association’s 
(suggestion for) “educational standards” (Verband 2006). For a critique 
see e.g. Körber 2007. 
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Furthermore, these abilities, too (analyzing material, considering multi-
ple perspectives etc.) more closely resemble techniques rather than 
methods of independent historical thinking. 
As is becoming clear, the consequence to focus history teaching on 
developing competencies and dispositions needed for independent par-
ticipation in a society’s historical culture and debate is not so self-
evident as it would seem. 
Moreover, our model of historical competencies calls for paying at-
tention not only to techniques and methods as well as concepts, termi-
nology etc. (competence-dimensions “methodical competence” and 
“subject matter competence”), but also explicitly for developing the abil-
ities to ask historical questions (“inquiring competence”) and to (indi-
vidually and collectively) reflect upon possible consequences of specific 
stories (which have been derived from re- and/or de-constructive pro-
cesses) for the present, the future and for further thinking. Together with 
the de-constructive component of “methodical competence” this also 
demands the use of historical narrations not only (or even mainly) as 
media of bits and pieces of information, but as material to be analyzed in 
depth. Students and pupils must learn to dissect the narrative structure of 
historical accounts in order to be able to consciously and critically han-
dle them. 
Last, but not least, as follows from much of what has been said earli-
er, the conventional concepts a society uses for grasping and structuring 
the domain of history and historical knowledge should be presented not 
as factual, but have to be addressed explicitly and in a reflective way. 
Thus, for instance, the common concepts of periodization (Antiquity, 
Middle Ages, Modernity) need to be taught as contingent models with 
specific benefits and limits, which need to be compared to others (e.g. of 
history of art, of ecclesiastical history and of course to the ones used in 
other cultures as in Islam and such used in everyday life).13 The same 
holds true for (other) conventions of historical methodology such as pro-




13  See. v. Borries 2008. 
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Teaching in a controversial memorial culture 
 
As for the subject of this book, the competence orientation and compe-
tence model holds some further consequences for history teaching. Most 
notably, competence orientation calls for an integration of the large field 
of commemoration and memory culture into history teaching at school. 
The old dichotomy of “history vs. memory” which has been stressed by 
Halbwachs and still by the earlier Jan Assmann should not lead to ex-
cluding the “family album” and “public memorial culture” – type of ad-
dressing the past (and orientation) from the curricula, which would re-
sult in the denial of their power, logic and relevance by pointing to the 
academic dignity of scientific knowledge. Quite contrarily, these specif-
ic functions, their conditions and the immanent logic of communicative, 
social and cultural memories (A. Assmann) need to be explicitly ad-
dressed and recognized. On the other hand, it would also be wrong to 
treat these as sacrosanct and as not revisable in the light of other, most 
importantly, academic knowledge. For prospective members of a plural-
ist society, it is of utmost importance to be able to reflect upon the re-
spective status and benefits, but also the limits of specific forms of (his-
torical) construction of meaning. 
This then, among other things, means that students must learn to re-
flect upon the epistemological status of  original sources as well as upon 
that of contemporary witnesses, that they must become acquainted with 
the concepts of “authenticity”, “originality” and “truth”, as well as with 
those used in memory debates like “victim” and “sacrifice”, the differen-
tiation between different types of memorials (hero-, victim- and so on), 
the political concepts which draw on historical interpretations (like “hi-
erarchy of victims” vs. “equalization of victims”) and so on. 
History teaching needs to address the plurality and multiplicity of 
handlings of the past and of orientations drawn from history, it must en-
able students to recognize the interests of specific groups in history, their 
questions, their political agenda, but it must enable them to arrive at 
conclusions and judgments individually and independently, too. History 
teaching in this sense is not about forming a society by creating uni-
formity, but about forming social coherence14 by enabling people to 




14  I here relate to a distinction within a new concept of “interculturality” by 
Klaus-Peter Hansen. See Rathje 2006. 
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Coping with Burdening History1 
BODO VON BORRIES 
 
 
1.  Types of  coming to terms with histor ical  
 harm and gui l t  
 
1.1  Outline of the argumentation 
 
History is only learnt effectively under three given conditions: if new in-
sights can be linked up with old ones, if it is connected to – negative or 
positive – emotions and if it is relevant in life. The learning of affirma-
tive cases of heroism and glory/pride seems easier, but burdening expe-
riences of harm and guilt/shame (or both of them) are much more diffi-
cult. The Holocaust and the other mass crimes of National Socialism are 
good examples. It is quite clear that learning means more than scientific 
investigation, it includes a mental conflict as well as change: Coping 
with burdening history is a problem of mental working through as well 
as of intellectual activities. There are productive forms of coping with 
burdening history and defective ones. Four of these defective forms will 
be analyzed below (see section 1.3.):2 
a. Hostile histories in a revenge and blood-feud system (inherited en-
mity), 
 
1  This text is to a large extent identical with the second half of a presenta-
tion given at the conference “Opening Historical Reconciliation in East 
Asia through Historical Dialogue” in Seoul in October 2007, meanwhile 
published (Borries 2009). 
2  The typology presented here was introduced by myself some years ago 
(see Borries 2008: 121-137). It is the result of theoretical reflections as 
well as of observations and qualitative empirical studies in the culture of 
history (autobiographies, novels, interviews, historical narrations). 
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b. The history of the winners and damnation/oblivion of the losers 
(cynicism of power), 
c. The underground history of losers and hope for inversion (heroism 
of remembrance), 
d. Lost hostile history discarded due to irrelevance (priority of surviv-
ing). 
 
In parts, these mental reactions may be inevitable. Achieving a real rec-
onciliation however – with former enemies (victims, perpetrators) and 
with yourself – is more complex (see section 1.4.). People need the ex-
perience of moving towards each other and continuing together along 
the same path (in life and historiography). But this involves – besides 
undoubtedly necessary analyses of historical events and interpretations 
according to intellectual standards – a process of taking distance from 
one’s own past and that of the other without forgetting one’s history. 
The aim is to search for the conditions and chances of a common future 
(in spite of a hostile history). Some examples will serve to illustrate this. 
Afterwards, some German experiences with different strategies of 
reflecting and (self-)reflective methods of learning history3 for promot-
ing reconciliation via history are discussed (see section 2.1 to 2.4.). 
 
1.2  Some reflections about the feelings of  
guilt and shame in respect to history 
 
A remark about terminological – and systematic – issues is necessary. 
What is “burdening history”? Does it include guilt like grief and harm? 
Are there any examples of collective or inherited guilt? Or is this an in-
adequate notion? Of course, different ways of expressing and develop-
ing central categories are possible, but they must be logically clear and 
morally convincing. 
Guilt can only be personal in the strict sense of penal courts. A pun-
ishment of another family member, another hostage from the same pro-
fession, city or nation is a clear violation of international law and human 
rights.4 Any assignment of guilt to innocent and uninvolved persons or 
later generations is an unjust, illogical, archaic reaction in itself. For 
people born after 1945 any collective guilt in the context of National So-
cialism can only be a metaphor, and a dangerous one. This does not 
mean any denial of guilt by default (or omission) among many contem-
 
3  In respect to the theoretical foundations, please compare the contribution 
of Andreas Körber in this volume. 
4  The NS state often oppressed – or punished – completely un-involved 
relatives of opponents (“Sippenhaft”); this was one of the Nazi-crimes. 
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porary German bystanders, but this is individual guilt, not a collective 
one5. 
That does not imply that members of later generations born in a 
country where political crimes against mankind (e.g. genocides) have 
been committed are completely disconnected from any special relation 
to the past, or are not involved any differently than anyone else in the 
world. Countries – we should better say: societies – have their unspoken 
continuities, self-evident truths, socially desired answers and traditions, 
transferred by socialization (like a heritage). Even if nobody can inherit 
guilt for a crime, he or she can inherit the consequences and costs of a 
crime. Of course, the benefits of past crimes (at least of the last decades) 
have to be returned – and the damages recompensated as far as possible. 
This is often called responsibility. The notion makes sense if understood 
correctly.6 Nevertheless, the word liability should be preferred, since re-
sponsibility often includes guilt (for instance, if a captain is responsible 
for the sinking of his ship). German citizens remain collectively liable 
for a lot of costs and problems, even in the innocent third and forth gen-
erations and even if they are innocent (grand-)sons and (grand-) daugh-
ters of immigrants from Turkey or Russia. 
Shame is a third problem. A son of a man who murdered his wife 
and buried her in the garden is not guilty, but he may feel very ashamed 
and burdened for the rest of his life. This is the case of succeeding gen-
erations in Germany (and perhaps other countries like Russia or Japan). 
Shame is a very strong and uncomfortable feeling. Therefore the tempta-
tion to escape shame via denial/refusal of the crime is also strong. Many 
reactions can only be understood as avoidance of shame. Forcing some-
one to be ashamed is an offensive act, often answered by aggression. 
Nietzsche famously wrote “‘I have done that’, says my memory. ‘I can-
not have done that’, says my pride, and remains adamant. At last –
memory yields.” (Nietzsche 1968: 86) Coping with shame – without de-
nial or depression – is very difficult; it includes admittance and distance 
at the same time. 
Fourthly, the decisive feeling in the case of burdening history is – or 
should be – mourning (Liebsch/Rüsen 2001). But what is mourning? In 
private life, we associate it with pity – and also self-pity. Mourning is 
coping with a loss, with a hole in one’s life, with the hurting absence of 
a beloved person or relation. Psychoanalysis experts refer to mourning 
 
5  For an empirical analysis on the theme of victim and guilty in the case of 
Finland see the contribution by Ahonen in this volume.  
6  The clear allusion to the character of an answer, a reply to a demand from 
outside (in English like in German) is an additional advantage of the term 
“responsibility” (see Jonas 1984, 1987). 
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as work, thus working through history, work of commemoration, and 
work of mourning become very similar. The emotion – while learning to 
live with a loss – is a mixture of pity with the unhappy, ill or dead per-
son and of self-pity because of having lost a relative or a friend, simply 
because of being bereaved, perhaps lonely. In the case of mental burdens 
from history, we seriously have to ask which elements constitute the 
feeling of mourning. After the Holocaust for instance, who are the 
young Germans of 2010 mourning for, if they mourn: The murdered 
Jews and Slavs – or the lost honor, innocence, self-esteem, and territory 
of their great-grandfathers? Who do they mourn together with? 
Thus the mental task of coming to terms with burdening history (in 
the sense of severe crimes committed by one’s own side in the past) – in 
a country, a family or an institution – is rather complicated, protracted 
and mentally burdening. A productive solution includes the admittance 
of the crimes committed; the handling and reflecting – and avoidance – 
of temptations to deny or forget; the rejection of any personal guilt, 
while distancing oneself from the perpetrators and acknowledging liabil-
ity; coping with feelings of shame and even more so with expectations 
or demands to feel shame expressed or made by others. For young gen-
erations in societies that have continuity with periods of major crimes, 
this does not imply simply internalizing the history as told by grandpar-
ents, parents, authorities and the state. Instead, they have to reflect, 
study, compare, examine, and decide for themselves when dealing with 
historical interpretations and their own orientation. Therefore, the com-
mon sentence “Grandpa was no Nazi!” – frequently used by young 
Germans – (Welzer et al. 2002) may often be wrong, but the sentence 
“Don’t confuse me with my grandpa!” is morally correct. 
 
1.3 Defective forms of working through history 
 
Learning or grasping history is not a cognitive process alone, but also a 
question of emotions, aesthetics and moral judgments. To secure and 
connect certain little pieces of the past (some call them facts) may be 
important, but is not enough. The question is, how to give a general, val-
id, and agreeable version of the historical narrative and how to handle 
the effects for the present. The mental act of assimilating, digesting and 
overcoming burdening histories is decisive.7 Of course, the process of 
 
7  For systematic and pragmatic reasons, the extreme case of “Holocaust Ed-
ucation” cannot be analyzed in detail here, but I have written some articles 
about it during the last years (see Borries 2004a/b, 2005, 2006a/b). Twen-
ty years ago, any comparison of the Holocaust with other genocides and 
mass crimes (like those committed by the Japanese war in China) was 
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working through – to use a psychoanalytical notion – can, in a contro-
versial case, take diametrically opposite directions. 
The grandchildren of victors and defeated, of perpetrators and vic-
tims, of rich and poor may remember and digest a certain event or de-
velopment in rather contrasting ways.8 In addition to the technical pro-
cess of writing history, the mental (social psychological) conditions for 
dealing with terrible experiences are the decisive point. Obviously, the 
processes follow certain patterns. When human beings use history in 
their lives and for their legitimations and decisions, i.e. when they orient 
themselves by means of history to confront and face the future (see 
Rüsen 1994a),9 they choose a limited set of strategies and logical ver-
sions.10 To know them is a vital precondition for the description and 
analysis of chances and risks for reconciliation (comp. Borries 2004b, 
2008, p.121-137). 
1. If both sides only wait – and prepare – for the next clash after the 
end of a preceding war, the situation is clear but dangerous. Rome and 
Carthage fought such wars in the third and second centuries B.C. Peace 
was only a pause to gather new assets, i.e. weapons, troops, money and 
allies. The old wars had to be re-enacted in new campaigns until the 
complete destruction of Carthage. The situation between Rome and Per-
sia in late antiquity was similar – up to the decisive victory of the Arabs 
against both Rome and Persia. The repetition of serious wars between 
   
considered taboo. Today one could be criticized for omitting “Holocaust 
Education” in an analysis of “historical reconciliation”. It is just the oppo-
site. For me, the case is much more complicated, and therefore it cannot be 
covered explicitly here. 
8  A remark about perpetrators and victims has to be added here. A perpetra-
tor may, indeed, later on become a victim. Psychologically, it is not wise 
and fair to accuse the (former!) aggressors and their heirs of remaining 
fixed in their view when engaging in a discourse about harm and mourn-
ing within their own society. Of course, proportion and causation have to 
be taken into account. 
9  According to Rüsen (1994 and often), orientation for the present and the 
future is the basic purpose of history. 
10  Rüsen’s theory of the logical patterns of making sense out of history 
(1994a and often) is a very basic and important one, since it clarifies dif-
ferent modes of relating past and present/future, i.e. of concluding from 
history for the sake of a current orientation. “Traditional” sense-making 
means the prolongation of an institution or value invented in the past and 
remaining valid for the future. “Exemplary” sense-making is subsuming a 
historical event/structure as a case under permanent and lasting rules (e.g. 
pragmatic historiography). “Critical” sense-making includes an autono-
mous decision against a societal interpretation of history, e.g. the denial of 
an outdated tradition or a false (inapplicable) rule. “Genetic” sense-
making accepts the change of rules in the course of time (development) al-
so, but insists on continuities, on duration in change.  
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Sweden and Denmark or Sweden and Poland may also have been a main 
reason for the common decline of both enemy partners. These are the 
typical outcomes of such assimilations of history: total defeat and anni-
hilation of one side or common decline of both sides caused by a third 
power from outside. This type of reaction may be called “revenge sys-
tem” or “blood feud” with the character of a vicious circle – the opposite 
of historical reconciliation. 
2. Another type is the “winner’s history”: If one party has really 
won, it can decide about memories, perhaps for a very long time.11 We 
know a lot of cases where the victor destroyed the documents, memori-
als, memories, and leading families of the defeated (though not the 
whole population). Thus Shi Huang Ti, the first emperor of imperial 
China, is said to have burned all historical books of the other dynasties 
(except his own Chin) and of the other philosophical schools (except his 
own “legalism”). The question whether he really did so, is less important 
than the idea and structure as such. The story was taken for granted for 
more than 1500 years. Other victors acted alike, e.g. the Fulbe against 
the Haussa in Western Africa, the Spanish against the Maya in Yucatan 
and Christians against “heathens” in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
destruction of buildings, statues, paintings and monuments may be add-
ed to the burning of texts. This “damnatio memoriae” ([con]damnation 
of memories) can be a successful strategy in the long – or very long – 
run; perhaps the population may forget its ancestors or its descent. Nev-
ertheless, this complete “oblivion” and “loss” is also far from “reconcil-
iation”. It may be called “cultural – not physical – destruction”. 
3. But it is not easy to completely destroy the traditions of defeated 
collectives. Mothers may tell their children, itinerant priests their believ-
ers. Oral traditions can be saved for centuries; they can be preserved and 
spread separately from the official histories of the ruling group (in 
schools or chronicles). This is “underground history” in slave language 
and only carries validity for the subjugated, but also for small ethnic 
groups in large European empires (Ireland, Basque region, Estonia, Slo-
venia, Czechia).12 The case of Latin America is perhaps even more in-
teresting. Of course, Spanish and Portuguese conquerors tried to force 
their victors’ histories on the native Americans (“Red Indians”). But 
very often, the official, written, so-called scientific version is counter-
acted and devalued by oral variants of pre-modern, mythical character 
 
11  “History is written by the victors, at least by the survivors, at worst by the 
slayers.” 
12  If the one-sided history versions of the winners (the large empires) had 
been successful in all European cases, we would not have around forty but 
only around ten or fifteen European states. 
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among the “aborigines”, in particular when they live far from the big cit-
ies in remote areas and speak their pre-Spanish and pre-Portuguese lan-
guages. Thus, the old gods, old kings, old heroes, and old myths are sur-
viving – and with it the hope for a future post-Spanish (or post-
Portuguese) “golden and happy era”. Such “underground history” may 
guarantee cultural diversity and richness, but it is definitely no historical 
reconciliation. 
4. On the other hand, the battles, hardships and crimes of the past be-
tween two groups can also fade away, even if no winners command and 
rule the losers. Progress of time and change of (economical, cultural, 
technological) conditions may simply overrun and devalue the heroes 
and hatreds of the past. In Italy, the parties of Guelphs and Guibellines 
faught, killed and executed each other in nearly all cities for a period of 
two hundred years (like the already mentioned “blood feud”). But some 
generations later it became difficult to understand – or internalize – the 
reasons of this existential struggle. Maybe, the relation of the two big 
Christian confessions in Germany is an even better example. Catholics 
and Protestants fought each other for a long time, not only in the Thirty 
years war (1618-1648). All over Europe, martyrs were executed and 
minorities were persecuted (religious cleansing); authorities forced their 
subjects to convert and robbed them of all their rights and property. In 
the end, formal tolerance was laid down in the “Holy Roman Empire of 
the German Nation”. The rivalry and mistrust, however, lasted much 
longer (they tolerated, but strongly disliked each other), maybe even un-
til 1948. Today, only sixty years later, many – at least some – children 
do not know, whether they are Catholic or Protestant (or neither). There 
are a lot of mixed couples. The history of the religious split has become 
irrelevant, and the attitudes towards it indifferent, apathetic. Can this 
process be called historical reconciliation? I doubt it, because I prefer 
the notion a-historical, anti-historical, a falling asleep or a dwindling 
away of a conflict. The past does not only loose its power over the pre-
sent (which is necessary and acceptable in some respect), but also its 
dignity and relevance (and perhaps that constitutes a problem). 
These four types of “historical non-reconciliation” form a system of 
oppositions and similarities: 
 
  
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Table 1: Types of Missing Historical Reconciliation 
Integration of  
histories 
Direction and  
perspectives 





 Preservation of sepa-
rate memories, threat-
ening war due to lack 
of historical reconcili-
ation. 
Mainly seen from 
the viewpoint of 
the ruling institu-
tions (history poli-
cy top down) 
Winner’s history and 
loser’s damna-
tion/oblivion (cyni-
cism of power) 
 Hostile histories in a 
revenge and blood 





  X 
 
Mainly seen from 
the viewpoint of 
populations (histo-
ry policy bottom 
up) 
Lost hostile history 
dwindled away due 
to irrelevance (prior-
ity of surviving) 
 Loser’s underground 
history and hope of 
inversion (heroism of 
remembrance) 
 
1.4 Strategies of historical reconciliation 
 
If all these ways are misleading, what are the chances and structures of 
succeeding in reconciliation? Of course, there are political, cognitive, 
moral and aesthetic elements. But in its core, it is not only a historical-
cognitive, but also a historical-social and historical-emotional process. 
The main issue is moving towards each other and continuing togeth-
er along the same path. But this is not at all easy; it has some mental 
preconditions: taking distance from the past without forgetting the past, 
not allowing the past to completely determine the present, looking for 
the conditions and chances of a common future. Thus, every side has to 
change its habits a bit and has to anticipate the other side’s reaction: 
avoiding the simple traditional and exemplary patterns of making sense 
means achieving complex critical and genetic patterns of making sense 
(see Rüsen 1994a, p. 85-90, 141-155, 231-235). 
In particular, the process demands continuously changing and com-
paring the perspectives to history, the criteria of selection, the attribu-
tions of causes, that means looking through the eyes, walking in the 
shoes of the “other”, even the “enemy”, singing the songs and telling 
the stories of the “enemy”. But empathy in order to understand the “oth-
er” is not enough. It leads to systematically comparing and exchanging 
the historical narratives, the historical orientations (consequences for 
the present, conclusions for own actions). Sometimes, changing one’s 
own position becomes inevitable: abolishing historical falsifications and 
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biased myths about superiority and particular dignity (“being chosen, 
being selected”) of ones own group and the inferiority or lack of dignity 
(“being damned, being degenerate”) of other groups. 
Profoundly understood, this approach to history has a universalist 
basis: acknowledgment of universal and valid civil and human rights. 
Only after a serious study of contrasting concepts can one accomplish 
the construction of new, plausible and convincing histories, at least 
compatible (i.e. non exclusive) ones or partly common (i.e. agreeable) 
ones. Superficially, this version of history looks like a weakening of 
one’s own position, like a loss. But this is short-sighted: The superior – 
inclusive, encompassing – narrative allows self-esteem out of own 
achievements and abilities, not borrowed from the so-called (often dubi-
ous) heroic deeds of the ancestors. This means strength, not weakness, 
because there is a development in one’s own personality. In the end it 
may bring about tolerance – even mutual sympathy and mutual ac-
ceptance – for the other, in spite of the forefathers’ hatred.13 
 
Table 2: Mental Strategies of Historical Reconciliation 
 Understanding 
history 
















from the (own and 
foreign) past without 







tives on history and 
criteria of selection 
Going towards 
each other and go-
ing on together (in 
life and historiog-
raphy) 
Looking for the 
conditions and 
chances of a com-
mon future (in spite 











at least compatible 
or partly common 
Developing toler-
ance – even mutual 
sympathy and mutu-
al acceptance   for 
the ‘others’ (includ-
ing their history) 
 
Clearly, this includes a new approach to, use of and coping with history, 
a change in the traditional notion of history itself. It is no longer a fixed 
 
13  One of the consequences of a process of reconciliation could be to learn to 
mourn in common ceremonies, as Germans and French meanwhile some-
times do when commemorating World War I and World War II. 
–
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and unchangeable value to hold on to, to preserve, but a valuable, and 
also hazardous, field to handle in an intellectually convincing and moral-
ly honest way.  
 
 
2.   Four  approaches to “histor ical  
 reconci l iat ion”  via  “learning history” 
 
Until now, nothing has been said about children and schools. In fact, all 
the problems and processes mentioned before take place in all parts of 
society, they are deep, often unconscious movements of the political and 
historical culture. Since historical awareness and historical interpreta-
tions are learnt by socialization, young people will clearly be involved in 
those changes. Often the generation growing up will turn to an alterna-
tive version, will promote opposing ideas and therefore will accelerate 
societal movements. This is a typical structure of the generation conflict 
in history. 
Nevertheless, any political class, any ruling group, tries to implant 
its historical constructions, which in fact include the anticipated tasks for 
the future, into the thoughts, plans (and dreams) of the young ones, at 
least of those who will be influential (see Weniger 1969). History text-
books are a battlefield for this; winning means shaping the thoughts of 
young people, losing means a defeat in the transfer of ones own ideas to 
the next generation. Inevitably, history teaching in schools is history 
policy, even if a strong orientation towards historical science is claimed 
and aspired. 
In the German case, we mainly executed and experienced four ap-
proaches to reconciliation in the more narrow field of learning history, 
especially at school and in the subject matter history: 
• History textbook commissions and purification of textbooks, 
• Common textbooks, 
• Youth exchange programs, 
• Comparing history textbooks and exchanging historical narratives by 
the pupils themselves. 
 
Now we need to describe all four strategies in detail and to explain their 
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2.1  History textbook commissions and  
purification of textbooks 
 
Already in the twenties before World War II, many left-wing teachers in 
different countries, e.g. Germany and France, had begun common work 
in comparing and correcting history textbooks in a mutual process of ex-
amining, discussing and deciding. The aim was not to find a uniform 
version for both sides, but to mitigate the hatred and the mistakes in or-
der to find some solutions and some discourses with the aim of agreeing 
to disagree (controversial discussions are better than firing at each oth-
er). Already in those early times, the aim was explicitly called decon-
tamination of the national history textbooks. 
After World War II, a German professor of teachers’ education in 
Brunswick, Georg Eckert (born 1912), took up the same activity. When 
Eckert died in 1974, a scientific institution with his name was founded 
and funded; until today it has edited a periodical and a long series of 
more than one hundred books (see Pingel 1995; 1999, 2000; Becher/Rie-
menschneider 2000). After long years, a series of textbook commissions 
was institutionalized with the help of the UNESCO. They were not gov-
ernmental institutions, but produced a mixture of scientific expertise, 
peace-education policy and diplomatic negotiations. In fact, those pro-
cesses of exchanging and understanding need a long time. Both sides 
have to gain confidence in each other step by step, and also insight into 
the special wounds, taboos, neuralgias and limits of both sides. That is a 
good reason why international help and status via the UNESCO is pref-
erable to receiving support from national governmental agencies only. 
The commissions need a certain independence and distance from nation-
al blinkers. 
Perhaps some remarks are necessary about the main method of the 
commissions’ work. The neuralgic topics of the bi-national history are 
presented scientifically by both sides and the controversies are dis-
cussed. But textbook analyses – conducted cross-nationally – are even 
more important. In those mutual researches and diligent comparisons, 
the points which one partner cannot accept in the other’s official narra-
tives are identified. After that, scientific debates about interpretation and 
synthesis of history and about the cultures of history, the images of and 
dealing with history in the societies involved, has to take place again. 
Between both sides in the commissions, a difficult and long process of 
scientific and diplomatic negotiation – even bargaining – begins and 
hopefully comes to a mutually acceptable end, a common recommenda-
tion. 
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In this process, not every problem can – and should – be settled by 
an uneasy compromise in the middle; sometimes it may be better to 
agree to disagree in some points and to preserve this rest for the com-
mon future, when more insight and trust have evolved through the im-
provement of negotiation and exchange. Of course, the method can be 
applied to tri-lateral or multi-lateral textbook talks as well (German, 
Polish and Ukrainian or German, Russian and Baltic or German, US and 
Israeli or European and Latin American). But, as far as I know, this has 
seldom been wholly accomplished and has proven to be even more diffi-
cult than bi-lateral work. 
The results of those commissions were textbook recommendations, 
not textbooks. The different systems of textbook production of the dif-
ferent partners were accepted. Some countries have rather varied text-
book types and series on a free capitalist market, others have official and 
centralized (uniform) textbooks. Of course, the effect or success of the 
recommendations was tested and examined after some years. Often, one 
side was not satisfied with the publishers’ practice in another country. 
Nevertheless, in the long run, most recommendations were fulfilled. 
The German-French textbook reconciliations in the fifties were the 
first ones. Later on, the Israeli-German and Polish-German textbook 
commissions were the most important ones. The German-Polish case 
has become the most famous or most infamous. It took place at the time 
of the policy of détente (“Entspannungspolitik”) of Chancellor Willy 
Brandt. To summarize the conflict: Germany conquered Poland in 1939, 
took great parts of the territory, shot a huge number of people from all 
elites, killed three millions Polish Jews, displaced hundreds of thousands 
of Polish citizens and forced millions of them to work in Germany dur-
ing the war. After the war, Poland (and Russia) took the Eastern quarter 
of Germany (mainly inhabited by German speaking people) and drove 
out – or did not allow to return – a population of about nine million 
Germans (ethnic cleansing). There is a lot of pain and hatred on both 
sides – and in a very asymmetric case. 
During the textbook negotiations, a precondition had to be accepted. 
The Polish side was prohibited by its government to talk about the Hit-
ler-Stalin pact of 1939 with the plan to separate and abolish interbellum 
Poland, giving the West to Germany and the East – today’s Western 
Belorussia und Western Ukraine – to the Soviet Union. This secret addi-
tional protocol to the Hitler-Stalin-treaty of 1939 was officially called a 
Western secret intelligence falsification. Only in 1989 did Gorbachev 
admit to the existence of the document. But in 1969 or 1972, every men-
tion of the loss of Eastern Poland was strictly forbidden. When the rec-
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ommendations of the bilateral commission came out in 1976, the prob-
lem – like others – was excluded and postponed to the future. 
The conservative opponents of Willy Brandt’s policy of détente – 
including the conservative party leaders – were immediately up in arms 
and accused the German members of being traitors of historical truth 
and German interests (Jacobmeyer 1979). Indeed, they produced an al-
ternative recommendation which looked much more convincing and 
plausible to German readers (Menzel et al. 1978). Ironically, it had only 
one mistake: It was a German position, not a common one that also in-
corporated the Polish viewpoint and Polish history culture. Affirming 
one’s own position and securing it in documents full of pathos is just the 
opposite of a reconciliation by history. 
If the textbook publishers write the opposite of what has been nego-
tiated and decided in history textbook commissions, this is a problem. 
But if they simply omit a topic which had been considered and – after 
long controversies – agreed upon, they may undermine the common so-
lution or they may decide in favor of more important themes. History in-
evitably is selection. Many topics the researchers or politicians of one 
country want to fix not only in their own curriculum but also in the one 
of their – formerly hostile – neighbor cannot be covered in detail or at 
all. Every country has to accept that others learn a different history. This 
is not easy. But in instances where a neuralgic issue is covered in one 
country, the others have a legitimate right to look at it and perhaps voice 
their differing opinions and respectful protest.14 
 
2.2 Common textbooks? 
 
The concept of a common textbook has to be sharply distinguished from 
the concept of textbook examination and textbook decontamination. Dif-
ferent states, nations, and regions remember different histories and 
therefore merit different textbooks, but – that is the result of a successful 
textbook commission – not at the emotional costs of the neighbour. 
Textbook negotiation (even textbook bargaining) is a question of good 
diplomacy, of intellectual honesty and of anticipatory peace-keeping. 
Common textbooks are a question of identity policy, of a type of second 
order nation building (or federation/alliance building). About twenty 
years ago, a private donator financed a common “European History 
 
14  Commentaries from other positions (“controversial articulations”) are a 
good alternative to common history texts. This is not only true for (for-
merly hostile) nations, but for classes, genders, religious communities etc. 
as well. Remember that international history with diplomacy, trade, war 
and peace is not the only aspect of history! 
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Textbook”, written by more than ten scientists coming from more than 
ten countries (Aldebert 1992).  
In my opinion the result was not convincing. On the one hand, the 
different versions in different languages have not been completely iden-
tical. Central notions and remarks varied. On the other hand, the text 
was rather abstract and boring. In this, it fell far short of the best text-
books in many European countries.15 
Obviously, the same textbook has completely different effects in 
small countries (like Czechia) and large countries (like France), in geo-
graphically central countries (like Germany) and marginal countries 
(like Norway), in conservative countries (with a tradition of learning by 
rote, falsely called “learning by heart”) and in progressive countries 
(with a tradition of free learning). The idea of a common textbook, alt-
hough it is often renewed in the public discussion, is not a good idea. 
What we need, is not a common history, but a history for every country 
with a common European aspect and perspective on one hand, and a 
basic idea of European peace and reconciliation on the other. This noble 
dream has not yet been wholly accomplished. 
A second attempt to produce a common textbook was made by the 
French president Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder. A German-French youth conference itself had made the pro-
posal; and the two leading politicians pushed it through against some 
experts’ warnings and all legal impediments (top-down-model). Now the 
second and the third volume have been published (Histoire/Geschichte 
2006, 2007); chronologically they cover modern and contemporary his-
tory. It may be more difficult to agree when it comes to earlier periods.16 
Contrary to what the top politicians had in mind, almost nobody thinks 
that it can be used alone and exclusively. It is accepted as additional ma-
terial only. The two partners’ common book is far from being a solu-
tion.17 As a thought experiment, you only have to think about a generali-
 
15  Perhaps an important illusion has to be destroyed: The content of history 
textbooks is not really learnt or internalized by the students. Therefore the 
quarrel for proportions and inclusion often resembles a shadow-boxing. 80 
to 90% of the facts and topics covered in history lessons will be forgotten 
only one year later; only identity-relevant interpretations will be retained 
for a long time. Teaching does not mean ordering learning or enforcing 
learning, it can only stimulate or encourage learning. 
16  But even in this case, the compromise was not easy (at least, there are 
hints): In the common textbook Germans stressed multi-perspectivity and 
the French value education. 
17  Germany, for instance, has nine direct neighbours (not to mention the 
countries overseas that Germany has had historical ties with): The Nether-
lands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czechia, Po-
land and Denmark. 
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zation of the project of bilaterally common history textbooks. Can we 
want and use a British-German, a US-German, an Italian-German text-
book – and many others – as well? We cannot. This is only possible – if 
at all – for one privileged partnership (as an anticipation of a closer uni-
ty?). 
The Polish reaction to the German-French plan was very typical and 
very contradictory. On the one hand, Poland wanted to participate, to 
join a trilateral project. On the other hand, a parallel German-Polish pro-
ject was demanded. And finally, a strong polemic discussion against the 
whole idea broke out and became dominant: As a perfectly sovereign 
nation, Poland cannot accept any interference in its textbooks. Anti-
German slogans were uttered, even by the Polish government.18 Recon-
ciliation – as a long process – is mutual alteration and rapprochement, 
but not unification or uniformity. Experiments in adopting the really dif-
fering perspectives of others (empathy) may be superior to pre-given 
uneasy – and un-loved – compromises. 
 
2.3  Youth exchange and youth encounter 
 
Extensive programs of youth exchange and encounter are not possible 
without a lot of money; they do not effect positive results of reconcilia-
tion automatically and they often do not include much historical learn-
ing.19 These points need to be mentioned at the beginning. Nevertheless, 
youth encounter and exchange are very important and perhaps the best 
of all concepts (Dethlefsen 2003). Many German school pupils of the 
higher grades in privileged types of school spend one year in a foreign 
country, normally France, Great Britain, and the USA, but also Canada, 
Australia, Spain or Italy. Exchange programs with Russia, Poland and 
Czechia exist as well, but the number of participants is lower and the 
exchange periods are shorter. 
The special exchange programs are of another type; they are con-
ducted in groups, with normally whole classes visiting France or Poland. 
And entire Polish and French classes come to Germany in mutual ex-
change programs. In the French case, a particular treaty was signed more 
than thirty years ago, and heavy funding was effected. Millions and mil-
 
18  This took place from 2005 to 2007; in October 2007, the Polish People 
elected a new parliament and the Polish parliament elected a new govern-
ment (Donald Tusk) in November. A careful policy of rapprochement to 
Germany began immediately, even in the field of history policy. The 
common work for a common German-Polish history textbook has mean-
while begun. But the German - Polish relations remain complicated. 
19  At least, this is the impression after observing the experiences of the Ger-
man-Polish-Youth-Exchange Organization. 
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lions of young people have meanwhile visited the other country. In the 
Polish case, the parallel organization, the “German-Polish Youth-
Exchange Organization”, was founded only after the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989 (and it received far less money). Nevertheless, millions of 
young students have gone to Germany or to Poland. Unfortunately a 
German-Czech agreement has not yet been accomplished, because of re-
peated public discussion within both countries. 
The linkage of youth encounter and reconciliation by means of his-
torical learning is not really close. In the case of Poland, we know very 
well that doing sports, music, shopping, comparing fashion and dancing 
together is much easier for the young boys and girls than discussing his-
tory. Often they understand each other immediately if they do not talk 
about history. Often mixed friendships last for a long time, and there are 
also cases of love relationships. Thus, one might suggest that history on-
ly impedes reconciliation instead of promoting it. In fact, teachers often 
avoid history in such German-Polish exchanges instead of itemizing it. 
A very important exception has to be mentioned. From the German 
side, many excursions are organized to the sites of the extermination 
camps of Auschwitz, Maidanek, Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor etc. Finan-
cially, these trips are paid for by the German-Polish Youth-Exchange 
Organization like exchanges, even if there is no encounter with Polish 
students. Here, the asymmetric situation – German mass crimes in Po-
land 1939 to 1945 – is taken into account. 
The practice of German-Polish encounters reflects the difficulties of 
historical reconciliation. As already said, history (except the history of 
the NS period) is often excluded or avoided – and the students therefore 
like each other. Unfortunately, historical consciousness takes revenge 
(like a restless and irreconcilable ghost), if it is omitted. The develop-
ment of the last years clearly shows that history returns subconsciously 
(through the back-door) like a revenant if you try to exclude it con-
sciously (via the front door). When the Polish government began with an 
anti-German policy, when it used anti-German feelings to promote con-
servative party policy, it became evident how thin, fragile, and endan-
gered the practice of reconciliation actually is.20 Resentment and preju-
dices dominate, instead of historical analysis. The majority is helplessly 
exposed to such tactics of history poetics. 
The “German-Polish Youth Encounter Organization” clearly decided 
to promote common historical work of German and Polish groups, in the 
sense of local research projects (e.g. NS history, former German popula-
 
20  This concerns the years 2005 to 2007 again; conditions changed with the 
re-election of October 2007 (see above). 
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tion in now Polish cities). But these are long-term projects. First, teach-
ers have to learn and to work together. The early attempts have clearly 
shown a very different culture of history.21 
Polish teachers (like Polish students) know a lot about history, but 
most of it is closely connected to a limited, even fixed interpretation 
(“myth”) of Polish history. There is only one, clearly nationalistic ver-
sion (based on an a-historical understanding of “nation”). Certainly we 
can call this an integral nationalistic mode of making sense of history. 
The master narrative of history constitutes the nation (and has saved or 
preserved it during 120 years of partition from 1795 to 1918). History is 
used – but not acknowledged and reflected – as construction of identity. 
And this national identity is that of a victim’s history and a homogenous 
nation (not at all convincing in the case of the Polish nobility’s republic 
with Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and German noblemen belong-
ing to the Polish nobility nation before 1795). 
German teachers – like German pupils – often know much less about 
history than the Polish ones. But their pattern of interpretation is normal-
ly no longer national or nationalist. The history of the German nation 
means guilt and shame since National Socialism. Therefore, the interpre-
tation is mainly organized in a European or universal history perspec-
tive. Additionally, Germans are prepared to listen to differing types of 
making sense. Many of them have already moved to a “constructivist” 
concept/theory of history (hopefully!). They are more ready to compare 
and discuss other narratives – and perhaps to change their own opinions. 
An interchange between a rich, but narrow Polish and a poor, but flexi-
ble German version is very difficult, often uncomfortable and irritating. 
Thus, teachers have to be prepared to guide the students during their 
common history projects. First experiences with teachers’ summer 
courses have been collected. 
Without any doubt, experienced teachers und students can do good 
work. For about ten years, there has been a network of students’ history 
competitions (Eustory 1999). Promoted by the Körber-Foundation in 
Hamburg, the approx. eighteen competitions from France to Russia, 
from Italy to Ireland, from Bulgaria to Estonia exchange their ideas and 
their winners. Common workshops are used to tell each other the respec-
tive investigated history and to investigate new topics together. It takes 
 
21  Here I rely mainly on my own experiences in a couple of seminars with 
teachers of both countries (and some scientific meetings). Additionally in 
1995, the questioning of 1 250 teachers and 31 500 ninth graders in 27 
countries (see Angvik/Borries 1997; Borries et al. 1999: 85-89, 92-91, 95, 
125, 174, 185, 187, 241, 302, 304-311 etc.) showed marked differences in 
German and Polish cultures of history and cultures of learning. 
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some time – and some language difficulties have to be solved, but the 
results are encouraging. Exhibitions and books have been produced. 
Long-term friendships have started (e.g. Wancerz-Gluza 2003). The best 
experiences were made in common summer-courses and international 
networks (e.g. EUSTORY 2007).  
 
2.4  Comparing history textbooks and exchanging 
  historical narratives among pupils themselves 
 
Regional history research projects of school students are a good idea, 
but they only cover small fields. There is another chance to initiate an 
international debate or discourse among students themselves, e.g. 
through the comparison of textbooks. In 2006, a small pilot-study was 
done, financed by a German foundation. Students in many countries 
compared the textbook chapters about 1989/90 (the fall of the “Berlin 
Wall” and the “Soviet Empire”), presented their results to classes from 
other countries and revised them together. Very similar work was previ-
ously done with Polish and German teachers. 
In some respects, communicative textbook comparison (and respon-
sible textbook revision) is better than pre-fabricated purged versions af-
ter comparison by scientific textbook commissions. Of course, gross fal-
sifications, myths or tirades of hatred can be eliminated beforehand. But 
the simple fact of completely different selections, perspectives and in-
terpretations (and identity contributions) is striking for both sides. Simi-
lar experiences took place in several internet projects, but – and that is a 
restriction – the language problems proved to be a crucial issue. 
Perhaps the logic of this fourth method has to be explained a bit 
more in detail. When textbook decontamination started sixty years ago, 
scientific work normally took place in national frameworks. In the pro-
cess of the textbook commissions, nobody learnt more than the members 
of the commissions themselves. They broadened their horizons, they re-
peatedly changed their perspectives, and they developed a multi-
perspective and a meta-perspective, without losing their individual – and 
national or cultural or religious – position. Today, in the era of globali-
zation, school pupils travel and communicate as much or more than sci-
entists did sixty years ago. Why should we not give them the same 
chances which were presented to the professors two generations ago? 
They will discuss their historical interpretations anyway. Why not pre-
pare and organize this process systematically – and with the help of 
translations? The first experiments were very successful, although so far 
only among elite students. 
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To sum up: Reconciliation via history and coping with burdening 
history is a long-term project and program (for individuals as well as for 
societies). It needs reflection and (self-) reflection, not only more histor-
ical knowledge, but more self-distance, empathy and – as far as possible 
– mourning as well. It may be encouraged at school, but mainly chal-
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Exhibit ing the War. Approaches to World 
War I I  in Museums and Exhibitions  
OLA SVEIN STUGU  
 
 
Traditionally, war exhibitions have functioned as media for officially 
sanctioned narratives of sacrifice and victory. After World War II new 
kinds of exhibitions have developed, balancing between moral messages 
and research-based narratives. What does this development mean for the 
role of museums in shaping historical consciousness? 
Museums are among the most important institutions molding histori-
cal consciousness in modern society. Through the ways of selecting and 
editing which past is worthy of being presented in exhibitions, museums 
convey values, concepts and thought models not only as orienting tools 
for the present, but also as guidelines for future action. During later dec-
ades historical museums in general have undergone substantial changes 
within the ways of representing and presenting the past. In accordance 
with this, approaches to war in museums and exhibitions staged in other 
institutional settings have also changed. Yet these changes should not 
only be understood in the light of developments within the museum in-
stitution itself but also in accordance with changing focuses in reflec-
tions and interpretations of the war. This article aims at exploring and 
discussing these changes in light of recent theory of memory, identity 
and uses of history.  
In the grand narratives of the great historical museums from the 
middle of the 19th century and onwards, war, as a rule, was depicted as 
an integral, sometimes unavoidable part of shaping and securing the 
state. The national museums were to a large degree public institutions 
with manifest missions to serve the nation and support hegemonic na-
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tional narratives of the time. The greatness of the nation demanded great 
deeds from its sons (and from time to time even from its daughters), and 
museum exhibitions were designed to install pride and patriotism in 
their visitors. War exhibitions, with their narratives of us and them, he-
roes and villains, bravery and pride, were particularly well suited for this 
purpose. Exhibitions with a more specific military focus usually con-
tained weapons, uniforms and banners, while exhibited pieces of art il-
lustrated heroism and sacrifices for the good, worthy cause. The enemy 
was usually one-dimensional, and on several occasions cruelty and a 
breach of the code of honorable conduct on behalf of the enemy were 
displayed as a means to boost morale and strengthen identity on one’s 
own side.  
The enemy was not necessarily shown as evil or treacherous. If he 
had fought bravely or behaved chivalrously, he was respected, some-
times even admired, like the position of the confederate commander-in-
chief Robert E. Lee within the narratives of the victorious side of the 
American Civil War. Nevertheless, the distinction between friend and 
foe was always clear, and the behavior of one’s own side was hardly ev-
er questioned.  
Following World War I, the experiences of the trenches also made 
exhibitions focus on the fate of the ordinary soldiers, but whereas the 
absurdity and cruelty of the slaughter became a central topic in scholarly 
debate as well as in literary fiction, museums rarely managed to inte-
grate these aspects of war in their exhibitions. This may partly be as-
cribed to the fact that most museums focused on collecting and preserv-
ing artifacts of the war and cared less for the themes of history, which 
did not manifest itself materially. But it may also be seen as a continua-
tion of the understanding of museums as patriotic institutions with an 
educational mandate to help produce good, loyal citizens, prepared to 
bring new sacrifices for their country.  
After World War II, the one-dimensional friend and foe narratives 
are still to be found in quite a few museums. The overall picture, how-
ever, has become much more ambiguous and inconsistent. New themes 
and topics have found their way into exhibitions, even at official nation-
al institutions, and most museums no longer consider themselves 
obliged to prop up national identities and master narratives. This does 
not mean that the main trend in these institutions has been a turn to chal-
lenging the established narratives, but public discussions about the war 
have unavoidably left deep imprints also within the museum world. War 
exhibitions no longer restrict themselves to telling narratives of the past, 
they have also become arenas for discussing abuse of human rights at 
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large as well as other moral dilemmas. These tendencies are most clearly 
seen in Germany, but can be noticed in other nations too. 
To clarify these processes of change, some basic questions concern-
ing the presentation of historical knowledge and insights have to be 
asked: To which degree do exhibitions present authoritative master nar-
ratives of events in contrast to open ended, discussing approaches? How 
much is still to be seen of the classical identity-based contents? How do 
exhibitions answer the challenge of finding a balance between the ideals 
of the research community of critical, non-partisan investigation and 
discussion on the one hand and the aim to educate and to convey basic 
values on the other? Are there significant differences between exhibi-
tions aiming at different audiences and target groups? Are there im-
portant differences in the form of exhibitions and how does this relate to 
their contents? This last dimension above all considers the difference be-
tween object-based exhibitions where collected items are central and 
concept-based exhibitions where attention is focused on messages, re-
gardless of whether there are artifacts or other objects at hand to illus-
trate and underline the narrative and message told within the exhibition. 
(Dean 1996: 4pp.)  
Below I will broadly distinguish between two main types of war ex-
hibitions, the first one communicating national narratives much in line 
with traditional historical museums, and an alternative one, basing focus 
and activities on universal values, usually including human rights and 
adherence to an open, democratic society. What separates the two types 
of exhibitions is the character of the values they support and wish to 
convey. This means that within both types one may find exhibitions fol-
lowing high academic standards as well as exhibitions where the mes-
sage overrules research-based conclusions.  
A brief note also needs to be added on what is meant by a museum. 
Museums are usually regarded as places containing and exhibiting mate-
rial artifacts and objects. This is reflected e.g. in the definition of a mu-
seum approved by The International Council of Museums, which de-
fines a museum as a: “a non-profit making, permanent institution in the 
service of society and of its development, and open to the public, which 
acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits, for purpos-
es of study, education and enjoyment, material evidence of people and 
their environment” (Ambrose/Pain 2006: 8). This definition excludes 
museum-like institutions of research and education-producing exhibi-
tions that are to a large degree concept-based. In my discussions, how-
ever, these institutions will play an important role, not least because they 
often serve declared educational purposes and defined universal values. 
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Therefore they have at least implicitly been forced to deal with the ques-
tion of the historical consciousness of their visitors.  
 
 
The patr iot  narrat ive 
 
After World War II, the patriot master narrative of fighting, hardships 
and sacrifices for the country, liberty and other good causes is well rep-
resented in war exhibitions. The point of view is normally clearly parti-
san, presenting “our own, our parents’ and our grandparents’ war”. For 
obvious reasons narratives of this type are normally to be found on the 
victorious side. However, they differ from earlier patriot narratives by 
not glorifying the own nation’s victories as the main achievement of the 
war. Instead, as a rule, they legitimize the war efforts as a fight for jus-
tice and honorable general values against dictatorship, oppression, injus-
tice and the inhumanity and barbarism of the enemy.  
The Norwegian Resistance Museum, situated at Akershus fortress in 
Oslo, is a paradigmatic example of this master narrative approach. The 
museum is also a research institution with extended educational activi-
ties, centering on the main exhibition of the museum, which has been 
left largely unchanged since its establishment in the early 1970s. The 
exhibition tells an unambiguous story of invasion and collaboration, re-
sistance and victory, heroes and villains with limited space for alterna-
tive perspectives, questions and discussions. The narrative is very much 
in line with the way in which war history has been presented in history 
textbooks during most of the post-war period, and it may easily be con-
sidered an authoritative version of the national Norwegian war narrative. 
The exhibition builds upon thorough scholarly research, and, apart from 
questionable omissions of allied activities in sections of the exhibition 
covering the prelude to the German invasion, it is difficult to raise seri-
ous objections against the treatment of any of the subjects. Above all, 
what makes this exhibition an orchestrated master narrative is the way in 
which themes and events have been chosen, highlighted and linked to-
gether by help of an authoritative, undisputable mode of presentation.1  
Without doubt the best known Western European master narrative 
museum is the Imperial War Museum, founded in 1920 to commemorate 
British participation in the First World War and to collect items con-
nected to the war effort. It gradually developed into a general museum 
of war during the 20th century, and might be seen to epitomize the grand 
 
1  http://www.mil.no/felles/nhm/start/Utstillingen/#= Personal visits, latest 
March 2009. 
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museum of national standing taking great pride in its collections. The 
museum announces on its website: 
 
“Chronicling the history of conflict from the First World War to the present 
day, the Museum’s vast collections range from tanks and aircraft to photo-
graphs and personal letters as well as films, sound recordings and some of the 
twentieth century’s best-known paintings.”2 
 
Since its first years, the museum has shifted the focus from its original 
nationalistic perspectives to a more distanced, scholarly approach with a 
broad appeal, not least to schools. Recently the museum has tried to re-
invent itself by adding a Holocaust exhibition and a specially commis-
sioned film on human rights violations. But the main impression of the 
major parts of the museum is still that of solid, traditional presentations, 
well founded in historical research, but virtually devoid of surprises and 
challenges for reflection. This does not mean that the exhibitions are 
value-free. The underlying message of the whole institution is to show-
case the British army as a necessary tool in defending the country, the 
British way of life and the values of the British political system, but also 
to emphasize the central role of Britain in the total war effort. Regarding 
World War II, there is a clear tendency in the exhibitions to overestimate 
the British contribution to victory compared to that of the Soviet Union.  
The message of a museum is not only derived from its contents, but 
also from the form in which the contents are being presented, which may 
be illustrated by the recently opened northern branch of the Imperial 
War Museum in Salford (Manchester).3 “For all its audiovisual innova-
tion and striking building, this is a very traditional museum of the histo-
ry of warfare in the twentieth century,” the British philosopher Beth 
Lord writes in an analysis of the museum and continues:  
 
“The museum is organized around a timeline which runs along its walls, with 
relevant objects arranged near the key dates. The objects illustrate the points 
on the timeline and fit neatly into the chronology. The space is punctuated by 
‘silos’ using objects to illustrate big concepts that don’t fit neatly into the 
chronology: propaganda, women at war and so on. In traditional style, the visi-
tor moves through time as he or she moves through the museum, following the 
trajectory and development of the twentieth century through its wars […]” 
(Lord 2007: 360) 
 
 
2  http://london.iwm.org.uk/server/show/nav.182. Accessed 10/20/08. Most 
of the analysis is based on this large, well organized site. 
3  Personal visit January 2005 
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This kind of display, according to Lord, “arguably […] is a good way of 
communicating a long and complex history in a short time and small 
space” (Lord 2007: 360). But presenting history in this way as a fixed 
and continuous line where one may mount events and objects is also a 
way of conceiving history as a kind of stable objection-free totality.  
This way of presenting history may be well in accordance with deep-
rooted traditions in British museums. According to Tony Bennett “the 
British past was largely shaped through the commemoration of military 
exploits of empire, a tendency that was equally strong in France” (Ben-
net 1995: 137). This marks a contrast to another preservationist philoso-
phy, which originated in Scandinavia, but also adopted in the United 
States, in which material objects of folk culture were assigned historical 
significance. This argument may explain differences in the main profiles 
of the national museums, but not the specific features of war exhibitions, 
where the Norwegian resistance museum seems to have much more in 
common with British institutions than with other historical museums 
within the Norway.  
The Western master narrative differs substantially from the version 
found in Central and Eastern Europe during the era of state socialism. 
Like other institutions with educational purposes, museums were re-
quired to serve the overall needs of the state and the ruling party. Con-
sequently exhibitions had to adjust their messages to the party version of 
history, which means that the victorious adversary of Nazi barbarism 
and inhumanity was not the liberal democracy, but socialism and peo-
ple’s democracy. This was not least the case in the Soviet Union, where 
the sufferings and hardships of war made sense as a necessity to pre-
serve not only the political system, but also the nation itself.  
This aspect of the war narrative has become even more crucial after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, a fact well illustrated in the new Central 
Museum of the Great Patriotic War, which opened in Moscow in 1995. 
In contrast to earlier Soviet representations, which glorified Stalin and 
the Party as the great leaders of the war effort, the museum has shown a 
will to also confront the more problematic aspects of the war, like the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty, the catastrophic mistakes of leadership dur-
ing the early phases of war and the fate of the prisoners of war. Never-
theless, there is no doubt about the museum’s patriotic message, as illus-
trated by a quotation from one of the directors of its research department 
in 1996:  
 
“The people were not forced to fight, pressured by political institutions. They 
fought consciously for their fatherland, for Russia. And we won, not because 
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of but despite the inhuman regime of oppression and terror. Here are the roots 
of our victory.” (Prusakova 1997: 87)  
 
An almost ideal typical example of a nationalist military museum is to 
be found at the old Kalmegdan fortress in Belgrade. The Kalmegdan 
military museum was founded in 1878, shortly after the war when Tur-
key lost control over large parts of the Balkans. During the era of Tito 
the authorized narrative of the Yugoslav partisan war 1941-45 was a 
highlight of the museum. It still boasts Serbian resilience and resistance, 
e.g. by displaying parts of an American stealth bomber destroyed during 
the 1999 war.4  
Within the former GDR, the memorials at the Nazi concentration 
camps of Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück and Buchenwald were organized 
in a way that not only displayed a well-documented presentation of the 
history of the sites until 1945, but which also intended to demonstrate 
Communist resistance against the Nazi regime. This was particularly the 
case at Buchenwald, which had the strongest concentration of Com-
munist inmates of all camps during the period. In this way, the memori-
als also showed how the GDR regime actually belonged on the side of 
the victors of the war – in contrast to the Federal Republic. After the re-
unification of Germany the presentations and the narratives they con-
veyed were replaced by newer ones more in line with the history being 
told at other German memorials. At Buchenwald, the old exhibitions 
have been supplied with two new exhibition buildings, one focusing on 
the site’s usage as a prison camp during the early days of the Soviet oc-
cupation, the other one presenting a meta-history about the development 
of the exhibitions and monuments at the site between 1945 and 1989.5 
These new exhibitions may even be characterized as a kind of meta-
museum, an approach that has been quite rare so far. Concerning war 
history at large, however, an exhibition at the Imperial War Museum in 
London in 2008, titled “Re-vision” may be viewed as a kind of meta-
exhibition. There, paintings and other pieces of art from the collections 
of the museum were used to show ways of presenting the war through 
art during the first fifty years of the museum’s existence.6 Hopefully this 
 
4  The website of the museum is only in Serbian/Croatian, but the pictures on 
http://muzej.mod.gov.yu/stalna%20postavka/postavka.htm (accessed 
10/20/08) give an impression of a rather old fashioned object based exhi-
bition, which seems to have changed very little since my visit in August 
1974. 
5  Personal visit. November 2007, cfr. http//:www.buchenwald.de/index_en. 
html. 
6  http://london.iwm.org.uk/server/show/conEvent.2292nd. 
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is only the first step towards a more comprehensive meta-museum pro-
ject within that museum.  
An interesting variety of the patriotic exhibitions may be found at 
local or regional museums with sections on the 20th century. Of particu-
lar interest are city museums of big cities like Tokyo, London and Ham-
burg, which all have large sections about the local effects of the war. To 
a larger extent than other museums dealing with the war, these museums 
are able to show how war affected civilians and their lives, from the 
fears and sufferings following large-scale bombings to everyday strug-
gles of finding food and shelter. However, the approach becomes prob-
lematic when local history is not properly tied to the overall structures of 
politics and war strategies.  
The “War and Reconstruction” section of the spectacular Edo-Tokyo 
Museum is a good case in point. The effects of the great air raids on the 
city in March 1945, with the number of people killed in the firestorm 
exceeding that of the immediate casualties of the nuclear attack on Hiro-
shima, are displayed extensively. But as the civilian sufferings are not 
contextualized against Japanese warfare at large, the main lesson to be 
learnt from the exhibition is about Japanese suffering, with no reference 
to Japanese guilt and the suffering inflicted upon others.7  
The impressive Museum of the History of Hamburg also displays a 
thorough and well-researched narrative, not only of events narrowly tied 
to the war, like the firestorm following the air raid in 1943, but also the 
story of the local growth of the Nazi movement and regime. A visitor 
cannot avoid noticing repeated statements about the local Nazi regime, 
which is considered relatively mild compared to the harsh repression 
elsewhere, but there is no mentioning of the extensive cooperation be-
tween city authorities and the SS on brickstone deliveries from the Neu-
engamme concentration camp to the city (On the theme of victim and 
guilty in national history culture see also the contribution by Ahonen).8  
Most countries occupied during the war have resistance museums of 
various kinds. Some of them, like in Norway, are on a national level and 
bear an official stamp, whereas the state in France seems to have been 
quite reluctant to reproduce memories of the war through this type of 
central institutions. From the mid 1980s, however, 25 or so museums 
have been erected on regional and local levels with “resistance” or “de-
portation” in their name.  
 
7  Personal visit April 2003, http://www.edo-tokyo.msusum.or.jp/enlish 
/index.html. 
8  Personal visit November 2007, http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/index_e. 
html. (Kaienburg 1991: esp. 97 pp). 
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This development seems to coincide with an increased openness in 
French memory culture towards the more problematic sides of French 
war history, particularly concerning the Vichy regime. But the fact that a 
majority of the institutions have been erected within Vichy controlled 
territory calls for further investigation, and a possible explanation sug-
gested by Kevin Walsh is that memorizing resistance in these parts of 
France might be seen as an effort to counter impressions of widespread 
regional collaboration. In this way, regional and local institutions answer 
more to regional than to national needs, as Walsh suggests: 
 
“What such an analysis reveals is that it is very difficult to discuss national 
memories, and in fact a regional approach to the study of identity is the only 
valid and useful approach […]. No matter how hard the state tries, popular 
memory at the local or regional level cannot always be subsumed by the craft-
ed national memory, constructed by national ideology.” (Walsh 2007: 446) 
 
 
Exhibit ions as media for  moral  messages  
 
After Auschwitz, a strictly value-neutral presentation of the history of 
World War II seems impossible, even preposterous, and it seems quite 
appropriate that war exhibitions signal some kind of value-based appro-
ach, not only defining the enemy as evil, but also trying to identify some 
of the values to be defended. Not least after the Nuremberg trials and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 this seems to be an ap-
propriate approach. However, there is a broad variety in how the institu-
tions choose to communicate these values, and their main messages vary 
extensively. This does not least apply to the presentations of the war and 
its messages in the countries on the losing side.  
A most interesting case in this respect is the Hiroshima peace memo-
rial museum. Like the Edo-Tokyo museum it offers an extensive display 
of human suffering. However, the Hiroshima museum’s approach to the 
past differs profoundly from that of the Tokyo museum. The museum 
opened in 1955 with a declared aim to contribute to abolishing nuclear 
weapons, and the oldest parts of the exhibition almost exclusively focus 
on the effects of the bomb, using quite strong effects to raise emotions 
and provoke attitudes. During a thorough reshaping and extension of the 
museum in the early 1990s, a new section was added, representing the 
events and developments leading up to August 6th 1945, when the bomb 
was dropped. This part of the exhibition maintains an analytic, reflective 
approach and tells different, but intertwining narratives leading up to the 
fatal date of the bomb.  
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One narrative focuses on the development of Japanese militarism 
and imperialism that led to the efforts to realize the vision of an “Eastern 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” by brute force. Another narrative tells of 
scientific progress, particularly in nuclear physics, which was a precon-
dition for making the bomb. A third story follows the internal develop-
ment of the city of Hiroshima, which due to its proximity to the Asian 
mainland became a port of departure for armies to Korea and China. A 
fourth one deals with American war strategies, where extensive space is 
given to the chilly tale of why Hiroshima was chosen as target for the 
first full-scale test of the new weapon, while Kyoto, with a similar to-
pography of hills on three sides of the city, was spared because of its 
cultural heritage treasures. Frequent special exhibitions have focused 
upon sensitive topics like the early post-war period efforts on the Amer-
ican side to cover up the effects of the bomb, but also on politically less 
controversial issues like the reconstruction of the city.9  
Commemorating the atrocities and guilt of one’s own group or state 
is historically a very rare occurrence, and despite some serious efforts to 
include a perpetrator perspective into the exhibitions, the main approach 
at the Hiroshima museum is the city and its inhabitants as war victims, a 
position not difficult to understand or defend. Turning to Germany as 
the other great loser of the war, similar victim’s perspectives may be 
found in sections of city museums dealing with the allied bombing cam-
paign. As a rule, however, German museums and memorial sites display 
a clear will to admit the nation’s perpetrator role, not least when it 
comes to the fate of the European Jews. This is not only the case at the 
sites of former concentration camps, but has also become so widespread 
in other museums and memorials that one might virtually speak of a 
kind of remorse industry, which has accelerated during the last 20 years 
or so. (See also the contribution by Borries in this volume, which pre-
sents a typology on ways of dealing with burdening pasts.)  
As a whole, the institutions, particularly the latest ones, display a 
scholarly approach to the war and give due respect to all kinds of vic-
tims. I find it appropriate to call this approach to the war the “scholarly 
remorse and guilt approach”. For instance, the museum exhibitions at 
Bergen Belsen, opened in the autumn of 2007, not only present the rela-
tively short history of the concentration camp whose infamy British war 
photographers helped to bring to public attention shortly after the sur-
render, but also the prisoner-of-war camp at the site as well as the post-
war period where it functioned as a camp for displaced persons, mostly 
 
9  Personal visit April 2003. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 
(1999), http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jb/index_e2.html, accessed 25/11/ 
09. 
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Poles and Jews. The exhibitions are organized as what has been termed 
“study exhibitions”, where materials for more comprehensive studies are 
available on shelves, in drawers and in digital storage media within the 
exhibition building. The study material is a wide selection of factual 
sources, and in this way it differs profoundly from the emotionally 
charged approach in other areas of the camp’s site which were organized 
at an earlier time.  
The exhibitions at Neuengamme are another example of the scholar-
ly study exhibition approach which is not aiming directly at the empathy 
and emotions of the visitor, but instead aims at making an impact and 
inducing visitors to take a stand by way of reflection and insight. A spe-
cial exhibition focusing exclusively on the SS perpetrators was widely 
discussed before opening, as some critics feared that the perpetrator fo-
cus might result in some degree of identification with the perpetrators. 
The danger seems to have been largely overestimated, and even when 
some leading SS functionaries of the camp are being followed quite 
closely, even with notes and pictures of their family life, the main focus 
is on their actions as SS members and camp personnel. Instead of identi-
fication, this approach rather raises the imminent question of what actu-
ally turned these men into perpetrators and of the interplay between the 
system and the individuals in these cases.10  
Parallel to the growth of the German institutions and sites displaying 
remorse, their role and meaning within German contemporary culture at 
large have been discussed, more or less independently of their specific 
contents and character. In 1988, Martin Broszat raised a warning that 
through their reference to the fascist era, monuments “may not remem-
ber events as much as bury them altogether beneath layers of national 
myths and explanations.” (Quoted inYoung 1993: 5) This was part of a 
wider discussion where Broszat argued that the time had come for the 
Germans to historicize and normalize their attitudes towards their Na-
tional Socialist past. He drew heavy criticism for this position, and the 
renewed interest in building and organizing large museums of repent-
ance may on one hand be interpreted as an argument in favor of the posi-
tion that the time is not yet ripe for historization. The comment of Mary 
Fulbrook on an “obsessive concern with guilt and shame” which was 
displayed in a debate about the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin may be 
taken as a support of this view (Fulbrook 1999: 229). On the other hand, 
the scholarly approaches at the newest sites also bear witness to a kind 
of approach that manages to attend to the values without falling prey to 
 
10  The description of Bergen Belsen and Neuengamme is based on the au-
thor’s own visits at the premises in November 2007. 
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shallow emotions. At all events, the question of how World War II is be-
ing presented within German museums and exhibitions has become a 
part of the much larger theme of the German struggle to make sense of 
its traumatic past.  
Another value-based approach that might have been chosen in exhi-
bitions is what may be called “the reconciliation approach”. Recon-
ciliation between earlier enemies has been an honorable aim for different 
kinds of institutions, probably the most famous being the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the aftermath of the political 
changes in the country in 1994. Another institution based on recon-
ciliation between former enemies is the Georg Eckert Institute of Text-
book Research in Braunschweig, Germany, which was founded shortly 
after the Second World War with the explicit aim of defusing national-
ism and reciprocal animosity by harmonizing the narratives in history 
textbooks from different nations.  
In the museum world, a paradigmatic example of reconciliation as a 
goal may be the museum inaugurated in 1967 at the World War I battle-
field of Verdun. Its explicit aim has not been to generate pride in the 
glory of the French army, but to promote understanding between the 
former enemies.11  
History exhibitions aiming particularly at reconciliation are much 
more rare when considering Word War II. One main explanation for this 
is the fact that reconciliation demands a minimum of reciprocity be-
tween parts and a minimum of admittance on both sides that they may 
have something to regret. Opinions are very clear as to who bears the 
overwhelming guilt and blame for the war. Hardly any serious historian 
would object to this verdict. However, recently research has focused 
more extensively on themes like the allied air campaign against German 
cities and the Soviet army’s harsh behavior during its advances on the 
Eastern front, but also in Poland and the Baltic states during the first 
year of the War. One might very well imagine that special exhibitions 
focusing on subjects like these may be curated under the banner of re-
conciliation. But then reconciliation cannot be separated from other feel-
ings and attitudes, like admittance of guilt, remorse, repentance and for-
giveness.  
An example of the reconciliation approach may be the German-
Russian museum at Berlin-Karlshorst, which opened in 1994. From 
1967 on, the building, where the armistice between Germany and the 
Soviet Union was signed in 1945, was the site of a Soviet army museum 
 
11  http://memorial-de-verdun.fr/m-historique-et-missions.html, accessed 28/ 
02/10. 
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“for the Unconditional Surrender of Fascist Germany in the Great Patri-
otic War 1941-1945”.12 After German unification and the fall of the So-
viet regime plans began for a new museum, aiming at providing a com-
mon German-Russian interpretation of the war. The approach is low-
keyed and based on the idea that when facing unheard of amounts of ter-
ror and mass murder, one has to give the visitors some possibilities to 
distance themselves emotionally. Only from some distance the scale of 
the monstrousness may be grasped, the organizers maintain. (Jahn 1997: 
11 pp.) In this way the museum clearly distances itself from a row of 
other institutions that deliberately seek to evoke emotional involvement, 
even immersion in individual fates.  
Concepts like guilt and repentance are closely tied to religious atti-
tudes. Religious expressions are not least visible at exhibitions com-
memorating the Holocaust, but also at other memorials focusing more 
generally on massive violations of human rights before and during the 
War. This approach, which is very common at Holocaust memorials, 
may be summarized by the words “remembrance and sorrow”.  
First and foremost in this category one finds institutions like Yad 
Vashem in Jerusalem and Auschwitz in Poland. In contrast to Auschwitz 
and other memorials built on the premises of the atrocities, Yad Vashem 
resembles the Holocaust Memorial in Washington DC by being situated 
a long distance away from where the atrocities were committed. Never-
theless Yad Vashem has become a model and source of inspiration for a 
large number of memorial sites and exhibitions, not only because of its 
early foundation in 1953, but also because of the solid base of research 
for its activities. Auschwitz has to be mentioned in this analysis, not on-
ly because of the scale of the atrocities that were committed there, but 
also because the very name has become emblematic of the Holocaust all 
over the world.  
Institutions in this category do not only research and teach history in 
an academic sense of the word. A crucial aim is to invoke feelings and 
empathy with the victims as a means to produce and strengthen values 
and attitudes. A particular method of employing empathy may be found 
at the Holocaust Memorial in Washington, where visitors are equipped 
with an ID card of a victim, with whom they are supposed to identify 
and to connect emotionally. The method is not unique, as it has also 
been employed at the Flanders Field Museum at Ypres, where the sub-
jects of identification are soldiers at the World War I battlefield (Lord 
2007: 358). However, the method has been subject of discussion, and 
 
12  http://www.museum-karlshorst.de/html/gebaude/aa/langtext.shtml,  
accessed 28/02/10. 
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has not been replicated in a grand scale at other institutions (see also the 
contribution by Bjerg in this volume, on the relationship between evok-
ing empathy, history education and history culture).  
A further development of this approach is what may be called “The 
educative human rights-focused exhibition”. Following a rapid increase 
in public as well as academic interest in human rights, new centers have 
sprung up. Here, displaying the history of the war is not an end in itself, 
but primarily a means to draw attention to and to illustrate more general 
principles of human rights. An example of this category is the Centre for 
Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities in Oslo, with an “explicit 
aim to be a meeting-place for people who want to participate in the en-
during controversy concerning all kinds of religious, racist and ethnic 
motivated repression”, as stated on the website of the center.13 Other 
Norwegian centers with pronounced profiles of linking human rights to 
Second World War experiences, are the Memorial and Human Rights 
Centre at the former concentration camp Falstad in Central Norway and 
“Stiftelsen Arkivet” (The Foundation the Archive), based in the former 
regional headquarters of the Gestapo in Kristiansand. The institution de-
clares that 
 
“[b]y promoting dialogue, historical reflection and communication among dif-
ferent generations, Stiftelsen Arkivet wants to assist in the achievement of 
human rights, human dignity, peace building and conflict prevention”.14  
 
In practice it is difficult to draw a clear line between these generally ori-
ented centers and exhibitions with pronounced educational goals, e.g. at 
former concentration camps in Germany. Under all circumstances are 
they to be judged not only by virtue of their ability to communicate de-
sired values, but also on whether they manage to uphold scholarly prin-
ciples. The tendency of “universalization” can also be observed outside 
the museum world. See e.g. the contribution by Bjerg in this volume.  
 
 
Developments and chal lenges  
 
From this overview four main lines of development may be drawn: 
• There is a clear development away from patriot grand narratives of 
hardship and victory towards more general, moral questions.  
 
13  http://www.hlsenteret.no/English, accessed 10/23/08. 
14  http://stiftelsen-arkivet.no/english, accessed 10/24/08. 
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• War exhibitions based on material objects have to a large degree 
given way to concept-based exhibitions. Authentic war objects have 
to serve some communicative function to deserve being displayed.  
• Exhibitions tend to be based on a more distinct scholarly approach at 
the expense of one-dimensional didactic narratives.  
• Exhibitions are to an increasing degree being combined with other 
means of communication and learning. 
 
These trends seem to be well in line with general trends in historical ex-
hibitions. However, there are other trends in museum development that 
represent more profound challenges to how war should be exhibited. 
On one side there has been a recent trend in some big museums to 
tune down the historical context of artifacts, emphasizing instead the ob-
jects themselves, particularly when aesthetically valuable. This is a very 
rare approach in war museums, not only because aesthetic properties as 
a rule are of minor importance compared to other properties of the ob-
jects connected to war, but also because war exhibitions invariably con-
vey some form of message which demands explaining the contexts 
where artifacts have been produced, used or found.  
Another challenge may be seen as an extension of post-modern 
tendencies to criticize grand narratives and what the British philosopher 
Beth Lord characterizes as “the heavily didactic displays of the past” 
(Lord 2007: 362). “Ideas of universal truths or single fixed histories are 
ideas that the best museums are trying to challenge”, she maintains. “If 
the past is to be genuinely open, it cannot be presented as a fixed truth 
that can only be remembered” (Lord 2007: 358).  
As opposed to the fixed way of telling history, Lord advocates a 
“general history” in Michel Foucault’s sense, where the main methodi-
cal approach is examining particular artifacts or documents and develop-
ing how they fit into “multiple, discontinuous historical series. General 
history does not assume that all such documents will be evident for a 
single principle governing the time and place they are from, it takes their 
differences, specificities and discontinuities as primary”, Lord writes. 
(2007: 362) She is preoccupied with changing the role of the objects in 
exhibitions, and her ideal is a museum where the object has become  
 
“a living site of difference. It contains infinite differences and specificities to 
be opened up, related to other things and arranged in discontinuous series. The 
museum object is not the inert trace of a fixed past with which we can only 
connect through memory and empathy. Rather, in working with the object, in 
developing it into different causal series and multiple micro-histories, we will 
recognize the object as an integral part of what we are, and understand how 
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these causal series have been the condition of possibility of present circum-
stances.” (Lord 2007: 364-365) 
  
However noble Lord’s ideals may be of giving “power to both objects 
and visitors” by employing principles of general history, the ideals of 
“presenting history without narrative, without memory, and without em-
pathy” (Lord 2007: 365) pose huge problems, epistemologically as well 
as ethically. An open-ended micro-historical approach to World War II 
would serve to confuse and complicate rather than clarify not only the 
explanations of what happened, but also the profound moral issues at 
stake.  
Lord too seems to concede this. “Perhaps for many histories – the 
First and Second World Wars among them – it is too soon to treat them 
without reference to memory,” she maintains rather inconclusively 
(Lord 2007: 366). An alternative view would rather state that it is not 
only “too soon”, but also that for an indefinite future the war of the past 
neither is nor ought to be “genuinely open” and devoid of fixed truths. 
Avoiding dogma, there nevertheless are truths, e.g. about atrocities and 
genocide that are undeniable, and trying to present this history “without 
narrative, without memory, without empathy” would be untenable. The 
challenge is to find ways to combine empathy and moral engagement 
with scholarly discussion, multi-perspective approaches and an urge to 
pose, face, and explain even the most profound and disturbing questions.  
The very best war museums have come a long way towards these 
goals. They also manage to take advantage of the main features of ex-
hibitions as a medium, namely their three-dimensionality. A conscious 
spatiality and a successful employment of object-based narratives are the 
main arguments for choosing exhibitions as a means of communicating 
history. This means that one not only has to decide what to tell, but also 
how to tell it.  
Another challenge stems from the meeting between the intentions of 
the curators of the museum and the visitors’ memory, historical con-
sciousness and expectations at large. “Although visitors may fully ex-
pect and desire to be educated, instructed, to learn ‘something new’, as 
soon as that knowledge conflicts with memory and experience, trouble 
begins”, Susan Crane (2004: 322) maintains in a comment on the con-
troversies about the Smithsonian’s plans for a commemorative ex-
hibition on the bomber Enola Gay, 50 years after it dropped the first 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The row demonstrated that important parts 
of the American public simply did not want to be confronted with in-
convenient parts of the past. “The original Enola Gay exhibit, with its 
images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing victims and artifacts from 
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‘ground zero’, would have transgressed the bounds of acceptable Ameri-
can memory by emphasizing ‘suffering caused’”, Crane writes (2004: 
329).  
In short: Museums may aim at influencing historical consciousness 
and at creating more profound morally based understandings, but they 
have no control over the outcome of the meeting between the exhibitions 
and the expectations and prejudices of the public. 
  
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World War II shows no sign of fading away. A large number of books 
and articles are still being published at the same time as memories of the 
war intermingle with present day politics. Events and processes that be-
gan before the outbreak of the war and had effects on Europe long after 
1945 are, in many respects, still at the core of most, if not all, European 
politics. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the German-Soviet non-aggres-
sion agreement from August 1939, is a vivid example of a European 
Lieu de mémoire. It is, the German historian Stefan Troebst writes, one 
of several central points of a memory culture dealing with one of the 
greatest catastrophes in human history (2009: 249–256).  
Despite, or perhaps because of, simplified divisions between credi-
ble historical research, on the one hand, and subjective memories, on the 
other, collective memory and memory culture have been concepts at the 
core of historical research during the last decades. One of the more am-
bitious attempts to define memory culture takes as its starting point the 
ongoing struggle between what is included and what is excluded from 
dominating narratives of the past. This is at the same time a construction 
of memories and a struggle for meaning. Seen in this way, collective 
memory is both an important part of a construction process which aims 
to find meaning in a chaotic diversity and an ideological conflict in 
which history is used in order to win advantages in the present or in the 
near future. Thus, memory is a narrative representation of the past ori-
ented towards the future (Karlsson 1999: 48; Sundholm 2007: 115). 
Since film is such an important mediator of history, moving images give 
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meaning at the same time as they are at the core in fierce ideological bat-
tles, not least when it comes to the Second World War. 
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact is, like many other significant histori-
cal events, important in its own right, but we can hardly underestimate 
the importance of contemporary political life, which has effect on the 
mediation aspect. For decades, the secret protocol of the Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact, dividing Eastern and Northern Europe between Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia, remained unknown to the general public 
throughout Eastern Europe. But when it surfaced in the late 1980s, the 
new knowledge had a deep impact on the liberation movements in the 
Baltic States and in Poland. Thus, what we remember, or are allowed to 
remember, and what we forget depends to a large extent on the devel-
opment of history cultures. A history culture can be studied both as a 
structure and as a process. When studying history culture as a process, it 
is the different ways of mediating history and their consequences which 
are of importance. When analyzing history culture as a structure, the fo-
cus is on differences between, for instance, countries. In a country like 
Sweden, which has been spared from war during a period of almost two 
hundred years and been a democracy for almost a hundred years, differ-
ent attitudes and behaviors are to be found compared with dictatorships 
and/or war-torn countries. Such a conclusion by no means excludes dif-
ferences within one country (Karlsson 2003: 30–38). A history culture 
can include dividing opinions both over time and in regard to one and 
the same product. With the filming of Väinö Linna’s famous novel 
Tuntematon Sotilas (Unknown Soldier) as an example, John Sundholm 
(2007: 120–139) underlines striking differences in the reception of the 
version from 1955 compared to the one from 1985. While the first one 
soon became, as the novel, an icon for the Finnish war experience, the 
second one failed.  
It is not surprising to find that the combination of war and film has 
been a viable one ever since the infancy of cinema. Thanks to films, 
wars and genocides can come to life and turn into a kind of assembly 
points for thoughts on and opinions about justified wars on the one hand 
and immoral and excessively violent assaults on the other. With the Jew-
ish experience as an example, Paul Patera wrote in 1950 that film was 
the art which most easily prepared the public for “we” against “the oth-
ers” generalizations. The tragedies of the Holocaust were a shocking 
proof of this. However, the increasing number of films dealing with the 
legacy of the Nazi genocide, which premiered in the late 1940s, showed 
that films could also be a forceful weapon in fighting the prevailing anti-
Semitism (Patera 1950: 149–159). 
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Film and war are interdependent in a number of ways. Films became 
early on a sharp propaganda weapon, used in wars and conflicts, and 
thoroughly explored during the First World War. During the interwar 
period, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany established strong links be-
tween government and film industry. Even power holders in the United 
States and Great Britain realized the importance of film propaganda, but 
left the primary responsibility for developing corresponding activities to 
the various studios. In addition, the wartime film production created, as 
it turned out, profitable employment. From an American point of view, 
war as depicted through films has been characterized as “a love affair”, 
and the same goes for many other countries’ film industries 
(Matelski/Street 2003: 3). An interesting conclusion is that films have 
had an impact during the wars, but even more so as “descriptions” of the 
war in hindsight, shaping the way we look on armed conflicts, then and 
now (cf. Paul 2003: 3). “Indeed”, writes historian Michael Paris (2007: 
2), “it might well be argued that the popular memory of the Second 
World War has always been shaped more by the moving image than by 
any other form of cultural transmission.”  
Since documentaries and, even more so, feature films occupy a cen-
tral position in most historical cultures, many history producers use 
moving images for their purposes, not least when it comes to questions 
of war and peace. Among them we find almost every position from ro-
mantic nationalist to war-weary pacifist. Due to its great influence on 
millions of movie-goers, it has been a temptation to rewrite history in 
the cinemas so that past defeats become moral victories, war criminals 
become heroes, or vice versa (cf. Strübel 2002: 8–9). The historical revi-
sion on film has in some cases been very successful. Undoubtedly, the 
South lost the American Civil War, but the Southerners’ “lost cause” has 
time after time undergone a transformation from a military and a politi-
cal defeat to a bitter-sweet farewell to a culture which, although it is 
stained by the slavery issue, nevertheless deserves a belated revenge 
against the industrialists in the North.  
The Scandinavian countries had very different war experiences. 
Denmark and Norway were invaded by German troops on April 9, 1940. 
The Danes capitulated the same day, and their government was allowed 
a certain amount of autonomy until 1943. In Norway, the fighting went 
on until resistance became impossible, when British forces had to leave 
the battlefield. While Vidkun Quisling led a puppet government, Nor-
wegians in exile formed a government in London. Sweden succeeded in 
remaining neutral, although the neutrality was determined by the winds 
of war. After the outbreak of the war and in the following years, special 
consideration was shown for the powerful German neighbor, but in the 
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last years of the war the demands of the Allies took priority. Considering 
this, one can say, as a starting point, that in all three countries the films, 
like history writing in general, show markedly different features.  
While especially American, German, British, French and Soviet war 
films have been analyzed in international research in recent decades, the 
study of Scandinavian examples is still rare. However, the material basis 
for such an analysis is rich. It consists primarily of films and television 
series depicting aspects of the Second World War in the Scandinavian 
countries and the extensive press material, dealing both with the produc-
tion and the reception of these history products. Of special interest are 
the Danish film Flammen og Citronen (Flame and Lemon, 2008), the 
Norwegian film Max Manus (Max Manus – Man of War, 2009), the 
Swedish television series Någonstans i Sverige (Somewhere in Sweden, 
1973) and the Swedish film 1939 (1989). We will look at them as histo-
ry cultural products that refer to the actual history of the Second World 
War. But it is most likely that their producers have worked even harder 
to capture the values of present society that prevailed during the period 
when the films and televisions series were produced. Seen in this way, 




Scandinavian cinema dur ing World War I I  
 
As in all other countries, film also played a vital role in Denmark, Nor-
way and Sweden during the Second World War. In Norway, attempts 
were made to adapt the national film production to the “new orientation” 
that Quisling and his party Nasjonal Samling tried to impose on the 
Norwegian society. The result was meager, yielding only a few political 
films (Sørenssen 2007: 220–230). Also, the German censorship could 
not foresee all possible alternative interpretations of certain films. For 
instance, the importance of resisting occupiers was indeed occasionally 
depicted, especially in films with historic settings. Snapphanar (1942), a 
Swedish film about the fighting and, eventually, consensus between the 
Swedish army and the Danish guerrilla movement during the wars be-
tween Denmark and Sweden in the 17th century took on a new meaning 
when it was shown in Denmark. To many Danish viewers, the Swedes 
from the old days could be seen as the Germans of today. The historic 
Danish guerrilla soldiers in the south of Sweden were forerunners of the 
resistance movement in wartime Denmark.  
Danes and Norwegians who opposed the Germans lacked the oppor-
tunity to make their own movies. This did not mean that they were for-
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gotten. The genre of occupation and resistance soon became popular in 
Hollywood. The first of these films were released during the war. The 
American movie makers made quite an effort to cover a great deal of 
European geography. Settings for the occupation-and-resistance-genre 
were the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, France and Norway. 
With few exceptions, the unity of the resistance fighters was praised, not 
least of those in Norway. The popularity of Norway in Hollywood can 
be explained with the actions of Vidkun Quisling. He became the per-
sonification of the fifth column which in the wake of the German attack 
betrayed the unsuspecting and peace-loving Norwegians. The other rea-
son is that, once the German invasion was a fact, the Norwegians, de-
spite hopeless odds, did actually fight tenaciously against the German 
army. Furthermore, King Haakon VII refused to surrender or support 
any form of German-friendly government. To the American public, 
Norway was, as President Roosevelt put it, “at once conquered and un-
conquerable” (McLaughlin/Parry 2006: 173–176). 
In Sweden the film supply was also limited. Before the war, Swedish 
film distributors wanted to limit the import of films from Hollywood and 
cooperated to a certain extent with the German film industry. It has 
rightly been claimed that most representatives of Sweden’s film industry 
did not support the racial and pro-Nazi political goals. Instead, they 
hoped to “side-step German propaganda efforts by steering clear of po-
litically sensitive stances of any kind” (Wright 2007: 266). After the 
outbreak of the war, this proved easier said than done. The German 
Propaganda Ministry was especially until 1943 successful in persuading 
Swedish film distributors not to show films with anti-German messages. 
As a result, before the end of the war it was only in membership based 
film societies that it was possible to watch Leslie Howard’s Pimpernel 
Smith (1940) or Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator (1941).  
In the domestic film production, the will to preserve Swedish neu-
trality was a strong theme. A recurrent motive was Swedish soldiers 
standing guard along the Swedish coasts, ever ready to keep the looming 
threats at a safe distance. With Kadettkamrater (Cadet Comrades, 1939) 
as an example, film historian Jan Olsson stresses that this type of films 
were based upon “camaraderie and patriotism, it pays tribute to military 
life and its hardships as well as the military justice system” (1979: 70–
71).  
Already in 1942, a critic of the Nazi regime could be seen on the sil-
ver screen. Rid i natt! (Ride Tonight!) was a film adaptation of the fa-
mous author Vilhelm Moberg’s controversial novel with the same title, 
which invited comparison between the aristocratic oppression of the 
peasants in the 17th century and the ongoing German occupation of large 
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parts of Europe. During the last war years, more allegories of the Nazi 
regime’s brutality could be seen at the movie theatres. Other Swedish 
films discussed neutrality dilemmas and the concessions made by the 
Swedish government during its neutrality policy. However, the critical 
tone was rather short-lived. Symptomatically enough, it did not take 
long after the war for the soldier’s life to again become the subject of 
fun and ridicule, especially in the Swedish equivalent of the good soldier 
Svejk, Soldat Bom (Soldier Bom, 1947), which also received some inter-
national attention (Liljefors/Zander 2003: 214). 
 
 
Memories of  a  war not fought   
–  the Swedish perspect ive 
 
The shift did not mean that the well-proven guard theme disappeared 
from sight. One of the most popular novels in post-war Sweden was 
written by the author and journalist Jan Olof “Jolo” Olsson and dealt 
mostly with the Swedish soldiers who were on guard along the Swedish 
borders from the outbreak of the war 1939 until its end in the spring of 
1945. Någonstans i Sverige was made into a seven-part television series 
in the early 1970s. It starts with a familiar motive: a guard on his post in 
a wintry landscape. The nostalgic feeling was reinforced by the choice 
of the musical theme – Ulla Billquist’s signature tune “Min Soldat” 
(“My Soldier”), a Swedish equivalent to Marlene Dietrich’s “Lili Mar-
lene” or Vera Lynne’s “We’ll Meet Again”. During and in-between the 
exercises there are political debates, such as the Communist defense of 
the Soviet attack on Finland, while at the same time strong demands are 
heard for the deployment of Swedish soldiers to Finland. 
Recently, a Swedish journalist concluded that Någonstans i Sverige 
is to be seen as the way the radical generation of 1968 looked upon the 
war in the aftermath (Arnstad 2009: 159). Even though he does not pre-
sent any real arguments for his point of view, there are scenes support-
ing his conclusion. For instance, a mild critique of the lack of Swedish 
willingness to go to war is presented early on, since it is obvious that 
many soldiers had never stood on skis before. The harshness of the first 
war winter is turned into hope of returning home, something which takes 
a dramatic turn when Germany attacks Denmark and Norway. Other as-
pects of the war which are commented are, for instance, the internment 
camps for Communists, the soldiers’ difficulties in keeping their rela-
tionships with their women back home alive and the difficulties for the 
women on the home front.  
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But the main theme in the television series is not radical critique. 
The willingness to support the by then dominating perspective of the 
“small state realism”, meaning the realistic but not always consistent or 
morally righteous neutral policy which prevailed in Sweden between 
1939 and 1945, is obvious in a scene with the German troop transports 
by rail to Norway through Sweden. The latter, widely discussed subject 
in Swedish postwar debate, is highlighted when a Swedish officer with 
sympathies for Germany complains that it has come to his knowledge 
that Swedish soldiers are armed and pointing their weapons at the Ger-
mans. He is also upset that a Swedish guard “salutes” the German sol-
diers with his fist. The problematic fact that German soldiers were al-
lowed to travel on Swedish railways is neutralized when the command-
ing officer takes the soldier’s side, ironically saying that he hopes that 
the German soldiers did not shit down their pants in fear. This comment 
is very much in line with a dominating viewpoint during the first post-
war decades, claiming that Sweden, as a small country with a realistic 
policy towards the mighty Nazi Germany, in reality did not have any 
choice. This opinion is also supported in a regular reading of a well-
known photography, showing a Swedish soldier on high ground, point-
ing his rifle down at a large number of unarmed German soldiers. In 
fact, this picture was taken after the end of the war and depicts German 
prisoners of war, but has repeatedly been described as if it was from the 
early war years when the Swedes were in full control of the German 
transports (Liljefors/Zander 2003: 217–218).  
When Swedish territory really comes under attack in the television 
series, when the Germans are retreating through northern Finland, the 
matter is quickly resolved thanks to a Swedish trademark: calm, reason-
ing and convincing argumentation. The peace is of course welcomed, 
and the soldiers promise to meet again, but the comradeship of the war 
years does not last. 
 The television series was eagerly anticipated. The selection of first-
rate actors, ambitious attempts to recreate the environment of the war 
years as well as the use of period newsreel footage, which was inserted 
into the narrative, guaranteed quality. The Swedish soldiers could in a 
way be seen as a kind of counterpart to the elderly, confused and often 
inefficient grey guard in the British television comedy Dad’s Army 
(1971). In both cases the war is ever-present but the main characters sel-
dom or never come in direct contact with it. On the other hand, in the 
Swedish version the war is not only fun and games. It was, as writer Jan 
Olof Olsson and director Bengt Lagerkvist claimed, important to show 
the grey reality without any heroes and the contrast between the high 
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command and the common men, who despite hard conditions eventually 
became good soldiers (Adrup 1973; Björkman, 1973).  
When the first parts were broadcasted the men behind Någonstans i 
Sverige received support from none less than the commander-in-chief of 
the Swedish army. He, like many others, had nodded in agreement in 
front of the television set: this was the way it had been (Sörensson 
1973). Indeed, the television series became as popular as the novel and 
brought a breakthrough for several Swedish actors. In fact, Janne Carls-
son became – and still is – known as “Loffe”, the nickname of the sol-
dier he played in the television series. Någonstans i Sverige was, as di-
rector Lagerkvist emphasized, typically Swedish and he did not expect it 
to be exported to the neighboring countries since the Swedish neutrality 
policy had not always been regarded well there during the war (Nilsson 
1973). Critical voices were also heard in Sweden. The television series, 
they argued, showed a mendacious, fudged and even pathetic picture, 
which carefully avoided any potentially charged political conflicts in fa-
vor of humor. However, such views were the exception. One of the crit-
ics noted that he was in the minority, since he was surrounded by people 
competing to come forward and share their memories from the war years 
(Fagerström 1974; Nilsson 1974). 
An explanation for the popularity was that television series’ depic-
tion of the turbulent year 1939 seemed to reflect the economic crisis that 
was discussed in the early 1970s (Fabricius Hansen 1973). The author 
himself wrote that there were no reasons to look back upon the 1940s in 
a nostalgic way, but the popular culture of that time supported such a 
sentiment. And even though restraints and restrictions were much more 
severe then than during the early 1970s, it seemed to Jan Olof Olsson 
that a lot of Swedes thought that life was much easier back then, when 
the war was all around but not in our midst (Olsson 1974: 19, 44).  
The connections between the outbreak of the war and contemporary 
crisis were even more obvious in the film 1939, which had its premiere 
at the 50th anniversary in 1989. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
Sweden, then ruled by the Social Democrats, came under a lot of domes-
tic criticism, which included the (lack of) neutrality during the Second 
World War and the Cold War. In 1939, World War II from the Swedish 
horizon revolves around two women. The film deals mainly with their 
joys and worries, but it also includes Swedish military accidents, the 
German train transports through Sweden, the Norwegian resistance 
movement and conflicts between town and countryside. 
The Swedish exclusion from the war is not as unproblematic in 1939 
as in Någonstans i Sverige (Qvist 1990). During an exercise, one of the 
female characters says to her friend that it feels like there is not a war 
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going on, like the Swedes are trying to hide from evil, probably in vain 
in the long run. But even if the film mirrored the debate, the response 
was not positive. It was praised for credible period features, but the pre-
vailing verdicts were more in the style of “an anonymous harmless cav-
alcade” and “stacked anecdotes” better suited for television (Hjertén 
1989; Schildt 1989; Schiller 1989). One of the few defenders was the 
former leader of the conservative party, Ulf Adelsohn, who praised the 
film. Not only did it give a trustworthy view of the life in the Sweden of 
50 years ago, it also offered a perspective on how other countries looked 
upon Sweden during the war, which was useful to reflect upon since 
Sweden was about to negotiate membership in the European Union (Ad-
elsohn 1989). However, not too many wanted to take part in the history 
lesson, and 1939 became a financial fiasco. 
 
 
The her i tage of  Apr i l  9  
 
“Do you remember April 9, 1940”, the voice-over belonging to the re-
sistance fighter Flamman (The Flame) rhetorically asks several times in 
the Danish film Flammen og Citronen. The German occupation is prob-
ably the most important historic event in both Denmark and Norway – in 
competition with the national sovereignty 1905 in the Norwegian case – 
which also had a great impact in Sweden. In a comparison between the 
Scandinavian countries, the Danish historian Claus Bryld has empha-
sized the similarities in the postwar history writing. Although the differ-
ent war experiences, he finds an emphasis of Nazi-skeptical attitudes be-
fore, during and after the war (Bryld 2007: 34). Beyond the similarities, 
the German occupations left their mark on Danish and Norwegian socie-
ties. Therefore, World War II have had a different and more important 
position in postwar Denmark and Norway than in Sweden, which after 
1945 adopted neutrality “as a state of mind”, to quote the Swedish histo-
rian Alf W. Johansson (1997: 170).  
It did not take long before a “basic story” was prepared in Denmark 
and Norway. According to the Danish version, the Second World War 
and besættelsen (the German occupation of Denmark) were two distinct 
and different phenomena. Although Danes took part in the fighting on 
both German and Allied sides, it was the national events in Denmark 
which were the important ones. As in Norway, two periods became 
dominant: the first days of April and especially the German invasion on 
April 9, 1940, and the beginning of May 1945, when liberation came. 
Even though the enormously successful Danish television series Mata-
dor (1978) takes part during the years 1929–47, the events during the 
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war are of special significance in the story of the transition of Denmark 
from a class society to a welfare state, based upon egalitarian principles. 
Indeed, there are a few examples of Danish collaborators and traitors in 
Matador. Instead, it is either active or passive resistance against “them”, 
the vaguely portrayed German occupants, which is highlighted. Matador 
also follows a main theme in postwar Danish historical culture. The ef-
forts to save the Jews in October 1943 are seen as the ultimate proof that 
resistance was widespread (cf. Grubb/Hemmersam/Jørgensen 1995: 61–
72). There are numerous examples of this “provincial” way of discuss-
ing the war in Denmark as well as in Norway. It has maintained a strong 
position, mainly because both countries more or less indirectly belonged 
to the victorious Allied side (Bryld/Warring 1998: 41–42).  
More films set during the war were produced in Norway than in 
Denmark, but regardless of the fact that the war looked very different in 
the two countries the films showed strong thematic similarities. With 
production starting during the last year of the occupation, films on the 
resistance movement were produced at irregular intervals in Denmark, in 
some early cases with illegal sequences from the war years. It was em-
phasized that the early films were authentic, capturing sabotage opera-
tions, interviews with traitors and with scenes from underground weap-
ons factories. More often than not the “good” Danes were seen in the 
role of David, armed with old and primitive weapons, in a heroic, 
strong-willed and intelligent fight against the Goliath Nazi oppressors 
and their Danish allies. Many of the films illustrated the consensus view, 
which was the result of the compromise characterizing the composition 
of the liberation government of 1945. Moreover, from the 1970s on-
wards the focus on resistance fighters was supplemented with films on 
the rescue of the Danish Jews to Sweden in October 1943 (Stræde 2004: 
123–142; Voilladsen 2000: 5–27). The documentary Det gælder din fri-
hed (1946) was a mixture of “dramatic reality” and “lyrical moods”, 
wrote one of its supporters (Roos 1945: 16–17). Claiming authenticity 
and documentary truthfulness, this particular film did not exclude a 
sharp criticism of Danish foreign policy leading up to the outbreak of the 
war in 1940 and of the marked willingness among Danish politicians to 
cooperate with the German occupants. Therefore, the role of heroes was 
given only to the resistance fighters. Such a challenge to the consensus-
oriented historiography resulted, not surprisingly, in an emotional and 
passionate debate (Hemmersam/Nielsen 2009: 92–93). 
Another example of a film which caused Danish debate was the 
Swedish television drama documentary Jane Horney (1985). According 
to the official version told by the Danish resistance movement, Jane 
Horney had been a beautiful but dangerous Swedish woman based in 
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Copenhagen, who had to be eliminated because she was a German spy. 
The television series drew another picture. Jane had not reported to the 
Gestapo but to the Swedish police. Among the shady activities she 
learned about, the so called traitor’s route between Denmark and Swe-
den was the most compromising. The route was jointly operated by the 
non-Communist part of the Danish resistance movement and the Ger-
mans in order to prevent Communist activities in Denmark after the end 
of the war. It was the fact that Horney learned about this route which 
was the actual reason for her being killed by resistance fighters, the film 
producers claimed (Leopold 1985). That this was controversial history 
writing became obvious in connection with the 40th anniversary of the 
end of the war in 1985. The remaining resistance fighters attacked the 
film producers and the Danish television, whose management had 
bought the television series and planned to broadcast it. The opponents 
to Jane Horney did not succeed in banning the television series altogeth-
er, but due to their protests its broadcast in Denmark was postponed for 
a few weeks (Ahnfeldt-Mollerup 1993: 65–85).  
One resistance fighter, who twice had orders to kill Jane Horney but 
failed to do so, was Bent Farschou-Hvid. He and his closest companion 
Jørgen Haagen Schmidt were better known under their alias, Flammen 
(The Flame) and Citronen (The Citron). They are the protagonists in the 
latest example of the Danish resistance film genre, Flammen og Cit-
ronen from 2008, already mentioned above. Both of them are at the cen-
tre of the resistance group Holger Danske, named after a mythical Dan-
ish king who according to the legend is said to be sleeping but who is 
always prepared to wake up and save his country when it is under attack. 
The resistance fighters took part in a number of sabotage operations and 
executed a dozen Nazi-friendly Danes. However, in the process, Flam-
men and Citronen become involved in disputes within the resistance 
movement and are used to eliminate persons suspected of being able to 
testify against Danes in high positions about their collaboration with in-
fluential Germans. With this plot, the film actually kills two birds with 
one stone. On the one hand, the film audience becomes aware of the de-
bate which has been going on in Denmark during the last decade, in 
which criticism has been raised against some of the executions that re-
sistance fighters were responsible for. It is also, on the other hand, obvi-
ous that the two main characters in the film are tricked by the resistance 
leader – who has personal reasons for concealing some compromising 
dealings with the Germans – into shooting innocent Danes and Germans, 
thereby saving their heroic status both in Danish history and in Flammen 
og Citronen.  
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Like many other Second World War films from later years, the di-
rector and the writer of the script of Flammen og Citronen combine the 
more traditional war epic with elements of the Holocaust. In a key scene, 
the Flame’s girlfriend asks him why he kills Nazis. He answers that his 
father sent him to Germany in 1940. At the hotel where he worked was a 
Jewish woman who had escaped detection. One day she is exposed and 
half beaten to death. The Flame does not respond directly to the addi-
tional question whether the Jewish woman had been his girlfriend, but 
his reaction reveals that this was indeed the case. Her destiny during the 
Nazi persecutions gives him the reason to fight, if necessary to the death. 
And to the death it is. Both the Flame and the Citron perish during the 
resistance struggle, but their memory lives.  
Flammen og Citronen is the most expensive Danish film production 
to date. It also attracted a large number of moviegoers and led to inter-
views with old resistance fighters and increased attention for museum 
exhibitions about the occupation. The critics’ response was mixed, prais-
ing both director Ole Christian Madsen and the leading actors, Thure 
Lindhardt and Mads Mikkelsen, but also complaining that the film was 
closer to a gangster drama than a war film (Skotte 2008). Others found it 
to be a nuanced and somewhat critical perspective on the resistance 
movement, saying it was “sober and serious” (Iversen 2008). Some 
voices criticizing a lack of historical correctness were heard, but equally 
interesting was that the film attracted much interest but sparked little de-
bate, as a Swedish journalist noted (Söderberg 2008). 
April 9 was also an important date in Norway, especially with the 
fighting there during the ensuing weeks as well as the resistance struggle 
after the German army established control over the country. A famous 
part of the struggle was the commando raid against the German heavy 
water-plant, immortalized in the Norwegian film Kampen om tungtvan-
net (The Fight over the Heavy Water, 1948) and The Heroes of Telemark 
(1965), starring Kirk Douglas. Even if films, as other history production, 
mainly mediated a heroic version of resistance and unity, there were 
some exceptions such as I slik en natt (In Such a Night, 1958) and Over 
grensen (Across the Border, 1980), dealing with Norwegian collabora-
tion and anti-Semitism (Bruland 2004: 458–460; Vibe 1977: 117–126).  
The latest addition to the genre, Max Manus, however, looks more 
like the resistance classic Ni liv (Nine Lives, 1957). In both cases the fo-
cus is on the harsh life of the resistance fighter. A telling example is the 
German ship “Donau”. In the film, Manus and his comrades sink the 
ship because it is used to transport German soldiers. In modern Norwe-
gian history culture, “Donau” is also synonymous with the deportation 
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of the Norwegian Jews. Neither this, nor any other aspect of the Holo-
caust is included in the film. 
Max Manus is based on the life of the resistance fighter of the same 
name. In the accompanying book Max Manus. Film og virkelighet 
(Nordseth-Tiller/Moland 2008), it is obvious that the film team wanted 
to get as close to a traditional scholarly historical ideal, to “the true sto-
ry” as possible. However, film makers usually have to concede to other 
priorities. Instead of capturing the multitude and diversity of “the actual 
past”, they have concentrated on dramaturgical aspects, making the story 
efficient and trustworthy in its own right (Zander 2006a: 14–22).  
 
Picture 1: Scene from Max Manus 
Photo credit: Filmkameratene 
 
That the result was doomed to be subjective, no matter how many facts 
it was based on, was something that Norwegian film critic Jon Selås 
(2008) was aware of. With the exception of the soundtrack, he found 
that the film makers had handled this subjectivity in the best possible 
manner. The film could, he stated, function as a reminder to the Norwe-
gian youngsters of today of all the suffering and sacrifices that the Se-
cond World War generation had to put up with in order to create the 
modern Norway. Other critics concurred in the chorus of praise and pre-
dicted hundreds of thousands of Norwegian moviegoers. Among the 
supporters, some claimed that Max Manus was the best Norwegian film 
ever made, and that Aksel Hennie’s performance in the leading role was 
outstanding (Olsen 2008; Steinkjer 2008). Other critics, who were gen-
erally positive, raised critical remarks. The film, they said, was very tra-
ditional and conservative and would most probably raise a debate (Alver 
2008; Haddal 2008). In this they were right; Max Manus is one of the 
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most successful Norwegian films in decades. But not everyone liked 
what they saw. The writer Erling Fossen (2008) reacted against what he 
saw as yet another example of glorification of a resistance movement. 
His article met with harsh criticism, not least from former resistance 
fighters. One of them went so far as to call Fossen’s article an example 
of an argumentation typical of the Nasjonal Samling (Sønsteby 2008).  
When Max Manus had its Swedish premiere a few critics supported 
the Norwegian praise. Most were, however, less favorable. Too few 
choices had been made, it was claimed, and therefore too many persons, 
places and events had been introduced. Furthermore, the mixture of gen-
res was considered problematic: the film was a psychological drama, an 
action thriller and a romantic story rolled into one (Janson 2009). An-
other recurrent remark was that, more than anything, Max Manus re-
minded one of an adventure book for boys, painted in moral black and 
white and without psychological depth or historical complexity (Aghed 
2009; Andersson 2009: 51–52). 
 
 
Fi lms and World War I I  
 
In many synthesizing historical works of the past century there have 
been two recurring characteristics: war, terror and genocide on one hand, 
the emergence of welfare states and technological development on the 
other. Among the latter, film made a great breakthrough early on and has 
been one of the most, probably the most, influential history mediator 
during the last hundred years. One explanation for the filmic domination 
is that moving images are often pluralistic. Another is that films, more 
than other media, appeal to the onlookers’ emotions and their under-
standings of good and bad, white and black. In this process, the differ-
ences between imagination and reality, facts and fiction, tend to be 
blurred even while the films’ message can be clear, unambiguous and 
convincing. Thus, films and television series can – and have repeatedly 
done so – contribute to focusing on suppressed historical misdeeds, of-
ten when the history cultural conditions have been in favor of change. 
For instance, the television series Roots (1977) and Holocaust (1978), 
with their critical approach towards slavery and the Holocaust as well as 
the prolonged silence about these events, were produced after a decade 
of harsh criticism against traditional values and history writing in the af-
termath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal in the United 
States. But the opposite is also the case. Most moviegoers are reluctant 
to be challenged. Instead, they want that their beliefs to be confirmed as 
“truths”. The result is, in the worst-case scenario, that established histor-
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ical interpretations are cemented and cannot be supplemented or re-
placed. A consequence of this slow movement is that, in order to attract 
as many people as possible, commercial films must include values and 
interpretations which are as broad and inclusive as possible. If there are 
few incitements in the history culture at large to confronting prevailing 
interpretations, this will most likely produce few filmic efforts to chal-
lenge historical master narratives (Zander 2006a).  
 Among the Scandinavian films dealing with the Second World War, 
both reactions against prevailing perspectives and defenses of old-time 
national identities based on heroic fights against the German enemy are 
to be found. The Danish Flammen og Citronen is an example of a film 
which contains references to the Holocaust, a celebration of the re-
sistance movement but also critique of the same, all in one. The result 
was a commercially successful history product, not least because both 
contained justifications of what happened 1940–45 as well as challenges 
of “old truths” of this era. Max Manus is a more simplistic film, reflect-
ing reluctance in Norwegian public life to revaluate the national under-
standing of the Second World War.  
In contrast to Denmark and Norway, the public debate in Sweden 
about World War II have had its centre in public life, and not in the spe-
cialized historical journals (Bryld 2007: 44). Thus, the lack of Swedish 
films on the Second World War and the mostly negative Swedish re-
sponse to Max Manus does not mean that there is no interest in the years 
1939–45 in Sweden. Debates about World War II have raged in recent 
decades in all three Scandinavian countries. Strong criticism has been 
put forward against what have been perceived as simplifications and 
idealizations. But as the Swedish example shows, fundamental changes 
do not come easy. It is clear that concepts such as neutrality, resistance 
and domestic consensus are concepts that still hold huge attraction, and 
challenges against them still tend to result in backlashes or to inclusion 
of critical aspects – in order to neutralize them – into the dominating na-
tional story (Zander 2006b: 368–374). As long as this is the case, the 
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Historical Propaganda and New Popular 




In connection with an exhibition about Leni Riefenstahl in the period 
12th of September to 26th of October 2008, the Center for Studies of 
Holocaust and Religious Minorities (HL-senteret) in Oslo, Norway, tried 
out a teaching structure based on ideas of reflective historical conscious-
ness. The pedagogical intention was to let the students/pupils explore the 
historical embeddedness of propaganda and thereby analyze the con-
structions of insiders and outsiders within propaganda by deconstructing 
the images and texts. The concept of historical consciousness and its 
three different levels are elaborated in Körber’s essay in this volume. 
The target group was 14 to 16 years pupils from the Oslo area who visit-
ed the centre for one full day.1 
The pedagogical goal was to enable the pupils to work in different 
ways of relating to history as developed through the concept of historical 
consciousness by Jörn Rüsen and others. We attempted to design the as-
signments given to the pupils in such a way that they would work either 
on the past, on history or on the present/the future – in either a recon-
structive or deconstructive mode. These concepts will be presented in 
depth later on.  
 
1  In addition to the visits of pupils at the centre, we also organized two 
teacher training courses – one for teachers with pupils aged 13-16 and one 
for teachers with students aged 16-19. The last-mentioned course was ar-
ranged so that there was a research conference the following day. The aim 
of these courses was how to use popular cultural expressions in teaching 
history, arts, Norwegian language, and social sciences. 
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In this article I will describe the pupils’ stay at the centre and how 
the day was organized, thereafter the background of this concept, and at 
the end I will present my evaluation of the pedagogical program through 
an analysis of the pupils’ presentations.  
The present study is an evaluation of how the pupils related to and 
learnt from history. Our goal was to use the specific genre of pro-
paganda and narrative features in general as a prism for the pupils to ex-
plore the past. The narrative features explored were the differences be-
tween an active in-group (“us”) and a passive or threatening out-group 
(“the others”). The final products presented by the pupils served as the 
basis for the evaluation of whether they were able to create and com-
municate their understanding of the past through analysis of narrative 
structures.  
This article will be looking at the ways in which the students inter-
preted narratives of the past and discuss them to decide to what degree 
the teaching exercise was successful.  
 
 
The program of the visi t  
 
The exhibition The Myth of Leni Riefenstahl was shown partly at HL-
senteret and partly at the Norwegian Film Institute for a brief period of 
time during autumn 2008 in Oslo, Norway. The HL-senteret entered into 
a partnership with the municipality of Oslo in order to develop a frame-
work which could convey the content of the exhibition to 14-16-year old 
pupils. This exhibition was the first one ever made on the theme of Leni 
Riefenstahl’s life and productions which was not controlled by Leni 
Riefenstahl herself. 
In practical terms, the visit of the pupils was organized as follows: 
First the pupils were guided through the permanent exhibition of HL-
senteret and the Leni Riefenstahl-exhibition. During this guided tour, the 
pupils were shown examples of propaganda and the concept of popular 
culture was introduced.2 Here we would use posters showing either the 
 
2  The notion of “popular culture” also has its historicity (as does the notion 
of propaganda). We did not try to establish any definition of “popular cul-
ture” with the pupils. Rather, we tried to provide examples and explain 
though these examples. As for the term itself, it is obviously meant as an 
opposition to “elite culture” or “high culture”. I would here suggest a 
sketchy definition that relates the term “popular culture” to 1) the rate of 
reproduction of the phenomenon, 2) consequently to the lack of dispute 
amongst its public as to what is original and what is a copy, 3) the diffu-
sion, and 4) its ephemerality – it is not intended to last even though (or be-
cause) it is spread everywhere. Propaganda is addressed later.  
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French General Dreyfus portrayed as a snake and traitor as an example 
of propaganda, or German children’s books depicting Jews as sub-
humans or as a threat to the pure people’s community as examples of 
both popular culture and propaganda in popular culture. In order to place 
the exhibition in a historical narrative and to help the pupils in their 
work on and in the exhibition, we gave a 45-minute lecture introducing 
the distinction between “us and the others”. Here, we used Tintin in 
Congo (1931/1946), Nazi election posters and propaganda posters, Sta-
lin area posters, Khmer Rouge posters, and selections from Donald 
Duck, as well as Rambo and 24. Examples which all clearly implied who 
or what is represented as the ideal and who is seen as subordinate. These 
examples and the tour in the exhibitions made up the basis for our 
presentation. Here we addressed the issue of how the assumed recipients 
of the message where made to identify themselves with the producers of 
the different pieces of propaganda. The need to create a sharp division 
between “us and the others” was also elaborated towards finding some 
propagandistic-political message – and this was in turn used in the exer-
cises.  
There are huge differences between the language of medial expres-
sions in the 1930s and 40s and today. In displaying examples of the 
formal rules of expression within that particular historical period, we 
aimed at liberating the (Nazi) content from the typical aesthetics of the 
period where the fit male was used as a symbol of the fit nation or the 
healthy people. In this way we hoped to pave the way for an easier ac-
cess to the historical topic by removing some of the pupils’ preconcep-
tions about Nazi Germany as some a-historical entity. Thus we decided 
to show the cultural context in which Nazi aesthetics existed. This was 
done by showing Communist posters and posters for the Maccabiah 
Games in the 1930s.3 
The integration of modern popular cultural expressions – and espe-
cially examples from movies, videogames, and TV after 9/11 – made up 
large parts of the continuing lecture. The examples were used to make 
the students discover what we mean with “propaganda and (new) popu-
lar culture”. 
In the presentation we drew upon classical narrative competence, i.e. 
who is the narrator, how are the different protagonists portrayed in the 
movie (and how are their opponents portrayed). Our main aim was to 
investigate how the others are depicted in modern popular cultural ex-
pressions and which – or how cultural codes are used in order to render 
 
3  The Maccabiah Games are an international Jewish athletic event similar to 




(violent and degrading) action legitimate. The pupils were shown film 
clips from Rambo 3 and 24. In Rambo 3, the US soldier does not suc-
cumb to torture, while Jack Bauer in 24 is a torturer himself committing 
these acts in order to save US citizens. In Rambo 3 the bad guys are us-
ing torture – and it does not work, while in 24 it is the good guys who 
are the tortureres – and it works! The obvious points are: To show the 
change in the means the good guys resort to; to show that torture is a 
crime; to show that in propaganda the hero is never wrong; and that in 
popular culture it is the main protagonist’s moral dilemmas that are ad-
dressed – there are seldom shifts in narrative perspective which would 




After this elaborate introduction the pupils were given exercises on three 
different levels. 
1. Analysis of historical propaganda from the Mythos Leni Riefenstahl 
and the permanent exhibition. 
2. The history of Leni Riefenstahl; create a biography where she is 
good and another where she is evil.  
3. Ironic production of propaganda for contemporary use. 
 
The students could use different types of media in working towards their 
presentation. They could draw posters; make movies or radio; create a 
PowerPoint, a collection of pictures; or other ICT-based presentations. 
The pupils’ presentations were held in a plenary session with their 
teachers present. The main objective here was to see how they interpret-
ed the past, and ask them questions concerning their products relating to 
both the past, history, or present/future and following up both the recon-
structive and the deconstructive mode and to the genre. Below I shall 
elaborate on the didactical concepts and ideas forming the background 
for the exercises presented here.  
 
 
Pedagogical  background and ideas 
 
The construction of this didactic framework took as a point of departure 
the insight that “research has shown that the pupils’ historical con-
sciousness is not primarily created at school, but rather at home through 
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contact with movies, books, and games”.4 We accepted this insight and 
started looking at popular movies, TV-series, cartoons, computer games 
in order to find out what the products forming and influencing the pupils 
might be. We then proceeded to collect examples from different popular 
cultural forms of expression which could make up the context of propa-
ganda in and through the media in which we wanted to present the work 
of Leni Riefenstahl.  
Furthermore, we followed Jörn Rüsen’s understanding of what con-
stitutes an historical narrative: 
 
“The general competence concerned with ‘making sense of the past’ can be 
divided into three sub-competencies. These can best be defined in terms of the 
three elements which together constitute a historical narrative: form, content 
and function. With respect to the content, one can speak of the competence for 
‘historical experience;’ with respect to form, the ‘competence for historical in-
terpretation;’ and with respect to the function, the ‘competence for historical 
orientation.’” (Rüsen 2004: 69). 
 
The lecture and the tour of the exhibitions were thought of as moving 
towards content and form of the historical narratives. There could have 
been alternatives to such a lecture, i.e. that the pupils worked on the top-
ics of propaganda in and through the media before arriving at the centre, 
but from experience we know that this can be a great threat to the overall 
success if the preparations are not carried out. Since the main objective 
in our work with the pupils was concerned with historical orientation 
and consequently with contemporary and future orientation, we wanted 
to leave it to the pupils to discover the functioning of propaganda 
through their own work in the exhibitions and to discuss the functions 
further during and after the pupils’ presentations of their exercises. 
Therefore the main focus in the lecture needed to be questions of form 
and content in order to leave the function to be discovered by the pupils. 
The different exercises correspond to work on three different levels: 
Past, History and Present/Future (see also Körber’s contribution in this 
volume where the six-field matrix is developed). We tried to translate 
the different foci from Körber’s didactical insights into assignments. Our 
choices when it comes to such a translation were: 
 
4  Original: “Forskning har visat att elevers historiemedvetande i första hand 
inte skapas i skolan, utan i hemmet genom kontakt med filmer, böcker och 
spel.” (Hägelmark & Johansson 2007: 17). 
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Table 1: The exercises analyzed from the theoretical methodical 
competences 
Exercise Historical  
orientation 
Re-construction De-construction
1. Analysis of 
historical propa-











Go through the 
narrative of the 
exhibitions with 
the aim to identi-
fy historical 
propaganda. 
2. The history of 
Leni Riefenstahl 
– create one bi-
ography where 
she is good and 
another where 
she is evil. 
Focus “History” 
Transforming past 




enstahl is viewed 













and history to the 








are the cultural 
codes of today 




These are specifications of the ways of what Körber calls methodical 
competence which “spans from the perception of any uncertainty refer-
ring to time via the activation of earlier insights, concepts and categories 
to the start of the methodically controlled process of re- and de-
construction” (Körber in this volume). 
With “focus” in the table above, we try to emphasize the specific 
temporality that the students were supposed to work on. As should be 
obvious, the past is connected to the future in history (and vice versa) 
rooted in the present. All three levels involve the full employment of 
historical learning, but the pupils will have their assignment and conse-
quently their presentation tied to past, history and present/future as ana-
lytical categories. There are no differences in value in the sense that one 
or each of these is more or less difficult than the others, but during the 
presentations it will be clear whether or not the pupils are aware of using 
mainly reconstruction or deconstruction.  
One small note on why we set some clear limits as to how they could 
work: It is vital in our understanding of history and in the pedagogical 
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ideas underlying the work of historical consciousness that one learns to 
ask questions based on the historical material that one encounters. This 
is what is called inquiring competence. Inquiring competence “spans 
from the perception of any uncertainty referring to time via the activa-
tion of earlier insights, concepts and categories to the start of the me-
thodically controlled process of re- and de-construction” (Körber in this 
volume).  
In order to stimulate this competence we asked open-ended ques-
tions, asked them to make descriptions, or asked them to produce some 
material themselves.  
 
 
Popular  culture,  values,  and propaganda 
 
When it came to the contents of popular cultural expressions, it was of 
great importance to show how the cultural stereotypes and hierarchies 
were represented. Here it was significant to show the transfer from his-
torical examples to contemporary ones. In using the dichotomy between 
“us” and “the others”, we postulated continuity in reading and interpret-
ing history. This is the level of historical consciousness described as 
traditional by Rüsen: “Traditional orientations present the temporal 
whole which makes the past significant and relevant to present actuality 
and its future extension as a continuity of obligatory cultural- and life-
patterns over time.” (Rüsen 2004: 71). Here the permanence of history 
was explored. As explained above we used cartoons, video games and 
movies/TV-series, in order to stress how aesthetical forms always stand 
in a relation to the society in which they are created. We presented histo-
ry as tradition, but in a critical way where the pupils were shown how 
aesthetic forms and elements formed a link between popular culture and 
ideology. In order to make this link clear and visible we had to show 
how the content of one such expression had changed with the ruling ide-
ology. This is then an introduction to what Rüsen calls exemplary histor-
ical thought and it “discloses the morality of a value or a value system 
culturally embodied in social and personal life by proving its generality” 
(Rüsen 2004: 74).  
In general the project “Historical Propaganda and New Popular Cul-
tural Medial Expressions” can be said to operate within the exemplary 
type of historical consciousness, but within a critical variation as speci-
fied above.  
Our concept of propaganda needs some explanation. In the debate of 
how to understand propaganda, our heuristic definition will problema-
tize the focus on the intent of the sender – we will follow the definition 
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applied by Gulseth from Jowett and O’Donell to the Rwandan genocide: 
“Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (2004: 27). The reason 
for such a modification is that since our material was made up of popu-
lar cultural expressions such as movies, games and comics, we would 
end up as conspiracy theorists if we tried to frame some sort of intent or 
premeditation. In our work with the pupils we aimed to explore the cul-
tural codes within contemporary popular cultural expressions and the 
implicit values. The point was to leave the exploration of possible inten-
tion to the pupils (and to be approached in the discussion during presen-
tation). Our goal was to make the pupils aware of how they themselves 
take contemporary medial expressions for granted by reflecting contem-
porary expressions in the light of historical expressions. 
We aimed at challenging the pupils to try to orientate themselves in 
history through our introduction on content and form. This orientation 
would then consist in an uncovering of the interdependence between 
content and form, which would constitute a very high degree of histori-
cal learning and understanding – in the scholarly sense. In relation to 
propaganda, this would then consist in exploring the historicity (recon-
struction) by comparing with other objects in the specific culture to 
grasp the issues taken for granted in that cultural sphere (deconstruc-
tion). Here we operate with a cultural relativist notion of truth. Such a 
truth notion created difficulties for the pupils when it came to making 
ethical as well as historical orientations, as I will show later. This under-
standing of truth is tightly connected to our modified notion of propa-
ganda since the final un-covering of the object will be the equivalent to 
the annihilation of the object and thereby any question of intent will also 
evaporate since the intention must be seen to be the constitutive factor of 
the message that is contained within the expression. 5 
This understanding of truth is akin to what Rüsen is aiming at in the 
genetic type of historical consciousness where the temporality of past 
events stops being a threat to us, but becomes a potential for future 
choices (Rüsen 2004: 78-80). This associative characteristic of a dia-
chronically self-reflectedness has also its counterpart in orientation to-
wards contemporary analysis for future choices, as is elaborated else-
where by Rüsen: 
 
 
5  It follows from this that propaganda is then the claim that its au-
thors/producers are “wrenching what is hidden from out of hiddenness”, as 
Heidegger would phrase it (Heidegger 2002: 100). 
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“Synchronically identity integrates the different relationships of an individual 
or collective ‘self’ to others into a unit in which the self is aware of itself. It 
‘reflects’ (bends back) the relationship to others back to the self thus furnish-
ing an internal unity in the variety of its manifold relations to others. Dia-
chronically this self-reflectedness is related to the change of the self and its re-
lationships to others in the course of time. In this respect identity is a concept 
of continuity of the sameness of oneself in the changes that every person and 
group have to undergo in the course of their lives” (Rüsen 2007: 38). 
 
In addition there is the issue of “identity concealment”, i.e. that the 
“propagandists do not want their identity to be known” (Jowett & 
O’Donnell 2006: 44), which creates further challenges when it comes to 
disclosing the intentions of the sender.  
The main scope of the project in teaching about propaganda is then 
to make the pupils aware about how past popular culture reflected and 
recreated the life conditions of that time and thereby making them able 
to see how their life conditions here and now are both reflected in and 




The pupi ls’  presentat ions 
 
Here I shall move from the project’s general background towards what 
the pupils themselves did and presented. There are of course different 
ways of measuring success. And when it comes to exercise no. 3 – pro-
ducing ironic propaganda – it is not easy for a group of pupils to produce 
both concepts and results in 90-120 minutes. On the other hand, these 
are challenges inherent in educating through exhibitions with limited 
time at our disposal. In addition, we had developed a program for 15-16 
years old pupils, but the main age groups present were 13 -14 years old. 
The first exercise: “Analysis of historical propaganda from the My-
thos Leni Riefenstahl and the permanent exhibition” could be solved in 
many different ways, but the majority of the pupils included Nazi propa-
ganda from the 1935 exhibition “Wunder des Lebens”, brutal treatment 
of Jews and pictures of Adolf Hitler. It was a tendency to look for the 
strongest and most emotionally charged objects and not so much Nazi 
propaganda as such. This suggests that the focus “Past” is a difficult one 
for 14-year olds. Some had a good grasp on the difference between 
(more or less intended) documentation and propaganda, but the majority 
analyzed rather the objects in terms of “us” and “the other” than through 
the intention of the artists of producing propaganda. This insistence on 
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using the traditional level of historical consciousness can be seen as a re-
sult of our introduction. Instead of looking for the genre of propaganda, 
they looked for the continuity in exclusion – regardless of form. The pu-
pils had problems in entering into both a reconstructive (“Establish how 
propaganda was used”) and a deconstructive (“Go through the narrative 
of the exhibitions with the aim to identify propaganda”) mode with fo-
cus on the past. With reference to Karlsson’s contribution in this vol-
ume, we could interpret these findings to different uses of history. The 
pupils got very interested in the distinctions made by propaganda, and 
thus related to the images in either a moral or an existential manner. The 
scholarly use of history thus veined into the background. 
The second exercise: “The history of Leni Riefenstahl – create one 
biography where she is good and another where she is evil” begs the 
question on what is good and what is evil. The following oppositional 
pairs were the main findings: 
• She supported Hitler because she believed in him (good), but lied 
later about her own involvement (evil). 
• She was a Nazi (evil), but a great artist (good). 
• She supported Hitler and was a fan of an ideal body (evil), but a 
good photographer (good). 
• Ruthless pursuing her own career (evil), but a good director (good). 
• Worked for the Nazis (evil), skilful in marketing herself (good). 
• Showed that the Nuba where strong people (good), but helped to 
stage Hitler’s rallies (evil). 
 
These different pairs are to some extent contradictory. Although, in the 
following dialogue with the pupils we discovered and elaborated on how 
history can be interpreted in different manners and how, in the case of 
Leni Riefenstahl, it actually is not easy to pinpoint exactly where her le-
gal and moral responsibility for Nazi atrocities lies. On this basis one 
could argue that we had some success in working within the deconstruc-
tive mode (“Establish how different stories present specific narratives.”), 
but when it came to the work of the pupils within the reconstructive 
mode (“Create a coherent narrative where Leni Riefenstahl is viewed in 
relation to her time.”) they often created an epithet “Nazi” outside of 
time and space and with “evil” as the direct extension. There were of 
course some exceptions to this – “She supported Hitler because she be-
lieved in him”.  
This exercise can be said to constitute an intentional use of history as 
a source for morality (see Karlsson in this volume for the different uses 
of history) 
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For the third exercise, “Ironic production of propaganda for contem-
porary use”, some groups chose to make films, others posters (drawn or 
ICT-produced) while a last category made illustrated stories in Power-
Point. Many of the propaganda products centered around the dilemma 
concerning how cool it is to be a part of the crowd and how being part of 
a crowd is “un-cool”, which is very much a part of youth culture; others 
on how “un-cool” it is to be stupid and how stupid it is to be cool; others 
again touched upon commercials and their way of promoting lifestyles. 
One group worked on sexual preferences. No one made political propa-
ganda, except in a broader sense of commenting upon societal trends 
that they dislike. Again the deconstructive part (“Analyze what are the 
cultural codes of today that are used to influence choices.”) of the exer-
cise was the one preferred by most groups. Maybe if we had changed 
our reconstructive understanding of this specific historical orientation to 
“Establish how propaganda is used in the contemporary cultural cli-
mate” we would have been closer to both what the pupils actually pro-
duced and what I believe we actually wanted to carry out, which was to 
make the pupils reflect on what they sense are the codes in popular cul-
ture used both in advertizing and propaganda.  
Both in exercise 1 and 2 the historicizing around propaganda and 
Leni Riefenstahl did not fully live up to our attempt to create a space for 
historical orientation, since most of the solutions to exercise 1 were just 
pictures of victims or perpetrators from World War II. Combined with 
the ahistorical uses of the word “Nazi” this suggests that there might be 
more suitable topics than the Holocaust for opening up for historical ex-
periences: The relation between some words like the Holocaust, Nazism 
and the phenomena they might be associated with can be understood as 
moving away from the phenomenal to the noumenal sphere, or univer-
salizing the narratives about the Holocaust (Kverndokk 2007: 254-262). 
Hereby the specific historical crimes and atrocities are attached to a 
moral universe expressed in a battle between good and evil, and this bat-
tle becomes the focus of attention – instead of the mediums through 
which these evil persons and institutions conveyed their message and 
how this message refers to the past. The solution to these dilemmas 
might be found in distinguishing between different uses of history. Exer-
cises tied to propaganda are related to the ideological use of history 
while our dichotomy between “us” and “the others” was presented by us 
as a historical continuity. From the start we put too much emphasis on 
the structure in the communicative situation and too little on the mean-
ing in the communication – we stressed the structural similarities be-
tween Rambo 3 and 24 without being able to go deeper into the genres 
or investigate the particularities of each phenomenon. Such a linear and 
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traditional presentation of history might interfere with the uses of histo-
ry. 
Furthermore it was difficult to see how the pupils approached the 
past as different from the present in all 3 exercises.  
In hindsight I would argue that we should have presented some form 
of communicative semiotic model resembling Greimas’ actantial model 
where there is focus on sender, message, receiver, but also on the role of 
helpers and adversaries, in order to open up for further analysis of prop-
aganda. Hereby we could have focused on the axis of transmission 
where all types of communication consists of three parts (sender, mes-
sage, and receiver) and on how these should be analyzed separately and 
in relation to each other. And further, we wanted the pupils to try to ori-
entate themselves after having received a presentation focusing on the 
content and the form of propaganda. 
However, in their deconstructive efforts the pupils demonstrated 
their capability of relating the content of a narrative to its form, especial-
ly when pointing to some of the clear dilemmas in youth culture. This 
capability is fairly advanced and shows that they have an understanding 
of society of which they are a part that is nonreductionist. The diachron-
ically self-reflectedness was not used on a meta-reflective level by the 
majority of the pupils – which in my opinion depends on the material 
presented to them, still they were fully capable of showing a synchroni-
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The Culture of Memory in the  




The purpose of this article is to present an empirical study of the culture 
of memory of World War II and the German occupation of Denmark 
within the “grandchildren generation” in Denmark. This generation’s 
culture of memory presents both continuities reaching back to the na-
tional master narrative established in the immediate postwar years, and 
recent developments allowing new perspectives and narratives to come 
into view, without totally wiping out older ones. In the following, I shall 
characterize the culture of memory of the third generation using exam-
ples from one individual interview and one group interview with mem-
bers of this generation in pointing to the characteristics of international-
ization, victimization, universalization and identification. Finally I will 
outline some didactical possibilities and challenges posed by the uses of 
history of WWII presented within this generation’s culture of memory.  
The findings to be presented in this article stems from the Danish 
part of the European research project “Traditions of Historical Con-
sciousness” (Welzer 2007). The project was a follow-up on a German 
study on the transition of memory of the Third Reich within German 
families in three generations (Welzer et al. 2002). Within the same 
framework, the European project offered a comparative perspective on 
the traditions of historical consciousness within the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Denmark, Serbia, Croatia and Switzerland (Welzer et al. 2007). 
From 2002 to 2005, 20 Danish families in three generations were inter-
viewed on the transition of memories of the German Occupation and 
WWII within these families. Furthermore, a series of focus group inter-
views with members from the same generation were conducted to follow 
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the exchanges on WWII amongst representatives from the same genera-
tions. In this article I shall be presenting empirical examples from an in-
dividual as well as a focus group interview in order to exemplify some 
of the findings, which were developed on the basis of the Danish materi-
al as well as comparisons within the overall project. 
The analytical concepts of “the culture of memory” and “uses of the 
past” to be used throughout the article are to a certain extent chosen in 
line with the argumentation put forward by Karlsson in his discussion on 
the concept of historical consciousness and the analytical operationaliza-
tion into “historical culture” and “uses of history” (See the contribution 
by Karlsson). Still, within this specific context I find “culture of 
memory” more appropriate, as the concept of memory alludes more to 
the private, un-official ways of using and presenting the past than does 
the concept of the culture of history. Moreover, memories as well as his-
torical consciousness were the concepts used within the research project 
as a whole. 
 
 
World War I I  –  An image of  s ignif icance 
 
As an introduction to the subject matter I will present an extract from a 
focus group interview conducted with young people born after 1975. 
Whereas the individual interviews conducted in the study took a national 
starting point, the focus group interviews were prompted by five photo-
graphs mainly depicting scenes to be interpreted as relating to WWII 
and, to a lesser extent, to the occupation of Denmark.1 In the interview, 
the participants were asked to relate to the photographs, an opening 
which raised a discussion amongst them on which pictures they found 
most significant in relation to their historical consciousness of WWII: 
 
Karina: THAT picture, number three. That’s really the sort of picture where 
you think of World War II, of a concentration camp. [...] At least that’s what I 
 
1  The five photographs depicted “familiar” scenes from WWII, but were not 
known icons. As such, the photographs had a certain vagueness allowing 
for the associations of the interviewees to place the pictures into the histor-
ical context. The pictures were: 1: Inhabitants fleeing during the last days 
of fighting in Berlin, 1945. 2. Stukas taking off from an airstrip in the So-
viet Union 1941. 3: A starved Soviet prisoner of war in the camp Stalag 
326 1941/42. 4. A pile of corpses in a barren landscape showing “The 
church yard” of the satellite camp Adabasch, 1941. 5. A Danish Woman 
who had tried to use a German uniform as disguise, but was discovered 
and dragged through the crowds in the streets by two armed resistance 
fighters with armbands.  
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think of, when I think of World War II, then I think of the terrible things that 
happened, of the concentration camps. And that is such a [...] [apologizing 
giggle] typical picture showing such a starved man. [...] 
Mikkel: I do not think of it in quite the same way. [...] It’s not like, when I say 
World War II, that’s not what I think of first. [...] Then I’m more into war/ 
Louise: Like picture number two. 
Mikkel: Yeah, pictures with war [scenes] and so on. 
Karina: Airplanes.  
Louise: I think number two is a bit ‘Pearl Harbor-like’ [the movie].  
Mikkel: Actually, I don’t think about it [the Holocaust]/ I mean, I know it’s 
there, when I think about it for longer, but when I think of World War II it’s 
war and airplanes.  
 
This brief discussion addresses three features characterizing the culture 
of memory which will be dealt with in this article. Firstly, it shows the 
workings of the iconography of the culture of memory where different 
icons link up to different narratives of WWII. 
The narratives may be related in some ways, but to a certain extent 
they also lead separate lives within the culture of memory. Significant 
icons are images of the Holocaust, of battlefield scenes, of Hitler and 
National Socialism, but also icons relating to the national narrative of 
the German occupation in Denmark like rationing cards, curfews, re-
sistance. Secondly, I shall later be making a point concerning Karina’s 
pause and apologizing giggle when referring to the picture of the starved 
man as “typical”. It is my assertion that this giggle is a gateway to the 
emotional landscape, which this generation moves into when touching 
upon the memory of the Holocaust. In that sense, the Holocaust takes up 
a specific and significant place within the culture of memory still it also 
exposes some more general features related to the quest for identifica-
tion, but also the tendency of universalization in the use of history. Fi-
nally, we see how Louise refers to the movie “Pearl Harbour” in her at-
tempt to interpret the significance and meaning of the historical material 
on the table. This points to the ways in which this generation draws on 
very different sources and references when dealing with the past, and 
more-over how they use the past in different ways and for different ends.  
 
 
A long- l ived master  narrat ive  of  the Occupation 
 
Below I have chosen to let 19-year-old Amalie speak on behalf of her 
generation, as I intend to use the individual interview with her as an ex-
ample of how the culture of memory can be said to work within the third 
generation. In the interview quoted above, the imaginary prompted by 
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the photos was mainly focusing on WWII and the Holocaust in an inter-
national perspective, whereas the individual interviews were designed to 
take the national context of the war as their starting point by asking what 
the grandparents had told about the occupation of Denmark:  
 
Amalie: He (Her grandfather. HB) did tell about the air raid shelters and that 
you sometimes could hear planes roaring in the sky and things like that. And 
something about the girls who slept with the soldiers, some Danish girls who 
had relations with the soldiers and had their hair cut off. It has probably al-
ways been those kinds of things that have interested me [...]. And people who 
said they were on the Danish side, but who were actually on the side of the 
Germans. Traitors, they were called. 
Helle: What do you think about how it was for people, if you should put it in 
you own words? 
Amalie: Then I think that the solidarity was probably strong in some ways. So 
even though it was negative, it probably also brought people closer together. 
And, well, one lived in insecurity, and that must have been really awful, but in 
another way it has/ I see people as very close. That people were brought to-
gether. That is how it is with hard times and times of distress.  
 
Amalie gives a very condensed and conventional version of what Bryld 
and Warring frame as the master narrative of the Danish occupation 
(Bryld/Warring 1998: 55 pp.). This narrative puts forward an exclusive-
ly national perspective and offers a mythically charged image of a small 
nation, occupied by a greater enemy, but at the same time united in ei-
ther open, military resistance or quiet support by the whole population. 
Within this narrative, the policy of collaboration is regarded as a prere-
quisite for protecting the people while at the same time opening up other 
ways in which resistance could be expressed. Furthermore, a very clear 
line is drawn between the united Danish people on “the right side” and 
groups on “the wrong side” such as Danish members of the National So-
cialist Party, volunteers on the Eastern Front, collaborators, girls with 
romantic relationships with German soldiers and their children. These 
individuals or groups are excluded from the national community of re-
sistance, and as such did not only experience different forms and degrees 
of social stigmatization and exclusion in the aftermath of the war, but 
are also excluded from the national master narrative. In a comparative 
perspective it is interesting and relevant to point to the resemblance be-
tween the Danish and the Norwegian master narrative (Eriksen 1995) as 
well as the way it functions within the third generation’s culture of 
memory (Lenz 2007). 
The national master narrative functions as a main interpretative 
framework within the third generation, not least in understanding and 
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narrativizing the memories of the grandparents. This can be seen in the 
quote where Amalie refers to how the memories of grandfather “fit” the 
overall national narrative. In this way the national and the “local” mem-
ories of the family are closely woven together, as the master narrative 
exerts a homogenizing effect on the culture of memory in the sense that 
stories or memories differing from this narrative are either not told or 
overheard because they do not fit this interpretative framework. Moreo-
ver, this quote points to a pattern of relating to the Occupation as a time 
of hardship, but also of solidarity and a sense of community, which is 
seen as the opposite to the stressful and individualistic conditions of to-
day. The Occupation is a period when the choices to be made where few 
and simple – and where people stood together: “Sometimes I long for 
that time even if I never lived it myself”, as a young woman says. Even 
when the grandchildren take an ironic stance towards their romanticizing 
view on the Occupation, they still draw on the mythical interpretation of 
the master narrative, where the Occupation both becomes a signifier for 




New narrat ives –  new perspectives 
 
In the Danish culture of memory the national master narrative has exist-
ed alongside, but often not related to the international history of WWII 
or, as pointed out by Karlsson, the international events is seen from a na-
tional perspective. This pattern can still be found within the younger 
generation, but is also slightly in the process of reconfiguration: Firstly, 
the exclusively national perspective is often related to or compared with 
the international context of WWII, and secondly, WWII and especially 
the Holocaust is gaining influence as a point of reference. This tendency 
shows itself in the individual interviews prompted by a national context, 
as these interviews very often include comparisons as “it was much 
worse elsewhere” and that the Norwegians or the German people suf-
fered much more. In the case of Amalie, the international perspective 
emerges in the shape of narratives of the Third Reich, the Holocaust and 
the role of the German people. Amalie expresses the necessity of pre-
serving the material remnants of the concentration camps in order to be 
able to confront people claiming that the Holocaust never happened. 
Furthermore, she very explicitly reflects on how her understanding of 
the situation of the German people was reconfigured when reading the 
novel “Lunch with Mussolini”. She stresses how reading this novel gave 
her a new perspective on the living conditions of a German family dur-
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ing the Third Reich, leading her to a new understanding of how the 
Third Reich could come about. Amalie highlights the importance of see-
ing history “from both sides” as opposed to her experience of history 
teaching in school where the history was only seen from “the perspec-
tive of the Jews”: Which is fair enough, but a lot of the other stuff is 
lacking, I think. It’s only now after reading this book that I’ve [...] You 
always knew that they didn’t have freedom of expression, that they were 
deceived. But now I have had it put into words how it was. I hadn’t read 
about it before, I hadn’t been able to feel it myself. And that’s what you 
can do, when you read fiction or see a movie. Applying the terminology 
on reflective historical thinking presented by Andreas Körber in this 
volume, one might say that Amalie reconstructs the narrative of the 
Third Reich and the Holocaust when she appropriates this new perspec-
tive into her understanding. At the same time she starts asking more de-
constructive questions when she reflects on how the history of WWII 
and the Holocaust has previously been presented to her. In the reorienta-
tion of her historical consciousness on the Third Reich, the case of Ama-
lie exemplifies yet another two features of the memory culture of her 
generation. Firstly, she draws a moral or at least political connection be-
tween the past and the present by using the history of the Third Reich to 
point to the importance of a democratic government allowing free 
speech and discussion, seeing the lack of free speech as one of the pre-
conditions for the Third Reich (See Karlsson’s article in this volume for 
elaborations on this “politico-pedagogical” use of history).  
Secondly, this reorientation leads her to positioning the German 
people as victims – not only perpetrators – of the war. With this move, 
Amalie points towards a very significant feature in the memory culture 
of the third generation. Here it seems that inclusion into a history of 
WWII relates strongly to being assigned a role as a victim. In a way this 
victimization means that an individual or a group can be freed from guilt 
and become legitimate subjects of history, but at the same time they be-
come objects of history as their role as active agents is transformed into 
rather passive victims (See Ahonen in this volume for a discussion of 
victimization within the culture memory). Within the interview material 
as a whole, this change of position and/or the process of being rewritten 
into history, is to some extent shared by the German people; the girls 
who had romantic and sexual relationships with German soldiers, Dan-
ish volunteers on the eastern front, as well as the German soldiers con-
stituting the occupying power in Denmark2.  
 
2  This tendency may partly be due to the fact that since the mid 1990s new 
historical research has been conducted on the history of some of these 
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Relating the case of Amalie to the general description of the culture 
of memory of her generation, I would say that her case shows the signif-
icance and perseverance of the national master narrative in structuring 
what seems relevant in history and what meaning to gather from this pe-
riod. Still, she also represents the tendency of developing a more inter-
national perspective, but first and foremost she exemplifies the strength 
of the configuration of the victim as an important signifying figure with-
in the memory culture of the younger generations. 
 
 
The emot ional  imperat ive of  the Holocaust 
 
Moving beyond the national context, the Holocaust holds a strong posi-
tion in the memory culture of the younger generation. And compared to 
the former generations – the grandparents’ and parents’ generation – it 
seems that the Holocaust is gaining influence and seems to be more pre-
sent within the memory culture of the third generation. There is no doubt 
that for the younger generation the Holocaust represents the strongest 
lesson to be learned from the WW II. Whereas “Never another April 
ninth”, referring to the starting date of the German occupation in Den-
mark, was the motto of the national master narrative and in that sense of 
the generation of the grandparents, “Never another Holocaust” could be 
said to be the motto of the younger generation. 
A certain explanatory framework is applied in order to explain “how 
it could happen” when referring to the Holocaust. In the case of Amalie, 
as well as in many other interviews, the explanations point to Hitler – 
his demagogical capabilities, his reconstruction of Germany in a time of 
worldwide economical crisis, but also the fear and lack of alternatives of 
the Germans involved in the genocide. And again we see how the open-
ness of the third generation towards integrating perspectives previously 
excluded from the public memory culture, takes the form of victimiza-
tion.  
Furthermore, there is also a strong tendency to use WWII and the 
Holocaust as steppingstones for referring to present wars (at the time of 
the interviews the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the most acute) and 
recent atrocities and genocides. When connections are made between the 
historical events of WWII and the Holocaust and present conflicts, it is 
mainly not in the form of specific historical or factual comparison or 
analysis. In that sense WWII and the Holocaust are not treated as specif-
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ic events within specific historical developments, but rather as icons or 
symbols of war and evil as such:  
 
Dorthe: [...]  That picture [number three], it also resembles that famous picture 
from Yugoslavia. 
Michael: Yes. 
Peter: It does, actually. 
Interviewer: I hadn’t thought about that, actually. 
Jens: That’s just ‘history repeating itself’. 
Dorthe & Anders: Oh yes! 
 
As was the case with the nostalgic tone in the use of the Danish occupa-
tion, the past is dealt with in an a-historical way, where the Holocaust is 
treated as a universal example of the theme of evil and inhumanity re-
played and repeated. In the quote above this occurs in the form of an 
iconographic resemblance, also exemplifying how memory is collective-
ly shared and constructed (Welzer et al. 2002). Within the reference to 
these icons of memory, while not actually unfolding the specificities or 
the meaning attached to them, it seems that there is a common ground of 
understanding, which I have elsewhere described as a shared “encyclo-
pedia of public memory” (Bjerregaard/Bjerg/Lenz 2006). 
Furthermore, the Holocaust does not only act as a moral imperative, 
but also as what I have chosen to call an emotional imperative. Let us 
look again at Karina’s apologizing giggle referred to in the beginning. I 
suggest that by interrupting herself when referring to the picture as “typ-
ical”, Karina reflects an unease which is sensitive to the question of 
whether or not it is appropriate to deal with the Holocaust as any other 
historical event and in that sense treating human suffering as “re-
presentative” or “typical”.  
Later in the same interview the participants discuss their difficulties 
in relating to the Holocaust: 
 
Louise: But then again, just imagine if it were you. If you try to put yourself in 
the shoes of those people [...] really, really try to relate to how it would be if 
somebody just decided ‘Your race is not good enough, because you are 1.70 or 
something’ [...]  
Karina: I just think, the first time I visited a concentration camp/ I think, I’ve 
tried it three times/ Then I was completely/ I mean, I felt sick/ And you were 
shown where they were gassed and you walked around in there/ And I just 
thought it was SO disgusting and I felt like crying and was beside myself, but 
already the second time, a year and a half later, when I also went on a trip 
where you went by a concentration camp/ Of course it was still TOTALLY 
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disgusting, but still/ Then I also thought my own reaction was disgusting, that 
you already/ I still thought it was really awful, but that I/ 
Louise: You took it a bit easier/Lighter? 
Karina: Yeah, a bit lighter than the first time. [...] 
Jesper: It’s terrible, but I think it’s hard to imagine it for yourself/ I must admit 
that I didn’t feel sick/ It’s terrible and disgusting, of course, that it could hap-
pen, but [...] I don’t know why it doesn’t affect me so much, but [...] I can 
easily see that it’s terrible, also what you’re saying, that it’s been seen so many 
times, that you’ve heard the story again and again and seen so much on film, 
that you’re kind of fed up with it. 
 
What is discussed here is how to approach the Holocaust – or rather 
what it does to you when you approach the Holocaust. Following this 
discussion it seems that there is an imperative to feel both a certain hor-
ror and disgust when confronted with the issue, and a capability to iden-
tify with “how it felt” to be in the position of the victim. 3  
This “emotional imperative” carries with it didactical possibilities as 
well as challenges. On the one hand it supports the position of the Holo-
caust within the culture of memory as an event still regarded as highly 
relevant to relate to, learn about and learn from. On the other hand it 
may also put forward a way of dealing with the Holocaust where feeling 
the appropriate and the strongest emotions becomes the measure of “get-
ting it right”. In that sense the emotions set the standard for the scale on 
which the approach to the Holocaust is measured and evaluated, in the 
sense that “if you don’t feel – you fail”. Again there seem to be common 
traits in the memory culture within Denmark and Norway. As an exam-
ple, crying seems to be obligatory after the emotional detour into the 
past in the “White Buses to Auschwitz”-trips attended by app. 10.000 
young Norwegians every year (Kverndokk 2007). Going back to Kari-
na’s apologetic giggle and her reflection on her three visits to concentra-
tion camps, I think her giggling can be interpreted as a kind of apology 
for her approach to the picture of the unique suffering of this one indi-
vidual, who is at the same time a representative of so many other indi-
viduals that the suffering becomes immense. By referring to this picture 
as “typical” it seems that she offends the suffering which should not be 
typified or analyzed, but left untouched and respected – or sacred, one 
might say. The following discussion also shows the risk of banalization 
(Eschebach 2005) in the form of a wearing-out of the emotional appeal 
of the remnants, the pictures, the stories of the Holocaust; You get “fed 
up” or “It’s not shocking any longer”. Another element in banalization 
 
3  In the overall project a very similar discussion can be found in focus group 
interview with Dutch youngsters (Jensen/Moller 2007: 236 pp.) 
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points to the moral function of the Holocaust where it is lifted out of the 
historical context and is taken, on account of its immensity and incom-
prehensibility, to represent pure evil. The use here is related to emptying 
the past of any specific historical content and using it as a reference for 
the necessity of respecting human rights and preventing human atroci-
ties. 
The didactical challenges to be singled out here is pointing to the 
need of balancing the immediate emotional appeal and identification 
within the confrontation with the Holocaust, with the competence of re-
construction and understanding of the historical specificities leading to 
the occurrences within the emblematic issue of the Holocaust. This may 
again form the basis for an analysis of what the many complex “lessons 




Using media  –  using the past 
 
The final question to be addressed is how this culture of memory gets 
established or, more specifically, what sources the young generation 
draw on in constructing their relationship to WWII and the Holocaust.  
Firstly, this generation’s culture of memory clearly shows that the 
sources for developing historical consciousness are definitely not made 
up of formal history education alone. Media such as film and television 
are very much drawn upon as sources of knowledge, interest and identi-
fication, but also the narratives of their grandparents are identified as 
important. Still, the national master narrative of the Occupation forms an 
interpretative framework for what counts as relevant within the culture 
of memory.  
When Louise remarks “It’s a bit Pearl Harbor-like”, she flashes a 
significant feature of this generation. Very often fiction – first of all 
movies but also novels – is used as a reference for “how it was” or for 
what kind of stories have made an impression. The standard reference in 
a Danish context is the television series “Matador” dealing with the pe-
riod before and during the war in a small Danish provincial town. The 
series was shown on Danish television several times during the last dec-
ades, making the narrative and iconography a common reference point 
for all three generations,also references to movies occur very often in the 
third generation interviews. In the group interview quoted above there 
are media references like “Pearl Harbor”, “Schindler’s List”, “Das 
Boot”, the television series “Band of Brothers”, the Anne Frank diary. In 
addition, especially the boys seem to be consumers of documentaries (on 
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Discovery). The media referred to also point to the way WWII and the 
Holocaust is “used” today. Here there is definitely an element of enter-
tainment in the way the media products are consumed, but at the same 
time the media also create a basis for identification, for opening up to 
new narratives and perspectives, for gaining knowledge and for further 
questioning. The significance of movies for the culture of memory may 
fortify the tendency of a morally oriented use of the past as movies near-
ly always feature one or two main actors or stars. These are depicted as 
real persons having to make tough moral choices. This, of course, 
strengthens the image of WWII as a moral war where the choices of the 
few determined the fate of the many. Furthermore, the family tales also 
have this structure, where moral high ground is claimed – even when re-
sistance was only lived out passively. 
To sum up, the interviews show a wide range of ways of using histo-
ry. Moreover, as far as their use of different types of media is concerned, 
such as fictional movies, documentaries, and computer games the 
younger generation can be said to use the history of WWII for enter-
tainment and “infotainment”. Another – and very different – usage is 
their way of integrating the past into moral considerations of right and 
wrong, the kind of usage termed “politico-pedagogical” by Karlsson in 
this volume. Within this usage, the Occupation or WWII is related to is-
sues such as human rights or war, but very often the connection is made 
in ways that lift the historical incidents out of the historical context, de-
historicizing and universalizing them in the process. The national narra-
tive is also used in a nostalgic form as a frame of projection for a bygone 
time “when life was simple and there was still such a thing as solidari-
ty”. In this usage, the past turns into a mythical landscape that is very 
much in contrast to the complexity and confusion of today. Still, there 
are also tendencies of a highly reflective way of dealing with the past re-
lated to the way in which new perspectives are challenging the national 
master narrative. Here, some of the informants do not use the past for 
moral judgment, but rather as a source of moral reflection on the dilem-
mas of the people then and of themselves now, dilemmas without any 
clear answers. 
The varied uses of different media as sources not only for gaining 
knowledge, but also for generating interest, excitement and identifica-
tion concerning WWII and the Holocaust, pose fruitful challenges for 
history teaching aiming at the development of reflective historical think-
ing through the development of competencies. It invites history teaching 
of any kind to work both with and against different types of representa-
tions of WWII and the Holocaust, in the sense that it needs to enable pu-
pils/students/visitors to use the principles of reconstruction and decon-
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struction (See Körber and Lenz for theoretical and empirical elabora-
tions of these principles) as well as concepts for assessing and discuss-
ing the quality and reliability or rather plausibility of the media products 
consumed. In the interviews conducted in this study, movies or books 
are very often used in arguments for a certain position or fact in relation 
to the history of WWII without any kind of reflection on the reliability 
of the source or of the specificities connected to the kind of narrative 





The specific study of the memory culture of the third generation in 
Denmark does not only reflect specific Danish or generational features. 
In relation to the findings of the overall project of “Transitions of Histor-
ical Consciousness”, the characteristics of the memory culture put for-
ward here also reflect broader tendencies, both in a generational and an 
international perspective (Jensen/Moller 2007; Welzer et al. 2007). To 
sum up, the memory culture of the third generation can be said to oscil-
late different “layers” of memory culture: The national master narrative 
of the Danish Occupation provides an encyclopedia of icons of memory 
and an exclusive narrative of the Danish people united in solidarity and 
resistance against both the outer enemy and the different groups of “trai-
tors”. This narrative carries a clear moral lesson of resistance and soli-
darity to be learned. Still, this narrative is also subject to a certain degree 
of questioning and reflection as the perspectives of hitherto excluded 
groups and themes are brought to the fore and are being incorporated in-
to the culture of memory. This process is what Jensen and Moller have 
coined the “de-heroicized” version of the national past, which seems to 
exist alongside the narrative of “being on the right side” within the third 
generation (Jensen/Moller 2007: 255). Moreover, the new tendencies 
within the culture of memory seem to be trans-generational, but perhaps 
somewhat more distinct within the third generation. These tendencies 
take the form of: internationalization, not least in the way the Holocaust 
moves even further into focus; victimization, where new groups, narra-
tives and perspectives are included, but mainly by passing as victims; 
universalization in the sense that the events of the war and the Holocaust 
are lifted out of the historical context and related to general moral issues 
such as human rights, (evils of) war, genocide – as “the lesson to be 
learned”. Finally, members of the third generation show a widespread 
tendency to relate to the past by seeking identification and stressing the 
importance of being able to project oneself into history by feeling the 
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horror, the disgust, and the anxiety. The last feature seems not least to be 
facilitated by the types and the ways in which different forms of media 
are used in relating to WWII. In that sense the immensity of the histori-
cal events still reaches out – it shocks, touches and offends – or at least 
they are approached as something that should. It only leaves us with the 
didactical challenge of what to do when affect is not enough.  
As such, the didactical challenges and potentials of this development 
within memory culture are like two sides of a coin: The way in which 
the events of the Occupation, WWII and the Holocaust still bear the sign 
of both relevance and interest or excitement for the third generation 
paves the way for an engagement in and with this period of history. 
Simultaneously, it represents a danger in diffusing two features of histo-
ry: On one side the mere fact of specific events in the past. On the other 
side hand history as the fact of existing in time, which is related to the 
process of sense making in time. This is what Karlsson in his contribu-
tion describes as a delicate balance between the genetic and the genea-
logical perspectives of history. Moreover, it points to the question, also 
raised by Karlsson, on whether there is such a thing as an abuse of histo-
ry. In a didactical perspective one might say that the challenge is to as-
sure and facilitate both processes of identification, not least with shared 
human themes of, for instance, suffering or agency and choice, but also 
de-identification and analysis of historical specificities. A reflection of 
this double-sided challenge could be a history teaching which welcomes 
the varied forms of media drawn upon by the youngsters as well as the 
varied usages of history related to this period on the one hand, and on 
the other hand confronting this with the development of the competences 
of both reconstruction and deconstruction and for assessing and discuss-
ing reliability and validity. This would require the application of both 
conventional concepts of history as a scholarly discipline and the devel-
opment of competencies for distinguishing between different types of 
narratives and media (See the contributions by Körber and Lenz respec-
tively for a theoretical and empirical elaboration on this thinking). If his-
tory education about WWII, the Holocaust and related themes only “go 
with the flow” of identification and universalization, the potential reflec-
tion and knowledge based analysis of historical specificities and not 
least its complexities may be lost. On the other hand the aim must be to 
fertilize the sense of relevance and relatedness to the past which these 
themes seem to offer in ways that also leave space for the development 
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Strengthening Narrative Competence by 




In this article I will present a teaching tool aiming at the improvement of 
narrative competence in the context of historical learning – and more 
specific: historical learning in museums or at memorial sites. The con-
cept is based on the technique of re- and deconstruction of historical nar-
ratives at museums and/or memorials. The example presented here is 
taken from a teacher training seminar entitled “One past – many narra-
tives”, attended by teachers from different parts of Norway. But as will 
be argued, the tool has the potential to strengthen intercultural sensibil-
ity, also in “multi-cultural classrooms” and international teaching set-
tings. The reasons for this potential are partly linked to the changes 
which memory cultures connected to World War II have undergone in 
all European countries in recent years. While in the first decades after 
1945 memory cultures were dominated by national interpretations 
(Flacke 2004), the decades after 1968 brought a shift towards self-
critical and more cosmopolite and universal interpretations. This has 
been reinforced by the special dynamic of international Holocaust com-
memoration (Levy/Sznaider 2005). (See the contribution by 
StokholmBanke in this volume.) Today, both the national and the cos-
mopolitan interpretative framework inform individual and collec-
tive/group specific interpretations and uses of the past, alongside with 
other narratives, originating in stories being told in families or narratives 
related to local identities (see the contribution of Bjerg in this volume).  
The teaching concept presented here aims to foster the learner’s 
competence to relate in a reflected and critical way to representations of 
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the past as they are displayed in historical museums. The concept is 
linked to the following aspects of historical competence:   
• The ability to identify and reconstruct musealized historical narra-
tives.  
• The ability to re-arrange and re-contextualize these representations 
of the past for the production of personal, diverging and even multi-
layered narratives.  
 
In order to contextualize this empirical example, I will first present some 
basic features of Norwegian history culture and its underlying narrative 




Sub- layers in  the dominant  Norwegian narrat ive 
  
The Norwegian memory culture requires a brief introduction since the 
empirical data originate from the Norwegian context. 
The dominant narrative about the time of the German occupation of 
Norway emerged quickly after 1945. It was structured by a dualistic pat-
tern of “German occupiers” versus “a nation in resistance” on the one 
hand, and “patriots” versus “collaborators”/“traitors” on the other. This 
interpretative pattern informed historical research, public memory cul-
ture and history teaching for decades. Within this framework, by far the 
most interest was directed towards the resistance movement on the one 
hand and the general population’s rejection against attempts to Nazify 
Norwegian society, the so called “Holdningskampen” (the fight to 
“keep” the country, in a symbolic sense) on the other. It is evident that 
this interpretative framework gave the majority of the population the 
possibility to identify with the position of good Norwegians/patriots 
(Eriksen 1995). The flip site of the coin, though, was the social stigmati-
zation of those branded as traitors – party members of the Norwegian 
collaborationist party “Nasjonal Samling”, SS-volunteers and women, 
who had sexual and/or love relationships with German soldiers. The 
consequences of this stigmatization were also “inherited” by the children 
of those who ended up on “the wrong side”. Therefore, to this very day, 
the memories of the time of the German occupation, have remained an 
emotionally charged topic in many Norwegian families (Lenz 2007, 
2008). The Norwegian Resistance Museum, created in the early 1970s 
by resistance veterans, can be regarded as a materialization of what 
could be called a “national master narrative” – a version of history be-
coming so dominant as to regulate every kind of interpretation of this 
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specific period. Moreover, power relations in a contemporary society are 
shaped by the positions that this narrative ascribes to individuals and 
groups.  
From the beginning of the 1970s onwards, a whole range of aspects 
of war history came into the focus of both professional historians and the 
broader public interest, notably the collaboration, the treatment of Nor-
wegian women having love relationships with German soldiers before 
and after 1945 and the fate of the children born out of these relation-
ships. The persecution of the Norwegian Jews, leading to the murder of 
more than 700 of them, became a topic of public memory culture and 
memory politics as late as in the mid-1990s. Whereas the investigation 
of the history of the political collaborators was for the most part fueled 
by the interest of a young generation of historians in the 1970s (who did 
not belong to the “resistance veterans” as most of the leading war histo-
rians after 1945 did), the attention for the other two subjects did not 
spring from professional historians’ work but was generated by the ac-
tivities of groups and organizations from civil society and, in the case of 
the Holocaust, from abroad. The most striking examples of this devel-
opment within Norwegian memory culture is the growing awareness of 
the fate of the children born out of relationships between Norwegian 
women and German soldiers during the war. Many of these “war chil-
dren” (in Norwegian, they were called “Tyskerbarn”/ Germans’ chil-
dren) had been stigmatized after the war. They and their mothers were 
branded as mentally retarded and there were even official political delib-
erations of how to get rid of them. In the 1980s, an organization of these 
“war children” was founded, claiming official acknowledgement for 
their sufferings after 1945 and even suing the state for financial compen-
sation. The developments leading up to the compensation lawsuit and 
the lawsuit itself received broad media attention, and eventually even a 
research project was launched, investigating the postwar life conditions 
of these children (Ericsson/Simonsen 2005). One can say that this com-
plex process of public lobbyism, media attention and historical research 
has left a deep change in public attitudes – as well as private narratives – 
related to these phenomena (Lenz/Moller 2006; Lenz/Welzer 2007). 
The way by which the history of the persecution of the Norwegian 
Jews became integrated in history writing and public history culture was 
quite a different one. Here, the interest and awareness for the subject had 
been increasing in limited artistic and intellectual circles since the early 
1990s. But the breakthrough in the public at large was achieved due to 
the work of an official commission, established in 1996 and reporting in 
1997, which investigated the reparations the surviving Norwegian Jews 
had been awarded after having been dispossessed by the Nazi regime in 
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1942. This commission’s findings led to both historical research and 
public awareness for this part of occupation history, which had been a 
blind spot until then (Maerz 2007).  
An investigation into the historical consciousness about the time of 
the German occupation cannot rely exclusively on public history culture 
(with historical research being a part of it). People’s knowledge, their 
perception of representations of reality and their interpretations relating 
to the wartime period are informed by many different sources: family 
narratives and stories told in the personal sphere, school lessons, media 
representations (TV, cinema, literature etc.) as well as local and national 
memory culture (monuments, commemoration days, ceremonies etc.). 
The didactical tool to be presented here takes its starting-point in the 
idea that the historical consciousness of most Western Europeans be-
longing to the postwar generation is organized by different layers of cul-
tural influences and narrative patterns (See also the contribution by 
Bjerg). This means that the narratives and interpretations related to this 
aspect of history are adaptable to different, even contradictory “uses of 
the past” and can embrace different interpretative options. In order to 
create the competence of being able to relate actively to the different 
narratives and interpretations existing in the public (and the private) 
realm(s), both within history teaching and in a wider sense, it is decisive 
that all processes of historical learning focus on “critical judgment” with 
regard to historical narratives. 
 
 
Theoret ical  assumpt ions 
 
Some of the basic assumptions shaping the concept of using museum 
exhibitions in order to develop the narrative aspects of historical compe-
tence have been extensively presented in the articles of Körber and 
Karlsson in this volume. Notably, the concepts of “(self-)reflective his-
torical consciousness” and “uses of the past” materialized in historical 
culture have been elaborated there. I will build on these theoretical 
premises, focusing on the relevance of narrativity for any construction of 
“meaning” related to timeliness and, resulting from this, the notion of 
“narrative competence”. 
Taking the concept of historical consciousness into consideration 
when designing tools for historical learning first of all means starting 
from the idea of “being in time” as an existential feature. This includes 
the understanding that subjects cannot build any relation to reality nor 
can they gain agency without the mental operations linking past, present 
and future together. Without references to experienced or represented 
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past and without the mechanisms of selecting and organizing infor-
mation derived from the past, the flood of impressions constituting every 
moment of present reality cannot be organized into a meaningful whole. 
Without references to the past, reality would literally “make no sense”. 
Though the patterns of selection and interpretation derived from past ex-
periences are constantly re-organized within social and cultural frame-
works, they represent the basis of subjectivity and agency – which 
means: the ability to act based on intentions and prospects for the future.  
Still, this existential dimension of our relation to the past as subjects 
and social beings, and hereby the absolute dependence on the relation to 
the past when it comes to the question of identity (who we are and how 
we became what we are), cannot change the fact that relating to the past 
is only possible in indirect ways, via representations. To be existentially 
related to something absent means being dependent on symbolic recon-
structions and communicative practices “verifying” the notions of the 
past. This creates a tension, which is often solved by cultural techniques 
of “ensuring” one’s own history. The idea of (self-)reflective historical 
consciousness – as it is also presented in Körber’s contribution in this 
volume and as it informs the teaching approach presented here – is 
therefore not only linked to the idea of cognitive or intellectual skills. It 
also refers to the capacity of coexisting with diverse cultures and taking 
actively part in democratic, pluralist societies.  
What is the focus of an approach in which historical learning is 
based on (self-)reflective historical consciousness and how does narra-
tivity come into play? As indicated in the contribution by Karlsson in 
this volume, the mental operations of “processing time” are linked to the 
experience of recognizing oneself and others in the dynamic of past, pre-
sent and future. We are able to imagine elderly people as the youngsters 
they once were and the hopes (future prospects) they once had, as well 
as we are able to imagine small kids being adults in the future remem-
bering us as good or less good parents. This means, we constantly relate 
to stories placing subjects and their actions in time. And the present 
needs for orientation, as well as the future prospects, influence the way 
the past is constructed. In order to do so, several interrelated mental op-
erations are processed: 
• identifying and selecting “meaningful events” in the past; 
• compounding events within coherent narrative patterns (the for-
mation of “history”); 
• relating the past to present and future in meaningful ways.  
Narrative psychology (Straub 2005) suggests that the individual’s capac-
ity to cope with reality is based on these narrative operations; patterns of 
orientation are gained from selected and “useful” former experiences – 
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which might be one’s own experiences or cultural representations of 
other people’s experiences.  
The capacity to organize reality in this selective and structuring way 
serves, according to Straub, the existential need of coping with contin-
gency. The existence of (narrative) patterns which can be applied in the 
encounter with new, unforeseen situations is a precondition for agency – 
since this enables us to see meaningfulness and even causality, which we 
can master, rather than chaos. But it is evident that the stabilizing func-
tion of narrative patterns is but one side of the coin of subjectivity and 
agency. It is equally crucial to adapt and “update” the narrative order of 
things constantly in order to be able to integrate changes and to react ad-
equately in varying situative frameworks. 
Here, the idea of two main features of narrative operations - recon-
structive and deconstructive – becomes manifest, since they represent 
the two complementary functions of narrativity for a subject’s coping 
with a constantly changing reality: The reconstructive operations repre-
sent the capacity to construct stabilizing frameworks and patterns, which 
help to stabilize existence “in time”, whereas the deconstructive opera-
tions represent the capacity to re-organize and adapt these patterns – 
similar to “reflexive distance” according to Straub’s terminology. Re-
construction and deconstruction both apply when it comes to the identi-
fication and selection of relevant aspects of the past, when it comes to 
historical narratives and when it comes to the ways the past is linked to 
present and future. This is mirrored in the 6-field matrix of historical 
consciousness by Hasberg and Körber: 
 
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Table 1. The 6-field matrix of historical consciousness. 
 




ascertain features  




things to history 
Focus  
“Present/Future” 
“ex nunc, pro nunc”
connecting things 
past and history  








 and “facts” from  
original sources 
Contextualizing  
“particles of the 
past” 
• synchron:  
structures  
• diachron:  
developments 
Constructing connec-
tions of causality  
and of meaning  
between past facts 
and incidents to  
present and future  
Synthetical (re-)construction of chronological meaning  
(a narrative story) from material 
 
 





Analysis of the narrative construction of a narration,  
determine its way of constructing historical meaning 
 
 
Detecting “facts” and 
incidents of the past 
from narrations 
Analyzing contextu-
alisations inherent in 
a narration (syn-
chron and diachron) 
Analyzing narratives 
regarding to their  
offers for orientation 
in present and future   
 (Hasberg/Körber 2003. See also the contribution by Körber in this 
volume for an elaboration of the matrix of historical consciousness) 
 
Thus, the idea of narrative competence combines the ability to recon-
struct “events in the past”, historical narratives and interpretations link-
ing the past to the present and future and the ability to “read”/ 
understand the inner logic of historical narratives and interpretations es-
tablished by others, as well as to identify the elements of “past events” 






How to operationalize these theoretical thoughts? 
 
The didactical concept “One history – many stories” was developed at 
the Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities in 2007 as 
an element of a course for school teachers. Since then the concept has 
been re-used in the context of a bi-national (German/Norwegian) semi-
nar with pupils between 18 and 20 years of age. In this presentation, I 
will focus on the outcome produced by the use of the concept within the 
teacher course. 
The concept of the course is based on the assumption that the na-
tional master narrative about the German occupation of Norway consti-
tutes an important point of reference in the historical consciousness and, 
not least, in the teaching practice of all participants of the course (due to 
its continuing predominant presence in history textbooks). At the same 
time, we assumed that this narrative would be interwoven with – or in-
terfered by – other narratives about the period. The aims of the course 
were as follows: 
• to make the participants aware of the different narratives they were 
carrying; 
• to give them tools to identify and reproduce (reconstruct) as well as 
“read” (deconstruct) different narratives in a public exhibition; 
• to operationalize these tools into elements of history teaching. 
 
The teacher course 
 
The participants of the course were 25 teachers, mostly teaching at an 
upper secondary school level. The presentation of the participants 
showed that most of them currently live and teach in the southern part of 
Norway, but that more than half of them grew up in other parts of Nor-
way. One participant had a German background. In order to create an 
“opener” to the subject of the course and an awareness of the different 
personal narratives which the participants relate to regarding the history 
of WW II, they were asked to present themselves in the following way: 
“Tell about your first encounter with the history of World War II.”  
The stories told in this first presentation showed a great deal of di-
versity, not only according to the participants’ regional and local back-
ground, but also in relation to their age and gender. None of the partici-
pants was, of course an “eye witness” of the war in terms of having ex-
perienced it consciously. But several members of the group had grown 
up in the immediate postwar years, and these persons tended to tell sto-
ries from their own family’s war experiences and the traces the war had 
left on their childhood. The younger participants, though, retold stories 
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from the war which they had heard via the media, school or older family 
members. And some of them commented on the impressions these sto-
ries made on them as youngsters – a de-constructive operation, showing 
some cognitive and emotional distance to the topic of war. There was an 
interesting, though typical gendered difference in the stories presented 
by the participants. Quite a few of the male participants with different 
generational and regional backgrounds told stories reflecting the fascina-
tion of military events and material remains, such as bunkers that boys 
would use for war games after the war, while none of the women con-
tributed stories of this kind.  
After the presentation, a lecture was held, introducing the changing 
scientific and public focus regarding the history of the German occupa-
tion of Norway. It was also shown how the ongoing investigation of 
phenomena related to the years 1940-45 coincided with a growing atten-
tion for the question of how this past has been dealt with and remem-
bered after 1945. This tendency to “historicize” postwar memory culture 
was related to the concept of historical consciousness and its basic as-
sumption that any reference to the past emerges from contemporary 
needs for orientation. The question was raised, which consequences this 
would have for history teaching concepts. Could the awareness that the 
history of WWII has been perceived and interpreted differently in differ-
ent periods of the postwar era, and by different groups, contribute to the 
competence of critical and (self-)reflective evaluation of historical ac-
counts and cultural representations of the past? Some of the participating 
teachers remarked that these ideas corresponded very well with Norwe-
gian history curricula, which focus more on critical judgment and the 
competence to relate past and present than on canonized factual 
knowledge. 
After this introduction, the whole group was taken to the Norwegian 
Resistance Museum, where they worked in the exhibition in smaller 
groups. This exhibition, created in the early 1970s by resistance veter-
ans, can be regarded as a materialization of the dominating national nar-
rative about WWII (as presented in the beginning of this article). On the 
one hand, the exhibition has a chronological structure which seems to 
tell the “whole story” of the five years of occupation. On the other hand, 
it breaks with chronology and focuses on the different forms of civil and 
military resistance and the German repression against it. By leaving out 
or at least not focusing on the “grey zones” between patriotic struggle 
and collaboration/ treason, the exhibition creates the impression of a 
“nation-in-resistance”, created by the occupation, where coping with ra-
tioned food, wearing forbidden national symbols and fighting against the 
German occupiers were just different points on a scale of a “good Nor-
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wegian’s” behavior.1 In this way, the exhibition displays a straightfor-
ward national narrative, reflecting a certain perspective, namely, the per-
spective of the veterans as it emerged in the 1970s. It is this narrative 
which has been extremely modified by scientific and public debates 
since then, as presented earlier. The question follows how visitors whose 
historical consciousness is informed by contemporary history culture 
and different personal backgrounds will read and interpret the exhibi-
tion? It may well be that it displays so many aspects and such a multi-
tude of material (written sources, pictures, objects from wartime, mod-
els, and commenting texts) that the visitors have the opportunity to se-
lect aspects and re-arrange them according to their personal experiences, 
imaginations and meanings, this past carries for them. 
 In order to facilitate an approach allowing the participants to use 
their own background in reconstructing the history of The Second World 
War, we divided the seminar group in sub-groups of three or four, hand-
ed out a digital camera to each group and gave them the task to create a 
mini-exhibition consisting of four images taken in the exhibition.2 These 
mini-exhibitions were required to address one of the following proposi-
tions: 
1. Tell the story of the years of occupation as it is told in the exhibition. 
2. Tell the story of the occupation as it is best known to you. 
3. Tell the story of the occupation as you think it should be told. 
 
In terms of narrative competence, the three tasks aimed at the identifica-
tion and reproduction of the exhibition’s narrative, at produc-
tion/construction of personal narratives and, last but not least, at the re-
flection and deconstruction of both the exhibition’s narrative and their 
own. 
After the visit to the Norwegian Resistance Museum the whole 
group returned to the HL-center where each of the groups presented 
their “mini exhibition” (the text below is the transcript of the three 
presentations given). Each presentation was followed by questions and 
comments from the other participants. This presentation and the subse-
quent discussion was an important part of the learning process regarding 
a focus on the de- and reconstruction of historical narratives. Confronted 
with the ways the other participants had solved the task in the museum 
and the multitude of “war narratives” generated, the participants became 
more aware of the choices they had taken. This self-reflexivity relating 
 
1  For the exhibition’s contents see: http://www.mil.no/felles/nhm/start/eng/. 
2  All photos in this article are the property of HL-senteret and the Norwe-
gian Resistance Museum and were kindly made available for use in this 
publication by Samantha Maurer Fox. 
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to the multi-layered character of possible historical narratives is an im-
portant starting-point for an active participation in the permanent negoti-
ations about the ways the past can be told, interpreted and used – regard-
less of whether it applies to family, local or national histories. 





1. The national narrative 
 
“K1: ‘Yeah, this is picture no. 1, King 
Haakon leaving Norway on June 7th, 
1940 to continue the fight from 
England. [He] was the head of the 
Norwegian resistance struggle for two 
months, and we thought this was a 
fitting image [...]  
Yeah, resistance struggle. This is a pic-
ture of a concealed radio transmitter. 
One of the most important tasks of the 
Norwegian resistance struggle was to 
collect information about German posi-
tions, German ships etc., and to send 
the information to England. 
This image may be of poor quality, but 
[telling] about the resistance struggle 
without mentioning Quisling is not an 
option. Quisling was the very symbol of 
Nazism in Norway.  
[...] There were many who fled from 
Norway, some to Sweden, as the arrows 
at the border show, and many others 
who travelled westward. And below in 
the picture there is a long red stripe [...] 
in that direction. Those were the ones 
who went to the Shetlands, to Scotland, 
to England, or in that direction. And 
there were different reasons why people 
left for either Sweden or the West. It 
could be in order to join the resistance 
struggle, or it could be because they had 
to escape from the Germans, because 
they perhaps had participated in some-
thing.’” 
 
In this group, the reconstructive 
mode of dealing with the material is 
predominant. Not altogether surpris-
ing since the group explicitly chose 
the task to reproduce the story about 
the war as it is told in the exhibition. 
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The participants selected four images which represent events, agents or, 
in a broader sense, phenomena from the war which they regard as ele-
mentary and they arranged them in a way which creates a linear story. In 
this way, the “focus past” and “focus history” – meaning, the focus on 
single aspects/events of the past and the focus on the narrated and inter-
preted past as shown in the figure above – are combined. The recon-
structive way of dealing with the focus past is evident, when each pic-
ture is explained by giving an outline of the historical event it represents, 
or in the case of Quisling, explaining, that he symbolized betrayal then, 
which also is a way of reconstructing the past. The arrangement of the 
four pictures has no chronological, but a logical order following the pat-
tern of public memory and history writing in the postwar era. The 
framework is the notion of “national resistance”, which is first and 
foremost represented by the king, who, before leaving the country in or-
der to continue the struggle abroad, fought together with his country-
men. There is no deconstructive element which might consider other in-
terpretations of the king’s decision – e.g. that he abandoned his coun-
trymen, leaving them to their fate, while getting himself to safety.  
The logic of the narrative of the king and “the people” fighting for 
the same cause is continued with the second and fourth image, which 
represent one branch of resistance activities, namely the transmission of 
sensitive military information to England and the consequences re-
sistance activities had for many Norwegians, namely, being forced to 
leave the country. Both images are connected to the first one by taking 
up the notion of “England”, and by doing so combining not only the 
struggle at home and abroad, but also, again, the king and “his people”. 
The second image exemplifies the antipode to the national unity which 
is represented by the other images. There is no further information, no 
narrative elaboration of Quisling as a historical agent. This image has, 
thus, no function related to the “focus past” (which means, the focus on 
single events in the past) but only to the “focus history” (which means 
the focus on an overall narrative, structured by a certain pattern of his-
torical meaning).3 It serves as a marker for “the other side”, which con-
stitutes (alongside with the Germans which are mentioned in the second 
and fourth image) the unity of the people, with the king as its “the head”.  
As mentioned before, we do not find any deconstructive elements in 
this presentation, neither related to the “focus past”, the single events 
 
3  Jörn Rüsen (1983) suggests four “ideal“ types which structure historical 
meaning – a traditional, a genetical, an exemplaric and a critical mode – 
which differ in the way past, present and future are linked together. Narra-
tive patterns, such as e.g. “everything used to be better” or “we learn from 
the mistakes of the past” reflect the different types of historical meaning.  
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which are reported (could there be alternative stories, interpretations?) 
and represented in the images (who has produced them and when, which 
might have been the intention, what do they tell, what not etc.?) nor re-
lated to the “focus history”. The story which is being told here can be 
described as a “royalist” version of the national narrative. There were 
many different motivations to participate in resistance activities, and en-
quiring into them and the alternative narratives they would constitute, 
would have been one possibility of integrating a deconstructive perspec-
tive in the presentation.  
Another dimension of narrativity left out in this presentation is the 
“focus present/future”. Nothing is said about the meaning this story 
about national unification in and through resistance could have today, 
neither in a re- or deconstructive way. 
So, one could ask whether the task for the group should have been 
formulated in such a way as to not only encourage them to reconstruct 
the museum’s narrative, but also to reflect on the premises of this narra-
tive. Nevertheless, when thinking about using the teaching concept in a 
school context, this task seemed to show that narrative competence can 
be fostered on a basic level.  
The second example I would like to present is far more complex, 
when it comes to the different foci and narrative operations.  
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2. Deconstructing the national … 
 
“P1: ‘We’ve found out that we pretty 
much come from the same background 
[...] We’re the ‘Finnmark bunch’. So, we 
chose that as an approach, this was the 
idea in the beginning. Just tell about the 
four pictures. The first image is named 
‘Hunting down Tirpitz’, the other 
‘Finnmark in flames’. For the third we 
took a picture of a notice in a newspaper, 
in which an evacuated woman from 
northern Norway is searching for people 
she knows. And the fourth image is a 
woman from the coast some place in 
Finnmark or North-Troms, with a scarf 
and somewhat vacant eyes. What did we 
think? Well, we thought we would take 
this perspective, this Northern Norwe-
gian perspective, and try to look at it 
starting with what we were told when we 
grew up.’ 
[...] 
P2: ‘Ok. A little bit about what we 
talked about while we walked around 
there. I remembered having a teacher 
when I studied history [...] who worked 
at the Institute for Defense Studies at 
that time. I can just remember that as a 
very young student I was embarrassed 
when he said: ‘Norway felt it was raped, 
Norway had no experiences with the 
cruelties so familiar out there in Europe 
through the centuries.’ And when we fo-
cus too much on the burning of Finn-
mark and North-Troms, and say that it 
was so terrible, that just shows how we 
look upon WWII, that we make such a 
big thing of it. In no other country were 
there so many books written about 
WWII as in Norway, he said. I was 
somewhat embarrassed, but not too 
much. But I said the same to my mother 
later, that the focus on the burning of the 
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North had become so big in our eyes. Then, she got very angry and left the 
kitchen table. But what [this teacher] meant, was probably that you cannot 
compare suffering, or what people have experienced, or personal pain. But he 
meant that seen from Europe’s experiences with the madness, the madness of 
war in Eastern Europe, Flanders and the North of France, the refugees from 
the east who came in the days of January 45, the German refugees, and all the 
personal tragedies and experiences [...]. Well, if I, as a teacher, would present 
the burning of Finnmark and my family’s personal histories in that broader 
perspective, then that would certainly have an impact on my pupil’s views. 
They would encounter a history narrative which now maybe has a somewhat 
different perspective.’”  
 
This group had chosen the task to represent the story about the war as 
they know it best. They introduce their perspective and their narrative 
angle as being framed by their personal background, which means, com-
ing from Finnmark in Northern Norway. This is the obvious selection 
criterion for the four images which are presented. All of them represent 
events which had happened in this region and so the choice combines a 
narrative reconstruction of events in the past as well as the reconstruc-
tion of a chronological historical narrative: The military confrontation 
between German and allied troops represented by the “Tirpitz”, followed 
by the “scorched-earth” policy the Germans carried out when retreating 
from the North and the traumatic consequences that forced evacuation 
had for the civilian population. The group makes a clear statement about 
their deconstructive aspiration when saying that they wanted to find out 
what was told about the North at all in the Resistance Museum. Indirect-
ly, this is a statement about the predominance of another, the dominant 
national narrative in the museum and the attempt to construct a “coun-
ter-narrative”. 
The sequence where P2 tells about her experience of meeting a uni-
versity teacher who embarrassed her at first and then seemed to have 
broadened her scope of historical thinking is a very interesting mixture 
of re- and deconstructing operations. Here we have a personal narrative 
which points to the speaker’s personal background and the way memo-
ries about the war were transmitted in her family. The teacher’s compar-
ison of Norwegian suffering during the war with the far more traumatiz-
ing experiences of other countries first embarrasses her, but is then de-
scribed as some kind of eye-opener due to the fact that war history may 
have become “oversized” in the national – and regional - memory cul-
ture. Here, we find a deconstructive attitude related to the “focus histo-
ry”. When telling about her mother – who probably has experienced the 
traumatic events herself and who reacts angrily – the speaker also intro-
duces the notion of generation-specific attitudes towards history. She 
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ends her statement with a call for multi-perspective approaches towards 
history, in which her familiar and local background would inform one of 
different voices (another would be the “European perspective”) when 
teaching about the war. 
Afterwards, the next speaker turns back to the images the group has 
chosen and starts to reconstruct the story of the events relating to them: 
 
… and reconstructing the local 
 
“P1: ‘I want to say something concrete 
about the four different pictures. This 
one about the ‘Tirpitz’ is a side of the 
war, of the occupation, which had a very 
strong impact on the people from the 
coast in Finnmark. The ‘Tirpitz’ had a 
vital function for the Germans in con-
nection with the convoy traffic in the 
North, and staying in contact with the 
maritime areas in the North was very 
important. What you also mentioned is 
that the ‘Tirpitz’ and the remains of the 
‘Tirpitz’ up there have a crucial meaning 
in people’s ideas about the war [...] yeah, 
even the popular description of the war. 
In textbooks, this perspective is not inte-
grated at all. And what we needed was 
also [...] we should try to use our back-
ground to [...] highlight [...] what the Re-
sistance Museum has focused on. Find 
out how much of Finnmark’s history is 
mentioned. And we almost had to go 
through the whole museum before we 
found anything about Finnmark [...].’ 
P3: ‘I heard somewhere that there was a 
place [...] which a German soldier re-
fused to set fire to, and it was not de-
stroyed. And he came back after the war 
and was a very respected man there. Do 
you know something about this? This is 
an example for, for [...] what shall I say, 
for resistance that existed also on the German side. There really was some-
thing like that, in fact.’ 




P4: ‘When it comes to East-Finnmark, very little was destroyed there, because 
they came in a hurry. So, one will find a lot left there. Because East-Finnmark 
was occupied by the Russians. [...] In the West, the Germans had more time, 
and there more or less everything [was burnt] apart from churches which stood 
on graveyards. They were spared. But nothing else [...]. 
In some way [all this] is very essential for us who have relatives, parents, un-
cles, aunts who were affected by this history of the evacuation. This was the 
war, because it happened under totally extraordinary [...] conditions. Especial-
ly regarding hygiene and health. Babies born [...] on a little fisherman’s boat 
with 50 people where the sanitary conditions were really bad. Such things are 
part of the whole story.’” 
 
Interesting in this sequence is how we do not get a “complete” narrative 
about what happened with the “Tirpitz”. Instead, the speaker makes 
many allusions and he seems to take for granted that the audience 
knows. In memory research, this way of introducing a story without tell-
ing and instead dropping some “key words” is called narrative abbrevia-
tion. Obviously, the “codes” of common local memories worked for the 
members of the group and they stuck to them when presenting their 
work to the rest of the seminar group. This differs from the way the sto-
ries about the burning of the Finnmark are told. Here we even get a 
chronological description (first, the Germans’ haste in the Eastern part, 
then the complete destruction of the Western part) and even a detailed 
story about an individual German’s refusal to follow his orders to burn 
down a town. We are not told which sources these narrative reconstruc-
tions are based on, only in one case is the speaker open about the fact 
that he is not sure about the details and asks the group for support (“Do 
you know something about this?”). Still, in the last sequence it is made 
clear, that family stories and, thus, memories transmitted in the group 
members’ own families represent an essential source for their 
knowledge about and views upon war history. 
This leads again to the deconstructive attitude the group has towards 
the exhibition of the Resistance Museum. It is obvious that this exhibi-
tion is regarded as representing a dominant, national narrative, which the 
speakers think is also transmitted in textbooks, where “this [the Finn-
mark] perspective is not integrated at all.” The confrontation of this nar-
rative with the group members own, Northern Norwegian narrative is in-
terpreted as an avenue to “read” the exhibition in a different way:  
 
“And what we needed was also [...] we should try to use our background to 
[...] highlight [...] what the Resistance Museum has focused on. Find out how 
much of Finnmark’s history is mentioned. And we almost had to go through 
the whole museum before we found anything about Finnmark.”  
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Reconstructing one’s own and deconstructing a dominant narrative go 
hand in hand here, but the exhibition still provides the material (images, 
texts) which can trigger the alternative narrative. Only speaker P2 di-
rects a deconstructive attitude towards this “own”, regional narrative and 
she is also the only one who touches upon the focus “present/future” 
when talking about how to teach war history today.  
The last example I would like to present here shows a completely 
different dynamic than the other two. The group chose the task to “Tell 
the story of the occupation as you think it should be told” and it solves 
the task almost without resorting to operations of reconstruction – be it 
related to “events” or “history”. 
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3. An “ideal” way of teaching history  
 
“We first chose the red cap [nisselua], of 
which there is a picture, which was in a 
display case about everyday life. And 
there we thought about this with empa-
thy, that both things and images can be a 
starting-point for getting interested into 
how everyday life was in Norway during 
the occupation. Anyway, I personally 
think that one should devote more time 
to this Norwegian perspective, and then 
build up empathy to get pupils interested 
in what happened. 
And then we had a poster, a propaganda 
poster. It was that one about the Bolshe-
viks, with a Viking boat, a Norwegian and 
a German who were going to fight Bol-
shevism. And we chose it for the critical 
perspective it offers, to understand propa-
ganda, which means: history being in-
strumentalized for persuasion, and that 
pupils become aware of this in different 
contexts, not only directly related to prop-
aganda posters, but also when one reads 
textbooks, sees films [...]. So we learn to 
use our critical mind which you acquire 
when you work in that way. So, related to 
all media they are confronted with. We 
spent a lot of time with [teaching] this, 
and we were successful. I see they have 
become more critical now, also in other 
subjects than history. Who wrote this, and 
how did he get such an idea and so on.  
 And then we chose a picture of [...] yeah, there were Jews and it must have 
been from the Warsaw ghetto. We had a question mark concerning images of 
Norwegian Jews, and exact numbers. There was something written there, but 
we thought there was something missing there, that this is also important for 
the pupils. They have a tendency to [...] that it is something which happened 
far away, even if they have information and read stuff about events which 
happened here at home. But still they don’t manage to relate to it, in a Norwe-
gian perspective. This is also very important. This starting-point. They could, 
for instance, follow a Norwegian Jew on a path where many others went. How 
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Norwegians in general reacted when the Jews were deported [...] They didn’t 
say much about that here. 
 So we had our fourth image, which was taken from [the newspaper] Af-
tenposten. There was a headline “Hitler attacks”, it must have been about Po-
land in 1939. We chose this image because of its usefulness for source criti-
cism. [We try] all the time to get original newspaper clips, authentic objects 
and so on and use them in history teaching. When they get something concrete 
and physical, things become more meaningful for them. I thought about the is-
sue of facts [...] living together with facts all the time, this is a challenge, 
something you must have in the back of your mind all the time, regardless 
which methods you use. And pupils can use this also in relation to other sub-
jects.” 
 
It is obvious, that the group does not tell “the story of the occupation” 
but, instead, starts a meta-discourse on how to teach history, which me-
dia to use and how. But the group definitely is also concerned with the 
contents of history teaching and, in this way they cannot do completely 
without narrative elements. I would like to illustrate this with two exam-
ples: 
1. When talking about how propaganda material from WWII can be 
used to strengthen a critical perspective on manipulative techniques, the 
speaker sums up very quickly what is shown on the poster: “[...] a Vi-
king boat, a Norwegian and a German who were going to fight Bolshe-
vism.” This is, again, a narrative abbreviation. It alludes to the whole 
narrative which motivated and legitimized Norwegian young men’s vol-
untary participation in the German warfare. It links the pan-Germanic 
project of the Nazis back to the “heritage” of the Vikings, making the 
fight against Bolshevism (and, implicitly, the planned “Germanic colo-
nization” of the east) appear as a logical continuation of the Vikings’ 
expeditions to the Black sea. The “critical” approach to the means of 
propaganda which the group claims here, points to re- and deconstruc-
tive competences, namely the competence to identify the propagandistic 
choice of highlighted elements in the past, the constructions of historical 
narratives of tradition and heritage and their exploitation for the interest-
ed party’s own ideological purpose.  
2. The second example is the presentation of the part in the exhibi-
tion dealing with the Holocaust. Here, the approach is deconstructive: 
What is told, what is missing? The speaker sees the Norwegian perspec-
tive lacking in the presentation of the situation of the Jews– which is ar-
ranged around a very popular image from the Warsaw ghetto uprising 
(an icon of Holocaust memory). The speaker states “They have a ten-
dency to […] that it is something which happened far away, even if they 
have information and read stuff about events which happened here at 
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home. But still they don’t manage to relate to it, in a Norwegian per-
spective.” This, again, alludes to the question of narrative competence. 
What the speaker is saying is that historical consciousness about the 
Holocaust is disconnected from historical consciousness about Norwe-
gian occupation history – it is not integrated into the national narrative 
about the war. Interestingly, he stresses that this is not only caused by 
lack of knowledge. So, the didactical challenge he describes here lies in 





The presentation of the ways in which the participants of the teacher 
training used the exhibition of the Norwegian Resistance Museum in or-
der to create narratives of their own has shown that various aspects of 
narrative competence can be triggered by the method of letting learners 
create narratives which take a starting-point in, are inspired by or just 
take their material from a historical exhibition. The examples above 
have shown that the participant’s capacity to relate to the museum’s ex-
hibition as a narrative has been fostered, which includes the awareness 
of the fact that the exhibition represents one of many possible narratives 
about the time of the German occupation. This creates a distance neces-
sary to address questions of history culture, historical culture and he-
gemony, and perhaps an increased open-mindedness to marginalized 
versions of this particular history. 
Related to this open-mindedness, and maybe even more important 
than the reflection about the exhibition in the light of the concept of nar-
rativity, is the participants’ deepened awareness about their own ways of 
dealing with the history and memories of World War II. They have been 
challenged to become aware of their individual ways of addressing this 
aspect of the past and how these individual narratives are related to oth-
er, local, national and even universal interpretative frameworks. It is 
here, that the effect of self-reflexivity is reached, the capacity to address 
one’s own historical interpretations as something which also could be 
different, which would be different under different conditions.  
The different tasks related to the exhibition offered possibilities to 
either work with the exhibition in a reconstructive way – creating own 
narratives – or in a deconstructive way – investigating existing narra-
tives, both one’s own, those of the other participants and public/official 
ones. It seems that the presentation and discussion of the results of the 
group assignments for the entire seminar group contributed to the partic-
ipants’ readiness to handle these different modes of creating and critical-
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ly investigating the narrative ways in which meaning is attached to the 
past. 
As a last thought, I would like to highlight the potential of using this 
teaching tool in the context of intercultural learning. One could provok-
ingly argue that already the effect of discovering the local sub-layers of 
the national master narrative and the identity of “good Norwegians” re-
lated to it had the character of an intercultural encounter. Here, definite-
ly, quite diverging memory cultures related to World War II emerged. 
Not to speak of the perspective of the participant with a German back-
ground and the German memory culture and coming-to-terms with the 
history of the Nazi era as an informing background. One can imagine 
that this kind of work with the exhibition of the Norwegian Resistance 
Museum would have been quite interesting with more participants with 
immigrant background, European and non-European. In which ways 
would Pakistani-Norwegian working immigrants or refugees from war 
and genocide have used the material from the museum exhibition in or-
der to create “their” narrative? Since the concept has a potential to cre-
ate, or enforce awareness and critical self-reflection of historical narra-
tives it could be used to trigger a dialogue about the ways in which pub-
lic narratives contribute to group identities, creating the feeling of be-
longing or exclusion. It could be the starting point of a dialogue about 
how an inclusive history culture could look like, inviting all members of 
society to create and articulate their own ways of “making (narrative) 
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How to Examine the (Self-)Reflective Effects 
of History Teaching 
BODO VON BORRIES 
 
 
In many countries the public and the political authorities strongly insist 
on standards and large scale evaluation (using high stake testing). In 
this concept, a school subject without precisely controllable and self-
evidently useful achievements – especially for future employment – 
does not merit learning time at school. This is fashionable, but merely a 
so-called mechanism to please everybody. Simple testing of historical 
competencies is an illusion, it promises more than can ever be effected. 
In contrast, many progressive critics (e.g. teachers and educators at 
memorial sites) deny and refuse any time-saving, objective and efficient 
evaluation of learning processes in history. They express their deep con-
viction that the mania of objective tests is damaging (self-)reflective his-
torical learning. This scepticism of evaluating historical learning pro-
cesses is just as bad – and as risky for historical learning as standards 
and large-scale evaluation might be, as long as it means that more elabo-
rated tests are not developed and tried out. If there are no measurable ef-
fects, history may vanish from the future obligatory syllabi. Any com-
munication between supporters and critics of evaluation seem to have to-
tally stopped in some countries. Here both parties have to return to the 
common table and learn together. 
Obviously, learning history is everything but copying and pasting of 
information about the past into the students’ minds. It is rather the indi-
vidual interpretation of the relation between past, present and future 
within social frameworks, which are relevant for an individual’s and a 
group’s orientation in life. Teaching history in a (self-)reflective way 
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does not mean teaching (nor enforcing) special knowledge, conclusions, 
opinions and attitudes, but stimulating and promoting participation in 
the culture of history (using [re]presentations of history), building one’s 
own historical identity (definition of self and groups in the course of 
time) and improving one’s historical competence (developed abilities 
and willingness of thinking historically) (see Körber et al. 2007; 
Schreiber/Körber 2006) 1. The result will and legitimately may be differ-
ent for every individual, for instance among thirty seventh-graders in a 
common classroom. This is obvious, but seldom seriously taken into ac-
count by history teachers. 
How does one evaluate, examine, and differentiate such a complex 
and ambivalent learning process? The long-term effects and the real be-
haviour in future life cannot be measured exactly, but only predicted hy-
pothetically to a certain, rather low degree. The limitations of multiple-
choice questions and of paper-pencil tests in general in evaluating his-
torical competencies are narrow, though potentially much wider than the 
actual practice of testing in many countries (comp. chapter 2). Indeed, 
differentiated tests employ more intelligent formats like allowing a 
choice of alternative answers, production of mental maps or writing 
short essays, which are able to diagnose special figures and logical steps 
of thinking historically. 
Nevertheless, the combination of insights, emotions, conclusions, 
and activities, which are typical for the entire process of historical 
learning, can only be evaluated by observation of students’ (re-)actions 
in similar situations or conflicts. Competences are transferable – but 
domain-specific – abilities of finding and solving problems in future life. 
There is no possibility to evaluate them other than by simulating new 
(hypothetical) problems of a similar type to those the student has al-
ready solved and by making the student work and act in them. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, this will be explained by examples. 
The argumentation will proceed in four steps: 
• Explanation of the preconditions of testing (self-)reflective historical 
thinking, 
• Examples of traditional (anti-)reflective history tests, 
• Examples of alternative testing approaches to second order concepts 
in history, 
• Examples of innovative testing methods for the evaluation of dealing 
with history. 
 
1  For elaboration of the theoretical understanding of the development of 
(self-)reflective historical thinking see the contribution by Körber in this 
volume. 
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1. General  approach 
 
What is the aim of history learning? Since the 1970s, German tradition 
and theory has been pointing to an elaborated historical consciousness 
(Jeismann 1985; Rüsen 1994a; Rüsen 1994 b; Schreiber 2003). But what 
does that mean? Is there any chance of operationalizing the concept of 
historical consciousness, which will be a necessary precondition of di-
agnosing and measuring? Other concepts which seem to emerge with 
strength and conviction in the debate, are historical identity, historical 
competence and historical culture (or better: culture of history), as well 
as politics of history, identity management and places of remembrance. 
This requires a small theoretical remark: To me, “historical conscious-
ness” remains the key concept and the general expression to be used 
(Borries 2008a:4ff; 2008b). Therefore, the crucial objective is to create 
“reflecting and (self-)reflexive historical consciousness” (see references 
above) of which three dimensions can and should be distinguished: 
• “Historical identity” means the self-definition of an individual or a 
group (city, gender, class, profession, nation) between interpreted 
past, perceived present and expected future. It is the construction of 
sense and continuity (persistence in change) in the course of time 
and its contingency (more than accident, less than necessity). It 
needs to be added that knowing and understanding otherness (alteri-
ty) and foreign behavior and identities is part of the process of evolv-
ing one’s own identity.2 Every identity has a narrative and a histori-
cal structure (Borries 2004. 259-287; Ricoeur 1988/89/91), but not 
all histories told by individuals or groups are sufficiently plausible or 
even plausible to a higher degree (Rüsen 1983: 85-136). The inclu-
sion of verified primary sources from different sides and of different 
points of view of the present etc. improves the quality of historical 
narratives and the chances of communication and agreement. 
“Historical competence” is the ability and willingness of thinking 
historically as one of the main accesses to the world (in addition to a 
mathematical, a linguistic, an aesthetic, a scientific one etc.). It is the 
capability and readiness: (1.) to ask historical questions and under-
stand them, (2.) to investigate historical topics and produce historical 
narratives about them and/or analyze the already perfected histories 
of others, (3.) to orientate oneself through historical narrations with-
in present and future (reorganizing ones own historical conscious-
ness and the understanding of oneself, the others and the world) and 
 
2  In order to know oneself, a narcissistic glance into the mirror is not suffi-
cient; discovering the world and reflecting one’s relation to it helps to po-
sition oneself. 
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(4.) to store and organize concepts, categories, notions, structures of 
history (Körber et al. 2007; Schreiber/Körber et al. 2006). 
• “Historical culture” is the public and private mode of handling his-
tory in presentations, consumption and discourse. Though the indi-
viduals decide to a large extent personally on the degree of participa-
tion – and non-participation – in historical culture, history culture is 
basically a social, societal, and communicative phenomenon. Today 
it is mostly determined by the mass media and their private and prof-
it-oriented market organization. The type of interference of individu-
als and groups in this field of historical activities (e.g. use, neglect, 
protest, debate, partisanship, revision) is the third dimension of his-
torical consciousness. 
 
All three dimensions can be operationalized, observed (and sometimes 
measured) and evaluated (to some degree at least). Normally, test pro-
ducers think of knowledge only,3 but competences are more important in 
modern concepts of historical learning (Borries 2008; Körber et al. 
2007; Schreiber/Körber 2006). Living and showing historical identity 
and taking part in historical culture are activities too and can be ob-
served and described. But the performance of historical identity and the 
use of historical culture always need and require historical competence, 
the second of the three dimensions of historical consciousness. Thus, the 
main problem will be the diagnosis of historical competences. 
Additionally, we have to state that identities and cultures cannot 
simply be judged by their affiliations. A nationalist does not per defini-
tion have a better or worse historical identity than a cosmopolitan. The 
same is true for conservatives and progressives, rightists and leftists. 
Visiting museums or being member of a local history club does not have 
a higher status than watching television or reading historical novels, at 
least not in a self-evident way. Already thirty years ago, Jeismann (see 
1985) distinguished three interdependent and necessary levels of histori-
cal learning in any learning process: “historical topic analysis”, “histori-
cal topic judgement” and “historical value judgement”.4 Jeismann clari-
fied a peculiarity of the third layer (that is historical value judgement or 
historical orientation): In this field it is inadmissible to grade the direc-
 
3  Of course, we have to be careful because of the very wide meaning of the 
word “knowledge” in English. In German, we may distinguish between 
special and single information (“Kenntnisse”), the content knowledge in a 
field (“Wissen”) and the general system including methods, insights and 
reflections (“Wissensformen” in a very comprehensive sense). 
4  Rüsen (1994b: 64-73, 164-170) similarly enumerates “historical percep-
tion”, “historical interpretation” and “historical orientation”. 
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tion of the decision in its content. Only the quality of argumentation and 
reflection may be evaluated, because it is important to compare and le-
gitimize a decision contrasting it to other possibilities (Jeismann et al. 
1987). This limitation of grading remains very important. 
 
 
2. Exclusive focus on knowledge damages  
(self - )ref lect ive learning  
 
I will here provide two examples of how the testing of mere historical 
information can damage (self-)reflective learning. Since 2008, Germany 
has a “scientific” and “standardized” test – designed by a well-known 
testing institute in Berlin – for evaluating an obligatory orientation 
course for foreigners desiring naturalization. This is the direct prepara-
tion for a “naturalization test”, devised by the Ministry of the Interior. 
The whole test consists of “multiple choice” items (four possibilities, 
one correct and three incorrect).5 The test was commented by some ex-
perts as statistically reliable, but showing no content validity whatsoev-
er. Many items were said to be wrong, ideological, unfair or unim-
portant. One question reads:  
 
“When did Hitler become Chancellor of the ‘[German] Reich’? 
  1923  1927  1933  1936”  
 
Undoubtedly, this is a technically correct topic – and it is rather simple. 
What does a correct answer actually measure? Knowing the information 
about the date – as opposed to the dates of the nearly fatal crises of the 
Weimar Republic (1923), the summit of the “Golden Years” (1927) and 
the Olympics in Berlin/Spanish Civil War (1936) – is useful, though not 
at all important. Without the knowledge of why this was important and 
what happened involving which actors with what consequences it is 
“pointless, dead information”. Choosing the correct date 1933 in the test 
does not say anything about the reflections on and the meaning of the 
date for the person answering the question. With such questions, abso-
lutely no evaluation of the (self-)reflective effects of history teaching 
takes place. 
All questions in the test under discussion are of this type. More than 
three items only refer to the dates of World War II, even more to the 
simple fact that the Nazi-regime was a “dictatorship”. Only one addi-
tional name (Stauffenberg, “assassination attempt”) and one additional 
 
5  The whole test was published in many major newspapers, e.g. “Frankfur-
ter Rundschau” (3.9.2008, p. 25-32). 
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date (9.11.1938, “destruction of synagogues”) are required. In these cas-
es, all false solutions are simply funny “kangaroos”. Of course, such 
tests say nothing about understanding, connections, contexts or reflec-
tions. They are simply a control of a superficial – and superfluous – 
naming of history items, of an ability of pretending to know what the 
public discussion is about. It is mechanical memorizing (i.e. learning by 
rote – and not really “by heart”). Since such examinations determine the 
type of preceding instruction (“teaching to the test”) they are detrimental 
to learning history in a reflecting way. 
In 2005, a major newspaper (“Die Welt”) presented a very similar 
questioning of average German citizens (Die Welt, 25.5.2005, p. 10-15). 
Questions were, for instance: “What is meant by the term ‘Holocaust’?”; 
“What happened on 31 January 1933?”; “Who carried out an assassina-
tion attempt against Hitler on 20 July 1944?”; “Which was the first 
country that Hitler Germany attacked?”6; “What is the first German re-
public between 1918 and 1933 called?”; “Who was the last German 
Emperor?” These are perhaps conventional historical questions (are they 
really important?), but they are obviously not designed to generate 
thinking or reflection, judgement or balancing, but a simple – possibly 
pointless – automatism of stimulus and response. 
One can deduce from the publication that the questionnaire is im-
plemented as an open answer format; at least, the percentage of correct 
answers is reported, but no frequency of particularly erroneous answers. 
The Holocaust question is answered correctly with “Annihilation of the 
Jews” by 81,7%, but the name “Weimar Republic” is known only to 
52,0% and the “Take-over of Power by the Nazis”7 on 31 January 1933 
to 48,4%. Poland is mentioned as the first victim of World War II by on-
ly 50,2%, Wilhelm II. by 50,5%, and the name of the would-be assassin 
Stauffenberg by 42,9%. 
Nevertheless and astonishingly, most commentators (journalists, 
bishops, historians, teachers, politicians etc.) expressed great satisfaction 
about the citizens’ “good” level of knowledge. But in fact, the results of 
 
6  In German, the question is phrased in such a way that it leaves open who 
attacked whom. The question is even worse, because it does not explicitly 
mention the context of World War II: Before that war, Germany had al-
ready launched military attacks against Spain in 1936, Austria in 1938, 
Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 and Lithuania in 1939. Thus the so-
called right answer of the test is quite wrong. 
7  This is a very problematic expression – by no means innocent or neutral. 
Contemporaries and historians debated different concepts like “seizure of 
power”, “transference of power” or “take-over of power”. This controver-
sy is not at all taken into account in the test question, which anticipates the 
solution in a dogmatic way and forbids or hinders reflection. 
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this asking for numbers, names, dates and facts without context are very 
poor (as in all other cases of such type of questioning). This had nothing 
to do with diagnosis of historical identity and historical competence. 
 
 
3. Measur ing competences 
 
Let us look at an example of testing an application of historical methods 
or insights instead of mere reproduction of information. Hans-Jürgen 
Pandel (2005: 61-62) proposes a nonsense-caricature (“a drawn joke”) 
with two archaeologists in pith helmets inside an ancient Egyptian tomb, 
discovering a wall-painting of a man burning a computer. The purpose is 
testing “consciousness of temporality” and “consciousness of reality”. 
After being taught about ancient Egypt and its type of tomb paintings, 
the tasks for the pupils (fifth to seventh grade) are: “What is incorrect 
with the picture? Identify the place where the two men are. In which 
country are they? Which profession do they have? Name the people who 
may have drawn the wall-painting. The picture is a joke. Why?” 
Pandel hoped that the topic would be adequate for testing “con-
sciousness of temporality” (then versus now/in the future) and “con-
sciousness of reality” (reality versus imagination/fiction). But he experi-
enced – and complained – that the pupils were not really able to solve 
the task. However, this is not astonishing at all, since “counter-factual” 
suggestions and anachronistic errors are rarely, if at all, mentioned or 
analyzed in history lessons (to say nothing about pith-helmets and short 
pants). At best, our instruction is only oriented towards re-construction 
from – reliably true and pre-selected – primary sources; at worst, it does 
not go beyond the drawing of information from – unquestioned – prima-
ry sources. It is unfair to test second order skills or concepts which defi-
nitely have not been taught before. 
This Pandel-assignment can be done with paper and pencil, as a 
short essay. Maybe it could even be transformed into a “multiple choice” 
form:  
 
“Which sentence explains the picture and its information best: 
 For tourists in Egypt the use of computers is forbidden. 
 The picture has the character of a caricature and is a joke. 
 An ancient Egyptian king ordered the destruction of all computers. 
 Archaeologists found out that already the ancient Egyptians used comput-
ers.” 
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But what is measured by the marking with a correct cross or – more 
complicated for students and researchers – by a good short essay? There 
is a certain hint of a conventional methodical competence.8 Detecting a 
major anachronistic mistake – even in the form of a dumb joke – is an 
achievement. The insight that it is possible for a stupid error to appear in 
print – even in a serious book – may be even more important. This is a 
characteristic of critical thinking, though not really specific for the cog-
nitive domain of history. But the capacity of narrating and understanding 
history is not directly examined by the Pandel-assignment. The impact 
on the self and its historical definition (“self-reflection”) is completely 
lost. 
Another example of the attempt to evaluate historical thinking stems 
from the group “Chata” around Peter Lee, which attempts to test stu-
dents’ competences in middle range concepts (second order concepts) in 
the course of a method-orientated curriculum (comp. History in the Na-
tional Curriculum 1995) (Lee/Ashby 2000). In different grades, Lee pre-
sents two short versions of the “End of the Roman Empire”. He restricts 
himself to very short versions (30 lines) with comic-style drawings (not 
with two long chapters and complicated primary sources!). The meaning 
is rather simple: The first version dates the “fall” in 476, but mentions 
the existence of Byzantium, the other describes the “fall” in 1453, hav-
ing spoken of the end in the West before and giving a map of the split 
Empire. Afterwards the students have to produce short texts or oral 
presentations about the relation between both narrations. 
The test can be done by paper and pencil (Lee’s group used short es-
says), by an interview or – again – by the transformation into a multiple 
choice format.9 But then, more than one sentence can be correct and less 
than three incorrect. 
 
 In the two texts, the meaning of the term “The Fall of the Roman Empire” 
is a different one. 
 Both texts contradict each other: The Roman Empire can only have fallen 
in 476 or in 1453. 
 Different historians use different pieces of information and therefore draw 
different conclusions. 
 
8  Demanding a “short essay” would cost students more time for writing and 
teachers more time for evaluation. But it would be analytically far superi-
or, because it would show the structure and reasons of students’ insights 
and errors in detail. 
9  In this format, the students do not write themselves, but think about solu-
tions. Therefore the risk of omitting the questions – and missing data – is 
smaller. Nevertheless, the logic of false answers can be analyzed. 
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 Decisions of controversies in history are not so easy; there are no suffi-
cient arguments for 476 or 1453. 
 Since we weren’t there and nobody is an eye-witness of 476 or 1453, we 
cannot know when the Roman Empire fell. 
 A “Roman Empire” has to control Rome; therefore “The Fall of the Ro-
man Empire” was in 476. 
 The Byzantine State is a continuation of the Roman one; therefore “The 
Fall of the Roman Empire” was in 1453. 
 The situation is doubtful; we have to look for what the best and most fa-
mous historians (and the handbooks) say. 
 History is written from “primary sources” of contemporaries: We must 
examine what they say about 476 and what about 1453. 
 
Some of these versions may be doubtful and some may be suggestive 
(additionally, the correct ones may promote the learning process, which 
had failed before, in the situation of the test itself). In our context, the 
other problem is much more important: What does this assignment test? 
It is focusing on the relation between the past and the historical interpre-
tation/narration. The past was full of innumerable (billions of billions of) 
particles of reality, most of them unknown today, never having been 
written down, painted or sculptured – or having since been lost com-
pletely. 
History is a hypothetical construction and narration about relevant 
parts of processes in the past with consequences for today. It requires 
words, notions, terms and concepts which are adequate to the past itself, 
to us and to our relation with the past. Those concepts have a huge im-
pact on the histories told. To realize this and to apply this thinking to a 
case of historical interpretation is an important part of methodical com-
petence and concept competence (See also the contribution by Andreas 
Körber in this volume). It may even have an influence on self-reflection. 
Peter Lee’s group used the assignment in a short essay version. We 
should have a brief look at their qualitative and quantitative results, 
which show the assignment to be a very powerful instrument for diagno-
sis. Three basic concepts in the answers are distinguished: “factual”, 
“multiple past” and “criterial” (Lee/Ashby 2000: 208). 
• In the first concept, the problem is facts and errors; the two reports 
about “the end of the Roman Empire” are contradictory. The vast 
majority of the students (more than three quarters) in second and 
fifth grade hold this conviction, but one third even in eighth grade. 
• The second concept is a medium or transition solution (an example 
of “seeking” instead of clear “explanation”): History is more com-
plicated and multiple than you think. Perhaps there is a chance to 
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combine both reports. This is written by tiny minorities in the second 
and fifth grade, but by larger numbers in sixth and eighth grade. 
• The third concept includes a differentiation of the notion “end of the 
Roman empire” itself: Does it mean “Western Rome” only or “East-
ern Rome” (“Byzantium”) as well? Both texts – with different 
though homonymous/homophone terms – are not at all contradicto-
ry. The insight that it is a question of the criteria used is inaccessible 
to pupils in second and fifth grade, but attainable for 25% in sixth 
and 40% in eighth grade. 
 
Of course, this is a rather disappointing or discouraging result. What 
might seem a very simple and logic conclusion to experts suggestively 
offered by the short texts themselves, is not so obvious in the way lay 
people relate to history. The theoretical – but empirically substantiated – 
five levels of “progression in students’ ideas about accounts and their re-
lation to the past” (Lee/Ashby 2000: 212) should be added. This is really 
a developmental model (among others of “Chata”) which can be applied 
(perhaps in a revised form) to other concepts of particular historical 
competencies of the middle range (second order concepts). The progres-
sion in students’ ideas about accounts (i.e. historical narrations, B.v.B.) 
and their relation to the past are listed as follows: 
• The past as given. Stories are about the same thing: The story is 
equivalent to something “out there”.  
• The past as inaccessible. We can’t know – we weren’t there. Noth-
ing can be known. Differences in accounts are a result of lack of di-
rect access to the past. 
• The past as determining stories. Stories are fixed by the infor-
mation available; there is a one-to-one correspondence. Differences 
in accounts are results of gaps in information and mistakes. 
• The past as reported in a more or less biased way. Shift of focus 
from the story and reports to the author as active contributor. Differ-
ences in accounts are a result of distortion (in the form of lies, bias 
exaggeration, dogmatism); the problem is not just a lack of infor-
mation. 
• The past as selected and organized from a viewpoint. Stories are 
written (perhaps necessarily) from a legitimate position held by the 
author. Differences in accounts are a result of selection. Stories are 
not copies of the past. 
• The past as (re-)constructed in answer to questions in accord-
ance with criteria. Shift of focus from the author’s position and 
choice, to the nature of accounts as such. It is the nature of accounts 
to differ. (Lee/Ashby 2000: 212) 
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In fact, we do not really know the reasons for the poor outcome men-
tioned above: Lee/Ashby (2000) suppose that even in the English case of 
a method-oriented curriculum, the teachers fail to provide sufficient 
promotion, stimulation and exercise of historical thinking during the les-
sons. One could add: It seems that many teachers are fixed on contents 
and are sometimes confounding past, facts, interpretation, narrative and 
history themselves. But that’s a supposition only; What to do if teachers 
have intensively tried to teach historical thinking and reflection, but pu-
pils prefer simplicity, security and un-ambiguity? 
This is only one example of the project “Chata”, but it perfectly 
shows the type of diagnosis conducted by the British researchers and 
history didacticians. Though a paper-pencil method and partly designed 
for placing a tick only (see Lee et al. 1998: 237), the approach is vastly 
superior to the typical German testing, but of course it in no way covers 
the two main domains of personal identity and long-term biography. 
Tests cannot validly diagnose the anticipation of future positions and de-
cisions. And they must not grade the normative convictions and existen-
tial conclusions of the pupils (as long as the democratic constitution and 
human and civil rights are loyally observed). 
 
 
4.   Test ing “deal ing with history”10 
 
For the reflecting and (self-)reflective dealing with history some qualifi-
cations are turning points, i.e. elaborated use of primary sources (mostly 
texts), but also the critical use of historiography or narrations (mostly 
texts as well), and finally the application to new cases and situations 
(transfer of insights). At the same time, historical argumentation should 
be examined, e.g. the distinguishing of occasion – or pretext – (causality 
of surface) and reason – or cause – (causality of deep structure) and ad-
ditionally the weighting of controversies (especially concerning the 
structural causes). 
The topic “Great Witch Persecution”11 has a high status of relevance 
in Germany, much higher than in other countries.12 It is quite clear that 
 
10  For the following propositions, I feel inspired and encouraged by two lec-
tures in Goettingen (31.3.-2.4.2008) of the circle of Robert Selman on the 
one hand and Sam Wineburg on the other hand. Interestingly, the ap-
proaches included one project with closed items (Alan Stoskopf and Ul-
rike Hartmann) and another with open items (Avishag Reisman). The se-
cond one will be published soon in Martens e.a. 2010, the first one seems 
to remain unpublished. None of my proposals is a direct application or 
translation. 
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“Witch Hunt” is an excellent parallel or similar phenomenon to Nazi-
crimes – and therefore adequate for an experimental test of transfer 
abilities.13 
 
4.1 Analysis of primary sources 
 
The knowledge and analysis of the perspective character and interest 
orientation of all primary source texts is a very basic point. Therefore, it 
is fruitful to present a short text of that type (or a picture as well) for 
evaluative analysis. Short essays are common, but “multiple choice” can 
be tried as well: 
 
“A Document about the ‘Great Witch Hunt’ 
Petition of the municipality Elz near Limburg/Lahn in 1589 to the Arch-
bishop and Elector of Trier: ‘ [...] we poor supplicants beseech Your Elec-
toral Grace in the matter of the suspicious and disreputable sorceresses, as we 
have already at various times most humbly besought Your Electorial Grace for 
the sake of God, to order Lord Keller to question them [the witches] and exe-
cute, what will reveal itself as truth and be declared as justice. Because, most 
graceful Prince and Lord, should such great and pernicious harm as hath be-
fallen us not be punished, they [the witches] would be strengthened in their 
designs, and we would be forced to take flight with our wives and children and 
to leave everything behind.’” (Schormann 1981: 56) 
 
Of course, it is easy to make students evaluate this text with an open 
formulation, i.e. in a short essay. “Please analyze the position, the inter-
ests and the intentions of the authors and reflect which relevance the 
   
11  Compare a teaching model “The ‘Great Witch Persecution’ (1555-1665) – 
Death Throes of Middle Ages or Birth Pangs of Modern Times?” in Bor-
ries 2003: 177-206. 
12  To give British North-America as an example: The Witch Hunt in Salem 
1692, where the judge officially asked for forgiveness from the victims 
and the survivors some years later, has been a single case; in Germany, 
there have been at least fifteen thousand casualties during four centuries 
(although the three hundred thousand or nine million sometimes men-
tioned are apparently overestimated by far). 
13  Some years ago, large groups of students (6th, 9th and 12th grades) were 
questioned about the “Great Witch Hunt”, especially about their emotions, 
partisanships, abilities of empathy, moral judgements, and conclusions for 
today (see Borries et al. 1992: 58-63, 200f.). Some of the strategies of this 
study can be transformed into a testing of historical reflections as well.  
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quoted contemporary evidence can have in respect to the explanation 
and judgement of witch trials.”14 The short interpretations could read: 
• “The Elector of Trier puts the responsibility for his cruel acts against 
the supposed ‘witches’ at other people’s door, like his council and 
his subjects.” 
• “The applicants are very sure on the subject of ‘witches’ and act ra-
ther decidedly and cunningly: By threatening to run away (emigrate) 
if the prince doesn’t punish the witches they are in effect blackmail-
ing him.” 
• “Hatred between Catholics and Protestants was one of the main rea-
sons of the Great Witch Hunt in the 16th and 17th century.” 
• “Influential subjects themselves repeatedly demanded the persecu-
tion of ‘witches’ from their authorities. According to their convic-
tion, these ‘witches’ caused them much harm through sorcery.” 
• “If such letters are frequent, one could conclude that there was a 
deep-rooted fear and bitter hatred among the normal people in the 
villages.” 
• “The rulers are by no means the only ones responsible for or guilty 
of the witch hunt. They have to take the convictions, wishes and 
feelings of their subjects into account.” 
• “The practice of accusing individuals of sorcery seems to have been 
something so frequent and normal that one can conclude: Attempts 
to perform witchcraft – at least making evil wishes or casting the 
evil eye – must have been common then.” 
• “Even in the dark, superstitious times of the 16th century, enlight-
ened people often warned against witch hunts and the torture and 
cruel burning of innocent women.” 
 
Apparently, here we have the interesting case of complexity and contro-
versy: Not one version is completely and definitely correct. And most of 
the others cannot be taken as undoubtedly erroneous or absurdly remote. 
Instead, different levels of understanding are possible, which may be 
linked to competences. But such items demand remarkable methodical 
 
14  But it is also possible, to write a set of interpretations or commentaries 
about the text (more or less correct and complex) and to make the students 
rate these texts with a five step Likert scale: 
  Completely unplausible;  Mainly unplausible;  So-so;  Mainly 
convincing;  Completely convincing 
 Obviously, some critics will argue that it would be fair to add an addition-
al answer “don’t know”; but the interpretation of a primary source text is 
not a task to refuse legitimately. For the ignorant and anxious ones, the ex-
istence of a version “so-so” is already an offer (without loss of data for 
further calculations). 
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standards, first in the process of construction of the items by the re-
searchers. It would be necessary to make small experimental groups 
write short essays, to analyze and classify those texts and to transform 
some typical remarks into test items. Without a qualitative pilot study 
such quantitative research is methodically (and normatively) impossible 
or at least unwelcome. 
These experimental versions should be tested (tried) with larger 
samples. In this way, the earlier mentioned suggestions about levels of 
difficulties and levels of competences in the different versions can be 
verified: Have the students’ articulations been predicted correctly? Thus, 
in the next phase, the evaluation of the students is less important than 
the verification or falsification – and revision – of precedent theories 
about levels of difficulties, learning processes and the logic of develop-
ment of competencies. 
 
4.2 Production of historiography 
 
On the other hand, such items, even if answered correctly, do not guar-
antee historical understanding in a comprehensive sense, but only the 
correct understanding of particular historical texts. This is a very im-
portant difference. The mentioned achievements, which have the charac-
ter of criticism of primary sources, could be introduced and exercised in 
a conventional source-oriented teaching. Of course, this is not meant 
negatively. But more is needed for historical understanding, i.e. the pro-
duction of one’s own historical description/narration and the analysis of 
divergent historical descriptions/narrations (this is called competence of 
de-construction). 
What does that mean for our example? Undoubtedly, a small set of 
primary sources (two texts, two quotations from the Bible, two wood-
cuts) had to be combined. To remain realistic, the whole collection could 
not exceed two or three printed pages in a testing situation. Additionally, 
the learners should first formulate questions on the material and then try 
to give a written presentation. It is nearly impossible to imagine this in a 
format of closed questioning (e.g. multiple choice); but in view of the 
limited time available, requiring the learner to create a mind map could 
be a better solution than demanding a fully elaborated short essay. 
It would be preferable to present a larger collection of diverse prima-
ry sources (pictures and texts), some theories, some transfers to the pre-
sent (propositions of historical orientation), different forms of fiction 
(pictures and texts), different narrations (pictures and texts), and to give 
the students the task to produce their own sense-making narration (with 
legitimation and argumentation) on the basis of this collection. This 
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would of course take at least three hours. We have occasionally carried 
this out at university level (see Borries 2006, 2007). The results have 
been rather problematic, even discouraging. Apparently, university stu-
dents interpret these demands as highly overburdening, but also as pro-
vocative. 
Apparently, written history class tests and even essays under exam 
conditions at university usually follow the model of a simplifying analy-
sis of primary sources and content problems. In fact, it seems altogether 
uncommon to ask for the production of a synthetic sense-making narra-
tion or a critically qualified judgement about other pre-fabricated narra-
tives. Thus, the usual exam question seems just an unfortunate mixture 
of arbitrary – and relatively simple – parts falling between what have 
been termed competence of “re-construction” and the competence of 
“de-construction” (Körber et al. 2007; Schreiber/Körber et al. 2006; See 
also the contribution by Lenz in this volume). 
 
4.3 Analysis of historiography 
 
The next task is of course just the opposite one: short narrations of the 
“Witch Hunt” have to be compared and evaluated.15 Again, a series of 
pictures from the 19th century – or a memorial of the 20th – could be in-
tegrated and added to two popular texts. Surely, such a request for de-
construction will first be arranged with open answers (short essays). But 
why not try to construct a set of prototypical stages from typical – more 
or less elaborated – articulations among experimental groups? These 
could be presented to learners for a rating via ticking boxes. One could 
also attempt to correlate particular positions to different political sympa-
thies. As already said, it is especially important to distinguish “causes” 
and “occasions” and to combine and discuss several incidental and also 
structural interpretations. 
As a substitute, I have listed six – basically contradicting – models 
of explanation of the “Great Witch Persecution” (see Borries 2003: 196-
199). Since the list is shortened to half its length, they are probably in-
adequate in respect to their amount, but perhaps overburdening in re-
spect to their degree of difficulty. The focus is not on the narration itself 
(it easily becomes too long), but on the theoretical ascription of causali-
ties (background and deep-structure reasons). Here I quote only two – 
especially contradicting – examples: 
 
 
15  In fact, because of the limitations on time in a testing situation, only con-
tradicting short judgements can be presented. 
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Six Explanations of the “Great Witch Persecution” 
 
Thesis 1: The obsessive belief in witches is a typical spawn of medieval 
superstition and dark sadism. It is based on pathological notions in the 
heads of fanatic theologians, who were enemies of science, and men of 
law, who were blind to reality. Thus, deviant minorities and autono-
mously thinking people could be intimidated and eliminated. It took a 
very long time until modern Enlightenment drove away these haunting 
ghosts and replaced fear of the supernatural by rational scientific ex-
planations: “Since I assume the vice of witchcraft to be a myth, I advise 
this one precaution only: A prince should never allow an investigation to 
be conducted [...] on the grounds of the vice of witchcraft, i.e. the alli-
ance of human beings with the devil” (a philosopher of the Enlighten-
ment, 1701). 
Thesis 6: The witch trials primarily served religious and secular au-
thorities to discipline and intimidate the rural subjects. Previously, 
priests and noblemen had tolerated all kinds of superstition and magic 
in the almost independent villages: “Often men and women came to see 
her (an old woman) in her house, begging her to release their friends, 
who had been bewitched, from the curse [...]. She can bring a husband 
back to a woman” (a witness from 1446). Henceforth, the soul was to 
belong exclusively to the church, the body unconditionally to the king. 
The persecution of witches was the most brutal phase of a long struggle, 
at the end of which man came to be shaped and moulded to the require-
ments of the modern state, conformist, manipulated and controlled. It is 
precisely this that constitutes the mental aspect of the long transition 
from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism. In that sense, the witch 
hunts are a spawn and a manifestation of modern rationality and of a 
strategy of modernization. 
Again, one could choose an open-question format, i.e. a list of ques-
tions like the instructions for working with textbooks. In this way, an 
evaluation of the theses can be promoted and demanded. Afterwards the 
outcomes can be rated/coded according to strict criteria, so that even 
quantitative studies are possible. 
 
“Which questions do you formulate after reading the six theses? By which 
procedures do you try to answer them? Which additional information would 
you like to have and use? Where would you have a chance of accessing it? 
How do you provisionally assess the mutual connection of the six theses and 
their peculiar persuasiveness?”16 
 
16  An alternative, more detailed order – with other focuses and more help – 
could read: 
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Such a qualitative preliminary stage with an experimental group is una-
voidable in the case of larger investigations. Afterwards, an attempt with 
closed items – and therefore quantitative methods – can be undertaken.17 
But for the moment it is not really clear how far it will be successful in 
testing the ability for historical reflection.  
At the end, a request to rank the statements in an explicit order could 
be added: 
 
“Please rank the six theses suggesting an explanation of the ‘Great 
Witch Hunt’ according to: which one you consider the most convinc-
ing(1), which one the second most (2), which one the least (6), which 
   
 “Please, discuss the six theses and decide – as far as possible – to which 
extent they are valid for you. The following questions may be helpful: 
• Where is the persecution of witches said to be typically ‘medieval’, 
where specifically ‘modern’? On which side is ‘rationality’, on which 
‘superstition’, found in the respective explanations? 
• To which degree are general social and mental mechanisms described, 
which can produce similar phenomena in all situations and epochs? To 
which degree are very specific circumstances of the late 16th and early 
17th century mentioned and made responsible? 
• Which theories assume ‘witchcraft’ to be a real phenomenon (though not 
a crime worthy of death sentences)? Which ones declare it to be an in-
vention, a myth or a figment of the imagination of the persecutors or the 
persecuted? 
• Which explanations remain general and neutral towards gender? Which 
give reasons for the fact that mainly women were accused and executed? 
• Who is the main blame for the large-scale judicial murder attributed to? 
Please analyze in particular whether the activities are assigned to the 
‘authorities’ or to the ‘subjects’ themselves! 
• Which explanations can be combined with each other, which ones con-
tradict others directly and unequivocally? Discuss the scope and the per-
suasiveness of each theory!” 
17  Every statement could be rated by the students according to several cate-
gories. Here is a sketchy draft (valid for all six theses): 
 “As an explanation of the ‘Great Witch Persecution’ thesis 1 [2, 3 etc.] is 
(answer only ‘Yes’, ‘Un-decided’ and ‘No’) [...] 
a) [...] convincingly argued and consistent in itself 
b) [...] well compatible with the other statements 
c) [...] completely arbitrary and rather far-fetched 
d) [...] intelligently concluded from the known facts 
e) [...] strongly biased in the interest of certain involved groups 
f) [...] irrelevant for us today - with our different rules and habits 
g) [...] worked out perfectly from the contemporary conditions of those 
times 
h) [...] much too lenient towards the crimes of those who committed them at 
the time 
i) [...] perfectly uncommon and unexpected, but productive and enlighten-
ing” 
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one the second least (5) and which one you would put in the middle (3, 
4). 
 Thesis 1  Thesis 2  Thesis 3  Thesis 4  Thesis 5  Thesis 6” 
 
4.4 Transfer achievement 
 
Obviously, the fourth step has to be the application (transfer). In order to 
show (and measure) the qualifications described above, it will however 
be necessary to use new topics instead of recurring to already familiar 
ones. Therefore it is important to rely on similar or equal categories (e.g. 
“cause” and “occasion”, “perspectivity”, “controversy”). If, for instance, 
the subject matter “witches” has already been discussed in the class-
room, it would not be appropriate to use it for the following exam or 
test. Instead, the topic could perhaps be a xenophobic riot or an anti-
Semitic pogrom, violent protests against the Huguenot immigrants in 
Germany around 1720 or the shooting of Belgian hostages by the Ger-
mans at the beginning of World War I in 1914. Nevertheless, in its struc-
ture, the questionnaire could, even should look like the one about the 
“witches” described above. 
When measuring the transfer, new problems arise. What do re-
searchers really measure when they expect insights into deep structure 
causes may be gained from the “Witch Hunt”, but are used for “Persecu-
tion of Jews 1933/45” or “Xenophobic Riots 1993”? Is this really histor-
ical thinking? By generalizing a certain figure or mechanism and making 
it obligatory or transferable to other cases, we have to exclude changes 
and fix or prolong ongoing rules automatically (standstill). This suggests 
purely exemplary sense-making as Rüsen understands it (1994b: 37-41, 
85-90, 150-155, 231-234) one might call it social-psychological insight 
as well, which implicitly assumes that the logic of social behavior has 
not changed in the course of long historical processes, not even during 
the process of modernization and in times of pressure and crisis. 
As historians, we will find this restriction problematic (but that is a 
general dilemma of presence-related historical learning). Without a ge-
netic sense-making – as well as a critical one, which means distancing 
oneself from an accepted interpretation – there is no chance at all (Rüsen 
1994b). But how can these figures be tested and how can sentences of 
genetic character (e.g. “in fact at that time [...], but today [...]” or “al-
ready then [...], and even more today [...]”) be classified as “correct”, 
“so-so” or “false”? Admittedly, with this point, we are not only in the 
center of a sensitive question of diagnosis, but in a mine-field of theory 
itself: Which status can exemplary – and traditional – sense-making pre-
serve in a world with unavoidably dominant genetic interpretations?
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5. F inal  remarks  
 
As already mentioned, the possibilities of testing by paper-pencil for-
mats are much greater than the current practice in most countries. This 
paper was mainly about experiments which should be performed by 
supporters of reflecting and (self-)reflective history learning, before 
more and more boring, anti-reflective knowledge-tests (see above) flood 
the market. According to my experience, most teachers are critical to-
wards tests (e.g. multiple choice formats), but not towards their mere 
content-based – and sometimes dogmatic unambivalent – logic itself. It 
is very important to know and to practice more intelligent and more 
elaborated paper-pencil-questions even of closed types (crossing and 
ranking), but of open types (mental maps, short essays) as well. 
Apart from paper and pencil, we have other opportunities for diag-
nosis during the teaching itself, which are more suitable for goals that 
are not operationalized or cannot be operationalized. In projects, pupils 
can be observed while they are investigating, discussing, reflecting, pre-
senting, evaluating, comparing, judging, transferring to other cases and 
personal life etc. Even (very cautious) assumptions can be made about 
their future behavior in a long-term perspective (life and biography), and 
their sense-making in private, communicative and public situations may 
be improved to some extent by these merely qualitative methods (which 
are often not compatible with exam grades). The simple reason is that 
the young people have already tried and executed such processes them-
selves and can transfer the competences to other situations and use them 
successfully. To describe these observations which cannot be quantified 
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